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ABSTRACT
Eyewitness behaviour is a very important issue in 
social psychology. Recent years have seen a boom in 
research in this area; however, very little of this 
research has addressed the important and fundamental 
issues raised by the social factors that are involved 
when eyewitnessing takes place. The present thesis 
reports research which addresses the effect of social- stereotypic information upon a number of aspects of 
the eyewitness situation. Of particular interest is 
the effect of stereotypic information upon the 
judgment of aggressive and violent actions, and face 
and body stimuli; on memory for information associated 
with a dramatic staged incident, when presented either 
before or after target material; and its impact in an eyewitness interview situation. Finally, an interview 
technique is designed and tested which aims to reduce 
the negative impact of stereotypic information on 
eyewitness memory. Throughout, the impact of
stereotypic information presented at encoding and at 
retrieval is contrasted and compared. The effect of 
delay between encoding and retrieval is also considered. It is concluded that stereotypic
information may affect judgments of information 
relevant to the eyewitnessing situation whether 
presented before or after target material. Similarly, 
stereotypic information may affect memory when it is 
presented before target material. Little effect is 
however to be expected on memory when stereotypic information is presented at retrieval, although the 
exact effects may be found to vary with the nature of 
the target stimuli used. The source-monitoring 
interview, based on research by Marcia Johnson and her 
colleagues, appears a promising means of reducing the 
distorting effect of stereotypes on memory; 
particularly when a delay occurs between the encoding and retrieval of target material.
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Overview
It is argued in the present chapter that too little 
recent research in the eyewitness field has addressed 
the important issue of the impact of social factors. 
The present thesis represents an attempt to increase 
our knowledge of this important area by a preliminary 
investigation of the impact of stereotypic information 
upon judgment and memory factors in the eyewitness 
situation, and also the production of an interview 
technique which aims to reduce these effects. The 
thesis falls into three sections, each dealing with 
one of these areas. An introductory chapter to each 
section reviews the relevant literature in the area 
and its importance in the eyewitnessing situation. 
The aim of the present chapter then is briefly to 
outline the current state of the eyewitness 
literature, to identify the type of question to be 
considered later in the thesis, and to point up the 
need for further research into the importance of 
social factors to the eyewitness situation.
Social Factors in the Eyewitness Situation
Recent years have seen something of a research boom in 
the eyewitness memory field. This is understandable 
given the great social importance of the criminal 
justice system, and its heavy reliance (some, e.g., 
Woocher, 1977, would call it over-reliance) on 
eyewitness testimony. According to Sobell (1972,
cited in Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon and Holland, 
1986,) incorrect eyewitness identifications may have 
been responsible for more miscarriages of justice than 
all other factors combined. A new research paradigm 
with implications for the area has also emerged in
recent years - this is the social cognition paradigm. 
The aim of social cognitive research is "to push 
cognitive explanations...as far as possible" (Johnston 
and Hewstone, in press). The application of this
research paradigm to the eyewitness situation has been
responsible for a large part of the work of the last
decade or so (see, e.g., Bodenhausen, 1988; 
Bodenhausen and Wyer, 1985; Macrae in press; Macrae 
and Shepherd, 1989a and b).
As Sporer (1982) has shown, the relatively recent 
flowering of the "psychology of testimony" is in many 
ways a renaissance of the "Psychologie der Aussage" 
that flourished at the beginning of the century. 
Although the problems of eyewitness testimony seem to 
have been known even to the historiographer Thucydides 
in the fifth century BC (Levine and Tapp, 1973), 
laboratory studies in the area were not conducted 
until the last years of the nineteenth century. It 
would probably be wrong however, as Sporer (1982)
points out, to try to finger any one figure as the
"father" of such research: more or less concurrently, 
Cattell studied "incidental memory" - aspects of which
have relevance to the eyewitness situation; Bolton
investigated the confidence - accuracy relationship; 
examining justice Hans Gross performed early "witness
tests" with the witnesses in his own criminal 
investigations (Cattell, 1895; Bolton, 1896; Gross 
1894/1907; all cirted in Sporer, 1982). It is likely 
that more textbooks cite Alfred Binet than any other 
researcher as the first important figure in the 
"Psychologie der Aussage". Indeed it is interesting 
to note that two aspects of his work have since 
developed into central areas of research in the field; 
those of the child witness, and the suggestibility 
effect (Loftus, 1977; Schooler, Gerhard and Loftus, 
1986; McCloskey and Zaragoza, 1985/87; Lindsay and 
Johnson, 1989; Wright, 1992), Binet's work is often 
cited today in support of the traditional view of the 
extreme suggestibility of children; However, as 
Cunningham (1988) points out, his work has never been 
translated into English, and citations of his 
conclusions take them largely at face value and from 
secondary sources. Binet was the first experimenter 
in the literature to employ what Cunningham terms a 
"multiobservational methodology"; his aim, throughout 
several experiments, was to discover the relationship
if any, between age, academic aptitude, and
suggestibility, for male elementary schoolchildren 
aged 7 - 14 years. Using such methodology, Binet was 
the first to discover such now-familiar effects as 
qualitative differences between reports given
spontaneously and those given in response to specific 
questions, the powerful effect of the form of a
question upon the answer given, and the group 
conformity effect. It was a source of disappointment
to Binet that he was never really seen as a prophet in 
his native land; while research into eyewitness 
testimony had its origins in France, it was left to 
German researchers such as Louis William Stern to 
develop it. From an historical perspective,
Cunningham remarks:
"...La Suggestibilité marked a radical turning point in which the position of Bernheim and the Nancy school on the normalcy of suggestibility could finally be accepted. As such, it laid a cornerstone for the scientific study of influence and other aspects of social behavior (Apfelbaum, 1985). The misfortune of Binet's death in 1911, however, ablated the vision he had for the progress of social psychology (Binet, 1909); and the work's significance in the founding of modern experimental social psychology was never fully developed (Apfelbaum, 1985)" (Cunningham, 1988, p 275).
Stern appears to have been the second important 
figure in the history of eyewitness memory research. 
His work is reviewed in some detail by Sporer (1982), 
and is considered only briefly here. Stern (1902) was 
the first to stress the less-than-perfect functioning 
of the memory in the eyewitnessing situation: which
led him to suggest that the court of law should be 
more cautious in its acceptance of eyewitness 
testimony. Stern is particularly important as the 
inventor of the staged incident (Wirklichkeitversuch) 
research paradigm as a means of studying memory for 
dramatic events which are in some ways similar to 
witnessed crimes. This paradigm had a burst of 
popularity at the beginning of the century, and has 
returned to favour in the last twenty or so years.
Following Stern's "call for an interdisciplinary 
approach to the problem of 'Aussagepsychologie'", 
(Sporer, 1982, p 328,) eyewitness memory became quite 
a fashionable research area: spreading as far afield 
as Russia, India, and Chile. Researchers during this 
period appear to have been keen to stress the 
practical implications of their work: something which 
has not always been the case in more recent years (cf. 
Yuille and Cutshall, 1986). The reaction from the 
legal profession appears to have been generally 
positive:
"Their criticisms were to the point but constructive, emphasizing Stern's (1902) postulate of 'closeness to life' ('Lebensnahe') as a principle for experimentation and thus anticipating many arguments about the 'external validity' of laboratory experiments as we would call it today (Loh, 1981; Monahan and Loftus,1982)" (Sporer, 1982, p 330).
While progress in the eyewitness testimony field has 
never come to a complete halt - indeed, some 
interesting work was published in mid-century, see, 
e.g., Rourke, 1957 - the dominance of the Behaviourist 
approach during these years resulted in an inevitable 
reduction of pace.
With the relatively recent increase in importance of 
cognitive psychology, the new area of social cognition 
has arisen; giving researchers in the area new tools 
with which to address eyewitness testimony issues. In 
1983, McCloskey and Egeth published a paper entitled 
"Eyewitness identification: What can a psychologist
tell a jury?"; implicitly answering their question
"not much". As noted above, however, recent years 
have witnessed an increase in research, and in 1991, 
Deffenbacher was able "to suggest that a psychologist 
can now tell police quite a bit" (p 377). While it is 
not the purpose of the present chapter to review the 
recent literature in its entirety, (Deffenbacher, 
1991, presents perhaps the best recent review,) it is 
possible to mention briefly the areas in which most 
work has been done. Conspicuous failures of recent 
research have been in attempts to identify individual 
factors predictive of an eyewitness' ability to 
provide useful and accurate testimony; and to develop 
procedures by which to improve the encoding of a 
witnessed event (e.g., Deffenbacher, Brown and 
Sturgill, 1978; Malpass, 1981). For face recognition, 
a number of studies (e.g., Klatzky, Martin and Kane, 
1986; Shapiro and Penrod, 1986) have shown a depth-of- 
processing effect at encoding: faces for which more
cognitively complex processing occurs later show a 
memory advantage. However, short-term training in 
memorial strategies does not appear to be helpful 
(Woodhead, Baddeley and Simmonds, 1979). The storage 
of eyewitness memories has also received attention: 
e.g., the degree of forgetting with delay interval was 
studied by Deffenbacher (1986); and the nature of 
retroactive interference during misinformation studies 
was studied by McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) and by 
Lindsay and Johnson (1989). Much more attention has 
been paid to issues associated with the retrieval of 
eyewitness memories, and specifically the development
of techniques designed to improve retrieval. 
Techniques that have been developed include hypnosis, 
conversation management, and the cognitive interview, 
both basic and enhanced. This literature is reviewed 
in some detail in Chapter 11. Additionally,
techniques have been developed to aid police in cueing 
eyewitness memory: e.g., the use of face composite
systems, such as Photofit and Identi-kit. A good deal 
of recent research has addressed the usefulness or 
otherwise of these systems (e.g., Davies, 1983; 
Davies, Ellis and Shepherd, 1978); findings tending 
to be somewhat negative (e.g., Christie and Ellis, 
1981, found that Photofits were less accurate than 
witnesses' verbal descriptions of faces - see Chapter 
4 for a fuller discussion of literature pertaining to 
this topic). A great deal of research has addressed 
factors involved with the identification parade, and 
how the fairness of such parades can be increased 
(see, e.g.. Cutler and Penrod, 1988; Cutler, Penrod, 
O'Rourke and Martens, 1986; and Malpass and Devine,
1983) .
Research has also addressed the role of what Wells 
(1978) terms "estimator variables" (i.e., those over 
which the criminal justice system has no control). 
Examples of this are studies of event characteristics 
(e.g., the length of a witness' exposure to a criminal 
- Ellis, Davies and Shepherd, 1977; and the effect of 
"weapon focus" - Loftus, Loftus and Messo, 1987). The 
individual characteristics of suspects has also 
received attention: e.g., the role of the suspect's
sex, race, and disguise (Shapiro and Penrod, 1986; 
Cutler, Penrod and Martens, 1987), as have the 
characteristics of witnesses. For example, Shapiro 
and Penrod appear to have established that race has no 
effect upon eyewitness accuracy; while as far as sex 
is concerned, females may have slightly superior 
memory for faces than males (see, e.g., Clifford and 
Bull, 1978, for a dated but detailed discussion of 
this). The age of eyewitnesses however appears to be 
of great importance (Chance and Goldstein, 1984; Flin, 
1980). Much research (Bothwell, Deffenbacher and 
Brigham, 1987; Cutler and Penrod, 1989) has addressed 
the old issue of the correlation between an 
eyewitness' confidence and his/her accuracy - which 
appears to be positive but small - and also the 
correlation between a witness' accuracy of prior 
verbal description of a suspect and his/her subsequent 
identification accuracy - which does not appear to be 
significant.
Despite the apparent exhaustiveness of this list, 
however, as Tollestrup, Turtle and Yuille (1993) point 
out, recent research has tended to consider certain 
topics in far greater depth than others. There has 
been a particularly pronounced emphasis upon such 
areas as interviewing practices, identification 
procedures, the relationship between an eyewitness' 
confidence and her/her accuracy, racial issues, and 
the eyewitness abilities of young children. However, 
other areas appear to have been unjustly neglected. 
There has, for instance, been a tendency to
concentrate upon the negative rather than the positive 
aspects of eyewitness memory (Yuille and Cutshall, 
1986), and upon memory for facial rather than body 
features (MacLeod, Frowley and Shepherd, in press). 
The above-mentioned use of the social cognition 
research paradigm, while carrying with it many 
undoubted advantages, has also tended to foster a 
greater reliance by eyewitness memory researchers on 
the cognitive rather than the social. Much research 
utilises the implicit model of the eyewitness as 
"black box", conceptualizing the ultimate aim of 
research in the area as detailing the cognitive 
apparatus contained within that box.
From an objective point of view, however, it might 
seem strange that more attention has not been devoted 
to the role of social information in the eyewitness 
situation. After all, eyewitnessing always takes 
place in a social situation, as does an eyewitness' 
recall of the event (whether among friends and 
relatives, or during a police interview). Social 
information might therefore be expected to have 
powerful implications both for eyewitness memory and 
for other aspects of a crime situation.
An example might help to elucidate this point. In 
the novel Intruder in the Dust by the Southern writer 
William Faulkner, a black man, Lucas MacCalsin, is 
accused of stabbing a white man in the back. This 
accusation is made on the basis of little more 
evidence than that Lucas is black, and this was 
considered more or less normal behaviour for blacks at
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that time and in that part of the world. Lucas, 
however, will not even answer the charges that are 
brought against him. Proud of the white blood that is 
in his veins, he refuses to act according to the 
prevailing social stereotype of black people. A mob 
of angry "cognitive misers" (Macrae, in press) is 
therefore organised to go out and lynch him. This is, 
of course, just a novel: but, given the social
situation prevalent in that part of the world (similar 
scenarios could be derived from any number of other 
sources) it is probably not a very far-fetched one.
Similar social stereotypes are applied particularly 
to the eyewitness situation by Boon and Davies 
(1987b); a study which demonstrates quite clearly what 
is meant by stereotypic information causing memory 
distortions. Part of the Boon and Davies study was 
based upon an earlier study by Allport and Postman 
(1945): a study which utilised the then-current racial 
stereotype of blacks as carriers of cut-throat razors. 
Boon and Davies wanted to assess the influence of an 
updated version of this stereotype (blacks as knife- 
carriers) on the reporting of a story. They recounted 
to one subject the story of a subway incident between 
a white person and a black person, and then used a 
chain-report technique to generate a final version of 
the story. In the original version it was specified 
that a knife was pulled, but not who pulled it. The 
result of interest was to see who was said to have ' 
pulled the knife at the end of the chain. They found 
that in no case was the white said to have been the
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knife-carrier. The third experiment reported in this 
paper shows a similar kind of effect: Again, a social 
variable, this time attitude, was found to have an 
influence in the eyewitness situation. In this 
experiment, subjects were shown photographs of a 
mounted policeman attempting to break up a miners' 
strike, after having their subjective attitude towards 
the strike tested. Finally, they were shown a set of 
line-drawings based on the photograph, and asked to 
select from these the drawing which in their opinion 
best represented the photograph. The line-drawings 
differed only in how threatening a posture the 
policeman was adopting. Subjects who were more in 
favour of the strike tended to select drawings in 
which the policeman appeared more threatening, and 
vice versa.
The Boon and Davies study (reviewed in more detail 
in Chapter 10) is an elegant demonstration of how 
important social factors - attitudes or stereotypes - 
can be in the eyewitnessing situation. Similar points 
have been made by Lindsay and Johnson (1989), and by 
Shepherd, Ellis, McMurran and Davies (1978). 
Nevertheless, social factors have received relatively 
little attention in the eyewitness literature.
Only relatively recently has a literature even begun 
to develop concerning these more fundamentally social 
psychological aspects of the eyewitness situation, 
from the actual witnessing of the crime, through the 
police interview, to appearance in court. The 
influence of such a perspective - viewing the witness
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as a human being intricate# in a series of more or 
less complex and unpleasant social situations - can be 
seen in a number of disparate areas of recent 
research. Miller, Turnbull and MacFarland (1990) 
investigated the common phenomenon of counterfactual 
thinking ("thinking about what might have been"), and 
the factors which influence the instance of such 
behaviour: a research area with obvious applicability 
to the crime situation, both for the eyewitness, and, 
more importantly, the victim. Until relatively 
recently, the police interview also suffered from 
failing to identify itself as an ultimately social 
situation, in which factors such as dominance- 
submissiveness and poor conversational technique 
played profound roles (Adams, 1985). Recent advances 
in research into the police interview have however 
tended to emphasise the importance of conceptualising 
it in social terms: hence the birth of such strategies 
as the enhanced cognitive interview (Fisher et al, 
1987? Geiselman and Fisher, 1988) and conversation 
management (E Shepherd, 1985/87; George 1992). The 
conceptualisation of the criminal trial as an 
intimidating social situation has meant that children 
may now present evidence via video link to the 
courtroom (Flin and Tarrant, 1989). Finally,
Bodenhausen and Kramer ( in press) present a study of 
the effects of stereotypic information in the criminal 
justice system, addressing such questions as whether 
social stereotypes can affect the veracity of 
eyewitness reports, and whether jurors' own prejudices
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lead to differential learning of trial testimony and 
differential recall of this during their final 
deliberations. Nevertheless, despite recent advances, 
such studies are certainly in the minority. The 
present thesis attempts to go some way towards 
redressing this balance, by assessing the influence of 
the social phenomenon of stereotyping on several 
aspects of the eyewitnessing situation; in many cases, 
aspects which appear never to have received such 
attention in the past.
The Social Stereotyping Literature
There exists an immensely complex literature in the 
stereotyping field. An attempt to apply all of the 
extant research paradigms and perspectives (from 
psychodynamic models of stereotype formation, to 
social identity theory, to studies of illusory 
correlation) to the eyewitness situation would 
inevitably cause confusion and blur interpretation of 
the results achieved.
A simplifying approach is therefore adopted here. 
It is argued in Chapters 2 and 6 that two broad 
approaches to the stereotyping literature can be 
identified; these are discriminable essentially by the 
type of explanation of phenomena which they offer; 
explanations which can be more or less "social" or 
"cognitive" in nature. The social psychological 
approach has often dealt with issues which are not 
directly relevant in the present instance: e.g., many 
social psychological studies are essentially
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descriptive, detailing as they do such phenomena as 
the contents of one group's stereotypes of another 
group (e.g., Katz and Braly, 1933; Gilbert, 1951; 
Karlins, Coffman and Walters, 1969). More relevant to 
the present situation are studies of the inter­
relationship between social stereotypes and target 
information of one sort or another (e.g., ambiguous 
actions - Duncan, 1976, Sagar and Schofield, 1978; 
biographical information - Snyder and Uranowitz, 
1978c, Bellezza and Bower, 1981; or faces - Bartlett, 
1932). The literature has considered the effects of 
stereotypes upon both judgment of such target material 
(e.g., Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen 
and Wyer, 1985) and memory for this material (e.g., 
Cohen, 1977; Rothbart, Evans and Fulero, 1979). More 
ambitious studies have attempted to account for the 
wide-ranging results that have been produced both for 
judgment (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1988; Macrae, in press), 
and memory for target material (e.g., Hastie, Park and 
Weber, 1984; Stangor and Ruble, 1989; Wyer and Gordon, 
1982/84).
The present thesis broadly follows this general 
conceptualisation of the previous research. Each of 
these three areas, (i.e., judgment, memory, and the 
construction of models to account for the findings,) 
is considered in some detail, both in a review chapter 
and empirical research chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 
deal exclusively with judgment phenomena, although 
these are also dealt with less exclusively in Chapters 
4 and 5; Chapters 7 - 9  deal with memory phenomena;
15
and Chapters 6 and 13 with the construction of models 
of the effects of stereotypic information upon memory 
for target materials. Additionally, Chapters 10 - 12 
deal with an area of particular relevance to the 
eyewitness situation - that of the police interview - 
and how this can be used to reduce the impact of 
stereotypes upon memory for a witnessed crime.
The approach adopted in Chapters 6 and 13 is 
predominantly a social cognitive one. This is not to 
deny the basic importance of the social approach - 
indeed, as outlined above, stereotypes are conceived 
here as essentially social phenomena - but reflects 
the belief that cognitive models are a valid approach 
to this social psychological field. The construction 
and testing of models of stereotypic effects appears 
the optimum means of refining our conceptualisation of 
this highly important field.
Summary
Despite a recent boom in eyewitness research, little 
work has considered the importance of social factors 
in the eyewitness situation. The present thesis 
attempts a preliminary outline of the ways in which 
the social phenomena of stereotypes may impact upon 
this situation. The present state of research into 
stereotyping is highly complex, but it is possible to 
identify three more or less discrete foci and two more 
or less discrete research paradigms. The foci of
particular interest here are the effects of 
stereotypes on judgment and on memory, and the
16
construction of models of these effects. The research 
paradigms are the social and the social-cognitive.
The present thesis consists essentially of three 
sections. The first section considers the impact of 
stereotypes on judgments in the eyewitness situation, 
and the second considers the impact of stereotypes 
upon eyewitness memory. Both of these sections also 
consider implications for the construction of models 
of such effects. The third section concentrates upon 
the police interview, and means of reducing the impact 
of stereotypes in the eyewitness situation. An 
introductory chapter to each section outlines relevant 
research in the area, devoting attention to both 
social and social-cognitive paradigms. A general 
discussion in Chapter 13 attempts to summarise and 
explain the results in terms of social cognitive 
models of stereotype action.
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CHAPTER 2 - STEREOTYPES AND JUDGMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
The present chapter attempts briefly to review some of 
the psychological literature on stereotypes and 
judgment relevant to the eyewitnessing situation. Two 
approaches to this question are discriminable: broadly 
these are the social (which dominated most earlier 
research on the topic) and the social-cognitive (which 
has been the dominant research paradigm in about the 
last two decades). While much research has been of a 
generally descriptive nature, (see the next sub­
section,) the literature has dealt with a number of 
varied aspects of the stereotyping question. The role 
of the "authoritarian personality" in the formation of 
stereotypes was investigated by Adorno, Frenkel- 
Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950); Sinha and 
Upahyaya (1960) studied the role of world events in 
changing stereotypes of ethnic outgroups; Snyder and 
Uranowitz (1978c) looked at the way in which 
stereotypes might provide retrieval schemata for 
previously-presented biographical information; 
Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein (1987) looked at the way 
in which stereotypes could mediate juridic judgments; 
Levine (cited in Tajfel, 1981,) looked at the role of 
economic factors in the creation of group stereotypes. 
The present thesis looks at only a narrow area of the 
stereotyping question; that is, the aspects which are 
of most relevance to the eyewinessing situation. Of 
particular importance are the distorting effects of
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stereotypes on memory (Chapters 9 and 10), the use of 
stereotypes as retrieval schemata (Chapters 7 and 8), 
and their role in the formation of social judgments. 
This final area is the specific area of interest in 
the first part of the thesis. The first two sub­
sections in the present chapter consider, 
respectively, the literature concerned with the social 
and the cognitive functions of stereotypes. While the 
thrust of this chapter is the consideration of the 
effects of stereotypes on social judgments, much of 
the research into the functions of stereotypes has 
considered their effects upon social memory. 
Therefore, it is necessary for the present chapter to 
make some mention of this literature, also.
Social Functions of Stereotypes
The greater part of early research into stereotyping 
behaviour was descriptive in nature, attempting to 
define the contents of particular groups' stereotypes 
of other groups (see, e.g., Allen and Wilder, 1975; 
Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Gilbert, 1951; Karlins, 
Coffman and Walters, 1969; Katz and Braly, 1933; 
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and Flament, 1971; Taylor and 
Jaggi, 1974). These studies demonstrate stereotypic 
bias in terms of how members of particular social 
groups are perceived, and the way in which their 
behaviour or psychological characteristics are judged. 
More recent work has concentrated less on the contents 
of stereotypes as on providing explanations of how and 
why they arise. Tajfel (1981) characterises this work
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as favouring one of two different types of 
explanation: the social or the cognitive. As Ashmore 
and Del Boca (1981) point out, the "social" 
orientation may further be broken down into 
"sociocultural" and "psychodynamic" approaches: 
however, for the sake of simplicity, this scheme is 
not adopted in this review. The present sub-section 
considers social explanations as a single unified 
approach.
This social approach can be characterised as being 
concerned with questions of a descriptive sort, such 
as "what are the contents of ingroup x's stereotype of 
outgroup y?" (see, e.g., the list presented above) and 
more general theoretical questions of the sort "how do 
stereotypes affect perceptions of outgroup members?" 
(e.g., Jussim, Coleman and Lerch, 1987), and "what 
social needs does the act of stereotyping fulfill?" 
(e.g.. Testa, Kinder and Ironson, 1987). The 
cognitive approach meanwhile has tended to consider 
questions of the sort "what mental processes give rise 
to stereotypes?" (e.g., Morgan, 1989,), and "how is 
stereotypic information organised in memory?" (e.g., 
Hastie, 1981). As Tajfel (1981) remarks, we can 
afford to ignore neither approach. We will never have 
a complete picture of the functions of stereotypes 
without considering both the cognitive and social 
aspects of the question. Indeed, it has been argued 
that the cognitive approach may be meaningless on its 
own, as the social circumstances which determine 
stereotypes is in constant flux (Haslam, 1985). An
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attempt to produce a coherent theory of the "social 
functions of stereotypes" must, Tajfel argues, "bring 
together what is known from social psychology, social 
history, social anthropology and common sense" 
(Tajfel, 1981, p 160). Three such social functions of 
stereotypes can be identified, and examples are cited 
from the literature in support of these.
Social stereotypes can be used as part of an attempt 
to understand large, complex, and often distressing 
social events. A colourful example of the use of 
stereotypes in this fashion is the "explanation" given 
for the English plague of the seventeenth century - 
this was blamed on "untrustworthy" Scots (for reasons 
of their own) poisoning the wells of Newcastle 
(Thomas, 1973, cited in Tajfel, 1981, p 161). The 
outbreak of the Austrian civil war in 1934 was 
attributed to destructive Bolshevik tendencies; 
resulting in the hanging or internment of members of 
the Social Democratic party (Scheithauer, Woratschek 
and Tscherne, 1983).
Second, stereotypes can be used to justify actions 
(whether planned for the future or committed in the 
past) against outgroups. Tajfel illustrates this 
principle by reference to the work of Kiernan (1972), 
who finds that European conquest of foreign countries 
was justified by a stereotype of other races as in 
need of "advancement" through the good offices of the 
Europeans; and the belief of the English in India that 
"en agissant avec des brutes il faut être brutal*^. 
Hitler's Final Solution is perhaps the most virulent
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historical example of a stereotype being used to 
justify negative behaviour towards an outgroup 
(Shirer, 1959).
The final social function of stereotypes is 
positively to discriminate the ingroup from outgroups. 
This will be particularly important at a time when 
such differences are seen to be being eroded, or when 
further justification is required for negative action 
(social, cultural, or political) against an outgroup. 
This is certainly the most extensively researched of 
the social functions of stereotypes. Tajfel
(1957/59/69) developed a theory which holds that the 
effect of categorisation is the cognitive exaggeration 
of differences between categories, and the 
minimisation of differences within categories. Such 
an effect holds not only for physical stimuli such as 
lines (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963,) and nonsense stimuli 
(Campbell, 1956), but also for social stimuli. 
Secord, Bevan and Katz (1956), for example, found that 
highly prejudiced white subjects tended to perceive 
the skin colour of blacks as darker than in fact it 
was: a fairly clear example of the exaggeration of
between-category differences. Tajfel, Billig, Bundy 
and Flament (1971) asked: "Can the very act of social 
categorisation, as far as it can be identified and 
isolated from other variables, lead - under certain 
conditions - to intergroup behaviour which 
discriminates against the outgroup and favours the 
ingroup?" (Tajfel et al, 1971, p 151). Tajfel 
attempted to answer this question through the
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construction of "minimal groups". His work (e.g., 
Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel and Billig, 1974) 
repeatedly demonstrated that the construction of 
groups along even such artificial axes as preference 
for the paintings of Klee or Kandinsky, or even the 
outcome of a coin-toss, is sufficient to cause ingroup 
bias. This effect is increased with the introduction 
into the social situation of further variables which 
are normally associated with groups (Rabbie and 
Horwitz, 1969).
Early explanations of these results centred around 
what Tajfel (1969/70) termed the "generic norm" of 
ingroup favouritism. For a number of reasons however 
(see Billig, 1976), this conceptualisation does not 
appear tenable. Later explanations (e.g., Tajfel,
1972; Turner, 1975) have centred around social
identity theory. Every individual, the theory holds, 
tries to form and maintain a positive self-concept. 
This has two aspects: the personal and the social
identity. In different situations, one or the other 
of these aspects of the self-concept will become more 
or less salient. The social identity of a group is 
always achieved with reference to some outgroup. A
social category marks the ingroup off from outgroups;
and, furthermore, allows for explicit comparison of 
the groups along one or more dimensions. Denigration 
of the outgroup causes elevation of the ingroup, and 
consequent raising of social esteem. This process can 
work only if subjects actively engage in a social 
comparison process, and it is a strength of this
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approach that it explains the counter-intuitive 
finding that in a social categorisation situation, 
subjects often act not only to maximise ingroup 
benefits, but also intergroup differences (Turner, 
1975). Such phenomena as ingroup favouritism are 
therefore seen as consequences of attempts to achieve 
or maintain a positive social identity. Such effects 
may be explicable in terms of norms: when people are 
assigned to in- and outgroups, the concept of teams, 
and therefore the competitive norm, are evoked 
(Wetherell, 1981, personal communication). While the 
theory has not been without its critics (see 
Aschenbrenner and Schaeffer, 1980, and Brown, Tajfel 
and Turner, 1980), its major supposition - that of a 
link between intergroup discrimination and self-esteem 
- has been experimentally demonstrated on at least two 
occasions (Oakes and Turner, 1980; Lemyre and Smith,
1985).
Social identity theory appears therefore to provide, 
as Brown (1988) remarks, a plausible account of 
people's readiness to favour even the most minimal of 
ingroups. Neither is its applicability limited to the 
somewhat artificial situations which have tended to be 
used in the laboratory; it is also attractive insofar 
as Tajfel (1982) and Brown (1984) have shown it can 
also account for other, real-world phenomena. Indeed, 
it has been shown even outside the laboratory that the 
degree of matching of in- to outgroup attitudes may be 
negatively correlated with intergroup animosity 
(Thompson, 1988). Similar effects have also been
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demonstrated by Taylor and Jaggi (1974) and by 
Hewstone and Ward (1985); and may be maintained by 
illusory correlation (Chapman, 1967; Hamilton, 1981): 
A person's social world may consist of members of in- 
and outgroups performing positive and negative 
actions. Ingroup members may be encountered twice as 
often as outgroup members, and positive actions twice 
as often as negative actions. Where two relatively 
rare occurrences ( an outgroup member and a negative 
action) are encountered together, this event will be 
particularly memorable and their instance of co­
occurrence will be over-estimated.
Another possible explanation of ingroup bias is that 
proposed by Dion (1979), using an analogy to the 
Gestalt in perceptual psychology. Categorisation is 
held to divide the social environment into mutually 
exclusive categories: ingroups and outgroups. Since
the categories do not overlap, subjects expect to 
encounter social information which differentiates 
between them. Also, they will tend to act so as to 
accentuate these perceived differences. Intergroup 
discrimination, according to this view, is one means 
of maintaining cognitive differentiation between 
groups.
Views such as these might be taken to imply a social 
function or significance in social memory and indeed 
social "forgetting". Differential memory of actions 
of in- and outgroup members would tend to enhance the 
subjective social worth of the ingroup and denigrate 
that of the outgroup, so long as positive instances of
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ingroup behaviour are better remembered than negative 
instances, and vice versa. Also, such a process might 
maximise the perceived difference between social 
groups. Such effects would be particularly relevant 
to the eyewitness situation.
Howard and Rothbart (1980) found that the simple 
categorisation of persons into in- and outgroups is 
sufficient to bias their recall of information about 
the groups. This bias is found to favour the ingroup: 
more "positive" descriptors are recalled that applied 
to the ingroup; and more "negative" descriptors that 
applied to the outgroup. Wilder (1981) reports an 
experiment in which subjects were better able to 
recall information relating to ingroup similarities 
and outgroup dissimilarities (relative to themselves) 
than vice versa. On a recognition task, they made 
more false identifications of characteristics that 
implied ingroup similarity and outgroup dissimilarity 
(to themselves) than vice versa. Such an effect may 
hold even for material with less external validity, 
e.g., Tsujimoto (1978). The more salient is category 
membership, the more powerful the effects are likely 
to be (Cantor and Mischel, 1977; Haslam, 1985). The 
effects of stereotypes on memory are discussed more 
fully in Chapter 6.
Despite this wealth of research, however, as Tajfel 
(1979) remarks, the purely "social" approach to 
stereotyping has yet to address some basic questions 
concerned with the occurrence of stereotypes.
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Questions which remain unanswered are of the sort:
"Why, when and how is a social categorisation salient or not salient? What kind of shared constructions of social reality, mediated through social categorisations, lead to a social climate in which large masses of people feel that they are in long-term conflict with other large masses? What, for example, are the 
psychological transitions from a stable to an unstable social system?" (Tajfel, 1979, p 188)
Equally, the social approach has been unable to 
answer the question of how social stereotypes operate. 
For an answer to this question, it is necessary to 
look at social cognitive research.
Cognitive Functions of Stereotypes
During the last two decades, a new approach to the 
study of social phenomena has arisen: this is the
study of social cognition. This involves essentially 
the application to the social sphere of paradigms 
drawn from experimental cognitive psychology. 
Bodenhausen and Kramer (in press) define this field as 
having "the ambitious objective of conceptualising 
human social behaviour in terms of underlying 
information-processing dynamics". While it may 
therefore appear simply an application of cognitive 
psychology, the social element of social cognition has 
been defended by Leyens and Codol (1988) on the 
grounds that: l) it has a social origin, being created 
or reinforced through social interaction, 2) it has a 
social object, and 3) it is socially shared, being 
common to different members in a given society or 
group.
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Ultimately, social cognition provides a second, 
useful approach to issues which remain social 
psychological ones. The approach lends itself to the 
construction of models of what exactly takes place in 
the mind of the perceiver during a social situation. 
The construction of such models allows powerful 
predictions to be drawn regarding such important 
social events as eyewitnessing. It may prove possible 
for future researchers to construct a detailed model 
of the effects of stereotypic information upon 
eyewitness performance: both for memory and judgment 
factors. For this to occur, however, it will be 
necessary to draw upon a formulation of how 
stereotypic information can affect eyewitness memory 
and judgment. To this end, the remainder of the 
present chapter considers social cognitive approaches 
to the stereotypes and judgment literature.
Bodenhausen (1988)
Bodenhausen gives three models of the way in which 
stereotypes might affect judgments made about a member 
of a stereotyped group. These are reviewed below.
1. The interpretive hypothesis: Central to this
hypothesis is the fact that a single piece of 
behaviour may be amenable to multiple interpretations 
(by different perceivers, or by the same perceiver at 
different times or in different states). Prior 
expectations or stereotypical beliefs can affect the 
interpretation of any given piece of behaviour; thus 
affecting subsequent judgments based upon that
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behaviour. . This hypothesis receives support from a 
number of studies; perhaps most importantly from 
studies of the different interpretations of the 
behaviour of black and white actors by Duncan (1976) 
and by Sagar and Schofield (1980) - for further
discussion of these experiments, see Chapter 3. 
Support is also gained from an experiment reported by 
Bodenhausen (1988) himself - see below for a 
discussion of this.
2. Selective processing hypothesis: According to this
model, the mere activation of a stereotype in a social 
situation is sufficent to disrupt the (otherwise 
relatively smooth) flow of social information 
processing, in such a way that perceivers find it 
easier to process stereotype-confirming than 
stereotype-disconfirming evidence. Confirming
evidence is processed more elaborately and hence will
prove easier to recall (Bradshaw and Anderson, 1982; 
Hastie, 1980). This recall advantage for confirming 
evidence means that judgments are also biassed. This 
hypothesis receives support from Bodenhausen and Wyer 
(1985), who investigated the effects of racial 
stereotypes on causal attributions, sanctioning
judgments, and memory for criminal events. They found 
that when a criminal's race was stereotypically
consistent with the crime of which he was accused 
(e.g., an Hispanic charged with assault), subjects 
made more dispositional attributions and recommended 
harsher punishments than when this was not the case
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(e.g., a White Anglo-Saxon Protestant charged with 
assault).
Some methodological shortcomings of this study were 
unearthed by Macrae and Shepherd (1989a); but their 
conceptual replication of the study found a generally 
similar pattern of results. Bodenhausen and
Lichtenstein (1987) had subjects judge the guilt or 
innocence and the aggressiveness of a defendant after 
receiving both incriminating and exculpating evidence. 
Prior to the task, subjects were told that they would 
be making only the complex guilt/innocence judgment or 
the simple trait judgment; however, all subjects 
actually made both judgments. When subjects thought 
they had only a simple judgment to make, ethnicity had 
little effect; however, when they thought they had a 
complex judgment to make, ethnicity had a similar 
effect to that discovered by Bodenhausen and Wyer
(1985). Hence, stereotypic information appeared to be 
used only when information-processing demands were 
high.
Additionally, the studies of the illusory 
correlation phenomenon reported by Hamilton and his 
colleagues (e.g., Hamilton, 1981a; Hamilton and 
Gifford, 1976; Hamilton and Rose, 1980, and see 
Chapter 6) can be seen as demonstrating a kind of 
selective processing effect; providing this hypothesis 
with one more line of support.
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3. The heuristic hypothesis: According to this
hypothesis, stereotype activation may, in and of 
itself, be sufficient to cause biassed judgments. The 
very activation of a social stereotype provides the 
perceiver with a range of (more or less ‘accurate or 
useful) information (e.g.. Cantor and Mischel, 1977), 
upon which later judgments may depend, with little 
regard for the external validity of this information. 
Two experiments using stimulus materials based on rape 
cases provide evidence for this hypothesis. Ugwuegbu 
(1979) assessed how jurors made judgments about same- 
and different-race rapists, finding that other-race 
rapists were judged more harshly - in the absence of 
qualitatively different evidence against them. This 
effect appears to be mediated by the simple activation 
of a negative racial stereotype. And Jacobson (1981) 
found that, in judging rape cases, both male and 
female jurors gave greater credence to the alibi of an 
attractive than an unattractive defendant, found an 
attractive defendant guilty less often, and treated 
him more leniently when found guilty, presumably on 
the basis of a fairly primitive "beautiful-is-good" 
stereotype (an explanation which may also be cast in 
terms of implicit personality theory - Schneider, 
1973).
Macrae (in press) points out that there is a second 
possible variant of the heuristic hypothesis, 
according to which the social perceiver may actually 
store precomputed social judgments in memory. The 
activation of a stereotype would therefore simply
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entail the activation of a social judgment about the 
target, with no need for the "cognitive miser" to 
indulge in further laborious information processing. 
Empirical support can be found for both variants of 
this hypothesis: Bodenhausen, 1990; Bodenhausen and
Wyer, 1985; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982; Macrae 
and Shepherd, 1989a; Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Petzold, 
1986; Sherman and Corty, 1984.
Empirical tests: Bodenhausen (1988) tests these three
hypotheses in a pair of experiments, with particular 
emphasis upon legal judgments. As in his previous 
work, he had subjects act as mock jurors in cases of 
alleged assault in which the defendant was described 
as stereotypically linked or not linked with the crime 
(i.e., Hispanic or ethnically nondescript). He points 
out that both the biassed interpretation and selective 
processing hypotheses require the stereotype to be 
activated prior to receipt of other information. For 
the heuristic hypothesis, however, it does not matter 
when the stereotype is activated. Bodenhausen was 
therefore able to manipulate the time of stereotype 
activation to discriminate between the heuristic and 
other hypotheses. He found that stereotypic
information had little effect upon juridic judgments 
(or recall of case information) when presented after 
receipt of other evidence. However, when it was 
activated before receipt of other evidence, 
stereotypic information had a powerful impact upon 
both juridic judgments and recall of case evidence.
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Additionally, it was found that activation of a 
stereotype prior to receipt of incident-related 
information had no effect on ratings of probative 
implications of the presented evidence (e.g., "How 
unfavourable for the defendant would it be to learn 
that he left the bar ten minutes before the assault 
occurred?"). This refuted the selective processing 
hypothesis; hence Bodenhausen's study tended to 
support the biassed interpretation model.
Macrae (in press) - A Response to Bodenhausen
Macrae presents what is in part a review and critique
of Bodenhausen's work, during which he makes the point
that Bodenhausen's approach may be to some extent
invalid. Specifically, Bodenhausen may be mistaken in
testing both recall of case material, and judgments
based upon that material, in the belief that the two
are correlated. There may be grounds for believing
that memory and judgment are wholly independent
processes, for which different items of information
are employed. The valency (positive or negative) of a
judgment made on the basis of a stereotype need not,
e.g., be related to the valency of the material which
can be remembered with regard to that stereotype:
"A central feature of Bodenhausen's conception of stereotypical effects on decision-making is that jurors' judgments and recall are correlated. Within the context of a 'story-telling' model, stereotype activation affects the mental representation formed of the case evidence. For example, when the crime is stereotypically- consistent with the defendant's category membership the mental representation of the case is likely to be biased towards the organisation of prosecution (i.e., incriminating) evidence.
33
In recall, the accessibility of this evidence will increase the likelihood of jurors returning a guilty verdict (i.e., judgment/recall correlation). Thus, jurors' verdicts are related to their recall of case evidence."(Macrae, in press.)
This methodological weakness can also be seen in a 
review paper presented by Higgins and Bargh (1987).
In their study of this relationship, Hastie and Park
(1986) found that a positive correlation is likely to 
obtain only in "memory-based" tasks : tasks which
require social information to be stored in memory 
before judgments are made on the basis of that 
information. Such tasks may rarely be encountered 
outside the psychology laboratory. For "on-line" 
tasks, in which judgments are made as information is 
encountered, (as in the majority of real-world tasks) 
there will likely be little or no correlation between 
recall and judgment.
Jury decision-making appears to be unusual for a 
real-world task in that it contains both "memory- 
based" and "on-line" components (Hastie and Park,
1986); hence as far as this very particular case is 
concerned, Bodenhausen's conclusions appear likely to 
be correct. Other real-world cases however (e.g., the 
eyewitnessing situation) appear less likely to be 
structured in quite this way.
This is not of course to hold that Bodenhausen's 
conclusions are necessarily incorrect where it comes 
to the eyewitness situation, but simply that we should 
be careful in applying them in a hard-and-fast manner. 
Researchers must consider areas other than the very
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specific one of jury decision-making. This implies 
that consideration should be given to the heuristic 
hypothesis, abandoned by Bodenhausen. Hence, the 
possible effects of time of stereotype activation must 
be addressed.
When the Hypotheses Hold
The present chapter has so far considered only the 
ways in which stereotypes might affect judgment of 
social information. No consideration has yet been 
given to the circumstances under which these effects 
are likely to hold. Bodenhausen and Wyer (1985) 
provide three fairly general hypotheses with regard to 
this :
1. the (confusingly-named) heuristic hypothesis, which 
in this case holds that people will look for other 
(situational or dispositional) explanations of a 
target's behaviour only when a stereotype-based 
explanation is unavailable. If a crime or other 
transgression can be interpreted in terms of a 
stereotype, it will be punished accordingly, 
regardless of what other information is to hand.
2. the default hypothesis, which holds that 
stereotypes are used only as a last resort in judgment 
tasks. The influence of stereotypes on judgment will 
be eliminated if other information is to hand.
3. the integration hypothesis, which holds that, in 
making judgments, people will consider both 
stereotypic and non-stereotypic sources of information 
to arrive at their conclusion.
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Although Bodenhausen and Wyer consider only the 
single complex case of judgments of guilt or innocence 
in a case of assault, they conclude that - at least in 
suchlike cases - the heuristic hypothesis is the most 
likely to apply. In this case, the effects of 
stereotype activation appear to override any other 
information available. The activation of a stereotype 
appears to be a simple matter: it can be performed by 
the simple suggestion of a name or ethnic background. 
Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein (1987) however presented 
evidence that effects may be to some degree situation- 
specific. Subjects presented with the complex task of 
judging the guilt or innocence of a defendant appeared 
to use ethnic stereotypes as an heuristic to simplify 
the task; whereas subjects given the simpler task of 
making a trait rating about the defendant took more 
account of the situation, thus supporting the 
integration hypothesis.
A conceptual replication of the Bodenhausen and Wyer
study by Macrae and Shepherd (1989a) - using a
different criminal situation and improved dependent
measures - also tended to support the integration
hypothesis. They conclude:
"...the prediction that situational information would have little impact upon subjects' judgments when a stereotypical explanation for the crime was available was not supported... The present results... show that people are sensitive to situational information even when stereotypical explanation for the behaviour is available...That subjects did not ignore all the information available is perhaps not surprising given that they were instructed to pay close attention to all the information before making their judgments. The failure of previous studies to show the importance of situational information on
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causal judgements may be due in part to the experimental instructions presented to subjects.” (Macrae and Shepherd, 1989a, p 324.)
Work in other, related fields also tends to support 
this hypothesis. Kelley (1971) presents a
"discounting principle", by which it was proposed that 
perceivers make less extreme dispositional 
attributions where situational information is 
available; and this regardless of type of crime that 
the actor is said to have committed (and see also a 
wealth of research on causal attribution - Hewstone, 
1990). Work by Locksley and her associates (Locksley, 
Borgida, Brekke and Hepburn, 1980; Locksley, Hepburn 
and Ortiz, 1982; Locksley, Ortiz and Hepburn, 1980) 
nominally demonstrates that the default hypothesis 
gives the only compelling account of the way in which 
social judgments are made. She finds that subjects' 
use of stereotypic information in making judgments is 
eliminated as soon as direct behavioural information 
about a target is provided. More careful
consideration of her work, however, shows that her 
conclusions are based on inferences from just the sort 
of very simple judgment task that Bodenhausen, 
Lichtenstein and Wyer would predict to support the 
default hypothesis (see Grant and Holmes, 1981; 
Heneman, 1977). In each of Locksley's studies, the 
behavioural information provided has direct 
implications for the trait being judged (e.g., in the 
case of an honesty judgment, information about a theft 
might be given). Hence Locksley's evidence appears in 
fact to give more support to the integration
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hypothesis than to the default hypothesis. Of course, 
the relationship between task complexity and reliance 
on stereotypic information may not be a simple one-to- 
one relationship, but may be mediated by such factors 
as the perceived consequences of an action (Harvey, 
Harris and Burns, 1975). Higgins and Rholes (1978) 
had subjects describe a stimulus person to another 
person who purportedly either liked or disliked that 
stimulus person. Subjects were found to shade their 
communication of the stimulus person's behaviour in 
the direction of the other's supposed beliefs. They 
conclude that abstract judgmental summaries are stored 
in memory along with a representation of stimulus 
information, and as this stimulus information decays 
over time, subjects increasingly rely upon this 
judgment to reconstruct the information. According to 
this hypothesis, therefore, the degree of integration 
which will take place depends upon the amount of time 
elapsed since encoding.
Work in support of the integration hypothesis can be 
tied in quite elegantly with a model proposed by 
Devine (1989a and b) . Devine holds that, during 
socialization into their culture, everybody comes to 
learn the contents of that culture's stereotypes. 
Both bigots and non-bigots will unavoidably be aware 
of the contents of a particular culture's ethnic 
stereotypes. They will differ only in their personal 
beliefs about the actual applicability of these 
stereotypes: A bigot may consider the stereotypes
valid, whereas a non-bigot may not. Where stereotypes
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are activated, this will occur through an unconscious, 
uncontrollable process. The activation of personal 
beliefs however is likely to be a conscious, effortful 
process. The implication of this model is that, where 
information-processing demands on the perceiver are 
high, the cognitive effort is unlikely to be made to 
inhibit the activation of stereotypic beliefs. In 
this case then, (cf. Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein, 
1987,) judgments are likely to rely more heavily on 
stereotypic information than on any other type of 
information. Where information-processing demands are 
low, however, stereotypic information is likely to 
have relatively little effect upon subsequent 
judgments.
This intuitively appealing model of the effect of 
stereotypes on judgments also supports the integration 
hypothesis: It appears likely that both stereotypic
and non-stereotypic information can be used in forming 
a judgment? however, the relative importance of these 
two types of information will vary with the situation 
in which the perceiver finds him/herself. It should 
be borne in mind however that this model is applicable 
to an individual case only in a somewhat post-hoc 
manner: it is difficult to predict under what
particular circumstances information-processing 
demands will be so high as to preclude the activation 
of personal beliefs in a judgment task. This lack of 
predictive power means that it will be difficult to 
produce very compelling evidence in favour of the 
theory.
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Sherman, Judd and Park (1989) hold that there are 
multiple determinants of which items of stored 
knowledge will play a role in judgments. These are:
the relative accessibility of different items of 
information; the similarity between features of stored 
items and incoming information; and the relative 
usefulness of different types of information in making 
judgments. The relative weightings of these different 
factors will usually vary with the situation; hence 
Sherman et al's formulation can be conceptualised as a 
restatement of the integration hypothesis.
Judgments Hade Outside the Juridic Situation
Srull and Wyer (1989) present the only paper in the 
literature to consider the effect of stereotypes on 
judgment outside the juridic situation. This is 
nominally a "model of impression-formation", but 
consists essentially of a list of fifteen postulates 
which attempts to account for a number of findings in 
the literature concerned with the effect of 
stereotypes on the encoding and organisation of, and 
memory for, social information. It is important to 
stress, however, that these postulates apply only to 
the situation in which a subject is explicitly 
attempting to form an impression about a target 
individual. Hence their applicability in the majority 
of real-world situations is questionable. However 
some of the postulates presented may nevertheless be 
applicable to the eyewitness situation.
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According to Srull and Wyer, subjects asked to form 
an impression of a target person will first of all 
attempt to form an impression of him or her as 
generally likeable or unlikeable. This impression 
will be based on only a subset of the information 
received about that target; namely, the first 
information that is received. This, as Srull and Wyer 
note, implies a primacy effect on judgments.
Once such an evaluative impression has been formed, 
later behaviours will be interpreted in terms of that 
impression. Naturally enough, the ease with which 
this can be done will be a function of the evaluative 
consistency of the behaviour with the general 
evaluative impression.
If no evaluative impression can be extracted on the 
basis of the information initially received, subjects 
will tend to devote more attention to the behaviours 
they have already encoded to determine whether or not 
they have in fact interpreted this information 
correctly. This, presumably, will later give a recall 
advantage for this elaborately-encoded material 
(Bradshaw and Anderson, 1983). A corrolary to this is 
that, once an evaluative impression has been formed, 
inconsistent behaviours will receive more attention, 
in an effort to reconcile their occurrence. When 
asked to make a judgment about a specific 
characteristic of a target (e.g., his/her honesty) the 
subject will search memory for a representation of the 
target whose central concept relates directly to this 
characteristic (i.e., one which pertains specifically
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to the honesty of the target) . If a representation 
whose central concept has direct implications for a 
judgment cannot be found, the subject will retrieve 
and use the general evaluation-based person 
representation as a basis for this judgment (i.e., a 
target whose central evaluative representation is 
positive will probably be judged to be honest, and 
vice versa). It is important to note here that Srull 
and Wyer make no claims to the effect that any 
specific behaviour on the part of the target is 
retrieved from memory, just the evaluative impression. 
Hence this model makes no claim about the relationship 
between memory and judgment of the sort made by 
Bodenhausen (1988).
These last points especially may have implications 
for the eyewitness situation. An eyewitness is 
unlikely to have time to form any but the most basic 
evaluation of a criminal; and, naturally, this 
evaluation is likely to be negative. Hence, according 
to the Srull and Wyer model, when asked to make a 
judgment about, e.g., the appearance of the criminal 
in question, where the eyewitness has no specific 
memory of the feature of the criminal, recall will be 
based upon this negative, central evaluation. Hence 
such judgments are likely to be biassed in a negative 
direction, regardless of the actual appearance of the 
criminal. This implication of the Srull and Wyer 
model is quite intuitively appealing, reminiscent as 
it is of work on the "implicit personality theory" 
(Schneider, 1973; and see also Chapter 4).
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Conclusions
Until recently, the literature on the effects of 
stereotypes on judgments was somewhat incoherent, 
lacking as it did any central focus or model to 
support or attack. Papers by Bodenhausen (1988) and 
Macrae (in press) have helped to rectify this 
situation, although it could still be argued that both 
concentrate on juridic matters almost to the exclusion 
of other matters, such as judgments of other people's 
dispositions, or physical characteristics, which may 
have more external relevance. An analagous charge 
could be levelled at Srull and Wyer (1988), since this 
paper is concerned essentially with impression- 
formation tasks.
Together with papers by Bodenhausen and Wyer (1985) 
and Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein (1987), the papers by 
Bodenhausen (1988) and Macrae (in press) hold that a 
perceiver's social stereotypes may interact in one of 
three ways with incoming social information to produce 
a judgment.
In the jury situation, the selective processing 
hypothesis (Bodenhausen, 1988) appears to give the 
best explanation of the effects produced in the 
laboratory. However, as Hamilton (1979) points out, 
the jury situation is likely to be a special case; 
involving as it does both "memory-based" and "on-line" 
components (Hastie and Park, 1986). Neither the 
biassed interpretation nor the heuristic hypothesis 
can be discounted. Research which addresses tasks
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which are relatively more "on-line" and relatively 
less "memory-based" (i.e., research utilising 
paradigms which are more like real-world situations) 
must consider the effects of stereotypic information 
presented both at encoding and retrieval of 
stereotypic information. The eyewitness memory
situation provides a good paradigm for such an 
investigation, as well as being an important area of 
research in and of itself. The following chapters 
consider the role of stereotypic information in the 
creation of judgments relevant to this area: 
violent/aggressive actions; facial and whole-body
information.
Three hypotheses have been proposed to account for 
when stereotypes will affect judgments made. The 
preponderence of evidence appears to be in favour of 
the integration hypothesis, which holds that both 
stereotypic and non-stereotypic information is likely 
to be used when a judgment is made. Probably, the 
weight which is given to each type of information will 
vary with circumstance, and particularly the 
information load with which the perceiver is asked to 
deal (Locksley at al 1980a, b; 1982; Devine 1989a, b). 
The "average" eyewitnessing situation appears 
intuitively likely to present the perceiver with a 
great deal of information all at once; therefore one 
would predict a powerful effect of stereotypes on 
judgment in this situation. This accords with the
predictions of Srull and Wyer (1989) for the
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impression-formation paradigm. It is with this area 
that the following three chapters aim to deal.
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CHAPTER 3 - DOES SIZE MATTER? THE EFFECT OF BODY-BUILD ON THE JUDGMENT OF AN AMBIGUOUS ACTION
"The bigger they are the harder they hit,"
Woody Allen
",,,not only huge, but horrible huge,"
Ken Kesey: Little Tricker the SquirrelMeets Big Double the Bear
Introduction
The aim of the present experiment is twofold. First, 
by considering the effects of stereotyped 
characteristics on the interpretation of behaviour, it 
acts as a starting point for the investigation of the 
effects of stereotypes in the eyewitness situation. 
Second, it attempts to further present knowledge of 
body-build stereotypes. To address the first issue: 
Some, (e.g.. Reiser, 1976) still hold with the so- 
called "video-recorder" theory of memory which holds 
that all incoming information is stored in its 
original form in memory throughout life. This is 
however hardly the generally accepted view. The 
malleability of human memory has been a subject for 
psychological research at least since Bartlett (1932) 
conducted his first experiments into the phenomenon. 
Among the factors which may be considered particularly 
important in shaping memory are social factors: e.g., 
generic schemata for social events (see Chapter 6), or 
social stereotypes. The powerful implications that 
stereotypic information can have for social memory 
have been demonstrated in a number of studies. 
Principle among these are those presented by Hastie 
(1981); Hastie, Park and Weber (1984); Rothbart, Evans
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and Fulero (1979); Snyder and Uranowitz (1978c); Srull
(1981); Stangor and Ruble (1989); Wyer, Bodenhausen 
and Srull (1984); and Wyer and Gordon (1982/84). All 
of these studies are reviewed in Chapter 6. 
Stereotypic information is likely to impact upon the 
eyewitness situation in at least two fundamentally 
dissimilar ways (discounting for the moment the 
possibility of a third sort of impact - that of the 
retrieval schema - also discussed in Chapter 6). The 
nature of a witnessed crime may bias memory or 
interpretation of a stereotyped aspect of the person 
or persons involved (e.g., facial features); 
alternatively, perception of a particular stereotyped 
aspect of a target (e.g., some aspect of the facial 
features) may bias memory or interpretation of the 
crime itself. These are two sides of the same coin: 
each could, and probably does, have implications for 
real-world situations. The former circumstance comes 
into effect where, for example, a person witnesses a 
particularly violent crime in which witnessing 
conditions are sub-optimal and the witness is unsure 
about, say, facial or body features of the criminal in 
question. At an identification parade, or while 
constructing a Photofit, the witness' memory of the 
violence of the crime might make him/her misremember 
the criminal as having a more stereotypically 
"violent" look than s/he otherwise would have done (a 
broken nose or cauliflower ears, perhaps): leading to 
the arrest or imprisonment of the wrong person. The 
latter circumstance comes into effect where, for
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example, viewing conditions are somewhat better, and 
the witness is able to perceive the criminal as in 
fact being possessed of a stereotypically "violent" 
look (really having a broken nose or cauliflower 
ears). In this instance, the witness might
misremember the incident as more violent than s/he 
would otherwise have done; leading perhaps to a longer 
jail sentence than would otherwise have been given. 
Evidently, it is necessary to consider each of these 
possibilities in an investigation of the effects of 
stereotypes in eyewitness situations. It is the
latter effect which will be investigated in the
present experiment.
Such an experiment could conceivably utilise either 
body or face stereotypes. Whole-body stereotypes were 
however chosen. There were two reasons for this; 1) 
body stimuli may be simpler in nature and easier to 
manipulate than face stimuli, since they appear likely 
to vary along a smaller number of continua; 2)
relatively little research has addressed the issue of 
body-memory or judgment; hence to conduct an
experiment using whole-body stimuli has greater 
marginal utility than to conduct another experiment 
using face stimuli; it provides an opportunity to 
increase scientific knowledge of these potentially 
important stimuli.
Literature Review
The present study is less concerned with the objective 
relationship between physique and psychology, as the
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perceived relationship. It concerns the way in which 
a stereotypic body-build might affect the judgment of 
an action. To this end, it is necessary to review 
here the state of the literature on whole-body 
stereotypes.
Whole-Body Stereotypes: To the extent that everyone
is a "lay psychologist", everyday perceptions of 
character are likely to be influenced by what is seen 
- in this case, whole-body information. To what 
extent then are social judgments mediated by whole- 
body stereotypes?
Much of the work on this question has its basis in 
the research of Sheldon (1927). Sheldon developed the 
idea that the human physique was determined by three 
independent variables, which he termed endomorphy, 
mesomorphy and ectomorphy (although this idea was not 
strictly original to him, being similar to work that 
had been carried out by psychologists and medics from 
Hippocrates to Kretschmer - see Sheldon et al, 1940 pp 
11 - 15, and Eysenck, 1947). Endomorphy referred to 
the relative predominance of "soft roundness" in the 
body; this occurred when the digestive viscera had 
greatest dominance of the bodily economy. Mesomorphy 
referred to the relative predominance of muscle, bone 
and connective tissue, giving the body a generally 
more rectangular appearance. Ectomorphy referred to 
the relative predominance of "linearity and fragility" 
(Sheldon et al, 1940 pp 5 - 6).
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Sheldon's system was a means of classifying any 
human physique on an index of three digits, ranging in 
value from 1 to 7. The first digit referred to the 
relative contribution of endomorphy to that body; the 
second to the relative contribution of mesomorphy; the 
third to the relative contribution of ectomorphy. In 
each case, the digit 1 referred to the smallest 
possible contribution, the the digit 7 to the largest. 
For instance, a 7 1 1 physique would be characterized 
by extreme endomorphy and minimal mesomorphy and 
ectomorphy. A 1 1 7 would be characterized by extreme 
ectomorphy and minimal endomorphy and mesomorphy. A 4 
4 4 would lie at the mid-point of all these scales.
Sheldon's classification system is unfortunately of 
limited use to the researcher into eyewitness memory. 
It takes little account of the factors which might be 
thought most salient when viewing another person; 
factors such as height and weight, and the relative 
length of the limbs. And while a witness to a crime 
might be able to make a fairly accurate judgment of 
the perpetrator's relative endomorphy or mesomorphy, 
say, there is little reason to believe that s/he would 
be able to place the perpetrator's physique with any 
degree of accuracy on Sheldon's scales. Additionally, 
Sheldon's work has more recently come under fire for 
being insensitive to subtle variations in physique 
(see, e.g., Powell et al, 1974). It fails to provide 
any really useful system for the generation of body- 
shapes in the way that Photo-fit, say, provides a 
system for the generation of facial stimuli.
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Nevertheless, Sheldon's system has provided the basis 
for a number of studies in the psychological
literature. Many of these imply that different social 
stereotypes may exist for different body-builds. Some
of the most important are mentioned here.
Lerner and Korn (1972) studied the development of 
body-build stereotypes in males from different age- 
groups between five and twenty years. They found
that, at all ages, the mesomorph was the most 
positively regarded somatotype; and that there was a 
generally negative view of the endomorph and a 
slightly less negative view of the ectomorph: in other 
words, value judgments varied with physique presented. 
Yates and Taylor (1978) had thirty subjects attribute 
sixty personality traits to outline drawings based on 
Sheldon's three primary somatotypes. Somatotypes were 
not only found to be strongly stereotyped, but 
stereotyped in accordance with Sheldon's predictions: 
a rare finding in support of his theory. Hiller
(1982) had college students write stories concerning 
either normal or overweight targets, and found that 
more overweight targets were associated with more 
negative personality characteristics. Iwawaki and 
Lerner (1974) had subjects of each sex attribute 
thirty behavioural descriptions to pictures of male 
endomorphs, ectomorphs, and mesomorphs. Each sex was 
found to give mostly positive evaluations of 
mesomorphs, and mostly negative evaluations of others. 
Strongman and Hart (1968) found that subjects 
considered the mesomorphic somatotype to be associated
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with "competitive aggressiveness" and "assertiveness 
of posture and movement", while the endomorphic 
somatotype was associated with neither of these
characteristics, and the ectomorph was seen as an
introvert. Gacsaly and Borges (1979) had subjects 
attribute twenty-four personality traits to one of six 
body-types, varying by height and somatotype. The 
tall mesomorph was attributed the most socially
desirable personality traits, and the endomorphs the 
least socially desirable personality traits. A
positive image was found for ectomorphs in this study. 
This finding was mirrored by Ryckman, Robbins, Kaezor 
and Gold (1989), who had subjects attribute a variety 
of traits to male and female target mesomorphs, 
ectomorphs, and endomorphs. They found a positive 
stereotype of mesomorphs, and a negative stereotype of 
endomorphs. They also found ectomorphs to be viewed 
in a generally favourable light; an unusual finding in 
the area, and one which might conceivably reflect 
changing societal views about the kind of body-shape 
that is desirable: a phenomenon which may also be seen 
in the growing emphasis on slimming and increasing 
prominence of the "super-model".
Rappoport (1975), in a slight break from traditional 
research in this area, considered male body-height 
stereotyping. She found that stereotyping existed for 
all subjects, although field-dependent subjects 
attributed more positive traits to a tall target than 
did field-independent subjects. This was true for
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both tall and short subjects. Women on the whole were 
found to stereotype less than men.
Biases in Body-Perception: On the basis of the
studies mentioned above, it seems likely that everyday 
social perceptions are mediated to some extent by 
stereotypic judgments made on the basis of physique. 
The picture is further complicated by the systematic 
egocentric biases which also appear to be involved in 
body-perception. Estimates of others' heights and 
weights are notoriously inaccurate. In the US 
criminal case People vs Thomas. a witness had 
described two perpetrators as being each about 5 foot 
8 inches tall, and then went on to pick defendants of 
6 foot 5 inches and 6 foot 4 inches from 
identification parades (Parker, 1973, p 256). Errors 
are made even by trained observers (Clifford and 
Richards, 1977).
Subjects tend to use their own height and weight 
when estimating the height and weight of others (see, 
e.g., Bailey, Shinedling and Payne, 1970; Dunaway, 
1973; Gorchinski, 1973; Williams, 1975). Flin and 
Shepherd (1986) extended the findings of earlier 
studies by using a range of targets rather than just 
one individual. They had targets ask members of the 
public for directions in a busy city centre. Once the 
target had disappeared from view, subjects were asked 
to estimate his height and weight. Both estimates 
varied systematically according to the height and 
weight of the target and, to a lesser extent.
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subjects' own height and weight. Importantly, Flin 
and Shepherd also concluded from their study that 
eyewitness errors were related to initial 
misperceptions of the target's physical 
characteristics, rather than to any subsequent memory 
distortions caused by the body-build of the 
interviewer. Unfortunately, it is unclear which is 
more important: the subject's actual or perceived
height and weight.
This is important because of the general inaccuracy 
of people's perceptions of their own height and 
weight. This effect is especially pronounced for 
overweight people and those who suffer from eating 
disorders, but is by no means restricted to them (see, 
e.g., Glucksman and Hirsch, 1969; Bailey, Shinedling 
and Payne, 1970; Gardner, Martinez and Sandoval, 1987; 
Collina, McCabe, Jupp and Sutton, 1983 - who found
obese subjects to overestimate their own body-size by 
a mean of 19%; and Collins, 1987, who found obese 
subjects to overestimate their own body-size by amean 
of 12%, as against a mean of just 0.88% for normal- 
weight control subjects). Schonbruch and Schell 
(1967, cited in Collins, 1987) summarised this 
literature in concluding that persons with deviant 
physiques made more errors in judging body shape than 
persons with more normal physiques.
Not that these effects are limited to those with 
"deviant" body-builds. Systematic distortions are to 
be found throughout the population. Singer and Lamb 
(1966 - cited in Collins and Plahn, 1988, p 320) found
54
that most female adolescents systematically distorted 
self-estimated physique toward their estimate of their 
ideal physique; and Collins and Plahn (1988) found 
that females tended to underestimate their own body 
dimensions, while males tended to overestimate them. 
Minahan (1971) found that teenage girls tended to 
perceive their figures as more attractive than they in 
fact were. Given that anorexia is most likely to 
develop during the teenage years, it is obvious that 
prediction of the direction of any distortion of self- 
body-image during this period will be extremely 
difficult.
Despite studies such as those reviewed above, the 
issue of whole-body perception and stereotyping has 
consistently failed to receive the attention that its 
social psychological importance warrants. A pair of 
papers by Powell, Stewart and their colleagues 
highlight the basic work that still remains to be 
done.
Powell, Stewart and Colleagues: Powell, Tutton and
Stewart (1974) investigated how different two 
physiques needed to be in order to be stereotyped 
differently. They had fifty subjects rank six 
physiques (two examples of each of Sheldon's 
somatotypes) from "most suiting" to "least suiting" 
each of fifteen concepts. It was discovered that 
"superficially similar physiques, members of the same 
overall somatotype, are clearly differentiated in 
terms of stereotype" (Powell et al, 1974, p 422).
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À follow-up paper by Litman, Powell and Stewart
(1983) made a more controversial claim. They argued 
that the original results may have been an artifact of 
the ranking procedure employed in the experiment. 
Therefore they ran a conceptual replication of the 
experiment, this time not using the ranking procedure, 
but simply having subjects rate targets, one at a 
time, against their own internal standards. Subjects 
were presented with a target, plus six seven-point 
bipolar scales on which to rate it. Again, clear 
evidence was found for systematic differential 
stereotyping of similar physiques. Twenty-three of 
the twenty-four differences found favoured the less 
extreme target.
Litman et al claim that the categorical view of 
whole-body stereotyping (as adopted in the papers 
discussed above) is jeapordised by these findings. It 
would, they claim, require a huge number of stereotype 
categories to account for all possible whole-body 
types. Furthermore, person-perception and
stereotyping may not necessarily be independent 
processes. They may be two sides of the same coin; 
the particular process employed in a given experiment 
depending on the stimuli employed. Where stimuli are 
emotive and logically indefensible, the process will 
be called "stereotyping"; where they are realistic and 
reasonable, it will be called "person perception".
The potential ramifications of this paper for whole- 
body stereotyping research are evident. It is 
possible that while many researchers have believed
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themselves to be investigating the widespread 
influence of whole-body stereotypes, they have really 
been investigating the implications of their own 
target stimuli: hence their conclusions may have less 
external validity than has been claimed for them. 
Within the present field the ramifications are no 
smaller: the eyewitness situation is after all a real 
world situation, involving complex, subtle, and 
meaningful stimuli. Rigorous experimentation on 
eyewitness memory for whole-body information would 
provide a possible means of testing the claims of 
Powell, Stewart, and colleagues.
However, it is possible to argue that the results 
achieved in these papers do not justify the
conclusions reached. From the finding that whole-body 
stereotypes do not map onto somatotypes in a one-to- 
one fashion, Powell, Stewart and colleagues argue that 
such stereotypes may not exist. Certainly, their 
results may justify the claim that whole-body
stereotypes are more fine-grained than earlier studies 
would lead one to believe; but it is a big step from
there to the claim that there is no qualitative
difference between body-stereotyping and perception. 
It is possible to claim that the attribution of
stereotyped characteristics correlates with body-build 
without claiming a direct one-to-one relationship 
between classes of somatotype and stereotype 
categories. Indeed, such a model would fit the
results both of Powell, Stewart and their colleagues, 
and of Lerner and Korn, Yates and Taylor, etc..
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discussed above. If one were to hypothesize, say, the 
trait of introversion to be stereotypically linked 
with the ectomorphic somatotype in such a way that the 
more ectomorphic a target appears, the more 
introverted he is likely to be judged, this would 
account for both types of result. Where a study uses 
just one example of each body-type, evidently the 
ectomorph is likely to be judged more introverted than 
the endomorph or the mesomorph. Where two or more 
examples from each category are given, then more 
ectomorphic targets will be judged more introverted; a 
result analagous to that achieved by Litman, Powell 
and Stewart. This seems an intuitively appealing 
conclusion regarding the everyday use of whole-body 
stereotypes.
Pilot Study
INTRODUCTION The aim of this study was to investigate 
the relationship between perceived size of a male 
target's body, and his perceived aggressiveness. 
Everyday experience, not only of real-world 
interactions but also of, e.g., Hollywood movies, 
implied a stereotypical positive relationship between 
these variables. It was hypothesized that a
significant positive correlation would be established 
between perceived body-size and perceived 
aggressiveness.
MATERIALS Ninety-six still photographs were taken of 
male targets using a Pentax Asahi SPIOOO camera loaded 
with Kodachrome Gold 400 film. All targets were
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photographed against a plain white wall, with heads 
and facial features occluded.
SUBJECTS Ninety-six volunteer subjects were used in 
this experiment. Forty-six subjects were male and 
fifty were female. All subjects were aged between 18 
and 27 years. Each experimental session took a 
maximum of five minutes. None of the subjects was 
paid for participation.
PROCEDURE Each subject rated five photographs on nine- 
point scales on a number of variables: honesty,
intelligence, attractiveness, friendliness, co­
operativeness, and aggressiveness. Correlations were 
calculated between these character traits and the 
perceived body-size of the targets in the photographs. 
Each photograph therefore received five ratings on 
each scale. The exact definition of "body-size" was 
left to each individual subject to determine; if they 
enquired, however, they were told both height and 
weight should be considered.
RESULT A correlation of r - +0.309 was established 
between rated aggressiveness and body-size across the 
targets, p < 0.001 on a one-tailed test. No other 
correlation was significant.
CONCLUSION This provides support for the theory 
that judgments about aggressiveness correlate with 
judgments about body-size. The result also indirectly 
supports the theory proposed above, that whole-body 
stereotyping is unlikely to be a categorical process, 
but that the attribution of stereotyped 
characteristics correlates with body-build. All other
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things being equal, targets of larger perceived body- 
size are likely to be stereotyped as more aggressive 
than those of smaller perceived body-size. This 
implies that whole-body stimuli might be utilised in a 
study in which the variable of aggressiveness was 
studied. This variable has particular relevance to 
the crime situation. The body-size variable might be 
used in the same way that the race variable was used 
in an experiment by Duncan (1976), discussed below.
Heider and Simmel (1944)
This important paper provides an early investigation 
into factors which can affect subjects' judgments of 
ambiguous events. In this case, the factor in 
question was the size of geometric shapes. Heider and 
Simmel had subjects watch a complex sequence of 
actions involving numbers of geometrical shapes, 
including a large triangle (T) , and a small triangle 
(t). Subjects' interpretations of the behaviours 
being performed by the geometrical shapes varied 
partially with the size of the shape - e.g., when t 
moved behind T, t was said to be "following" the 
larger triangle; but when T moved behind t, it was 
said to be "chasing" the smaller triangle. Subjects 
also attributed human characteristics to the shapes in 
trying to explain their behaviour: e.g., T was
troublesome; t was heroic. If such an effect could
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hold for artificial stimuli, it seemed reasonable to 
suppose that it might also hold for human actors.
Duncan (1976)
In a sense, this experiment constituted an application 
of the conclusions reached by Heider and Simmel to a 
more realistic setting: i.e., one in which human
targets were involved. Obviously, the aggressiveness 
of a target person is an important factor in the 
present field of study. A paradigm allowing
investigation of the effect of body-size (and the 
correlated stereotype of aggressiveness) on the 
interpretation of an ambiguous incident would 
therefore have great interest.
Duncan presented subjects with brief video­
recordings ("video-clips") of target persons 
discussing "risky-shift" dilemmas (Wallach, Kogan and 
Bem, 1962). The discussion featured in each clip 
became more and more heated, until one discussant gave 
the other what Duncan describes as an "ambiguous 
shove", i.e., one that was neither obviously violent 
nor obviously playful. The race of target persons was 
varied across conditions: both "shover" (or
"protagonist") and "shovee" (or "victim") could be 
either black or white: giving a total of four basic 
experimental conditions. Each video-clip was
interrupted four times. Subjects were given a ratings 
form based on the Interaction Process Analysis form 
devised by Bales (1979), and asked to use this to rate 
the behaviour of the target who was acting immediately
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prior to each interruption. The rating of interest 
was the final one, i.e., the one immediately following 
the "ambiguous shove".
Duncan found that the shove was more likely to be 
perceived as "violent" when perpetrated by a black 
actor than when perpetrated by a white actor, likely 
to be rated as "more intense", and also that subjects 
were more likely to attribute the cause of the 
behaviour to situational variables in the case of a 
white protagonist and to person variables in the case 
of a black protagonist. Strangely, although he gave 
subjects the opportunity to rate the behaviour as 
"aggressive", Duncan failed to test the effect of race 
on the incidence of use of this category.
Whites, therefore, were thought to have committed 
the act because of the situation in which they found 
themselves; whereas blacks were thought to have 
committed the act because of the type of people they 
were. Duncan concluded that "the threshold for 
labelling an act as violent is lower when viewing a 
black committing the same act" (sic, p 596).
This finding is explained in terms of the stereotype 
of "blacks as violent" acting such as to lower the 
perceptual (judgmental) threshold for violence in 
black actors.
Duncan devotes some space to discussion of the 
attribution data. He had hypothesized that subjects 
would attribute violent behaviour - in all conditions 
- to stable personality traits of the actor. However, 
as noted above, this occurred only where the
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protagonist was black. Duncan explains this by 
reference to the suggestion made by Jones and Nisbett 
(1971) that "the illusion that our reactions are 
perceptions is sustained in part by the apparent 
consensus accompanying most of our reactions, a 
consensus that may rest as much on transmitted 
cultural norms as on the compelling features of 
objective 'reality,'" (Duncan, 1976, p 597, my 
italics). Hence, not only dispositional, but also 
situational attributions are strongly affected by the 
action of stereotypes. The term "situational
attribution" (as used here at least) may indeed be a 
misnomer; to judge by Duncan's conclusion, 
"situational attributions" seem to be a special type 
of "dispositional attribution" (subjects appear to 
have applied to certain actors a stereotype of the 
sort "the type of person likely to be influenced by 
situational factors"). This will come as no surprise 
to students of the fundamental attribution error.
Duncan's conclusion may be worth repeating here, 
since it ties in his study with the subject matter of 
the present thesis:
"It would appear that the black man is imbued (stereotyped, categorized, etc.) with such salient personality properties (e.g. given to violence) that these traits tend to engulf the field rather than be confined to their proper position, the interpretation of which required additional data about the situation. Dispositions then are treated as causal and are "packaged". Cronbach (1955) and Mischel (1968) recently spoke of these packages as an implicit personality theory, an intuition about how traits interact."(Duncan, 1976, his italics).
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Saaar and Schofield (1980): Sagar and Schofield held
that Duncan's study raised more questions than it 
answered. They wanted to discover whether the 
phenomenon would generalise to black subjects: Duncan 
having used only white subjects in his'study.
In an effort to generalise from Duncan's materials 
to other materials, they gave their subjects (black or 
white sixth-grade children) oral descriptions and 
artist's renditions of four different dyadic 
interactions: bumping in the hallway, requesting food 
from another student, poking a student in the
classroom, and using another's pencil without asking. 
Four different sets of stimuli were used, each
depicting one of the four possible pairings of black
and white protagonist and victim. Subjects rated the 
behaviour occurring in each picture on four traits 
(playful, friendly, mean, threatening), using seven- 
point scales in each case. They then rated the 
personality characteristics of protagonist and victim 
on sets of seven-point scales (e.g., thoughtless- 
considerate, strong-weak).
Sagar and Schofield achieved parallel results to 
Duncan: i.e., behaviours performed by black actors
were perceived as more "negative" (i.e., more
mean/threatening) than identical behaviours performed 
by white actors; although the incidence of "positive" 
(i.e., playful/friendly) ratings did not vary with 
condition. This effect obtained for both black and 
white subjects. Ratings of personality were heavily
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influenced by the depicted behaviour and the stimulus 
person's role: protagonist or victim. Protagonists
were judged to be ruder, meaner, more thoughtless, 
threatening, unfriendly, and less likeable, than 
victims.
Sagar and Schofield conclude: "... in the existing
social order, the stereotype is all too real. To 
activate it, the person engaging in an ambiguous 
behaviour need only be black" (Sagar and Schofield, 
1980 p 597).
A Paradigm for Investigation of the Effect of Body- 
Size Stereotypes on Judgment of an Action: Given the
relevance of Duncan's design to the present situation, 
and validation of his results by Sagar and Schofield, 
it was decided that a similar paradigm would be 
appropriate for investigation of the effects of 
perceived body-size on the interpretation of actions. 
Particularly appealing was the fact that the paradigm 
had already demonstrated an effect of social 
stereotypes on judgments. Hence it might be expected 
to demonstrate the effect again if indeed it was 
present: perceived body-size should affect the
judgments made about ambiguous actions.
Experiment 1
The hypotheses of the present experiment were:
1) large perceived body-size should cause 
similar reactions to black skin-colour in Duncan's 
experiment. In other words, an "ambiguous shove"
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administered by an actor with a large perceived body- 
size should be viewed more negatively than a similar 
shove administered by an actor with small perceived 
body-size. It could be perceived as more violent (as 
in Duncan's experiment), more aggressive, or, 
combining the ratings on these two scales, more 
violent/aggressive. The actions of a perceived larger 
target should also be judged as more intense than 
those of a smaller perceived target, although this is 
not central to the experiment: it is not a necessary 
condition of a stereotypic action that it is perceived 
as more intense than a non-stereotypic action. The 
stereotypic action of the larger perceived target 
would be more likely attributed to stable personality 
traits than to external forces or the situation in 
which the actor found himself.
2) smaller perceived body-size should cause 
similar reactions to white skin-colour in Duncan's 
experiment: i.e., reversing the stereotype of targets 
with a larger perceived body-size.
The effects of the actual body-size of the actors 
was also considered, although this manipulation was 
not central to the experiment. Subjects' perceptions 
of the actors' body-sizes was the more important 
measure; this manipulation acted to check whether the 
experimental manipulation of body-size was the same as 
subjects' perceptions of this variable.
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Methodology
Design: To ensure maximum validity, the design of the
present experiment closely paralleled that of Duncan 
(1976), with the exception that body-size rather than 
race of target was varied. Otherwise, changes in 
experimental paradigm were limited. In Duncan's 
experiment, subjects were misled into believing that 
they were actually witnessing, via closed-circuit 
television, an ongoing interaction between two other 
experimental subjects. In the present study, however, 
subjects were led to believe that they were witnessing 
a video-recording of an interaction which had taken 
place between two experimental subjects earlier in the 
week. This change was made for two reasons: partly
because Duncan's original paper did not specify what 
function the manipulation was supposed to serve, and 
partly because of the simple fact that the layout of 
the St Andrews School of Psychology did not permit 
copying of the original set-up. The one conceivable 
advantage of Duncan's approach is that subjects 
believed themselves to be watching a real interaction, 
rather than a pair of actors plying their trade. 
However, it is believed that this problem was 
circumvented by telling subjects at the time of the 
experiment that they would be viewing an encounter 
video-recorded previously. This approach had the 
advantage that subjects did not find themselves in the 
melodramatic position of apparently viewing a "live" 
interaction dissolving into an aggressive
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confrontation which had to be broken up by the 
experimenter as in Duncan (1976, p 593).
Another break from Duncan's procedure was to provide 
subjects with photographs and brief (fictional) 
biographical details about targets in the experiment. 
The purpose here was to impress upon subjects the 
divergence or similarity (as the case happened to be) 
of the body-sizes of the targets. This was a 
necessary break with Duncan's procedure: whereas race 
is an instantly recognisable characteristic even when 
a target is seated at a table, body-size is somewhat 
less so.
Materials: The stimulus material was a videotape of
two of a total of four actors (chosen to be divisible 
into two pairs on the basis of height and weight) 
discussing a situation derived from the "dilemma of 
choice" or "risky shift" item list constructed by 
Wallach, Kogan and Bem (1962). The actors were four 
white males, all aged between twenty-five and twenty- 
seven years. Two actors, used as "large" targets, 
were each approximately six foot one inch tall, and 
weighed approximately one hundred and seventy-five 
pounds. The others, used as "small" targets, were 
each approximately five foot ten inches tall, and 
weighed approximately one hundred and fifty pounds. 
This relatively small absolute difference in body-size 
was employed since this was believed to make the 
experimental materials more realistic. No actor had 
particularly distinctive or obtrusive features. All
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were casually dressed, as in everyday life. The 
dilemmas used were the same as those used by Duncan 
(1976); i.e., numbers 1 and 2 from the list provided 
by Wallach et al. The discussion of interest was that 
which centred around dilemma number 1 (see Appendix 5 
for an account of this dilemma, and also a copy of the 
script employed). The warm-up item (i.e., the first 
video-clip watched by subjects,) was number 2 from the 
list, concerning a man with a heart ailment who must 
choose between changing his way of life or undergoing 
a potentially lethal operation.
These video presentations were constructed in two 
stages; 1) a few days before the recordings were to be 
made, three actors came to the School of Psychology to 
improvise discussion of the dilemma of choice 
situations. A number of these improvisations was 
conducted, and all were tape-recorded. Tapes were 
later played back to determine which led most 
convincingly to the altercation culminating in the 
"ambiguous shove". This tape was then transcribed in 
the form of a script. 2) The four actors involved 
learned the script, and performed it on videotape.
Following Duncan's own procedure, the comparability 
of behaviours depicted in the video-clips was tested 
by having independent subjects rate the personalities 
of the actors involved in each clip. Both actors in 
each clip were rated by eight independent subjects on
t
thirteen character traits, using seven-point scales. 
These data were subjected to analysis of variance. 
For no character trait was an effect of video-clip
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found; indicating that actors did not act in 
significantly different manners across clips (Appendix 
1, Tables 1 - 12). Hence inter-clip similarity was 
comparable to that in Duncan's experiment.
The ratings forms used in this experiment contained 
a simplified version of the Interaction Process 
Analysis (IPA, Bales, 1970). The ratings system was 
simplified in the same way as in Duncan (1976) - i.e., 
the number of ratings categories was reduced, and only 
periodic, rather than continuous, ratings had to be 
made.
Instructions for use were presented with each IPA 
ratings sheet. These read;
"The observer should make one rating each time there is a pause in the video­recording. Upon receiving the signal the observer should rate the behaviour which took place immediately prior to the signal. In making the rating the observer should do, in order, the following things; (1) decide which person (A or B) was emitting the behaviour to be rated and then circle either A or B at the top of the rating sheet; (2) decide into which of the 10 major categories the behaviour falls and circle the number of that major category; (3) indicate whether the behaviour was of relatively low intensity or high intensity by making a check mark on the scale to the right of the major category being used; (4) fill out the three subscales under the major category being used. As soon as all these steps have been completed, turn over the filled-out rating sheet and get ready for the next rating signal. If the behaviour to be rated does not fall into one of the ten categories provided, circle # 11 (Uncategorizable) and briefly describe the behaviour. Use this category, however, only as a very last resort. It is important to note that each rating should be done on a separate sheet and only one person (A or B) and only one category of behaviour (one of
70
the ten categories) are scored on each rating. Also, a rating is to be made only when the signal is given."
The ten major categories used (as in Duncan, 1976) 
were; dramatizes, gives information, gives opinion, 
gives suggestion, asks for information, asks for 
opinion, asks for suggestion, playing around, 
aggressive behaviour, and violent behaviour. Each 
category name was accompanied by a nine-point 
intensity scale, and three minor categories 
("subscales"), each presented with its own nine-point 
scale. Aggressive and violent behaviour categories 
had the subscales provoked - unprovoked, intentional - 
unintentional, and consequential - trivial. 
Dramatizes and playing around categories had subscales 
emotional - calm, enthusiastic - unenthusiastic, and 
show-off - modest. Gives information, gives opinion, 
and gives suggestion were accompanied by subscales 
tactful - tactless, intelligent - unintelligent, and 
autocratic - democratic. Asks for information, asks 
for opinion, and asks for suggestion were accompanied 
by subscales inhibited - uninhibited, demanding - 
undemanding, and soft - loud. The rated intensity of 
the behaviour of the targets was calculated by 
combining the ratings administered by subjects on the 
major scale chosen and its associated sub-scales.
Subjects : Subjects were forty white undergraduates
and postgraduates from the University of St Andrews, 
aged between eighteen and twenty-seven years. Twenty-
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one subjects were female, nineteen male. All were 
recruited through a sign in the School of Psychology 
offering £2 for participation in a study of 
"interpersonal behaviour research". Only one subject 
participated in the study at a time. Each subject was 
randomly assigned to one of the four experimental 
conditions.
Procedure : On arrival, each subject was escorted to
the Social Psychology Laboratory. Here s/he found a 
desk and chair at a comfortable distance 
(approximately two metres) from a television and 
video-recorder. On the desk was a copy of the IPA 
ratings system (see above).
The subject was told that, earlier in the week, 
independent subjects had been invited to the School of 
Psychology to discuss a number of simple issues in 
front of the camera.
The subject was then given instructions very close 
to those given by Duncan to his subjects. The subject 
was told;
"The instructions for the use of these materials are given at the top of the sheet. In a moment I will give you time to read them and ask any questions you may have about them. First I want to tell you a little about this ratings system. This study is part of a project aimed at developing a new system for rating of interpersonal behaviour. As you can see, this new system involves quite simple categories of behaviour.This is because it is intended for non­professional observers. In the recordings of the interactions which you are about to watch, there will be a number of points at which the screen will
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go blank. At these points I want you to complete your ratings. You won't have a lot of time, so respond quickly. Now you will do ratings of two interactions. The first is by way of practice. I will stop the video-recorder after the first practice series to answer any questions you might have. Please do not ask any questions until the end of the first interaction."
Design: Each subject was randomly assigned to one of
the
following experimental conditions (clips): large
protagonist - small victim; small protagonist - large 
victim; large protagonist - large victim; small 
protagonist - small victim.
Each videotape contained two interactions. The 
first "warm-up" risky shift situation acted as the 
subject's "practice rating" - see above. As in 
Duncan's study, the subject was given two practice 
ratings during this interaction (which lasted 
approximately five minutes). After the practice run, 
the experimenter checked the subjects' responses to 
ensure that the rating system was understood and was 
being used correctly. If the experimenter was 
satisfied that this was in fact the case, he restarted 
the video-recorder to show the subject the second 
(experimental) video-clip.
This interaction was also approximately five minutes 
long. Immediately after the "ambiguous shove", the 
screen went blank, signalling the subject to rate the 
interaction. This was the subject's second rating 
during this particular clip.
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The experimenter collected the subject's completed 
ratings forms and asked him/her to complete a short 
questionnaire. This questionnaire was introduced in 
the following manner:
"Pick out a sequence of behaviour which left an impression on you and answer the questions on the form as they pertain to that interaction. Better yet, why don't you use the last sequence of behaviour which you rated [reminding subjects of the altercation in which A shoved B]."
This wording was used, as in Duncan (1976), so as to
give the impression that any behaviour sequence would
do, but the experimenter had made a spur-of-the-moment
decision to use the final interaction. A number of
nine-point scales was presented in the questionnaire,
concerning a) extent to which observed behaviour
should be attributed to external forces, b) extent to
which it should be attributed to the actor as a
person, c) extent to which it should be attributed to
the issue discussed (stimulus) and d) other (this
category was left open for interpretation by the
subjects, as in Duncan's experiment, but could be
interpreted as meaning some combination of the a, b,
and c, as suggested by Duncan). Finally, subjects
were asked which person in the video-clip they
believed to have been physically larger. If they
could remember which target (if either) was said to
have been larger, they were asked to give this answer;
otherwise they were asked to guess on the basis of
their perception of the video-clip.
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After completing this questionnaire, subjects were 
fully debriefed by the experimenter and paid.
Results
The results of this experiment fall into two discrete 
categories. Results for perceived and for actual 
body-size are presented separately.
Perceived Body Size: The raw data by perceived body-
size are given in Table 3.1. It can be seen from this 
table that there are unequal numbers of subjects per 
cell, and also that there are only three data-columns 
- for equal, large-small, and small-large pairings. 
This is because different numbers of subjects 
perceived the body-size pairings in each of the three 
different ways. Although two sets of equal body-size 
pairings were used (two large actors in one pair, two 
small actors in the other) subjects obviously could 
not be aware that a pair of targets that appeared of 
equal size were in fact "large" or "small" targets. 
Only four behaviour categories - playing around, 
dramatizes, aggressive behaviour, and violent 
behaviour - were used in the rating session. This 
pattern of responses is identical with that found by 
Duncan (1976). 82.5% of the ratings (thirty-three of
forty) used the categories "aggressive" or "violent". 
Twenty-three ratings (or 57.5% of the total) fell into 
the "aggressive" category.
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MajorCategory.
Equal Large-small Small-large
PlayingAround 2 0 0
Dramatizes 4 0 3
AggressiveBehaviour 2 14 7
ViolentBehaviour 0 6 2
TABLE 3.1 - MAJOR CATEGORY FREQUENCIES BY PERCEIVED PERPETRATOR/ VICTIM BODY-SIZE PAIRINGS
Chi-square revealed that perceived body-size 
pairings significantly affected the number of 
"violent" judgments made (1) = 4.0688 p < 0.05). A 
greater number of "violent" judgments was made in the 
perceived large protagonist/small victim condition 
than the perceived small protagonist/large victim 
condition, or the perceived equal size condition. 
This confirms one of the most important hypotheses of 
the present experiment. Although body-size pairings 
were not found to affect statistically the number of 
"aggressive" judgments made (1) = 2.8232 p > 0.05), 
a similar trend can be seen in the raw data. 
Perceived body-size was also found to affect the 
number of playing around/dramatizes judgments made
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(2) = 14.8036 p < 0.01), although one must be cautious 
in interpreting this, because of the small numbers 
involved.
When aggressive and violent ratings were combined, 
chi-square remained signif icantr'TC ^ ( 2) - 6.8920 p <
0.05. Except in the single case of "aggressive" 
judgments (which shows a similar trend but is not 
statistically significant), all of these results 
conform to the experimental hypotheses, above; with 
the implication that perceived body-size may affect 
judgment of an action in a manner parallel to that of 
race in Duncan's original experiment.
When results were broken down by body-size pairing, 
two pairings were found to affect judgments made. 
Where perceived body-size was e q u a l ^ (1) = 6.175 p < 
0.05, and where a large protagonist was matched with a 
small victim, (1) = 5.7318 p < 0.05. In the case
of equal perceived body-sizes, six of eight ratings 
fell at the playing around/dramatizes (or more 
"positive") end of the spectrum; whereas in the case 
of a large perpetrator and small victim, all twenty 
ratings fell at the aggressive/violent (or more 
"negative") end. With a small perpetrator and a large 
v i c t i m , 2(1) = 2.4535 p > 0.05: the distribution of 
ratings judgments in this condition appeared more 
evenly spread. These findings are all in accordance 
with the hypotheses: a larger perceived protagonist
was expected to be judged more negatively than a 
smaller perceived protagonist or one whose body-size 
was identical with that of his victim. Where body-
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sizes were perceived to be equal, ratings were 
expected to fall at the more positive end of the 
spectrum. No specific hypothesis was advanced for the 
case of a perceived small protagonist and large 
victim.
The next thing to be considered was perceived 
intensity of the action. The raw data generated here 
are presented in histogram form in Figure 3.1. 
Perceived intensity of actions was calculated by 
combining the intensity ratings of the major 
categories and subscales used in rating the behaviour 
of the targets at the point where the ambiguous shove 
was administered. These ratings were then subjected 
to analysis of variance. No effect of perceived body- 
size pairings was found: F(2,37) = 1.2660 p = 0.2939, 
and there was no interaction between perceived body- 
size pairing and intensity of particular behaviour 
rated: F(6,lll) = 1.1187, p = 0.3561 (see Appendix 2, 
Table 1). This ran counter to hypothesis, although, 
as mentioned above, this hypothesis is not central to 
the experiment.
Attributional behaviour: In the questionnaire
administered at the end of each session, subjects were 
asked four attributional questions concerning the 
behaviour of the protagonist on the video-clip (see 
above) . It was predicted that when the protagonist 
had a larger perceived body, his aggressive behaviour 
would more likely be attributed to stable internal 
forces, and less to varying external forces, than when
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he had a smaller perceived body. Attributions made 
for the various perceived body-size pairings were 
examined using analysis of variance. The raw data are 
presented in graph form in Figure 3.2. Given the 
permissible combinations of perceived body-size, 
(i.e., large-small, equal, and small-large,) no 
interactions could be studied, only the main effect of 
body-size per se. This was not significant: F(2/37) = 
0.0942 p = 0.9103 (see Appendix 3, Table 1). Neither 
was the interaction between body-size and attribution 
significant: F(6/lll) = 1.0390 p = 0.4040. Body-size 
had no significant effect on the attributions to any 
of the four possible causes: F (2,37) = 0.1028 p =
0.9026 on attributions made to external forces; 
F(2,37) = 1.4170 p = 0.2553 on attributions made to 
internal forces; F(2,37) = 0.4266 p = 0.6559 on
attributions made to the situation; F(2,37) = 0.5243 p 
= 0.5963 on attributions made to "other" forces - see 
Appendix 3, Tables 2 - 5 .  Although perceived body- 
size did affect the perceived nature of ambiguous 
actions, subjects did not seem to see this as a direct 
consequence of the actions of different motivational 
factors on actors with different body-sizes. The more 
negative perceived nature of the actions of the 
perceived larger actor were not seen to be caused, as 
in Duncan's experiment, by stable personality traits 
as opposed to changeable external environment.
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Any explanation of such an effect must necessarily 
be tentative and post hoc; however it is conceivable 
that, body-size being a less immediately obvious 
variable than race, subjects failed to "think through" 
their judgments; simply making judgments in a more or 
less visceral or automatic manner, without trying to 
attribute causes to them.
Actual body-size: Raw data by actual body-size are
presented in Table 3.2. This condition is less 
relevant to the eyewitness situation, but is included 
as a check on the data for perceived body-size.
Chi-square was used to determine whether the body- 
size of the targets in the video-clips affected the 
number of "violent" ratings given. This was not found 
to be the case; "Jt?(l) = 0.4000 p > 0.05. The number 
of "violent" ratings given was not affected by the 
body-size of the targets. Table 3.2 shows however 
that a large proportion of all the ratings given fell 
into the "aggressive" category.
Considering the "aggressive" category alone,^2(i) = 
0.8043 p > 0.05. Combining the incidence of
"aggressive" and "violent" ratings, a similar negative 
result was found: = 0.5700 p > 0.05.
Therefore, although incidence of use of the 
aggressive/violent categories was found to vary with 
perceived body-size, it was not found to vary with 
actual body-size.
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Large-large Small-small Large-small Small-largeMajorCategory ___________________________________________________________
PlayingAround 0 1 0  1
Dramatizes 3 1 3  1
AggressiveBehaviour 8 5 5 5
ViolentBehaviour 2 3 2 3
TABLE 3.2 - MAJOR CATEGORY FREQUENCIES BY PERPETRATOR/VICTIM BODY- SIZE PAIRINGS !
Hence the experimental manipulation of body-size does 
not seem to have accorded precisely with subjects' 
perceptions of body-size. Neither did actual body- 
size have any significant effect on the incidence of 
"playing around" or "dramatizes" ratings given:^^2(3) 
= 3.0480 p > 0.05. Hence, actual body-size appears 
not to affect the number of "negative" or "positive" 
judgments made.
The effects of the different combinations of body- 
size on behaviour ratings category used were subjected 
to chi-square. For the small protagonist/large victim 
condition,*^ 2 (3) = 4.4000 p > 0.05. For the large
protagonist/small victim condition,^^/(3) = 5.2000 p > 
0.05. For the small protagonist/small victim 
condition, (3) = 4.4000 p > 0.05. For the large
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protagonist/large victim condition, however, there was 
a significant effect of behaviour rating category 
used:’X M 3 )  = 18.3250 p < 0.001.
The next area to be considered was the perceived 
intensity of the behaviour of the targets. The raw 
data are presented in histogram form in Figure 3.3. 
No effect of actual body-size was found here, F(3/36) 
= 1.5223 p = 0.2253 (Appendix 2, Table 2).
Attributional Behaviour: The raw data are presented
in graph form in Figure 3.4.
Neither size of protagonist nor victim had a 
significant effect on attributions of behaviour to 
external forces: F (1,18) = 0.1427 and 0.0857 p =
0.7101 and 0.7730 respectively; there was no 
significant interaction, F(l,18) = 0.4623 p = 0.5052 
(Appendix 4, Table 1).
Attributions to internal factors were equally 
unaffected by actual body-size: F(l,18) = 0.2312 p = 
0.6364 for body-size of protagonist; F(l,18) = 1.4015 
p = 0.2519 for body-size of victim; F(l,18) = 1.5632 p 
= 0.2272 for the interaction (Appendix 4, Table 2).
The same situation held for attributions to the 
situation: F(l,18) = 0.4706 p = 0.5014 for body-size 
of protagonist; F (1,18) = 0.5145 p = 0.4824 for body- 
size of victim; and there was no significant 
interaction between the two, F(l,18) = 0.0058 p =
0.9401 (see Appendix 4, Table 3).
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Finally, the number of attributions to "other" 
factors was not affected by the body-size of the 
protagonist: F(l,18) = 0.4353 p = 0.5177, nor was
there a significant interaction between body-size of 
the protagonist and victim and number of such 
attributions made: F(l,18) = 1.9990 p = 0.1745
(Appendix 4, Table 4). However, body-size of victim 
did have a significant effect on number of 
attributions made to "other" factors: F(1,18) = 5.9024 
p = 0.0258. More attributions to "other" factors were 
made when the victim was large than when the victim 
was small: however this is a very difficult effect to 
interpret.
Discussion
The predictions were that the actions of targets with 
larger perceived body-sizes would be judged in a more 
"negative" manner than those of targets with smaller 
perceived body-sizes, and that these actions would be 
seen as more internally-driven and more intense than 
would be the case with a smaller perceived 
protagonist. The first hypothesis was supported. 
When the protagonist was perceived as larger than his 
victim, all the ratings made were found to fall at the 
negative end of the spectrum. No significant effect 
was found for the number of "aggressive" ratings given 
in this condition; although there was a trend in the 
predicted direction. A significant effect was found 
for the number of violent ratings, and for the 
combined total of aggressive and violent ratings given
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(i.e., those which fell at the more "negative" end of 
the spectrum).
This result appears to reflect the powerful action 
of stereotypes: the actions of persons with a larger 
perceived body-size seem to be judged more negatively 
than those of persons with a smaller perceived body- 
size. It is however difficult to pinpoint the 
location of this effect. This experiment fails to 
discriminate between three possible locations for the 
effect: body-size stereotypes may affect the number of 
"violent" judgments given, the number of "aggressive" 
judgments given, or may affect both. In Duncan's
(1976) experiment, the race variable acted to increase 
the number of "violent" ratings given, rather than the 
number of "aggressive" ratings given. Extrapolating 
from this result, it might be argued that larger 
perceived body-size would act in the present 
experiment to increase the number of "violent" rather 
than "aggressive" ratings given. However, as
mentioned earlier, Duncan failed to investigate the 
effect of race on the number of "aggressive" ratings 
given. Additionally, it was hypothesized that, in the 
present experiment, larger perceived body-size would 
be associated with a greater number of aggressive 
judgments, since a correlation between perceived body- 
size and rated aggressiveness had previously been 
discovered. No effect of perceived body-size on 
number of aggressive judgments was however found; 
although there was a significant effect of perceived 
body-size on the combined number of aggressive and
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violent ratings given. Hence the present experiment 
does not show whether body-build stereotypes act to 
increase only the number of violent judgments given, 
or whether they also have a (smaller) effect on the 
number of aggressive judgments given.
One possible explanation presents itself. It may be 
an extremely difficult task to make the distinction 
between aggressive and violent behaviour. 
Conceivably, no two subjects are likely to make this 
fine-grained distinction in exactly the same way. Any 
two given people may have different ideas about 
exactly when an "aggressive" action becomes a 
"violent" action (or vice versa). It could therefore 
be argued that a combination of these two "negative" 
categories provides the best measure of the exact 
operation of stereotypes in this situation.
Another finding that ran counter to hypothesis was 
that an increase in targets' perceived body-size did 
not give a corresponding increase in rated intensity 
of their actions. This hypothesis was however by no 
means central to the experiment: the main hypotheses 
could easily have held true despite this. It is 
possible that the effect of intensity of action in the 
perceived body-size condition was swamped by the 
larger effect under consideration. The fact that no 
effect was found should not necessarily be considered 
hard evidence that the effect does not obtain: simply 
that an independent experiment may be necessary to 
discover this for certain.
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An hypothesis that was central to the experiment was 
that the behaviour of large perceived protagonists 
would be seen to be due to relatively stable internal 
traits rather than fluctuating external events. This 
hypothesis is central to the concept of stereotyping: 
a personality stereotype is an attribution about 
enduring traits of the target in question, not 
external forces acting upon the target.
As suggested above, it is possible that the subtle 
nature of the stereotypes under investigation here is 
responsible for the fact that no significant effect 
was found for the attributions given. Subjects may 
have failed to "think through" their attributions in a 
way in which they might have done had a more obvious 
variable (like race) been employed. The only 
difference found in attribution of behaviour was a 
significant effect of the actual body-size of the 
victim on the number of attributions made to "other" 
(as opposed to "internal", "external", or 
"situational") factors. As argued above, the actual 
body-size of the targets was less important to this 
experiment than their perceived body-size; hence this 
is by no means a central finding. In the absence of 
any other effect on attribution, this is hard to 
explain; indeed, any explanation that could be given 
must be of a post-hoc nature.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the actual body-size of the 
actors involved had little effect upon interpretation 
of their actions. This experiment was an
investigation into the action of stereotypes, and
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these stereotypes were present only in the eyes of the 
beholders. In a real-world situation, these results 
suggest that a crime may be interpreted as more 
aggressive when committed by a larger person than when 
committed by a smaller person. However this will only 
hold where the criminal is in fact perceived as being 
large. Witnesses' perceptions of criminals' body-size 
appear unlikely always to accord exactly with the 
actual body-size of those criminals (Clifford and 
Richards, 1977; Flin and Shepherd 1986).
Against the conclusions reached here it could be 
argued that the effects seen in the perceived body- 
size condition were due not to perception of body-size 
changing perception of action, but to the opposite 
process. Perhaps when a more aggressive/violent 
action is perceived, then a larger body-size is 
deduced for the protagonist. However, this is 
unlikely to be the case: this argument carries the
implication that there was a systematic difference in 
quality of actions across video-clips. That this was 
not the case can be seen from the fact that 
independent subjects rated there as being no 
significant differences between clips, and the fact 
that no actual body-size pairing (i.e., no clip) was 
rated differently from any other. Hence the effects 
discovered appear to be caused by different 
stereotyping of targets with different body-sizes.
In a final summary of the results, then, it can be 
said that while the judgment of ambiguous actions does 
not appear to be affected by targets' actual body-
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sizes, it does appear to be affected by their 
perceived body-sizes. In the perceived large
protagonist/small victim condition, an "ambiguous 
shove" is seen in a more negative light than in the 
perceived small protagonist/large victim condition, or 
when both are perceived to be of equal size. However 
a marginally significant effect was discovered in the 
small perceived protagonist/large perceived victim 
condition for aggressive/violent behaviour: hence it 
could be argued that the effects discovered are due 
less to the relative largeness of the protagonist in 
one condition, as to the perceived body-size disparity 
in each condition. This appears unlikely however, 
given that a positive correlation was discovered 
between perceived body-size and perceived 
aggressiveness, and that a significant effect was 
found in the large perceived protagonist/small 
perceived victim condition.
Finally, this experiment successfully demonstrated a 
powerful effect of the body-size stereotype on 
interpretation of an ambiguous action. Where a target 
is perceived to have a larger body-size, his actions 
appear to be judged as more aggressive/violent than 
when the target is perceived to have a smaller body- 
size. The fact that this effect held even under the 
conditions reported here - where an actual height 
difference of just three inches was employed - points 
to the likely pervasiveness of the effect in real-life 
conditions, in which larger body-size discrepencies 
may frequently be encountered. Where real-life
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protagonists are larger than those used here, the 
effect is likely to be even more pronounced.
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CHAPTER 4: BUILDING OFFENDER PROFILES: THE EFFECT OFSTEREOTYPIC INFORMATION ON THE RECONSTRUCTION AND JUDGMENT OF FACIAL STIMULI
"I am a suspicious-looking person, I know, 
because I have no chin."Jan McEwan: Butterflies
Introduction
Experiment 1 considered the effect of a stereotyped 
feature (body-size) on the judgment of an ambiguous 
action. Experiments 2 and 3 consider an effect which 
may be more widespread in the real world: how the
presentation of stereotypic information affects 
reconstruction of facial stimuli (in Experiment 2) and 
body stimuli (in Experiment 3). Similar paradigms are 
used in these two experiments, in an effort to allow 
parallels to be drawn between the two types of 
stimuli. Facial stimuli are considered first. There 
follows a review of the literature on facial 
stereotypes. A number of areas are considered, 
including the validity or otherwise of facial 
stereotypes; the way in which these stereotypes may be 
maintained; memory for facial features; and the 
stereotyping of faces for intelligence, 
attractiveness, and occupation. Finally, some
methodological issues are considered.
Literature Review
Memory for faces has received more attention in the 
psychological literature than perhaps any other aspect 
of the eyewitness situation. Recent years have seen 
the publication of a large number of books concerned 
with perception and memory for faces: e.g., Bruce
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(1988/91); Davies, Ellis and Shepherd (1981); Ellis, 
Jeeves, Newcombe and Young (1986); and Young and Ellis 
(1989). Most of this work does not concern itself 
exclusively with the eyewitness situation; however, 
the majority is at least tangentially relevant. One 
would search in vain for similar reviews concerned 
with whole-body features, say, or gait. Cutler,
Penrod and Martens (1987) argue that, in the "average" 
eyewitnessing situation, the face and hair are such 
important memorial cues that they "outshine" all other 
features.
The literature on perception, judgment, and memory 
for face stimuli is too vast and wide-ranging to
receive adequate attention here, or, indeed, probably
in any single volume. The majority of such work is of 
course outside the present focus anyway. For present 
purposes, only the influence of stereotypes is
considered. This literature is itself extremely 
large; effects having been shown for perception (e.g., 
Secord, Bevan and Katz, 1956), memory (e.g., Bartlett, 
1932), and judgment (e.g., Macrae and Shepherd, 
1989a).
The ubiquitous nature of physiognomic stereotypes 
can be appreciated if the briefest thought is given to 
the number of arenas in which they are encountered. 
Folklore holds that people "with their eyes too close 
together" are untrustworthy, and that "women with long 
warty noses may be on intimate terms with the powers 
of darkness". Writers of fiction employ the
stereotypes in a manner that verges on the subliminal;
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yet thriller writers, for example, rarely chronicle
the adventures of cross-eyed private eyes. Everyday
encounters are certainly mediated by such stereotypes,
although it is anyone's guess to exactly how great an
extent. As Shepherd, Ellis, McMurran and Davies
(1978) observe:
"If systematic distortions in the perception and recall of faces do occur, there may be practical implications for groups such as the police who often collect descriptions of suspects from witnesses to crimes. Clearly, these witnesses, and to an even greater extent the victims, may be in a state of high emotional arousal, and may hold strong attitudes towards the suspect they are describing. In such cases, distortions in recall would be expected to occur." (Shepherd, Ellis, McMurran and Davies, 1978, pp 263 - 264.)
It is this important area which is addressed in the 
present experiment.
The Validity of Physiognomic Stereotypes: The
systematic study of this area has a history which 
extends at least as far back as Lombroso (1911, cited 
in Shepherd, 1989): and the history of conjecture 
about the area may extend centuries further than that. 
The heyday of research came in the 1920s and 30s, as 
part of the then-current interest in "constitutional-, 
psychology".
There was some theoretical justification for the 
view that character could be inferred from facial 
features, Darwin (1904) pointed out that, since the 
facial muscles are implicated in the expression of 
emotion, character might be inferred from measurment 
of the relative development of these muscles in the 
individual. And Allport (1937) remarked that
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individuals possessed of stereotypically-linked 
physiognomy might adopt traits imputed to them by the 
rest of society. However, the findings were mostly 
negative (see, e.g., Cleeton and Knight, 1924; Hull, 
1928; also Atherton and Ley, 1971). Hence the area 
was neglected for many years, with the exception of 
work by Sheldon and his colleagues (see Chapter 3).
Relatively recently, however, three papers have 
appeared which seem to be minor exceptions to the 
generally negative rule. Squier and Mew (1981) 
studied the correlation between facial structure and 
score on the 16PF scale in groups of subjects with 
differing faces. They found long, angular faces to be 
associated with naivete and naturalness; and short, 
square faces with shrewdness, discreetness, and 
susceptibility to emotion. Two other relatively 
recent studies with positive results were reported by 
Terry and Snyder (1972), and Terry (1975), who found 
that high-school students showed not only highly 
consensual but also accurate judgments in identifying 
three different social categories from photographs of 
unknown students. Since one of the categories 
investigated was "beauty queens", however, one must 
speculate as to the difficulty of this task.
Taken alone, these studies may not constitute 
undeniable evidence that physiognomic stereotypes are, 
after all, valid; but certainly imply that a second 
look at the area might be valuable.
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Mechanisms Underlyina Physiognomic Stereotypes: With
the general failure to discover any relationship 
between physiognomy and psyche, the psychological 
literature turned to descriptive studies of the 
stereotypes in question (see, e.g., Bradshaw, 1969; 
Hochberg and Galper, 1974; Hurwitz, Wiggins and Jones, 
1975; and MacGregor, Abel, Bryt, Lauer and Weissmann, 
1953), and, more ambitiously, attempts to discover how 
and why such stereotypes arose. Secord (1958/59; 
Secord and Bevan, 1956; Secord, Bevan and Katz, 1956; 
Secord, Dukes and Bevan, 1954) was the founding father 
of this research. His methodology has since been 
advanced by Cunningham (1986) and Berry and MacArthur 
(1986), whose work lies outside the scope of the 
present review.
Secord (1958) suggested two mechanisms by which 
stereotypic responses to faces might be mediated. 
First, it is (virtually) always a salient cognitive 
response to another person to assign him/her to 
certain social groups (by, e.g., age or sex), and this 
categorisation can be performed on the basis of 
certain undoubtedly valid physiognomic cues. Such 
categorisation will provide a basis for stereotypic 
attributions. Second, stable dispositions may be 
inferred from relatively transient facial expressions; 
e.g., inferring on the basis of a passing smile that a 
target person is of a happy disposition. Attribution 
theory holds that, in the absence of other 
dispositional information, such cues are likely to be 
utilised by the perceiver. A third possible mechanism
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is mentioned by Shepherd (1989): It is possible that 
certain facial attributes have evolved as means of 
communicating such selectively-important states as 
dominance or dependence, and these attributes form the 
foundation of many social judgments. These remain the 
cues most likely to underlie stereotypic phenomena 
associated with physiognomic information (Shepherd, 
1989).
Memory, Judgment, and Attributes of the Face: The
present sub-section briefly considers the literature 
on face-memory, and attempts to demonstrate that, 
while much previous work has considered individual 
features of target faces, emphasis should now be 
shifted to take more account of global attributes. 
Specifically it is argued that, despite the wealth of 
research on face-memory in the psychological 
literature, little research has addressed the issues 
most important in the social situations in which face- 
memory is usually employed in the real world. 
Research into the effect of stereotypes on face-memory 
is well-positioned to help fill this gap. The sub­
section ends with a brief consideration of the way in 
which judgments of facial stimuli are made, contending 
that similar arguments can be made for this paradigm.
The earliest work on face memory (which used 
recognition paradigms almost exclusively: recall
paradigms having been used with regularity only during 
the last fifteen years or so) was concerned with the 
relative memorability of different parts of the face
99
(e.g., Hanawalt, 1944; Howells, 1938). This work 
generally supports two complementary conclusions: 
that, with the exception of the hair outline, the eyes 
and mouth are the most salient parts of the face for 
memory (presumably because they are "expression- 
carrying" - Clifford and Bull, 1978, p 72, and Argyle, 
1967 - and also vital to social interaction - Argyle 
and Cook, 1975), and that upper features tend to be 
more important than lower features. A good example is 
the work of McKelvie (1976), who presented subjects 
with photographs of faces with or without eyes or 
mouths masked, and then tested recognition memory for 
these faces. He found that masking eyes caused 
significantly more errors than masking mouths. 
Goldstein and Mackenberg (1966), testing a population 
of school-children, found that covering upper features 
had a greater effect on subsequent recognition of 
school friends than covering lower features; and 
Friedman, Reed and Carterette (1971) found facial 
features to be important to recognition in the order: 
nose, eyes, forehead, mouth. Ellis, Davies and 
Shepherd (1975), using a Photofit kit, found that 
subjects selected features in the order: hair and
forehead; eyes; nose; mouth and chin. Shepherd, Ellis 
and Davies (1977) had subjects write descriptions of 
ten of one hundred target photographs of male faces. 
From four hundred descriptions generated, frequency 
counts were made of the number of times each feature 
was mentioned and the number of subjects using the 
particular feature description. Of thirteen discrete
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facial features identified, upper face features 
received most attention: Hair, forehead, eyebrows, and 
eyes together accounted for nearly half the total 
number of feature descriptions given. A similar 
result was found by Ellis, Shepherd and Davies (1980), 
using colour prints of two male faces, with varying 
delay intervals. The pattern of results achieved was 
strikingly close to that reported by Shepherd et ai. 
The primary importance of the hair is stressed in a 
literature review by Shepherd, Davies and Ellis 
(1981).
For further research on the relative importance of 
different facial features to memory, see, e.g., 
Garneau (1973); Langdell (1978); Nash (1969); Seamon, 
Stolz, Bass and Chatinover (1978), and studies of eye- 
movement during face perception by Cook (1978); Luria 
and Strauss (1978); Walker-Smith, Gale and Findlay
(1977); and Yarbus (1967).
While these findings have great value to anyone 
conducting research into face memory, more recent work 
has emphasised the importance of the facial Gestalt 
over individual features. This has an intuitive 
appeal when everyday experience is taken into account: 
e.g., the fact that it is possible to recognise as 
adults people we knew only as children, by which time 
individual features will presumably have changed, 
leaving only the pattern the same.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence for this 
argument comes from Fisher and Cox (1975). They 
revealed to the observer progressively greater amounts
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of target photographs of famous persons, doing so 
either horizontally or vertically. This allowed them 
to see not only which features were most important in 
facial recognition, but whether pairs of features had 
additive or multiplicative effects. They found that 
lower features contributed 15% more information in the 
context of upper features than when presented alone, 
and that the addition of eyes produced the greatest 
increase in recognition performance. However, only 
12% of subjects were able to recognise target faces 
when eyes were presented alone. Further evidence
comes from Homa, Haver and Schwartz (1976), who found
that features presented within the context of the face 
were significantly better remembered than features 
presented alone.
Others have found face-memory to depend upon 
attributes of a whole face: e.g.. Cross, Cross and
Daly (1971) found memorability to be an inverse 
function of normality: i.e., the more normal a face, 
the lower its memorability (see also below); and 
Peters (1917, cited in Ellis, 1975) found memorability 
to be a function of "pleasantness". A similar finding 
was made by Shepherd and Ellis (1973) for the
attractiveness of a face: memory of an undistinctive 
target face was at chance level after only five weeks. 
However they found no evidence for increased 
forgetting with time for a distinctive face. Clifford 
and Bull (1978) make the telling observation that, 
when using Photofit, subjects rarely describe targets 
in terms of discrete features, using instead such
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global descriptions as "fierce-looking". This is
supported by Mueller and Thompson (1986, Expt. 2). 
They had subjects generate traits applicable to twelve 
famous personalities, either before or after a 
recognition task which involved picking from an array 
famous faces which had previously been presented. 
Subjects who wrote down trait information before the 
memory task were expected to analyse the presented 
faces in terms of "deep traits"; the others in terms 
of "shallow traits". As predicted, subjects who wrote 
the largest number of traits ("high-trait-generators") 
made fewer false alarms on testing than "low-trait- 
generators". Mueller and Thompson termed the process 
of trait-generation "stereotyping". Although their 
use of the term differs from that of most social 
psychologists, their results indicate that subjects 
did not rely upon feature information to improve 
performance in the memory task, but on some 
supervenient quality.
All of this is evidence that future work on the
memorability of face stimuli would do well to
concentrate on attributes of faces rather than
discrete features. Shepherd, Davies and Ellis (1981)
conclude their review of face fragmentation studies
with the following comment :
"Upper features are generally better cues for reintegrative purposes than lower ones. Eyes in particular emerge as powerful aids, though eyes in isolation are not particularly effective.This latter finding underlines one deficiency of all fragmentation studies, namely the way in which the normal facial Gestalt must be broken up, giving rise, perhaps, to abnormal or unusual processing strategies. Before drawing any more general conclusions regarding the saliency of
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various aspects of the face, studies which have striven to retain a normal whole-face at all stages of study should be surveyed."(Shepherd, Davies and Ellis, 1981, p 119)
A similar argument can be made for stimuli mediating
judgments of target faces. To take just one example,
judgments of intelligence do not appear to be made on
the basis of any single facial cue. Gurnee (1924)
found that no single facial part correlated
significantly with whole-face judgments of
intelligence; the balance of parts appearing
essential. Secord et ai (1954) found no single
physical feature of a face to be associated with
intelligence; although Laser and Mathie (1981) did
find correlations of intelligence ratings with facial
length and eyebrow thickness, and McArthur and Apatow
(1983 - 84) found a correlation with eye size.
Shepherd (1989) concludes his survey of this
literature with the comment that:
"It is unlikely that any single trait of physiognomy will be related to judgments of intelligence. What evidence there is points to a constellation of feature attributes which add up to general attractiveness."(Shepherd, 1989, pp 300 - 301.)
This conclusion, reinforced by the research of
Brunswick (1956), Clifford and Walster (1973), Cook 
(1939), and McArthur and Apatow (1983 - 84), further 
strengthens the notion that global features of faces 
are those upon which social judgments most depend. It 
is a we 11-documented phenomenon that the more 
"average" or "normal" the inter-relationship of facial 
features, the more likely is a face to be judged 
attractive (Benson and Perrett, 1991/2; Pollard 1986,
104
cited in Shepherd, 1986). It appears important for 
research in this area to take more account of the 
attributes of facial stimuli (attractiveness, 
stereotypicality, etc.) than has been the case in the 
past.
It is to this literature that the present study aims 
to contribute. Particularly germaine to Experiment 2 
is previous research considering memory for and 
judgment of physiognomic stereotypes associated with 
intelligence, attractiveness, and criminal occupations 
in facial stimuli. These are reviewed briefly below. 
Obviously, studies involving stereotypes of honesty 
and aggressiveness would also be applicable here: 
however I am not aware of any work in these areas, 
other than that by Macrae and Shepherd (1989).
Intelligence:
"The assessment of intelligence from the face has preoccupied psychologists and physiognomists for centuries. Before the advent of intelligence tests, and after, physiognomists tried to devise an index based upon measurements of the skull and face which would yield a measure of intellectual capacity. Lavater (1804) in the eighteenth century believed he had found such a formula, though it was never systematically tested." (Shepherd, 1989, p 299.)
The majority of research into the physiognomic 
stereotypes of intelligence was carried out during the 
"constitutional psychology" boom of the mid-century, 
and most was concerned with testing the validity of 
such stereotypes. Here, constitutional psychology had 
an unusual, if modest, success. Gaskill, Fenton and 
Porter (1927) had judges rank for intelligence
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photographs of 11 - 12 year old boys. The correlation 
between these ranks and measured IQ was .42: although 
the very extreme range of IQ scores used renders the 
generalisability of the results questionable. 
Anderson (1921), Cook (1939), Laird and Remmers 
(1924), and Moriwaki (1929) all found median positive 
correlations up to .3.
Shepherd (1989) summarises this literature as 
demonstrating that judges usually agree on rankings of 
target faces, but that such orderings are usually only 
weakly correlated with external measures. Work by 
Hollingworth (1935 - who compared the attractiveness 
ratings given to gifted adolescents with those given 
to adolescents of normal intelligence,) and that cited 
above by Clifford and Walster (1973) and McArthur and 
Apatow (1983 - 84), makes Shepherd's conclusion appear 
all the more valid. This is supported in part by a 
finding of Shepherd, Ellis, McMurran and Davies 
(1978). Photofits of a target face were constructed 
under the belief that the target was either a murderer 
or a lifeboat captain. When the target was believed 
to be a murderer, generated faces were judged to be 
significantly less "intelligent" and significantly 
less "good-looking" than when he was believed to be a 
lifeboat captain.
Such findings show the necessity of taking into 
account the "attractiveness" factor when seeking 
differences in perceived "intelligence" in 
experimental stimuli, as in the present experiment.
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Attractiveness : Research into facial attractiveness
has had a somewhat different slant from that concerned 
with intelligence. Judgments of attractiveness cannot 
be tested against external criteria; hence the 
majority of research has considered levels of inter­
rater agreement. While impressive research has been 
conducted here, (see, e.g.. Cash 1981, Berscheid and 
Walster 1974,) this is not the area of concern here.
The stereotypical basis of facial attractiveness has 
come under psychological scrutiny only relatively 
recently, perhaps because of the methodological 
difficulties involved in the work. The main problem 
is probably in trying to isolate factors that 
consistently affect perceived attractiveness across 
the large range of possible stimulus groups (infants 
to senior citizens of both sexes and all races) , all 
of which presumably boast "more" and "less" attractive
members. The most important single study in the area
however is probably that conducted by McArthur and 
Apatow (1983 - 84), in which they discovered
attractivess in adult males to be associated
particularly with increased maturity of features (the 
opposite of the case with adult females). A similar 
discovery was made by Keating (1985).
In attempting to explain such results, the 
literature has expended much energy in considering the 
communicative functions of "babyish" and "mature" 
stimulus configurations (e.g., Cunningham, 1986) - in 
females, for example, perceived "submissiveness" may 
have selective importance, while the opposite may hold
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for males. Little energy has however been expended on 
arguing for the idea of a Platonic form (or "optimal 
stimulus configuration"), to which more attractive 
faces may tend. Of course, it is possible that the 
Platonic form tends towards the "mature" in males and 
the "babyish" in females (Benson and Perrett 1991/2).
Different approaches to the quantification of human 
facial attractiveness have been taken by orthodontists 
- who have related measurements of parts of the face 
to measurements of facial attractiveness - and studies 
by Hirschberg, Jones and Haggerty (1978) and Milord
(1978) have applied multi-dimensional scaling to the 
same problem. Hirshberg et al (1978) used photographs 
of nine male black and nine male white faces for 
target stimuli. Thesetargets were known to vary on a 
previously-developed Face Differential Scale. 
Subjects were asked to rate the similarity of all 
possible pairs of stimuli, and also to rate the faces 
on a number of physical and psychological 
characteristics. Additionally, physical measurements 
were taken of a number of facial features of each 
photograph. The dimension accounting for most 
variance in the judgments was the race dimension, with 
which no psychological ratings were correlated. The 
second dimension (called "desirability") was related 
to ratings on such scales as "likeable",
"attractive", and "pleasant". There were positive 
correlations with "chin type" and "nose profile". The 
third dimension was labelled "masculine maturity", 
which was correlated with the psychological
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characteristics of "strength", "masculinity" and 
"maturity", and ratings of the physical features 
"moustache", "beard" and "sideburns". The fourth 
dimension was "face shape", correlated with one 
physical and one psychological dimension; and the 
fifth dimension was correlated with ratings of 
"relaxed" vs. "tense" and "eye-shape". Finally, the 
sixth dimension was related to face flatness and neck 
thickness for white, but not for black, subjects. As 
Shepherd, Ellis and Davies (1981) point out, it is an 
interesting feature of these results that in some 
cases dimensions were related to global aspects of the 
target faces but not to specific features; while in 
other cases they were associated with a specific 
physical feature, but no psychological characteristic. 
In a similar experiment. Milord asked subjects to 
judge the similarity of pairs of young white male 
target faces, and found that the dimension that 
accounted for most variance correlated positively with 
ratings ofthe "pleasingness" and "beauty" of the 
faces, and negatively with ratings of their 
"uniqueness".
Some studies appear to show an advantage of 
attractive over unattractive faces in memorability; a 
finding which might be taken to imply a similar 
advantage for "intelligent" over "unintelligent" 
faces. Cross, Cross and Daly (1971) found better 
recognition memory for attractive than unattractive 
faces, across a range of social categories, in an 
experiment in which subjects were led to believe that
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they were to be judging the facial beauty of a set of 
stimuli. This was not caused by length of exposure 
time - since subjects spent longer attending to faces 
of medium attractiveness - but may have been due to 
more "active attention" paid to the facial Gestalt 
(this interpretation can however be queried: see
Shepherd, 1981). The findings of Benson and Perrett 
that more average faces are perceived as more 
attractive throw some doubt over this assertion, since 
a number of studies in the literature appear to have 
found poorer memory performance for typical than 
atypical faces (see Valentine, 1991, for a brief 
review). Yarmey (1975) found that faces rated low on 
attractiveness were later better recognised than faces 
rated high or medium. Memory for faces has
consistently been shown to be better following more 
elaborate processing (see, e.g., Bower and Karlin 
1974, Winograd 1978). Winograd (1981) holds that this 
effect is due to the greater chance of encoding a 
distinctive facial feature following more elaborate 
encoding.
Although there does appear to be a high level of 
cross-cultural agreement on standards of facial 
attractiveness (Cross and Cross, 1971; Thakerar and 
Iwawaki, 1979), these levels may not always be so high 
as those achieved within a single culture (compare, 
for example, the inter-rater correlation achieved by 
Madden and Hollingworth, 1932, with that achieved by 
Dion, 1973; and see also Milord, 1976); hence it is 
probably practical to limit target stimuli in face-
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processing experiments to examples drawn from just one 
culture, at least until such time as these differences 
have been quantified.
Occupations : Stereotyped notions of both criminal
and conventional occupations have received attention 
in the literature. It is the former which are of 
greater interest here.
Three studies have shown agreement across judges in 
the assignation of male faces to criminal categories. 
Shoemaker, South and Lowe (1973) had subjects select 
from an array of twelve photographs those most and 
least likely to have committed one of four types of 
crime. Judges agreed significantly in both positive 
and negative directions, indicating a shared facial 
stereotype of four types of "criminal" - homosexual, 
murderer, robber, and traitor. Bull and Green (1980) 
presented ten photographs of young male adults to 
forty-eight members of the public, who had to ascribe 
each of eleven listed crimes to the faces. No 
consensual agreements were found for faces ascribed to 
the crimes of arson, theft, rape, or burglary. 
However, consensual agreements were found for the 
faces that best fitted the crimes mugging, robbery 
with violence, company fraud, soliciting, possession, 
and gross indecency. In each of these cases, one face 
was chosen more frequently than the others. Golstein, 
Chance and Gilbert (1984) arranged facial photographs 
of white middle-aged men into five equal, separate 
arrays. Subjects were told that each array contained
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one mass murderer, one armed robber, one rapist, one 
medical doctor, one clergyman, and one engineer. 
Attributions of occupation category to photographs was 
found to be significantly non-random. A small number 
of photographs was frequently selected for what 
Goldstein et al term "good guys" and a small number 
for "bad guys". These choices also tended to be 
occupation-specific, although this effect was more 
pronounced for criminal than non-criminal occupations. 
This effect may be caused by "some kind of 
unintentional 'matching-to-sample' technique, wherein 
the 'sample' is a prototypic image or other memory 
representation of a face" (p 551).
It is unfortunate that none of these studies used 
target persons with known criminal records, since no 
inference can be made about the accuracy of these 
inter-rater agreements. Lombroso (1911) would argue 
that the agreements might well be veridical, holding 
that there is indeed a set of physiognomic signs of 
criminality, including low forehead and facial 
asymmetry.
This very issue was addressed by Thornton (1939). 
He selected case records and photographs of twenty 
criminals, showing the photographs to a group of 
subjects who were required to say which of four 
possible crimes they thought the criminal had 
committed. Although the accuracy of these judgments 
was above chance, Thornton concluded that the effect 
was so slight as to be negligible. Hence it appears 
unlikely that judgments made in the experiments cited
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above were in fact veridical, although the possibility 
cannot be discounted entirely.
Kozeny (1962, cited in Bull and Green, 1980) 
obtained photographs of seven hundred and thirty 
convicted criminals, and divided these into sixteen 
categories by crime type. From each category a 
composite portrait was produced, which showed a 
statistical difference in the physiognomies of the 
different groups. This effect is perhaps less likely 
to be caused by genetic factors than by social 
expectations of the behaviour of persons possessed of 
certain physiognomies: Cavior, Hayes and Cavior (1975, 
cited in Bull and Green, 1980) found that low physical 
attractiveness contributed to criminal deviancy. This 
effect appears to operate even in the world of very 
young children: see Rich (1975) and Bull and Green
(1980) for further development of this argument.
The real-world importance of such physiognomic 
stereotypes does not end here. As Bull and Green 
remark:
"...witnesses of a criminal incident may unwittingly permit in their identifying of a suspect, their expectations about him (or her) to play a role. That is, for example, when witnesses attempt to pick a person out from an identification parade they may merely pick out the person who best resembles their expectation of what a certain criminal should look like."(P 50)
Three studies in the literature have considered 
memory and occupational stereotypes (criminal or 
otherwise). These studies are discussed in the next 
sub-section, along with the other study which is
113
especially germaine to the present work, that by 
Shepherd (1991).
Stereotypes. Memory and Judgment of Face Stimuli: 
Given the number of papers that have been published on 
the subject of face memory, it is perhaps surprising 
that so few have considered the effect - particularly 
relevant here - of stereotypic information upon face 
memory. Judging from the powerful effects
demonstrated for stereotypes in the literature, (from 
studies of biographical material by Snyder and 
Uranowitz, 1978c, to actions performed in video­
recordings by Duncan, 1976, to pictures shown to 
children by Martin and Halverson, 1983,) one would be 
naïve to expect stereotypic information to have no 
effect in this instance. The few studies which have 
addressed this issue are reviewed below.
Klatzky, Martin and Kane (1982) report a study 
which, although utilising a recognition rather than a 
recall paradigm, is nevertheless germaine. Klatzky et 
al were studying categorical perception of faces by 
occupation. Subjects were found to be able to assign 
faces to occupations at above-chance levels in a 
forced-choice task. On a subsequent memory task, 
recognition performance was found to be superior for 
stereotypically-linked than for non-stereotypically- 
linked faces: implying that category membership may
play a role in the encoding of faces.
Bartlett (1932) demonstrated an analagous effect of 
occupational stereotypes on recall. He found verbal
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recall of previously-presented line-drawings of 
military personnel to be biased in the direction of 
then-current stereotypes of soldiers.
Two experiments that are particularly relevant to 
the present work are those by Macrae and Shepherd 
(1989a) and Shepherd (1991). Both studies demonstrate 
the distorting effect of stereotypic information on 
later reconstruction of facial stimuli, and judgment 
of those reconstructed stimuli by independent judges,
Macrae and Shepherd (1989a) present what is perhaps 
the best controlled study yet to be conducted into the 
effect of stereotypes on memory for faces. In pilot 
studies, they identified four target photographs of 
males, two of which had been rated at the opposite 
ends of the honesty dimension and two at the opposite 
ends of the aggressiveness dimension. These targets 
were all matched for age and attractiveness. Each 
subject viewed a videotape consisting of a picture of 
one of the faces and a commentary describing either an 
assault or a theft. Subjects in the "assault" 
condition were presented with either a face that had 
previously been rated as high or a face that had 
previously been rated as low in aggressiveness, while 
subjects in the "theft" condition were presented with 
either a face that had previously been rated as high 
or one that had previously been rated as low in 
honesty. The commentary informed them that the 
individual in the photograph was suspected of 
committing the crime in question, and they were asked 
to rate the likelihood of the target's guilt, using
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only the face information available. Macrae and 
Shepherd found that, for both incidents, subjects 
considered the defendant with the stereotypically- 
linked physiognomy more likely to be guilty.
This study is somewhat reminiscent of a study by 
Shepherd (1991 - personal communication). Subjects
were presented with a male target face along with 
biographical material supposedly pertaining to the 
target person. In one condition the target was said 
to have received a 2i degree, and in the other a 2ii 
degree; otherwise this material was identical across 
conditions. Later, subjects were asked to reconstruct 
the face they had seen, using a Photofit kit. The 
attractiveness of these reconstructions was then rated 
by independent judges. Those made by subjects who 
were told that the target received a 2i degree were 
judged significantly more attractive than those made 
by subjects who were told that the target received a 
2ii degree. The study was an elegant demonstration of 
the effect of the stereotypical notion of the link 
between intelligence and attractiveness on the 
reconstruction of facial stimului.
Experiment 2 constitutes an attempt to replicate 
this finding, and also to investigate the effect of 
the criminal stereotype isolated by Macrae and 
Shepherd (1989a) on reconstruction of a target face, 
in an attempt to clarify the results achieved in the 
previous experiment, and to extend present knowledge 
of the effects of stereotypic information upon memory 
and judgment in the eyewitness arena.
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Methodological Points:
1 ) TIME OF PRESENTATION OF STEREOTYPIC INFORMATION
Classically, there are two strands to the research 
into the effects of stereotypic information on memory 
or judgment. Investigators have considered the 
effects of stereotypes presented at encoding of target 
material and (less frequently) those of stereotypes 
presented at retrieval. The literature on the effects 
of stereotypes presented at encoding is a particularly 
complex one. This literature will be exhaustively 
reviewed in Chapter 6, but for the moment a more or 
less random sampling of the results reported might 
give an idea of its contradictory nature. Rothbart
(1981) found that stereotype-consistent information 
was better recalled than inconsistent or irrelevant 
information; O'Sullivan and Durso (1984) also found 
that consistent information was best remembered, but 
only when very inconsistent information was also 
presented; Hastie and Kumar (1979) found better recall 
for inconsistent information; and a similar result was 
found by Crocker, Hannah and Weber (1983).
The social cognition literature therefore gives no a 
priori grounds to predict what type of information - 
consistent or inconsistent with the physiognomic 
stereotype of the criminal - will be better remembered 
by an eyewitness when stereotypic information is 
present at encoding; or indeed whether either will be 
better remembered. Given that there is potential here 
to elicit extra information from an eyewitness, as
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well as potential for an eyewitness' account of a 
crime to undergo systematic distortion, it seems only 
sensible that systematic investigations into the area 
should be performed.
A smaller literature exists on the effects of 
stereotypes presented at retrieval: one which centres 
around the ongoing controversy surrounding the seminal 
paper by Snyder and Uranowitz (1978c), on the effects 
of a "lesbian stereotype" on memory for a biography of 
the fictional character, Betty K. Calls for greater 
emphasis in the literature on stereotypes presented at 
retrieval (see, e.g., Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein, 
1987; Bodenhausen and Wyer, 1985,) have unfortunately 
gone all but unanswered; because of either the thorny 
nature of the area, or the fact that the majority of 
models of effects of stereotypes on memory take little 
account of the possibility of this effect (see Chapter 
6). Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein write:
"There is a great deal of research documenting the importance of encoding operations and organizational processes, but there is a relative dearth of evidence provided by social cognition research documenting retrieval effects" (p 879).
Experiment 2 will take the opportunity partially to 
fill this hole in the literature by considering the 
effects of stereotypes presented both before and after 
target information.
2) THE NATURE OF TARGET STIMULI Ekman (1978) isolated
three categories of facial information by which
stereotyping might be mediated. These are: 1. static
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signs with a very slow rate of change, e.g., the 
structure of the skull, 2. faster-changing signs, 
e.g., quantity of hair, wrinkling of skin, and 3. 
rapid signs: like muscular contractions which
temporarily alter the shape of a facial feature, or 
facial expressions which communicate emotion. Most 
real-life judgment and memory tasks presumably rely 
more heavily upon the first two types of sign, and 
less upon the third, since the third type is usually 
likely to carry least information. Most laboratory 
stimuli, however, fail to discriminate between the 
types of sign. It is difficult to tell, for example, 
whether the sneer in a still photograph is the long­
term consequence of a target's sneering disposition, 
or a short-term reaction to the infacility with which 
the photographer handles his camera.
The use of schematic faces rather than still 
photographs as experimental materials has the 
advantage that rapid signs are eliminated, but the 
consequent disadvantage that much individuating 
information is lost. Artist's sketches and Photofit 
reconstructions may be more realistic; but may produce 
poor likenesses. Photofit appears to produce a worse 
likeness than a witness' own sketch (Ellis, Davies and 
Shepherd, 1978, and see Davies, 1981, for a discussion 
of different face recall systems). Also, the lines 
which appear between Photofit features appear to 
disrupt processing (see, e.g., Ellis, Davies and 
Shepherd, 1979). Both Photofit and Identikit
(Laughery, Duval and Fowler, 1977, cited in Davies,
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1981) appear to lack sensitivity. Neither kit appears 
able to utilise all the information available in a 
target face. Video-recordings presumably produce the 
most realistic materials, but have the disadvantage 
that it is hard to generalise from one very specific 
set of video-recorded faces to the general population. 
There is also the problem of selecting lighting 
conditions, poses, and expressions, and keeping these 
constant across targets.
Photofit was the system employed by Shepherd, Ellis, 
MacMurran and Davies (1978), who claimed that,
although the system often produced poor likenesses, it 
did seem a useful method by which to investigate 
systematic biases in visual recall. The Mac-a-Mug
system, while basically similar, is something of an 
improvement over Photofit in that it eliminates
horizontal lines across the face, and requires no 
special training to use (although it does not overcome 
the problem of interference caused by subjects' 
perusing a large number of features: Davies, Shepherd 
and Ellis, 1979; Laughery, Fessier, Lenorovitz and 
Yoblick, 1974). The many facilities which Mac-a-Mug 
offers for enlargement and reduction of facial 
features, movement of features relative to one 
another, and application of many different types of 
shading, also make it an extremely subtle instrument. 
It might therefore be considered to go some way 
towards balancing the pay-offs of photographic stimuli 
and schematic faces. A subject can add or subtract 
rapid signs, and make the face more or less schematic.
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at will. Mac-a-Mug is not the perfect system for this 
type of research, but is probably the best currently 
available.
One other change was made here from the Shepherd et 
al methodology. In the original experiment, only 
female subjects and judges were used, presumably 
because of the (arguable) female superiority with such 
systems (see Ellis, 1975; McKelvie, 1978). In the 
present study, both male and female subjects were 
used, since this gives a more realistic representation 
of a genuine eyewitnessing situation. Besides, what 
gender difference there is, may lie in the opposite 
direction for violent crimes like assault, and vary 
with type of crime witnessed (Clifford and Scott, 
1978; Kuehn, 1974). Hence it seemed appropriate to 
use both male and female subjects in the present 
experiment.
Experiment 2
The two pairs of reconstruction conditions in this 
experiment are reported separately as Experiments a 
and b.
Experiment 2a
The hypotheses of this experiment are listed below.
1. Where subjects are told a target committed an 
assault, the faces generated should be judged more 
stereotypically "aggressive" than when subjects are 
told that the target committed a theft. Where 
subjects are told a target committed a theft, the
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faces generated should be judged more stereotypically 
"dishonest".
2. Effects should be less pronounced, although 
still significant, when stereotypes are presented 
after than when they are presented before to-be- 
remembered information.
Methodology
Subjects : Subjects in this experiment were fifty-four
undergraduate and postgraduate volunteers, who took 
part for a small fee. Thirty subjects were female, 
twenty-four male; with an age range of 18 - 26 years.
Apparatus : An Apple Macintosh computer loaded with
the Mac-a-Mug programme was used for both generation 
of target images and their later reconstruction.
Materials : Original target stimuli were generated by
asking eighteen volunteers (ten male, eight female, 
all students aged 20 - 25 years) to come separately to 
the laboratory and use the Mac-a-Mug programme to 
create face images. They were asked to create images 
of adult male faces which they knew at least 
moderately well. Each volunteer was given fifteen 
minutes for this task. All were explicitly informed 
of the intended use of these images. The eighteen 
faces thus generated were submitted to six independent 
judges (Honours Psychology undergraduates from the 
University of St Andrews) who rated them on nine-point 
scales for the dimensions intelligence.
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attractiveness, honesty, and aggressiveness. Only 
target faces that were balanced on these dimensions 
were used in the experiment. Six target faces 
fulfilled this criterion (see Appendix 6, Tables 1 - 
4).
A two-hundred word biography was constructed in two 
stages; four randomly-selected postgraduate students 
from the University of St Andrews were asked to write 
brief autobiographies, simply detailing important 
events in their life from childhood to the present. 
These were combined using a cut-and-paste technique 
until a single, coherent narrative was obtained. 
The biographies used in the Experiments a and b were 
identical except that the biography used in Experiment 
a stated that the target was accused of committing 
either an assault or a theft, while that used in
Experiment b stated that the target received either a 
2i or a 2ii degree. since the biography used in 
Experiment a therefore made no mention of criminal 
behaviour on the part of the target until the final 
sentence, it could be claimed that this material was 
somewhat ambiguous, and subjects would be unable to 
tell whether the target's criminal behaviour was 
caused by his criminal disposition, or by some special 
force of circumstance acting at that point of his
life. In the latter case, the crime might be thought 
less stereotypically-linked than in the former case. 
Nevertheless, it was considered that the advantages of 
using directly comparable biographies in the two
experiments outweighed any advantage that could be
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gained through the alteration of the biography used in 
Experiment a. (The biographies are reproduced in 
Appendix 11.)
Procedure : One of the six target images was presented
to each subject either before or after presentation of 
the biography. Target images were presented randomly 
to subjects, with the proviso that all of the images 
were presented to an equal number of subjects. Each 
subject was given three minutes to read the biography, 
and then administered a five-minute, unrelated, filler 
task, after which s/he was instructed in the use of 
the Mac-a-Mug programme and asked to regenerate the 
target image. Once the subject was happy with the 
regenerated image, the image was printed, and the 
subject allowed to leave.
The two sets of images thus generated (i.e., in the 
assault and theft conditions) were submitted to a 
panel of six independent judges and rated for 
aggressiveness, honesty, and likeness to the original 
target.
Results
The raw data by reconstruction condition and 
stereotype presentation time are presented in Table
4.1. An example of one of the target faces and 
subsequent regenerations of this face, one for each of 
the two experimental conditions, are given in Figure
4.1, below.
Likeness Aggressiveness
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Honesty
Condition
Assault M 4.492 6.042 4.575SD 0.922 2.236 3 . Oil
Theft M 4.392 4.150 5.408SD 2.234 3.149 2.626
TABLE 4.1 - MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR RATINGS OF REGENERATED IMAGES, "ASSAULT" AND "THEFT" CONDITIONS
All regenerated images were first analysed for their 
likeness to the target images, to ensure that any 
effects obtained could not be attributed to the 
greater likeness of images to target stimuli in one 
condition than the other. Likeness did not differ 
significantly with reconstruction condition, F(1/20) = 
0.0323 p = 0.8592, or with time of stereotype
presentation, F(l/20) = 4.3942 p = 0.0510 (see
Appendix 7, Table 1).
Neither was there a significant interaction between 
reconstruction condition and time of stereotype 
presentation for likeness of regenerated images to 
targets, F(l/20) = 0.1516 p = 0.7012 (Appendix 7,
Table 1). Hence, any differences in judgments across 
reconstruction conditions or stereotype presentation 
times could not be attributed to the greater likeness 
of regenerated images in one condition than another.
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Assault condition
?
Theft condition
FIGURE 4.1 - TARGET FACE WITH SUBSEQUENTREGENERATIONS, "ASSAULT" AND "THEFT" CONDITIONS
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Next, the entire data set was subjected to analysis 
of variance. A significant main effect of
reconstruction condition was discovered, F(1/20) =
4.6889 p = 0.0426; overall, images regenerated in the 
"assault" condition were found to be attributed higher 
scores on the aggressiveness and honesty scales than 
those regenerated in the "theft" condition. This was 
not affected by time of stereotype presentation, 
F(l/20) = 2.3028 p = 0.1448. A significant
interaction was however discovered between 
reconstruction condition and overall ratings, F (1/20) 
= 18.2131, p = 0.0004 (see Appendix 8, Table 1). A 
Neumann-Keuls test on these data showed that 
significantly higher ratings of aggressiveness were 
given to faces regenerated in the "assault" condition 
than to faces regenerated in the "theft" condition (Q 
= 1.892 p < 0.01), a difference of 1.892 on a nine- 
point scale. Within the "assault" condition,
significantly higher ratings were given on the 
aggressiveness construct than on the honesty construct 
(Q = 1.467 p < 0.01). Within the "theft" condition, 
significantly higher ratings were given on the honesty 
construct than on the aggressiveness construct (Q = 
1.258 p < 0.01). Faces regenerated in the "theft" 
condition were rated significantly more honest than 
faces regenerated in the "assault" condition (Q = 
0.833 p < 0.05), a difference of 0.833 on a nine-point 
scale.
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Time of stereotype presentation was found to have no 
effect on ratings given, F(l/20) = 1.5492 p = 0.2276; 
neither was there a significant interaction between 
time of stereotype presentation and trait, F(1/20) = 
2.4938) p = 0.1300. Regenerated images did not
receive significantly higher ratings on either trait 
than the other, F(l/20) = 0.1065 p = 0.7476 (see
Appendix 8, Table 1).
Discussion
It was shown in this experiment that a single piece of 
stereotypic information embedded in a biography can 
have a significant effect on the way in which a target 
face is regenerated, and judgments made by independent 
judges about these regenerations. When subjects were 
told that a target was accused of a crime 
stereotypically linked with aggressiveness, 
regenerated faces were judged more stereotypically
"aggressive" than when they were told that the target 
was accused of a crime not stereotypically linked with 
aggressiveness. This finding is in accordance with 
the hypotheses given above.
The effect was not found to generalise to the
condition in which subjects were told that the target 
was accused of a crime stereotypically linked with
honesty. Indeed, judgments of honesty were
significantly higher in the "theft" than in the 
"assault" condition. This point deserves some 
discussion. It is possible that Macrae and Shepherd's 
finding of a stereotypic link between theft and
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dishonesty does not apply to the present population of 
judges, or that the physical manifestations of the 
stereotyped attributes in the regenerated images was 
too subtle to be used by judges in the experiments 
reported here. The second point is given some 
credibility when the actual mean differences in rated 
honesty between conditions is taken into account. 
While there was a mean rated difference of 1.892 
between ratings of aggressiveness across the two 
conditions, the difference in rated honesty was just 
0.83 3. On a nine-point scale, this may not represent 
a very meaningful difference. In this regard, it may 
be significant to compare the positions of the two 
pairs of means on a nine-point scale. For the 
aggressiveness construct, the mean rating fell more 
than 1.5 points above the mid-point of the scale in 
the "assault" condition, while in the "theft" 
condition the mean rating fell 0.35 points below the 
mid-point (see Table 4.1). Hence, faces regenerated 
in the "assault" condition were considered (far) more 
aggressive than the "average" face, while those 
regenerated in the "theft" condition were considered 
less aggressive than the average face. Not only was 
this result statistically significant, therefore, this 
disparity implies that it is meaningful. This pattern 
of results does not hold for the honesty construct, in 
which both means lay above the mid-point of a nine- 
point scale, implying that, in both "assault" and 
"theft" conditions, regenerated faces are judged more 
honest than average. By this argument, therefore, the
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difference appears to be less meaningful than the 
difference in rated aggressiveness across conditions.
An intuitively appealing explanation of the 
difference in honesty found across these two 
conditions might be in terms of implicit personality 
theory (Schneider, 1973) whereby positive traits 
(e.g., beauty) are stereotypically linked with other 
positive traits (e.g., honesty), and vice versa, in 
terms of a global representation of the person as 
e.g., a "good" or "bad" person. Assault may be viewed 
by subjects as a more "negative" crime than theft; 
hence a person accused of assault may be more likely 
to fall victim to the negative implications of 
implicit personality theory than one accused of theft. 
Stereotyping of the target may, therefore, extend into 
the "honesty" trait: subjects consider a target
accused of a dramatic crime like assault such a "bad" 
character as to be even less honest than one accused 
of theft; and to regenerate his face along those 
lines. Hence the effect of the "theft" condition in 
the present experiment may possibly have been swamped 
by that of the "assault" condition.
This interpretation appears flawed however inasmuch 
as the mean rating of honesty in the "theft" condition 
was nevertheless higher than the midpoint of the scale 
(see Table 4.1). An interpretation of the results of 
this experiment in terms of implicit personality 
theory cannot account for why faces regenerated under 
the "theft" condition should be judged more honest 
than average. Hence, taking all these factors into
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account, it appears likely that an interpretation in 
terms of the lack of meaningfulness of these data (as 
proposed above) is most valid.
Two significant results of this experiment have no 
implications for the hypotheses given above. These 
were that higher ratings of aggressiveness than 
honesty were given in the "assault" condition, and 
that higher ratings of honesty than aggressiveness 
were given in the "theft" condition. The hypotheses 
of the present experiment applied only to differences 
likely to be found between reconstruction conditions, 
and have no implications for differences found within 
conditions. Nevertheless, these findings are
interesting in themselves, and may have implications 
for the social stereotype of the two types of criminal 
considered here.
Again, the effects discovered in this experiment 
were not affected by time of stereotype presentation. 
It was hypothesized that, while the effects would hold 
whether the stereotype was presented before or after 
biographical information, they would be more 
pronounced when presented before. This was not found 
to be the case.
Experiment 2b
In this experiment, it is hypothesized that, where 
subjects are told that a target received a 2i degree, 
generated faces should be judged more attractive, and 
also more intelligent, than when subjects are told 
that the target received a 2ii degree.
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Methodology
The methodology of this experiment was identical with 
that of Experiment 3a? except that this time the 
targets were not said to have been accused of any 
crime, but the class of degree they were said to have 
received did vary. In one condition, targets were 
said to have received a 2i degree, and in the other 
they were said to have received a 2ii degree.
Results
The raw data by reconstruction condition and 
stereotype presentation time are presented in Table
4.2. An example of one of the target faces and 
subsequent regenerations of this face, one for each of 
the two experimental conditions, are given in Figure
4.2.
Likeness Intelligence Attractiveness
Condition
2i M 4.083 4.958 4.525SD 2.699 2.421 1.494
2ii M 4.167 4.983 3.442SD 1.967 2.812 2.709
TABLE 4.2 - MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR RATINGSOF REGENERATED IMAGES, "2i" AND "2Ü" CONDITIONS
All regenerated images were first analysed for 
likeness to target images. Neither experimental 
condition was found to give results more like the
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original than the other; F (1/20) = 0.0167 p == 0.8983. 
Neither presentation-time affected likeness; F(l/20) = 
0.0429 p = 0.8381. The interaction was also non­
significant; F(l/20) = 0.9671 p = 0.3371 (see Appendix 
7, Table 2).
The entire data set was next subjected to analysis 
of variance. Only one significant main effect was 
found: ratings on the "intelligence" construct were
found to be significantly higher than ratings on the 
"attractiveness" construct: F(l/20) = 12.2261 p =
0.0023 (Appendix 8, Table 2).
There was no significant interaction between trait 
and stereotype condition, F(l/20) = 3.8503 p = 0.0638, 
although there was a trend in the expected direction; 
mean attractiveness rating in the "2i" condition being 
4.525, against 3.44 2 in the "2ii" condition. The 
traits attributed to the regenerated images were not 
found to be affected by time of stereotype 
presentation, F (1/20) = 0.2092 p = 0.6523. For the
main effect of stereotype condition, F(1/20) = 2.7045 
p = 0.1157, and for the main effect of time of
stereotype presentation, F (1/20) = 0.0605 p = 0.8082. 
For the interaction between these variables, F(1/20) = 
0.4710 p = 0.5004.
Hence, the traits attributed to regenerated images 
were not affected by the particular stereotype 
presented, or by time of stereotype presentation; 
neither did the two stereotype labels differ in their 
effects when presented at different times.
Target
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21 condition
2ii condition
FIGURE 4.2 - TARGET FACE WITH SUBSEQUENT REGENERATIONS, "21" AND "211" CONDITIONS
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Together with Experiment 3, the present experiment 
constitutes one of the first in the literature to test 
the existance of parallels between facial and whole- 
body stereotypes: hence the extent of any possible
parallel was not known. Therefore it was decided that 
there would be justification for investigating the 
effects of the stereotype conditions on trait 
judgments in separate, smaller analyses of variance in 
an attempt to isolate experimental effects from the 
considerable noise likely to be present in the data. 
Since, once again, no main effect of stereotype 
presentation time was found, (this reinforced by an 
independent analysis of variance, see Appendix 9, 
Table 2) these data were combined for the purpose of 
this analysis. A significant effect of rated 
attractiveness was discovered, F(l/22) = 6.1107 p =
0.0216 (Appendix 10, Table 1); faces generated in the 
"2 i" condition were rated significantly more 
attractive than those generated in the "2ii" 
condition. No effect was found for rated
intelligence, F(l/22) = 0.0041 p = 0.9497 (Appendix
10, Table 2).
Therefore, a significant effect of reconstruction 
condition was discovered in this experiment: faces
generated in the "2i" condition were judged more 
attractive, although not more intelligent, than faces 
generated in the "2ii" condition. This effect appears 
to be independent of time of stereotype presentation.
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Discussion
The results reported here reinforce the conclusion 
reached by Shepherd (1991) that stereotypic 
information can cause bias in the regeneration of 
facial stimuli. As hypothesized, when subjects were
informed that the target face represented an
individual who received a 2i degree, the regenerated 
face was judged more attractive than when they were 
told that it represented an individual who received a 
2ii degree. The strength of this effect was not found 
to vary with time of stereotype presentation. Results 
did not appear to be mediated by the rated 
intelligence of the regenerated images. The fact that 
the two groups of regenerated images differed in terms 
of attractiveness but not intelligence is a surprising 
one, and difficult to explain. Conceivably, it 
represents the operation of a ceiling effect. The 
fact that the target was said to have taken a
university degree may have been sufficient to 
establish him as an intelligent character; the 
relatively small difference in intelligence 
represented by the award of different degree classes 
may have been insufficient to cause subjects tb 
regenerate the target stimuli in significantly
different ways. The fact that the target biography
included no implications about the attractiveness of 
the target individual, however, may have meant that 
subjects felt less constrained in terms of the 
attractiveness of the images which they regenerated.
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This argument is supported to some degree by the 
finding that ratings of "intelligence" were found to 
be significantly higher across conditions than ratings 
of "attractiveness". This finding reinforces the
contention, made in the Literature Review above, that 
the constructs, while perhaps highly correlated, 
should not be considered in any sense interchangeable 
in social cognitive research. The result may reflect 
the operation of response-bias: while subjects seem to 
have been fairly happy to attribute "intelligence" 
ratings to the target images at above the mid-point of 
a nine-point scale, (i.e., 4.5,) possibly they may
have been less happy to commit themselves to finding 
one face more attractive than the average (i.e., 
rating it at above 4.5 on a nine-point scale).
General Discussion
To recap the results of the experiments reported here: 
Subjects were presented with target faces and told 
that the targets had been accused of committing either 
an assault or a theft, or that they had received 
either a 2i or a 2ii degree. Regenerations made under 
the "assault" condition were judged more aggressive 
than those made under the "theft" condition. 
Regenerations made under the "theft" condition were 
judged more honest than those made under the "assault" 
condition: it was argued in the Discussion section of 
Experiment a that this might be due to the action of 
implicit personality theory in this case, although a 
more convincing explantation might be cast in terms of
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the lack of meaningfulness of the different ratings in 
the two experimental conditions.
Subjects told that the targets received a 2i degree 
regenerated images which were judged more attractive 
than those regenerated by subjects told that the 
target received a 2ii degree. This effect was not 
mediated by the rated intelligence of the regenerated 
faces: a surprising result which may be attributable 
to a ceiling effect on the rated intelligence of the 
targets. In neither Experiment a nor Experiment b did 
time of stereotype presentation have any effect upon 
results obtained.
Therefore the hypotheses laid out above were for the 
most part fulfilled, demonstrating that stereotypic 
information can affect memory for and judgment of 
facial stimuli. The potential importance of such an 
influence in the eyewitnessing situation is quite 
apparent. As Shepherd et al (1987) point out, 
systematic distortions in memory for facial stimuli 
have practical consequences for the police when 
collecting eyewitness descriptions of offenders. 
Experiment 2a helps highlight the kind of distortion 
that may arise: witnesses to a crime which is
stereotypically linked to aggression may possibly give 
descriptions of the offender which are biassed towards 
the stereotypically aggressive. The fact that time of 
stereotype presentation appears to be immaterial to 
the distortion produced is of particular importance: 
implying that even stereotypic information dropped 
late in the eyewitnessing process - during the police
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interview, say - might have the effect of distorting 
person descriptions. This possibility is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 7. The fact that faces 
regenerated in the "theft" condition were judged more 
honest than those regenerated in the "assault" 
condition runs counter to hypothesis, however.
A secondary aim of the present experiment was to 
provide a standard of comparison for a study of the 
regeneration of whole-body stimuli. It is conceivable 
that parallel effects may be found for the 
stereotyping of body stimuli to those for facial 
stimuli. For example, the presentation of
biographical material which contains the information 
that a target was accused of the aggressive crime of 
assault may cause subjects to regenerate a "more 
aggressive" body-shape. Such possibilities are
considered in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 5 - EVERY PICTURE TELLS A STEREOTYPE; THEEFFECT OF STEREOTYPIC INFORMATION ON THE REGENERATION AND JUDGMENT OF WHOLE-BODY STIMULI
"He was really very short and fat 
While in the story so skinny and bony."
Billie Holiday: Yankee-Doodle NeverWent to Town
Introduction
The present thesis has so far considered the effect of 
a stereotypic physical feature (body-size) upon the 
judgment of an ambiguous action, and the effect of 
stereotypic information upon the regeneration of 
facial target stimuli. The present chapter completes 
the first section of this thesis by reviewing the 
psychological literature on memory for whole-body 
features, and reporting an experiment which applies 
the paradigm utilised in Experiment 2 to the 
regeneration of whole-body stimuli. It is hoped in 
this chapter to establish the potential importance of 
whole-body features in the eyewitness situation, 
briefly to review studies of the relationship between 
body-type and criminality, and, in Experiment 3, to 
establish to what extent stereotypic information might 
affect the regeneration of whole-body stimuli.
Literature Review
The Importance of Whole-Body Information in the 
Eyewitness Situation: It may be helpful to clarify
the reasoning behind studying subjects' ability to 
interpret or remember whole-body information. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the majority of work in the 
person-identification literature concerns facial 
information; psychologists now know a great deal about
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witnesses' ability to remember facial information, and 
the factors which impact upon this ability. There is 
however reason to believe that other sources of 
information may also be important. A person
description given in everyday life, for instance, is 
likely to begin with whole-body information; "He's 
about five foot ten inches tall, and...", "She's very 
thin, and...". This habit is not restricted to 
conversation; it is also present in the works of 
descriptive writers, of which the following are more 
or less randomly-chosen examples;
"Mr Samuel Wilkins was a carpenter, a journeyman of small dimensions, decidedly below the middle size - bordering, perhaps, on the dwarfish. His face was round and shining, and his hair carefully twisted into the outer corner of each eye, till it formed a variety of that description usually known as 'aggerawators'."(Charles Dickens, Sketches by Boz, p 269)
"[Captain Black] was a tall, narrow, disconsolate man who moved with a crabby listlessness. He shaved his pinched, pale face every third or fourth day, and most of the time he appeared to be growing a reddish-gold moustache over his skinny upper lip."(Joseph Heller, Catch-22, p 146)
A few minutes spent studying the fiction shelves in 
any town library should be sufficient to show that 
these are not unrepresentative examples of person- 
description in literature.
The tendency to put body information first suggests 
that it may be more than just a part of person 
identification; it may conceivably provide a frame of 
reference for the remainder of the description. After 
all, in trying to communicate something as complex as
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a person-description, it makes sense to provide the 
most basic information first. Body-information may 
form an infrastructure around which it is possible to 
build the remainder of a description. Perhaps a 
phrase of the sort, "He's about five foot ten inches 
tall" provides the most basic piece of information one 
needs to know in order to complete a mental 
representation of a person.
Additionally, in many situations, judgments about 
other people appear to rest not only on facial but 
also on whole-body information. For example, we are 
routinely able to recognise friends and acquaintances 
from a distance or from behind, when facial 
information is presumably either lost or overshadowed 
by other sources of information.
It does not take much imagination to see that the 
ability to recognise individuals on the basis of body- 
information is of potentially great importance in the 
eyewitness memory situation (MacLeod, Frowley and 
Shepherd, in press). This is especially likely when 
disguise is used: since, although body-information can 
be hidden (by, e.g., a large coat), it cannot be 
obliterated in the way that facial information can be 
obliterated by a simple balaclava.
Body information can be considered a member of the 
class of context cues investigated in a series of 
experiments by Cutler, Penrod and their associates, 
(Cutler, Penrod, O'Rourke and Martens, 1986; Cutler, 
Penrod and Martens, 1986; Cutler Penrod and Martens, 
1987; Cutler and Penrod, 1988). These experiments
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consider the situations under which such context cues 
are most important. Probably the most significant for 
present purposes is the study reported by Cutler, 
Penrod and Martens (1986). This paper explicitly 
studies the effects of "physical characteristic 
context cues" - a term including, e.g., gait, posture, 
and voice, as well as physique. One of two types of 
"array" (conceptually the same as a lineup) was used: 
subjects received simple slides of suspects' head and 
shoulders in front and full profile, presented alone 
or with additional context cues - including voice 
information and videotapes of suspects entering and 
leaving a room. They found that "these additional 
context cues significantly improved overall 
identification accuracy...when retention interval was 
long and when subjects were not shown mug-shots after 
viewing the videotaped crime" (Cutler et al, 1986, p 
115). And, "[P]hysical characteristic context cues 
significantly improved identification accuracy when 
subjects were shown high-similarity line-ups; that is, 
when the arrays contained several foils who resembled 
the robber in physical appearance...physical 
characteristic context cues were most effective when 
memory for the target was degraded due to encoding 
factors such as disguise of the robber and weapon 
focus" (ibid.). This last finding - that reliance on 
cues other than face information is heavier when face 
information is made less salient at encoding - may 
indeed be unsurprising. However it does serve to 
point up the necessity for psychologists to take
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"physical characteristic context cues" into account in 
the design of experiments.
The importance of contextual variables has also 
been demonstrated by Thomson and his colleagues 
(Thomson, 1981; Thomson, Robertson and Vogt, 1982), 
who exposed subjects to a series of slides depicting 
target people wearing certain clothing and carrying 
out certain activities in certain settings. Later, 
subjects had to pick the targets from a second series 
of slides. In one condition, the three variables were 
kept constant. In another, all were changed. Two 
groups of subjects were used, each being given 
different instructions on how to treat the memory 
task. One group was told to maximize the hit rate, 
i.e., number of correct identifications made. The 
other was told to minimize false alarms, i.e., 
incorrect identifications made.
Thomson (1981) found that keeping the variables 
constant had a massive effect, boosting recognition 
accuracy from 25 to 89%. It was also found to 
increase the frequency of false alarms. Thomson 
argues that "The context elements, background, 
clothing and actions, are an integral part of the 
memory information stored by a person when he 
perceives an event or object" (p 52). An interesting 
addition to this work is the citation of an 
unpublished paper by Thomson and Robertson (1980), in 
which it was found that, for some of the test items, 
when a new person was shown wearing the same clothing, 
performing the same action in the same location as
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someone in the previous series, subjects seemed to be 
able to retrieve an "image" of the original event, and 
confidently reject the new person as having been seen 
previously. In this finding the positive effects of 
contextual cues on person memory as discussed by 
Cutler, Penrod and their associates can clearly be 
seen. Body information might also be expected to act 
in this way.
Thomson et al (1982) found negative effects on 
recognition performance when the three types of 
contextual information were altered; but these effects 
were not attributable to an independent change in any 
one type of information (Experiment 1 and 2); but 
rather to a concurrent change in all three (Experiment 
3). Unfortunately, this finding does not distinguish 
between two possible interpretations of the importance 
of contextual cues in person identification. The 
effects of changed context may be invisible until a 
certain threshold has been reached: and in Thomson's 
particular study this may not have occurred until all 
three contextual variables had been altered. 
Alternatively, it may be necessary to alter all 
contextual variables that are present in a given 
situation before any effect can be seen. Of the two 
hypotheses, the former appears intuitively more 
likely; the second cannot however be discounted.
Profound effects on subjects' memory performance or 
interpretation of information have been found in a 
number of situations and for a number of different 
types of contextual information. This has been shown
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by e.g., Ekman, Friesen, O'Sullivan and Sherer (1980) 
for non-facial and vocal cues? by Kozlowski and 
Cutting (1977) for movement of the body in identifying 
gender? and by Lindsay, Wallbridge and Drennan (1987) 
for clothing. All of this work gives good grounds for 
expecting whole-body information to be of great 
importance to eyewitness memory.
Despite such demonstrations of its potential 
importance, however, there is a great lack of research 
in this area. The majority of the psychological 
literature associated with whole-body memory and 
judgment concerns either discussion of Sheldon's 
system of body classification (this literature is 
reviewed in Chapter 3) or the body-size perceptions of 
patients hospitalised with eating disorders (see, 
e.g., Collins and Plahn, 1988). A small literature 
also exists on the relationship between physique and 
criminality. This literature is discussed briefly in 
the following sub-section.
Whole-Body Features and Their Relationship with 
Criminality: As discussed in Chapter 2, there is
little support in the psychological literature for 
Sheldon's theory of constitutional psychology: it
appears unlikely that psychological variables have a 
direct relationship to the physical variables of body- 
size and shape. Nevertheless, some researchers have 
found evidence for a relationship between body-shape 
and criminality. Glueck and Glueck (1955) conducted a 
careful study in which delinquent boys were matched
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for age, intelligence, racial origin, and residential 
background with non-delinquent boys. The delinquent 
group was found to be considerably more mesomorphic 
and less ectomorphic than the non-delinquent group. 
Epps and Parnell (1952) conducted a study of the body- 
shapes of young women in Borstal or university, 
finding those in Borstal to be heavier, more muscular, 
and fatter. Eysenck (1964), in gathering support for 
his theory of the relationship between somatotype and 
criminality, concludes on the basis of such data that 
criminals have a distinct tendency towards 
extraversion? a trait which he believes to be related 
to the mesomorphic somatotype. And Gibbens (1963) 
carried out an extensive study of the body-builds of 
"juvenile delinquents" detained in Borstal 
institutions, revealing that criminals tended to fit 
the category of "endomorphic mesomorphs": being
athletic in build, i.e., more "stocky and muscular" 
than "fat". They also showed a tendency towards 
extraversion and the related trait of impulsiveness.
Interesting as these conclusions may be, however, 
the amount of research which has been conducted in the 
area is limited, and it would be dangerous to draw any 
hard-and-fast conclusions from it. Also, these 
studies appear to leave open the question of direction 
of causation. Regarding Glueck and Glueck's (1955) 
study, for instance, it may be that the two groups of 
subjects - the "delinquent" and "non-delinquent" boys 
- did not in fact differ on any psychological trait. 
Conceivably, it is easier to become "delinquent" if
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one has a mesomorphic - more muscular and athletic - 
body-type. Alternatively, it is equally conceivable 
that the boys with the more mesomorphic body-type were 
simply trying to fulfill a social stereotype of 
mesomorphs when they became "delinquent". This 
hypothesis is lent extra weight by studies which 
illustrate the stereotypical relationship between 
certain body-types and psychological characteristics, 
reviewed in Chapter 3. It is such a relationship that 
Experiment 3 aims to investigate.
Stereotypes and Whole-Body Information: Of particular
importance to the present study is the effect of 
stereotypes on perception of and memory for whole-body 
information. It is conceivable that people who 
possess certain body-types may be subject to biasses 
similar in kind (if less extreme) to those experienced 
by, e.g., members of minority ethnic groups. The 
studies which address this issue are reviewed in 
Chapter 3.
Judging from the powerful effects demonstrated for 
stereotypes in the literature, (from studies of 
biographical material by Snyder and Uranowitz, 1978c, 
to facial information by Macrae and Shepherd, 1989a, 
to actions performed in video-recordings by Duncan, 
1976,) one would be naïve to expect stereotypic 
information to have no effect in this instance. 
However, this particular area of stereotyping research 
has received no attention in the literature, despite 
the fact that it could have powerful implications for
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eyewitness' memory of physiques. Indeed, the social 
cognition literature might lead one to predict almost 
any effect one might care to mention for whole-body 
memory. Classically, there are two strands to this 
research: investigators have considered the effects of 
stereotypes presented at encoding of to-be-remembered 
information and (less frequently) those of stereotypes 
presented at retrieval. This literature will be 
exhaustively reviewed later in the present thesis, but 
for the moment a more or less random sampling might 
give an idea of its contradictory nature. Rothbart 
(1981) found that stereotype-consistent information 
was better recalled than inconsistent or irrelevant 
information; O'Sullivan and Durso (1984) found that 
consistent information was best remembered, but only 
when very inconsistent information was also presented; 
Hastie and Kumar (1979) found superior recall for 
inconsistent information; and a similar result was 
found by Crocker, Hannah and Weber (1983).
The social cognition literature gives no a priori 
grounds to predict what type of information - 
consistent or inconsistent with the physical 
stereotype of the criminal - will be better remembered 
by an eyewitness; or indeed whether either will be 
better remembered. Given that there is potential here 
for elucidation of extra information from an 
eyewitness, as well as potential for an eyewitness' 
account of a crime to undergo systematic distortion, 
it seems important that researchers with interests in
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the area should begin systematic investigation of the 
area.
A smaller literature exists on the effects of 
stereotypes presented at retrieval: one which centres 
around the ongoing controversy concerning Snyder and 
Uranowitz' seminal paper on the effects of a "lesbian 
stereotype" on memory for a biography of a fictional 
character, Betty K. Calls for greater emphasis in the 
literature on stereotypes presented at retrieval (see, 
e.g., Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen 
and Wyer, 1985) have unfortunately gone all but 
unanswered; because of either the thorny nature of the 
area, or the fact that the majority of models of
effects of stereotypes on memory take little account 
of the possibility of this effect (see Chapter 6). 
Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein write:
"...there is a great deal of research documenting the importance of encoding operations and organizational processes, but there is a relative dearth of evidence provided by social cognition research documenting retrieval effects" (p 879).
The present study will take the opportunity 
partially to fill this hole in the literature by
considering the effects of stereotypes presented 
before and after target information.
A Paradigm for Research into the Whole-Body Arena: 
The literature on the processing of target faces was 
reviewed in Chapter 4. This processing appears to be
affected by such categorical information as age,
attractiveness, gender, intelligence, occupation.
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Brigham, 1971; Cash, 1981; Keating, 1985; Klatzky, 
Martin and Kane, 1982 a and b; MacArthur, 1982; 
MacArthur and Apatow, 1983). Parallels can be drawn 
between this work and that on body-size stereotyping 
by Christiaansen, Sweeney and Ochalek (1983); Ertel 
and Prodhohl (1969); Jansen and Horowski (1980); 
Lerner and Moore (1974); and Wilson (1968), discussed 
in Chapter 3. Indeed, it is possible to draw an 
analogy from the face-processing literature to the 
whole-body literature. "Upper face features
have... been shown to be more important in face 
recognition (see Fisher and Cox, 1975; Garneau, 1973) 
and one might suppose that upper body features may be 
more important to body recognition than lower body 
features" (MacLeod et al, in press). Therefore it is 
conceivable that the effects of stereotypic 
information on the regeneration of facial stimuli may 
also hold when whole-body stimuli are used. 
Experiment 3 is a conceptual replication of Experiment 
2, this time using whole-body information rather than 
facial information as target stimuli.
An Outline of Experiment 3
The effects demonstrated in Experiment 2 provide a 
good starting point for the investigation of the 
effect of stereotypes on whole-body memory. It was 
important to enter this area with the intention of 
investigating more or less robust phenomena. Were a 
wholly new experiment to be designed, then one could 
not know whether to explain the results in terms of
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the action of stereotypes on whole-body memory in 
general, or that one instance in particular. However, 
results (whether positive or negative), in a paradigm 
with strong connections to those used previously, 
would be far more easily explained.
Particularly germaine here is the fact that 
Experiment 1, while demonstrating a powerful effect of 
stereotypic information on judgment of an action, 
utilised a paradigm in many ways the reverse of that 
used here. The present experiment considers the 
effect of stereotypic information upon the 
reconstruction of whole-body stimuli, in an effort to 
demonstrate the generalisability of whole-body 
stereotypes to other situations of interest in the 
eyewitness situation. Hence, an experiment was 
designed with the intention of seeing how far the 
results of Experiment 2, and those of Macrae and 
Shepherd (1989a) and Shepherd (1991), held for whole- 
body information.
Especially important in the eyewitness situation is 
the effect of stereotyping with respect to criminal 
occupation. The applicability of criminal stereotypes 
to facial stimuli has been demonstrated in Experiment 
2, and by Macrae and Shepherd. This forms the main 
area of interest in the present experiment; however a 
second experiment is also reported in which subjects 
are given information about the degree class awarded 
the target individual, as in Experiment 2b. The 
purpose of this manipulation is twofold: to check the 
validity of generalising from facial to body stimuli
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by utilising conditions which have already been shown 
to have ramifications for facial stimuli; and to 
extend the presently limited knowledge of the effects 
of stereotypic information on body stimuli.
The present experiment considers not only the 
effects of stereotypes on reconstruction of body 
stimuli, but also the effects of time of presentation 
of stereotypic information, as in Experiment 2.
Since the two conditions in this experiment are not 
directly related, they are reported separately as 
Experiments a and b.
Experiment 3a
The hypotheses for the present experiment are 
presented below;
1. Where subjects are told that the target 
individual committed an assault, then the body-shape 
regenerated should be judged more "aggressive" than 
when subjects are told that the target committed a 
theft. Where subjects are told that the target 
committed a theft, then the body-shape regenerated 
should be judged less "honest" than when subjects are 
told that the target committed an assault. 
Extrapolating from the results of Experiment 1, which 
helped to establish that a larger body-size may 
stereotypically be associated with a more "aggressive" 
personality, it appears likely that a person involved 
in an assault will stereotypically be thought of as 
having a larger body-size than a person involved in a
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theft. However, it is less immediately obvious what 
body-type may stereotypically be associated with the 
"honest/dishonest" dimension. Nevertheless, the
"theft" condition is included in the present study for 
a number of reasons. First, it acts as a control 
condition for the "assault" manipulation. Second, it 
allows comparison to be drawn with Experiment 2a, in 
which the "theft" manipulation was utilised, and hence 
allows us to increase our knowledge of the 
similarities and dissimilarities between facial and 
whole-body stereotyping. Finally, the manipulation 
helps to establish whether or not there does in fact 
exist a social stereotype of an "honest/dishonest" 
body-type.
2. Where subjects are told that a target 
committed an assault, then a larger body-shape should 
be generated than when they are told that the target 
committed a theft.
3. These effects should be less pronounced, 
although still present, when stereotypes are presented 
after to-be-remembered information than when they are 
presented before to-be-remembered information.
Methodology
Subjects : Subjects in this experiment were forty-
eight undergraduate and postgraduate volunteers, who 
took part for a small fee. Subjects were aged between 
18 and 27 years. Thirty-one subjects were female, 
seventeen were male.
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Apparatus : For regeneration of target photographs, a
Kowa 2x anamorphic lens was used. This lens attaches 
to the front of a slide-projector and, when turned 
through 360°, produces consonant size distortions in 
the image produced. The lens has been used 
extensively in research into the self-body images of 
anorexic patients (see, e.g., Collins and Plahn, 
1986,) but appears never before to have been applied 
to a more strictly social-cognitive setting.
Materials : Using a Pentax Asahi SPIOOO loaded with
Kodachrome Gold 400 film, photographs were taken of 
eight target persons. Three photographs were taken of 
each target: one with the camera held on a tripod
perpendicular to the floor, one with the camera tilted 
15° to the left, and one with the camera tilted 15° to 
the right. This was done so that during the
reproduction phase subjects would not be able to use 
the angle of the image as an indication of the
accuracy of their work: the anamorphic lens altering 
the angle of a projection as well as its apparent 
size. All targets were males aged between 24 and 27. 
All photographs had heads and facial features occluded 
and were taken against a plain wall.
Next, all body-shapes were presented to five
independent judges (Honours Psychology undergraduates 
from the University of St Andrews) who rated them for 
intelligence, attractiveness, honesty, and
aggressiveness. Only targets balanced on these 
dimensions were used as target stimuli in the
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experiment. Four targets fulfilled this criterion 
(see Appendix 12, Table 1).
A two-hundred word biography was constructed in two 
stages: four randomly-selected postgraduate students
from the University of St Andrews were asked to write 
brief autobiographies, simply detailing important 
events in their life from childhood to the present. 
These were combined using a cut-and-paste technique 
until a single, coherent narrative was obtained. Two 
versions of the biography were used in the present 
experiment. In one version, the subject of the 
biography was said to have been accused of committing 
an assault; in the other of committing a theft. 
(These biographies are reproduced in Appendix 11).
Procedure : A target image was presented to each
subject, via Kodak Carousel slide-projector, either 
before or after presentation of the biography 
purportedly relating to the target. The target images 
were presented randomly to the subjects, with the 
proviso that each target image was seen by two 
subjects, one in the "assault" condition, and one in 
the "theft" condition. The subject was then given a 
brief (five minute) unrelated filler task, after which 
s/he was asked to reproduce as best s/he could the 
body-image seen previously. A photograph was then 
taken of this regenerated image, using a camera 
mounted on a tripod at a fixed distance of 2.5 metres 
from the screen upon which the image was projected. 
The two sets of photographs thus generated (i.e., in
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the assault or the theft condition) were then 
submitted to a panel of independent judges and 
compared for ratings of aggressiveness, honesty, body- 
size, and likeness to the original images. 
Measurements were also taken of the actual mean 
percentage distortion produced by subjects in each 
condition. This was performed to test whether judges' 
interpretations of differences between the body-shapes 
regenerated across conditions could be attributed to 
the existence of actual differences across conditions.
Results
a) Actual Distortions of Regenerated Images: The
actual percentage distortions by reconstruction 
condition are presented in Table 5.1, below.
Condition Assault I Theft___________________ I ____ ____Mean % IDistortion +25.887 I +30.148ISD 11.430 I 1.617
TABLE 5.1 - MEAN PERCENTAGE DISTORTION OF REGENERATED BODY-STIMULI X RECONSTRUCTION CONDITION, EXPERIMENT 3a
Immediately noticeable from the data presented above 
is the difference between the two standard deviations. 
The fact that the standard deviation was far larger in 
the assault than in the theft condition is probably 
not best explained in terms of outliers in the assault 
condition. Table 5.3, reproduced under Experiment b, 
below, gives the means and standard deviations which 
were generated under 2i/2ii degree class conditions. 
Under each condition in Experiment b, the standard
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deviation is comparable to that found in the assault 
condition here. Therefore, the standard deviation in 
the assault condition does not appear to be the 
unusual case. The difference here should therefore be 
explained by reference to the greater clustering of 
data points about the mean in the theft condition. 
There appears to have been far greater agreement among 
subjects about the appearance of a thief's body than 
about the body of someone accused of assault.
Analysis of variance of these data showed no 
significant effect of stereotype reconstruction 
condition on percentage distortion of regenerated 
images, F(l/47) = 3.1934 p = 0.804 (see Appendix 12, 
Table 2). The trend of the data is in fact in the 
opposite direction from that predicted: it was
expected that the crime stereotypically linked with 
body-size (assault) would lead to the production of 
larger images, not vice versa. Any significant 
results obtained in this experiment could not be 
attributed to actual differences in reconstructed 
body-size across the two conditions.
JbJ Ratings of Regenerated Images: The raw data by
reconstruction condition and stereotype presentation 
time are presented in Table 5.2.
All regenerated items were analysed for likeness to 
the original images, to check whether any differences 
found for the other variables could be explained in 
terms of greater likeness to the original stimuli in 
one condition than the other.
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Likeness Aggressiveness Honesty Size
Condition
Assault M 4.642 5. 333 5.250 5.692SD 1.315 1.055 0.627 1.025
Theft M 5.083 4.900 5.159 4.725SD 0.871 1.421 0.570 0.835
TABLE 5.2 MEAN RATINGS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF REGENERATED IMAGES X STEREOTYPE PRESENTED X STEREOTYPE PRESENTATION TIME, EXPERIMENT 3a
Likeness was found to differ significantly with 
stereotype condition: F(l/44) = 8.9213 p = 0.0046, and 
with the time of presentation of stereotypic 
information (i.e., before or after presentation of the 
target image): F(l/44) ~ 6.1487 p = 0.0171. The
interaction between condition and stereotype 
presentation time was not significant: F (1/44) =
1.8294 p = 0.1831 (Appendix 13, Table 1).
Next, a large-scale analysis of variance was 
conducted on the full data-set to indicate the 
significance of any main effects or interactions. No 
significant effect was found. For stereotype
condition, F(l/44) = 2.2813 p = 0.1381. For time of 
stereotype presentation, F(l/44) = 0.0063 p = 0.9370. 
Hence, stereotypes did not have different effects with 
different presentation times. For the interaction 
between stereotype condition and presentation time, 
F(l/44) = 0.2429 p = 0.6245. Regenerated images were 
not found to be given significantly higher ratings on 
any one trait than any other, F(2/88) = 2.7052 p =
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0.0724; neither was this affected by stereotype 
condition: F(2/88) = 0.9237 p - 0.4008, or stereotype 
presentation time: F(2/88) = 1.0128 p = 0.3674,
(Appendix 14, Table 1). Therefore, the stereotype 
presented appeared to have no significant effect upon 
traits present in reconstructed body-images, and 
neither did stereotypic information appear to have 
different effects when presented at different times.
The present experiment constituted one of the first 
in the literature to use the whole-body as target 
stimuli: hence the magnitude of the expected effects 
was not known. Therefore, as in Experiment 2b, it was 
decided to investigate the effects of the stereotype 
conditions on trait judgments in separate, smaller 
analyses of variance in an attempt to isolate 
experimental effects from the noise that may be be 
present in the data. Since time of stereotype 
presentation had no independent effect upon ratings 
given, (an effect also supported in a separate 
analysis of variance, see Appendix 15, Table 1,) these 
data were combined for analysis.
No significant effect of stereotype condition was 
found for aggressiveness ratings: F (1/46) = 2.3581 p = 
0.1315, or for honesty ratings: F(l/46) = 0.0354 p = 
0.8516. However, bodies regenerated under the 
"assault" condition were rated as being significantly 
larger than those regenerated under the "theft" 
condition, in line with the experimental hypotheses: 
F(l/46) = 4.1053 p = 0.0486 (Appendix 16, Tables 1 - 
3) .
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Discussion
This experiment found that a piece of stereotypic 
information embedded in a two-hundred word biography 
can significantly affect the way in which a target 
body-shape is regenerated. When a target was said to 
have committed a crime stereotypically linked with 
aggressiveness, regenerated body-shapes were rated by 
independent judges as significantly larger than when 
the target was said to have committed a crime linked 
with dishonesty but not aggressiveness (theft). Given 
the significant correlation reported with Experiment 1 
between perceived body-size and perceived 
aggressiveness, this is precisely the result expected.
Two results that are somewhat inconsistent with this 
finding were also achieved however. No actual 
difference in the size of the regenerated images was 
discovered. Hence, judges' interpretations of this 
variable appear to have been based on some factor 
other than the actual size of the images they were 
studying. It is tempting to argue that this factor 
might have been the perceived aggressiveness of the 
images: but if this is so, then it is perhaps odd that 
no significant effect was discovered for the 
aggressiveness trait itself. The correlation found 
between body-size and aggressiveness is admittedly 
quite small, even though it is highly significant (r = 
0.1359 p < 0.001). Nevertheless, one would have
expected the stereotypic information that the target 
committed an assault to have had a direct effect upon
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aggressiveness per se, and not solely on a correlate 
of aggressiveness. Conceivably, this effect may be 
traceable to an artifact of the experimental materials 
used. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the biographies 
presented to the subjects in the present experiment 
may suggest that the cause of the crime committed by 
the target was not a dispositional one. Subjects may 
not therefore have felt that the target was a 
dispositionally aggressive person, and hence did not 
generate body-images which reflected stereotypic 
attributes of a dispositionally aggressive target. 
It should however be noted that there was a trend in 
the expected direction for the aggressiveness 
construct: mean rated aggressiveness in the "assault" 
condition being 5.425, against 4.875 in the "theft" 
condition, a difference of 0.55 on a nine-point scale.
It is evident that only the "assault" condition had 
any effect upon judges' ratings of traits in the 
regenerated body-shapes. Where targets were said to 
have been accused of theft, no significant different 
in rated honesty was found (a mean of 5.025 in the 
"theft" condition against a mean of 4.983 in the 
"assault" condition). As mentioned above, it is by no 
means immediately obvious just what the 
stereotypically "honest/dishonest" body-shape might 
consist of; and, indeed, one aim of including this 
condition in the present experiment was to establish 
to what extent whole-body stereotypes parallel facial 
stereotypes, and whether there is indeed any such 
thing as a social stereotype of an "honest/dishonest"
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body-type. The results of this experiment give cause 
to doubt whether any such stereotype does in fact 
exist. This is unsurprising when it is considered 
that the "theft" manipulation in Experiment 2a did not 
have a significant effect upon the rated honesty of 
regenerated faces, despite the fact that effects might 
be thought more likely to obtain when facial than 
whole-body stimuli are used.
' It could, however, be argued that another factor 
played the most important role in these results. It 
was found that the mean likeness of regenerated images 
to original stimuli was higher in the "theft" than in 
the "assault" condition. Conceivably, the main effect 
for body-size found here was caused by greater 
similarity in one condition, (or dissimilarity in the 
other,) to the original stimuli. Alternatively, a 
third variable may have had affected both body-size 
and similarity. It is conceivable that one of the two 
stereotypes presented in this experiment might have 
acted as a retrieval schema for the target information 
(see, e.g., Snyder and Uranowitz, 1978c): however this 
is a very tenuous conclusion to draw from the limited 
evidence available here. This possibility is
discussed in far greater detail in Experiments 7 - 8 ,  
below.
Experiment 3b
This experiment is a conceptual replication of 
Experiment 2b, utilising body rather than facial 
information for target stimuli. Two conditions were
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run, in which subjects were told that the target 
individual received either a 2i or a 2ii degree. It 
is hypothesized that, where subjects are told a target 
received a 2i degree, then a more attractive body- 
shape should be generated than when subjects are told 
the target received a 2ii degree. Since this effect 
may be confounded by the effect of perceived 
intelligence, (see the discussion of this possibility 
in Chapter 3,) ratings of intelligence were also 
taken. It is hypothesized that body-shapes generated 
under the "2i" condition will be judged more 
intelligent than those regenerated under the "2ii" 
condition.
Methodology
The methodology for this experiment was identical with 
that of Experiment a, above, except that the biography 
did not mention that the target had been accused of 
any crime, but instead varied the class of degree said 
to have been awarded, i.e., either a 2i or a 2ii 
degree.
Subjects: A further forty-eight subjects were used
in this experiment. These were undergraduate and 
postgraduate student volunteers, who participated for 
a small fee. Twenty-nine subjects were female; 
nineteen were male.
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Results
a') Actual Distortions of Regenerated Images: Mean
percentage actual distortion and standard deviations 
are presented in Table 5.3, below.
Condition 2i I 2ii    I ______IMean % IDistortion +26.835 I +26.459ISD 10.093 I 10.766
TABLE 5.3 - MEAN PERCENTAGE DISTORTION OF REGENERATED BODY-STIMÜLI X RECONSTRUCTION CONDITION
Analysis of variance showed no significant difference 
in the actual size of regenerated body-image across 
condition, F(l/46) = 0.0156 p = 0.9011 (Appendix 12, 
Table 3). Therefore, any difference found in ratings 
of these images could not be caused by actual 
differences in image size.
bl Ratings of Regenerated Images: Raw data by
reconstruction condition and stereotype presentation 
time are presented in Table 5.4.
Likeness Intelligence Attractiveness
Condition
2i M 4.650 5.133 4.671SD 1.344 0.863 1.779
2ii M 4.867 5.017 4.317SD 2.000 0.676 0.698
TABLE 5.4 MEAN RATINGS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF REGENERATED IMAGES X STEREOTYPE PRESENTED X STEREOTYPE PRESENTATION TIME, EXPERIMENT 3b
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Again, all regenerated images were analysed for 
likeness to the original images presented. Neither 
stereotype condition was found to affect the likeness 
of the images regenerated: F(1/44) = 0.3902 p =
0.5354. Neither stereotype presentation time (before 
or after presentation of target material) affected 
likeness: F(l/44) = 1.3923 p = 0.2444. The
interaction was also non-significant: F(l/44) = 0.5829 
p = 0.4492 (see Appendix 13, Table 2).
Next, a single large analysis of variance was 
performed on the entire data set - i.e., the ratings 
obtained for both dependant variables, in both 
stereotype conditions, and at both presentation times, 
(i.e., either before or after presentation of the 
target stimuli,) - to indicate whether any main 
effects or interactions appeared to be significant. 
This was not found to be the case. For both the main 
effects of stereotype condition and time of stereotype 
presentation, F(l/44) = 0.3199 p = 0.5746. For the
interaction between stereotype condition and time of 
presentation, F (1/44) = 0.0943 p = 0.7603. Hence, as 
in Experiment 2b, traits attributed by the independent 
judges to the regenerated images were equally 
unaffected by the stereotype presented and the time of 
stereotype presentation. Neither was it found that 
the stereotype labels had different effects when 
presented at different times, as it was expected they 
would. Only one main effect was found to be 
significant: ratings on the "intelligence" construct
-•'Li . •
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were significantly higher than ratings on the 
"attractiveness" construct: F(l/44) = 19.9882 p =
0.0001. This was not affected by stereotype
condition, however: F (1/44) = 0.0493 p = 0.3629; or by 
time of stereotype presentation: F(1/44) = 0.0251 p =
0.8748. (See Appendix 14, Table 2, for analysis of 
variance tables.)
Again, separate, smaller analyses of variance were 
also employed. There being no independent effect of 
time of stereotype presentation, (this backed up by 
analysis of variance performed on this data 
exclusively - see Appendix 15, Table 2,) these data 
were combined for analysis. No main effect of 
stereotype condition was discovered on the dependent 
variable of rated intelligence: F (1/46) = 0.2108 p =
0.6483 (Appendix 16, Table 4), or on rated 
attractiveness: F (1/46) = 1.5196 p = 0.2239, (Appendix 
16, Table 5).
Therefore no effect of stereotype condition could be 
isolated on judgments made about regenerated bodies in 
this experiment.
Discussion
It was hypothesised that, in the present experiment, 
similar effects would be seen to hold for body stimuli 
as had previously been discovered for face stimuli by 
Shepherd (1991), and in Experiment 2b: i.e., that when 
a target was said to have received a 2i degree, j
regenerations of that target's physical appearance 
would be judged more attractive then when the target
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was said to have received a 2ii degree. It was also 
hypothesized that such a result might be mediated at 
least to some extent by the effect of intelligence 
across the two conditions. Neither hypothesis was
supported. Body-shapes reconstructed in the 2i
condition were not judged significantly more 
attractive or intelligent than those reconstructed in 
the 2ii condition. Hence, in this respect at least, 
the reconstruction of body stimuli appears to be less 
susceptible to stereotypic bias than that of face 
stimuli.
It should, however, be mentioned that in both 
conditions the trend of results was in the expected 
direction. Mean rated attractiveness in the 2i
condition was 4.671, against 4.317 in the 2ii 
condition; mean rated intelligence was 5.133 in the 2i 
condition, against 5.017 in the 2ii condition.
Nevertheless, the fact that these trends were not 
found to be significant highlights the fact that the 
effects under investigation here are of a particularly 
subtle and elusive nature, or may not exist at all. 
Hence the results of the present experiment indicate a 
limitation to the possible parallels that may be drawn 
between facial and whole-body stimuli as far as social 
stereotyping is concerned.
The fact that ratings for "intelligence" were found 
to be significantly higher across conditions than
those for "attractiveness" also deserves mention,
since it appears to indicate that neither judgment is 
wholly reliant on the other; as mentioned in the
- - - ’ -^1 
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General Discussion section of Experiment 2. While the 
two judgments may be highly correlated - at least in 
much research which has used facial target stimuli - 
the constructs are certainly not interchangeable, and, 
in the present area at least, are likely to have a 
correlational rather than causal relationship. Judges 
appear to have been fairly happy to ascribe
"intelligence" ratings of greater than five on a nine- 
point scale to the regenerated images used here, but 
loathe to rate them at above about four-and-a-half for 
"attractiveness". Possibly (as mentioned in the 
Discussion section of Experiment 2b) this indicates 
some degree of response-bias in a population of judges 
who did not want to commit themselves to finding 
particular body-shapes "more attractive" than others.
General Discussion
Briefly to recap the results of the experiments
presented here: subjects were asked to regenerate a
target body-image which they had viewed either before 
or after receiving a piece of stereotypic information 
concerning the target. In the first experiment, this 
information pertained to the nature of a crime
committed by the target; in the second, to the class 
of degree achieved. It was found that class of degree 
did not affect the rated intelligence or
attractiveness of the regenerated image, as had been 
hypothesized from the results of Macrae and Shepherd 
(1989a), Shepherd (1991), and Experiment 2 in the 
present thesis. Stereotypic information concerning a
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crime committed by the target was found to affect the 
rated body-size of the regenerated image (a correlate 
of aggressiveness), although it was not found to 
affect rated aggressiveness itself. Information 
concerning a crime stereotypically linked with 
dishonesty (theft) was not found to affect the rated 
honesty of the regenerated image. As mentioned in the 
Methodology section, this might be related to the 
difficulty of establishing the possible nature of a 
stereotypically "honest/dishonest" body-shape. The 
present experiment also showed a significant effect of 
stereotype condition upon rated likeness of the 
regenerated image to the target image: this was found 
to be greater in the "theft" condition than in the 
"assault" condition. It is possible that the other 
results achieved in this experiment are explicable in 
terms of this effect; although the mechanism involved 
is far from obvious. Conceivably one piece of 
stereotypic information presented here acted as a 
retrieval mnemonic: an intriguing and potentially
important area for investigation in the eyewitness 
field, and one which will receive attention later in 
the present thesis (see Chapters 7 and 8).
A surprising result of the experiments presented 
here was that in neither case did time of stereotype 
presentation affect the results obtained. The 
majority of the psychological literature concerning 
the effects of stereotypic information on memory would 
lead one to expect it to have a more powerful effect 
when presented before the target information than when
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presented afterwards. Indeed, many models of the 
effects of stereotypic information hold that it will 
be ineffective when presented after target 
information. As pointed out by Bodenhausen and 
Lichtenstein (1987) this may reflect a bias in the 
literature (which rarely utilises this paradigm) more 
than it does the genuine action of stereotypes. The 
present experiment goes some way towards supporting 
this claim. This issue is considered in detail in 
Chapter 6.
Another aim of this experiment was to discover how 
far the effect of stereotypic information on body 
material might parallel that on facial material. In 
Experiment 3a it was found that, in the "assault" 
condition, larger body-sizes were regenerated than in 
the "theft" condition: a trait which had previously
been found to be positively correlated with perceived 
aggressiveness. To a limited extent, this parallels 
the result achieved in Experiment 2a, in which it was 
found that regenerations made under the "assault" 
condition were judged more aggressive than those made 
under the "theft" condition. However, the body-shapes 
regenerated under the "assault" condition were not 
judged more aggressive than those regenerated under 
the "theft" condition. No effect of degree class was 
found on regenerated body stimuli in Experiment 3b, 
although it was found in Experiment 2b that 
regenerations made under the "2i" condition were 
judged more attractive than those made under the "2ii" 
condition. Taking these results together, it cannot
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easily be argued that the effects of stereotypes on 
regeneration of whole-body materials are in any simple 
way parallel to those on regeneration of facial 
materials. However, while the effects achieved in 
Experiment 3 are weaker than those achieved in 
Experiment 2, the fact that a significant result was 
achieved in Experiment 3a implies that further work 
should be carried out in this area, in an attempt to 
establish the extent to which stereotypes of whole- 
body features parallel those of facial features, and 
under what circumstances they will prove important.
The present study provides some evidence that 
stereotypes can bias interpretation of target body 
information. However, the evidence is not very 
strong: this experiment indicates that the effects may 
be limited to the situation in which a target is 
accused of committing a crime stereotypically 
associted with aggressiveness. Experiment 1 indicates 
that a relationship may exist between such a crime (in 
this case, assault) and the stereotypic body-shape of 
the perpetrator. The stereotypic relationship between 
dishonesty and body-shape may be rather less explicit; 
indeed the present experiment gives little reason to 
suppose that such a relationship does in fact exist. 
Hence it seems likely that an eyewitness' account of 
the whole-body features of a criminal might be biassed 
by the stereotypic nature of the crime only in a very 
limited range of situations.
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CHAPTER 6 - STEREOTYPES AND MEMORY: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
Many studies in the literature have found stereotypic 
information to have a distorting effect upon memory of 
target material. Hence it is important that the 
present thesis attempt to isolate the implications of 
stereotypic information for eyewitness memory. Most 
obvious of these implications are the potential 
negative effects. Consider the following scenario, 
derived from the famous study of rumour by Allport and 
Postman (1945): A man, travelling on the London
Underground, witnesses an attack by a black man on a 
white man, during which blows are exchanged. On the 
premise that such an incident would come to the 
attention of the police, suppose that the witness be 
interrogated by a (white) police officer - himself a 
social stereotype of the racist white policeman - who 
during the course of the interview lets slip the 
stereotypic information that blacks are likely to 
carry knives with them wherever they go. The witness 
returns to the police station for a second interview, 
during the course of which he misremembers the black 
man as having been armed with a knife. Such 
distortion of memory may have powerful negative 
implications for the man who committed the assault.
This is an example of the way in which stereotypic 
information may influence eyewitness memory for an 
event: sometimes at great cost to the individual.
Certainly the example is quite extreme: but it is not
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hard to imagine the potential for such incidents
within the criminal justice system, given the number 
of interviews and interrogations that take place.
There is also, of course, the potential for
stereotypic information to have more positive effects: 
the encoding of an event in terms of memorial schemata 
(Alba and Hasher, 1983) - of which stereotypes may be 
considered an example (Hamilton, 1979; Macrae, in 
press) - may lead to more extensive cognitive 
processing of certain items, and subsequent ease of 
retrieval for those items (Bodenhausen, 1988). Also, 
when stereotypic information is presented at
retrieval, there is the possibility of its acting as a 
retrieval schema for certain aspects of an event 
(Snyder and Uranowitz, 1978c; Snyder, 1981).
The first part of the present chapter concentrates 
upon social cognitive models of the effects of 
stereotypes on memory. Again, this is not to deny the 
importance of the social psychological perspective, 
but to recognise the importance of the social 
cognitive approach - especially at this early stage in 
research, at which it is helpful to work within the 
framework of the kinds of models which the approach 
provides. Two research areas can be identified in the 
social cognitive literature: stereotypic information
can be presented either at encoding or during 
retrieval of target information. These areas are 
considered separately.
------ Ï ‘--i;
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Stereotypes Presented at Encoding
Models of social memory have for the most part 
ignored the effects of stereotypic information 
presented at retrieval; being concerned almost 
exclusively with its effects when presented at 
encoding. This in turn has generated a
disproportionate amount of research into these 
effects; and, as the literature has grown, the models 
have become more complex. Few early studies in this 
area made explicit claims to proposing actual models 
of stereotypes and memory. Those which did (e.g., 
Cohen, 1977/81; Cantor and Mischel, 1977; Graesser, 
Gordon and Sawyer, 1979; Graesser, Woll, Kowalski and 
Smith, 1980; Hastie, 1980) tended to propose 
principles (such as schema-consistency) which were 
conceptually so simple that, as the literature grew, 
they became unable to account for the large number of 
disparate findings that appeared. No model
postulating a simple one-to-one relationship between, 
say, consistency and memorability could possibly 
account for the range of findings reported in the 
literature (see Table 6.1).
Additionally, methodological factors should be taken 
into account. Srull (1984) outlines many
methodological considerations for work in the social 
cognition area, remarking that divergent approaches 
may yield divergent results; in free recall, for 
example, analysis of the actual words used by a 
subject may yield different results from analysis of 
the meaning intended. As early as 1979, Dreben, Fiske
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and Hastie presented evidence that the divergent 
results in the literature depended to some extent on 
whether the subjects received memory-set or 
impression-formation instructions. Hasher and Griffin
(1978) pointed out the importance of different 
circumstances of retrieval. More recent formulations 
are more sophisticated, taking account of such 
variables as task goals, subjects' perspective, and 
judgment factors. These formulations are considered 
here.
1) THE SROLL-HÀSTIE MODEL Although Hastie, Park and 
Weber (1984) do not present an explicit model of 
stereotypes and memory, they do argue for the "Srull- 
Hastie model", based on work by Srull (1981) and 
Hastie (1980). Fundamental to their perspective is
the inconsistency effect. They hold that unexpected 
behavioural information will receive more elaborate 
processing, at least under impression-set, although
arguably not memory-set, instructions. They
reinterpret previous research in an attempt to show 
that the inconsistency effect underpins the 
literature. The discrepancies in the literature 
result, they claim, from the various task
methodologies employed. For instance, Rothbart, Evans 
and Fulero (1979) found a consistency effect; but 
Hastie et al hold that this was an artifact of using 
inappropriate dependent measures. Srull (1981) claims 
that the Rothbart, Evans and Fulero results might be 
due to the fact that they considered stereotypes of 
groups rather than individuals. Similarly, he
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attributes the consistency effect found by Cohen
(1981) to response-bias.
This formulation is tied in to depth-of-processing 
models, particularly the work of Bradshaw and Anderson
(1982); who presented subjects with lists of facts 
about historical figures, one of which was a target or 
to-be-remembered fact, and the others "context" facts. 
There were four experimental conditions. In one 
condition, context facts were causes of target facts; 
in another effects of target facts; in the third 
unrelated. In the fourth condition, no context facts 
were presented. They found that facts related to 
context (whether causes or effects) were best 
recalled. They claim that this was because related 
facts received more elaborate processing than 
unrelated facts; and Hastie et al hold that items 
which receive more elaborate processing - in the 
present instance, stereotype-inconsistent items - will 
be best recalled.
This highlights the problem with the "Srull-Hastie 
model": they claim that the inconsistency effect
underlies all the results in the area, but try to gain 
support for this contention from the consistency 
effect reported by Bradshaw and Anderson. The 
arguments presented in support of the model depend 
largely upon post hoc reasoning: it is unconvincing, 
for example, to explain away results which are at odds 
with the model by reference to methodological factors, 
(e.g., using groups rather than individuals as target
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stimuli,) which are not explicitly set out in the 
model in the first place.
The issue is further complicated by the results of 
Bodenhausen (1988) who finds that consistent
information receives more elaborate processing than 
inconsistent information at the encoding stage, and 
hence, according to the Srull-Hastie model, should 
have a memory advantage. Sentis and Burnstein (1979) 
find that schema-consistent information is easily 
chunked and stored in memory, whereas pieces of 
inconsistent information must be stored on an
individual basis, and will therefore, being unrelated 
to other items in memory, be harder to access. 
Conclusions The Srull-Hastie model, at least as
presented here, appears unconvincing. Its predictions 
contradict many of the findings in the stereotyping 
literature, and these contradictions are explained 
away by post hoc reasoning. Also, the model is 
founded to some degree upon findings (Bradshaw and 
Anderson, 1982) which it would not itself have 
predicted. However, the model deserves credit insofar 
as it takes into account factors more subtle than 
merely the consistency or relevance of the information 
presented. More refined versions of the model may yet 
prove to have broader predictive powers than that 
presented by Hastie at al (1984).
2) THE WYER AND GORDON MODEL Wyer and Gordon (1982) 
present a model which is nominally an extension of the 
Srull-Hastie model. It discriminates between memory 
for individuals and for groups, and between
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impression-formation and memory-set task
characteristics. Under memory-set conditions, they 
hold recall to be governed largely by distinctiveness. 
Stereotype-consistent information, being less 
distinctive than -inconsistent information, is likely 
to be recalled less well. Under person-impression 
conditions, however, a trait-based representation of 
the target is formed by which the behaviours in target 
material are linked network-fashion to traits which 
they exemplify. Hence, trait-based descriptors act as 
retrieval cues for behaviours associated with them, 
causing a consistency effect.
Where subjects are required to form an impression of 
a group rather than an individual, Wyer and Gordon
claim that a consistency effect is likely; except in 
cases where extra cognitive effort is required for 
processing of target information. This may occur 
where the behaviour is itself inconsistent. This
argument is somewhat post hoc - one might ask how to
predict under what circumstances extra cognitive
effort will be required for processing - and appears 
to run counter to the conclusion of Rothbart, Evans 
and Fulero (1979): although see Wyer and Gordon (1982, 
pp 160 - 161) for a full discussion of this apparent 
conflict.
The model was expanded by Wyer and Gordon (1984) and 
Wyer, Bodenhausen and Srull (1984). Wyer and Gordon 
(1984) present a review of the social memory 
literature, from which they draw three general
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conclusions. All of these apply exclusively to 
impression-set conditions. They are:
i) subjects encode behaviours in terms of the traits 
they exemplify
ii) when subjects have prior knowledge of a target's 
traits, they generate a general impression of the 
target. Once this is formed, inconsistent behaviours 
will be processed more extensively (Hastie, 1980). 
This occurs only with evaluatively, and not 
descriptively, inconsistent behaviours
iii) when subjects have no trait-based expectancy, 
they do not immediately form an evaluative impression 
of the target, but spontaneously encode and organize 
behavioural information in terms of trait concepts.
The aim of the paper by Wyer et al (1984) was to 
explain the underlying basis of these effects. Their 
explanation consists basically of three postulates: 
first, associations between a target's traits and 
behaviours, or among the behaviours themselves, are 
formed as a result of thinking about them in relation 
to each other. Second, the likelihood of recalling a 
specific behaviour increases with the strength of its 
association with a trait-based concept of the target. 
Third, the likelihood of recalling a specific 
behaviour increases with the number of other 
behaviours with which it is directly associated. From 
this standpoint, they are able to generate algebraic 
formulations of the probability of recall or 
recognition of different types of information under 
different target conditions (i.e., an individual or a
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group). While it is not the aim of the present review 
to expound upon each of these formulations and its 
theoretical justification, a few words about their 
model of processing consistent and inconsistent 
information would be appropriate here. Wyer et al 
find a recall advantage for behaviours which are 
evaluatively inconsistent with trait-based target 
expectancies. In many instances this will not occur 
however: the most obvious being when trait
expectancies (stereotypes by any other name) are 
introduced only after receipt of to-be-remembered 
material. Where a subject's expectancy is based upon 
a general description of the group to which the target 
belongs, however, rather than a description of the 
target person him/herself, then a target person 
deviating from the stereotypic behaviour of that group 
will likely be labelled "exceptional", and his/her 
behaviour ignored when forming an impression of the 
group as a whole. Hence, exceptional behaviour may be 
remembered less well than the more stereotype- 
consistent behaviour of other group members.
Wyer et al also present evidence that recall and 
recognition paradigms may access different aspects of 
target material. However, due to the complexity of 
the area, and also the limited research on the topic, 
they do not attempt to incorporate this distinction as 
a central feature of the model.
Conclusions The great strength of this model is 
probably that it discriminates less between 
consistency and inconsistency than between the
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distinctiveness of different pieces of information 
with regard to the stereotype which they exemplify. 
It is possible that the findings presented in Table 
6,1 will one day be united by the expedient of drawing 
in a third factor which covaries with consistency and 
relevance to a stereotype. However, the difficulty of 
incorporating such findings as Hastie and Kumar
(1979), Hashtroudie and Mutter (1980), and Hemsley and 
Marmurek (1982), into the model, make it as yet an 
unconvincing account of the literature. Expansions of 
the model by Wyer and Gordon (1984), and Wyer, 
Bodenhausen and Srull (1984), make this probably the 
most sophisticated and detailed account of social 
memory yet presented. The fact that these later 
formulations consider impression-formation to the 
almost complete exclusion of memory-set paradigms 
however greatly limits their range of explanation; 
making it less applicable to the eyewitness memory 
literature than it might have been.
3 ) THE STÀNGOR AND RUBLE MODEL Stangor and Ruble
(1989) consider both memory-set and impression- 
formation paradigms. They argue that the controversy 
over the "consistency" vs. the "inconsistency" effect 
may reflect a failure to take into account the 
knowledge available to the perceiver as target 
information is processed. The stronger the
perceiver's expectations, the more likely is 
expectancy-consistent information to be recalled. 
This is supported by an experiment they report, in 
which subjects received behavioural descriptions of
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members of two college fraternities, one of which 
engaged in mostly extroverted behaviour, and the other 
in mostly introverted behaviour. Half of the subjects 
first saw an "expectancy-generating" presentation of 
thirty behaviours. Half received memory-set
instructions, and half impression-formation 
instructions. Both instruction sets were found to 
improve recall.
The fewer expectations a subject has about a target 
person or group, the more elaborate processing the 
subject must use in order to form an impression. In 
laboratory-based studies, which often employ stimuli 
for which subjects will have few expectations, 
inconsistent behaviours are likely to receive more 
elaborate processing: this explains results like those 
of Hastie and Kumar (1979), Hashtroudie and Mutter
(1980), and Hemsley and Marmurek (1982): who all found 
inconsistency effects for material consisting of 
randomly-generated traits applied to an invented 
target. Studies which employ stimuli for which 
expectancies are greater (e.g., Halpern, 1985; 
Koblinsky and Cruse, 1981; Martin and Halverson, 1983, 
who all considered gender stereotypes) are likely to 
show consistency effects. In real-world situations, 
Stangor and Ruble argue, the expectations of a 
perceiver are likely to be more well-developed than is 
usually the case in a laboratory experiment; again 
leading to a consistency effect.
This is reinforced by a review of gender 
stereotyping and memory presented by Ruble and Stangor
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(1986), who find a marked consistency effect in the 
literature: gender stereotypes presumably having high 
expectancies associated with them. A similar
conclusion was reached by Higgins and Bargh (1987) in 
a review of the social memory literature. Stangor and 
Ruble conclude that consistent information is likely 
to be facilitated in memory in all instances except 
when a subject is forming a first impression of a 
target,
Conclusion This is probably the most subtle
formulation yet to be applied to the literature:
differentiating as it does not only between the
results of impression-formation and memory-set tasks, 
but between different stages of the impression- 
formation process. Conceivably, the model could be
tied in with the depth-of-processing literature in the 
same way that the "Srull-Hastie model" is tied in by 
Hastie at al (1984). For example, Hamilton (1981) 
holds that schema-relevant information will be given 
more attention, and is more likely to be noticed, than 
schema-irrelevant information.
The Stangor and Ruble model is probably the best- 
supported model - and the one with most explanatory 
power - in the psychological literature at present. 
However, it is certainly not perfect. The volume of 
research and number of contradictory findings in this 
literature demand that much more work be carried out 
to test and refine the model.
It is evident that none of these models is entirely 
convincing; however, all probably have something to
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recommend them. Whatever model may in future be 
developed to account for the divergent findings in the 
literature, it is likely to resemble recent models 
more than earlier formulations. It must take account 
of the way in which results vary with task demands, 
and particularly with impression-formation and memory- 
set demands. Quite possibly, it will also take 
account of different stages that subjects pass through 
during each of these tasks; a problem not neglected by 
Stangor and Ruble. It must also show an awareness of 
depth-of-processing effects: certainly, as Bodenhausen 
(1988), and Hastie et al (1984), point out, 
information which receives the most elaborate 
processing is likely to show a memory advantage. 
Something which is missing from at least the majority 
of models reviewed here is a means of predicting, a 
priori, which items of target material are likely to 
receive most elaborate processing. Finally, although 
the literature has hardly considered this at all, it 
is conceivable that different results may be achieved 
with different memory paradigms (Wyer et al, 1984): 
memory advantages may vary from free-recall to 
recognition paradigms.
Stereotypes Presented at Retrieval
Very little theoretical work has addressed the issue 
of the effect of stereotypic information presented 
during retrieval. As mentioned above, the majority of 
models that have been presented in the literature deal 
exclusively with stereotypes presented at encoding.
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This unbalance threatens to create something of a 
vicious circle in the literature, by which models of
the one sort of effect are tested by means of
experiments investigating that sort of effect, which 
in turn lead to further refinement of the models: 
implying that ultimately the effect of stereotypes
presented at retrieval may come to be ignored
altogether.
Investigations into the effects of stereotypes 
presented at retrieval (e.g., Snyder and Uranowitz, 
1978c; Clark and Woll, 1981) have tended to formulate 
the problems to be investigated in terms of schema 
theory: the cognitve generalizations that are made
about the characteristics of events, objects, or 
people. Such generalizations affect subsequent
cognitive events associated with the objects of the 
schemata: i.e., information processing, cognitive
integration, and organisation process.
It is not difficult to see how cognitive schemata 
might affect the retrieval of information from memory: 
even when schemata are activated after target 
information is encountered. Retrieval processes might 
be guided by schemata; hence the subject would be more 
likely to retrieve schema-consistent than inconsistent 
information. For instance, given the generic schema 
of a prospective purchaser of property, subjects 
remember from previously-presented target information 
that which is relevant to the schema (i.e., 
information which might affect the value of the 
property); whereas given the schema of a burglar.
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subjects remember from the same target information 
that which is relevant to this schema (i.e., that 
which affects the ease of entering the house; the 
value of the contents, etc. - Anderson and Pichert, 
1978). It is an explanation of this sort that 
underpins intepretation of Snyder and Uranowitz' 
(1978c) seminal "Betty K" experiment, and its 
subsequent replications (these experiments are 
discussed in some detail below).
Probably the best theoretical formulation of the 
effects of stereotypes presented at retrieval is 
however that offered by Wyer, Bodenhausen and Srull 
(1984). The experiment relevant here was one of a 
series of studies aimed at building and testing the 
social memory model discussed above; hence it did not 
provide the focus for the entire paper.
They present a model whereby trait information given 
at retrieval cannot lead to the reorganisation of that 
material around trait information. Thus subjects 
encode behaviours mentioned in to-be-remembered 
material in terms of "trait-behaviour clusters". The 
behaviours within each cluster will become more 
strongly associated than those across clusters. When 
trait information is provided, a central concept is 
activated, and the clusters become associated with it 
as shown overleaf, where T is trait, b is behaviour, C 
is trait-consistent, and I is trait-inconsistent:
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person concept
TI
blbl
bl
Lines between letters represent interrelationships 
among the behaviours. The red line represents a 
stronger interrelationship; blue lines weaker 
interrelationships.
From this position, they predict a consistency 
effect for both free-recall and recognition tasks like 
that presented in the Snyder and Uranowitz experiment. 
Both predictions held up when tested. These are the 
same predictions as given by the theory that 
stereotypes act as retrieval schemata. Therefore, any 
successful replication of the Snyder and Uranowitz 
experiment, or unambiguous demonstration of a 
consistency effect where stereotypic information is 
presented at retrieval, will tend to support the model 
proposed by Wyer, Bodenhausen and Srull.
Methodological Aspects of Stereotyping Research
Stereotypes Presented at Encoding: Table 6.1
indicates that there is little variety in the 
methodology of those studies that have examined the 
effects of stereotypic information on memory. The 
majority tend to use the same paradigm: undergraduate 
subjects receive a piece of stereotypic information.
190
followed by a piece of to-be-remembered material 
(usually in the form of prose), under instructions 
either to try to remember as much information as 
possible, or to form an impression of the target(s) 
described. Subjects' memory for information from the 
original material is then tested, to see which type of 
information is best recalled: stereotype-consistent,
stereotype-inconsistent, or stereotype-irrelevant 
information.
The results obtained vary far more greatly than the 
methodology, however. Table 6.1 details twenty-two 
studies in which stereotypic information was presented 
at encoding of to-be-remembered material. Of these, 
thirteen found a consistency effect, eight an 
inconsistency effect, and one considered only recall 
levels of relevant vs. irrelevant information (Bower, 
Black and Turner, 1979). Roberts (1985), in his 
review of the literature on the effects of subjective 
attitudes on memory, holds that little variation here 
is due to consistency at all. Many studies consider, 
as a side-issue, the related question of the relevance 
of information presented. Rothbart (1981; Rothbart, 
Evans and Fulero, 1979) finds that irrelevant and 
inconsistent information are recalled equally well, 
but less well than consistent information. All other 
studies of this effect find lower recall levels for 
irrelevant information than for consistent or 
inconsistent information. A number of attempts have 
been made to give a coherent account of the apparently
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contradictory results of the studies reviewed in Table 
6.1. These will be considered below.
The literature on the effects of stereotypic 
information presented at retrieval is far smaller, 
consisting as it does essentially of one classic 
experiment - Snyder and Uranowitz (1978c) - and three 
attempts to replicate it. This important area 
receives close attention later in the present chapter, 
and in Experiments 5 and 6.
Table 6.1 also shows that few recent studies have 
been reported. The emphasis in the literature has 
recently moved away from demonstrations of effects of 
stereotypic information on memory and towards the 
applications of theories which have developed from 
this work (see, e.g., Macrae, in press). However, it 
is hoped that the present chapter highlights a number 
of important issues that still require resolution, and 
potential real-world ramifications which this might 
have.
Stereotypes Presented at Retrieval: In many ways, it
is the effect of stereotypic information presented at 
retrieval that is of most relevance to the present 
thesis. This area will be investigated in Experiments 
5 - 7 .  The area has been much ignored; the majority 
of studies mentioned in Table 6.1 and above consider 
only the effect of stereotypes presented at encoding: 
hence the fact that most of the models reviewed take 
only this paradigm into account. This threatens to 
create a vicious circle in the literature: experiments 
that investigate one sort of effect generate models of
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that effect, which in turn generate more experiments; 
and. the effects of stereotypic information presented 
at retrieval are therefore ignored. This has two 
important ramifications: 1) investigation into the
effects of stereotypic information presented at 
retrieval is proceeding at a crawl. A number of 
important questions in the area need to be addressed; 
and have done for many years 2) theories of social 
memory based solely on results achieved in one 
paradigm may be proven inadequate by successful work 
in the complementary paradigm.
There is reason to believe that stereotypes may 
affect memory when presented after to-be-remembered 
material. Researchers in related fields have found 
that information presented after target material can 
affect recall or recognition of that material. Arkes 
and Harkness (1980) found that subjects given a 
diagnosis of a medical condition (Down's syndrome) 
after receipt of information about symptomatology were 
better able than those not given such information to 
recognise consistent symptoms after a twelve day 
retention interval, and correctly to reject new, non­
presented symptoms, Dooling and Christiaansen (1977) 
found that subjects told after reading a biographical 
passage that it related to the life of a famous person 
later falsely "recognised" sentences which, while not 
present in the original passage, were consistent with 
the life of the famous person. Lingle, Geva, Ostrom, 
Leippe and Baumgardner (1979) found that making a 
judgment about a target person on the basis of trait
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information previously received about that person 
influenced the traits later recalled. Ross, McFarland 
and Fletcher (1981) manipulated subjects' attitudes to 
an issue, and then asked them to recall past 
behaviours relevant to the newly-formed attitude; 
finding that items recalled differed with attitude. 
This is a particularly interesting study in that it 
shows the effects not to be limited to the recognition 
paradigm but also to hold in the recall paradigm.
Experiments 2 and 3 in the present thesis find no 
effect of stereotype presentation time: biassing
effects were found both when stereotypic information 
was presented at encoding and when it was presented at 
retrieval. The same effect may be expected to hold in 
an eyewitnessing situation: a piece of stereotypic
information encountered after witnessing a crime 
(e.g., during discussions with friends and relatives, 
or during the police interview) may bias memory for 
the crime.
There are other reasons to predict an effect of 
stereotypes presented at retrieval. Generic knowledge 
structures or schemata may guide memory by providing 
retrieval cues (Snyder and Uranowitz, 1978c; Lutz, 
1983). Clearly this is an important area for 
consideration in the present thesis. The studies in 
this area are reviewed below.
ROTHBART, EVANS AND FULERO (1979): These researchers
presented subjects with a list of fifty behaviour 
descriptions. Each behaviour was associated with one
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member of a group of fifty men. Of the fifty items, 
seventeen were intelligent behaviours, seventeen 
friendly behaviours, three unintelligent behaviours, 
three unfriendly behaviours, and ten were unrelated to 
intelligence or friendliness. For half the subjects, 
the group of men was labelled "intelligent", and for 
half "friendly". Half the subjects in each group 
received this label at encoding, and half at 
retrieval. Behaviours consistent with labels
presented at encoding were better recalled and 
received higher frequency estimates than inconsistent 
behaviours. No converse effects were discovered:
presentation of a label at retrieval was not found to
affect memory in any way. Taken alone, this study
implies that, in the type of situation of interest
here, a piece of stereotyping information accidentally 
dropped into conversation during a police interview, 
say, would not be expected to affect the memory of a 
witness to a crime.
SNYDER AND URANOWITZ (1978C) : Snyder and Uranowitz
presented subjects with a biography of a fictional 
character named Betty K. The biography was
constructed in such a way that equal numbers of facts 
indicated that Betty was heterosexual or homosexual. 
After reading the biography, some subjects learned 
that Betty was currently living a homosexual lifestyle 
("lesbian-label condition"), and some that she was 
living a heterosexual lifestyle ("heterosexual-label 
condition"). Still others were given no such
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information ("no-label condition"). These pieces of 
information were intended to stereotype Betty as 
lesbian or heterosexual, or to give no stereotypic 
information about her.
The subjects were then administered a forced-choice 
recognition task consisting of thirty-six items 
assessing the impact of stereotypic information on 
their memory for the biography. Each item allowed 
subjects to choose one of a number of responses: which 
Snyder and Uranowitz called "alternatives". Some 
alternatives were lesbian-label consistent; some 
heterosexual-label consistent; others neutral with 
respect to sexual-orientation label. All items had 
previously been rated by a panel of judges for how 
well it would test a subject's beliefs about the 
sexual orientation of a person. Items judged to test 
beliefs about sexual orientation were termed 
"critical" items. The questionnaire contained
seventeen such items.
Subjects who believed that Betty was currently 
living a lesbian lifestyle remembered (or, in Snyder 
and Uranowitz' term, "reconstructed") the events of 
her life in such a way as to reflect stereotyped 
beliefs about lesbians to a greater extent than did 
those who believed that she was currently living a 
heterosexual lifestyle. The responses of subjects in 
the heterosexual-label condition did not differ from 
those of subjects in the no-label condition. 
Presumably this indicates that to label a person
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"heterosexual" is equivalent to offering no 
stereotypic information about them.
Snyder and Uranowitz went on to test whether the 
results obtained were mediated by differential
accuracy of memory in the two conditions (i.e., did 
receipt of a stereotype label make the subject more 
likely to choose a correct, label-consistent
alternative?) or by differential error (i.e., did
receipt of a stereotype label make the subject more 
likely to choose an incorrect but label-consistent 
alternative?) They found that subjects in the
lesbian-label condition were significantly more likely 
to make lesbian-label consistent errors than those in 
the heterosexual-label condition. The converse was 
also true: Subjects in the heterosexual-label
condition were more likely to make heterosexual-label 
consistent errors than subjects in the lesbian-label 
condition.
As far as accuracy measures went, for subjects in 
the heterosexual-label condition, a greater proportion 
of correct, heterosexual-label consistent answers was 
given. The converse was not found to be the case: 
receipt of a lesbian label did not increase accuracy 
of memory for correct lesbian alternatives.
Snyder and Uranowitz conclude that: "Our empirical 
research suggests that current beliefs can and do 
exert a powerful channeling effect in attempts to 
remember the past" (p 948). Although they do not 
explicitly state as much, this has been interpreted to 
mean that stereotypic information can act as a
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retrieval schema for previously-learned material 
(despite the fact that receipt of a lesbian label did 
not appear to aid memory for lesbian items in the 
original study - see, e.g., Bellezza and Bower, 1981; 
Clark and Woll, 1981). Were this true, it would have 
obvious potential to aid investigation into eyewitness 
memory.
However, the literature contains two important 
failures to replicate the Snyder and Uranowitz study,
CLARK AMD WOLL (1981): Clark and Woll point out a
number of methodological weaknesses in the original 
study. Most relate to the items used to test memory, 
which appear to have been poorly thought-out. The 
number of items to which the correct response was a 
lesbian alternative was greater than the number of 
items to which the correct response was a heterosexual 
alternative. Also, the number of lesbian alternatives 
in a given item was sometimes greater than the number 
of heterosexual alternatives, and vice versa. 
Sometimes there were more neutral alternatives than 
heterosexual or lesbian alternatives. Obviously, 
predomination of one type of alternative would tend to 
bias responses to that item. With all of these 
factors balanced in their own study, Clark and Woll 
found no effect of stereotype label on memory.
Concluding that the failure of this conceptual 
replication might be due more to changes made to the 
design than to non-existence of the effect, Clark and 
Woll then ran a direct replication of the original
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study, using all the original materials. Once again,
no effect was found; results in the three conditions
did not differ significantly. Although the lesbian-
and no-label conditions produced much the same results
as the corresponding conditions in the Snyder and
Uranowitz study, the heterosexual-label condition did
give different results, and these were the results
primarily responsible for the failure of the
replication. The experiment also included an
"encoding" condition, whereby subjects were presented
with the sexual-orientation label before reading the
biography. Given the results from similar paradigms
discussed above, one must expect some memory bias to
result from this procedure; although whether one would
do better to predict a consistency or an inconsistency
effect is unclear. Neither effect was however
discovered. Clark and Woll conclude that:
"Sex role stereotypes may not have as powerful an effect on reconstructive memory as Snyder and Uranowitz suggested, or at least that their paradigm may not be adequate for uncovering such an effect." (Clark and Woll, 1981, p 1071)
Conceivably, Clark and Woll mean by this that the 
Snyder and Uranowitz paradigm is inadequate for 
uncovering the effect in question when the experiment 
is designed more rigorously• The original results may 
have been an artifact of methodological failings 
rather than the consequence of the action of sex-role 
stereotypes on memory. Their results appear to 
indicate that stereotypic information presented at 
retrieval may have no effect upon memory for to-be- 
remembered material.
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This is of course possible. However, another of 
their findings casts doubt over the validity of their 
own design. As mentioned above, when they presented 
stereotypic information at encoding, they received 
neither a consistency nor an inconsistency effect. 
The effects gained under this paradigm differ 
considerably (see above) - but it is certainly unusual 
to achieve no results at all. One might therefore be 
tempted to conclude that some experimental artifact 
confounded their results. Without more details of
their study (none have been forthcoming despite 
letters requesting them), it is impossible to 
speculate further about this.
BELLEZZA AND BOWER (1981): Bellezza and Bower also
attempted a conceptual replication of the Snyder and 
Uranowitz study. Their hypothesis was that the 
original results were caused by "response-bias". In 
other words, they presumed that when a subject was 
presented on the forced-choice recognition task with 
an item the correct answer to which s/he did not know, 
then s/he would tend to guess: the direction of this 
guess biassed by the subject's knowledge of Betty's 
sexual orientation. Thus, if a subject did not know 
the right answer to a given item, but did remember 
that Betty was, say, a lesbian, then s/he would be 
likely to choose the lesbian alternative.
Bellezza and Bower used no "control" (i.e., "no­
label") condition as used by Snyder and Uranowitz: 
presumably because, in the original study, the results
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obtained in this condition did not differ 
significantly from those obtained in the heterosexual- 
label condition.
As an addition to the original procedure, Bellezza 
and Bower varied the type of distractor presented with 
correct alternatives in the forced-choice recognition 
task, i.e., so that a correct lesbian alternative 
might be paired in one condition with a lesbian 
distractor, and in another with a heterosexual 
distractor.
Two experiments were run with these materials.
Experiment 1 showed no better memory for lesbian
material in subjects given a lesbian label than in
subjects given a hetereosexual label; and no better
memory for heterosexual material in subjects given a
heterosexual label.
"...[there was] no greater memory sensitivity to lesbian information for subjects who were presented a lesbian label for Betty K than for subjects presented a heterosexual label.Similarly the heterosexual-label subjects showed no memory advantage when tested on heterosexual information. These results do not confirm the memory mechanisms proposed by Snyder and Uranowitz." (Bellezza and Bower, 1981, p 862)
Using a signal-detection paradigm, they did however 
find evidence of some response-bias in their subjects. 
There was not however strong support for either 
hypothesis: the retrieval-schema hypothesis, or their 
own response-bias hypothesis.
Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1, 
except that the salience of labelling was increased by 
presenting subjects with four questions concerning
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Betty's sexual orientation before completion of the 
task.
This time, greater response-bias was found towards 
lesbian alternatives when subjects were told Betty was 
lesbian than when they were told she was heterosexual. 
It was concluded that the original results were caused 
by response-bias, and not the mechanism originally 
proposed.
LUTZ (1983): Lutz essentially ran a direct replication
of the original Snyder and Uranowitz study, but 
included a recall condition as a check for the 
recognition procedure. If the presentation of
stereotypic information had an effect in the 
recognition procedure but not in the recall procedure, 
Lutz argues, then it might be possible that some bias 
existed in the recognition task itself.
After reading the biography, subjects were presented 
with stereotype labels either immediately or after a 
delay of one week. All memory tests took place one 
week after receipt of the biography. Recall data 
showed that delay reduced the effectiveness of the 
label in biassing a subject's memory, although 
recognition data was mixed. The essential finding of 
Snyder and Uranowitz, however (i.e., that a stereotype 
label presented at retrieval can distort memory for 
relevant biographical material) was replicated. There 
is however an important drawback associated with this 
study: Lutz employed the original materials, as used 
by Snyder and Uranowitz, and, as Clark and Woll (1981)
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point out, these were not of the highest quality. A 
similar study using the materials generated by Clark 
and Woll or by Bellezza and Bower would have been of 
more value.
ONE MORE PIECE OF WORK: A minor contribution to this
debate has been made by an undergraduate at Aberdeen 
University (Shepherd, 1991, personal communication). 
In this truncated version of the Snyder and Uranowitz 
study, the biography of a male was created and only 
the homo- and heterosexual label conditions run (as in 
Bellezza and Bower, 1981). Seventeen critical items 
were used; pre-rated as implying homosexuality or 
heterosexuality. The results achieved fairly well 
replicated those of Snyder and Uranowitz. Measures 
were taken of the accuracy and error rates found in 
each condition. Of these measures, only the rate of 
correct recognition for homosexual alternatives was 
unaffected by the presentation of a stereotype label. 
Strangely, this is precisely the measure that one 
would expect to be affected were Snyder and Uranowitz' 
explanation of their results correct, i.e., were 
stereotype labels acting as retrieval schemata.
Unfortunately, it has proven impossible to obtain 
any more information regarding this study. Although 
it must therefore be taken with caution, it does 
provide evidence which, if not exactly supporting 
Snyder and Uranowitz' contention, does appear to 
counter Bellezza and Bower's claims.
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COMMENT: While the Clark and Woll critique of Snyder
and Uranowitz' original experimental materials is well 
founded, it is not easy to explain their results. 
Certainly, the results of their first experiment 
appear to indicate that the original results were 
caused by poor testing procedure rather than by the 
explicit action of stereotypic information presented 
at retrieval; but this explanation is cast into doubt 
when one considers that their direct replication of 
the original study also failed to find the same 
results as Snyder and Uranowitz. Unless one argues 
that Snyder and Uranowitz included some other 
variation in their experiment which they failed to 
report, this does appear to make Clark and Woll's 
explanation appear tenuous.
Rather more interesting is the claim made by 
Bellezza and Bower that the original results were 
caused by response-bias. It is doubtful however that 
this will prove to be the whole story. Firstly, in 
Experiment 1, Bellezza and Bower found no response- 
bias when subjects were given a heterosexual label; 
although there was evidence of this in Experiment 2. 
It is hard to see how this result can be reconciled 
with their claim that the Snyder and Uranowitz results 
were caused entirely by response-bias. Secondly, in 
the original paper, Snyder and Uranowitz anticipated 
the kind of objection put forward by Bellezza and 
Bower. They employed a "fabrication group", whose job 
it was to invent answers to the forced-choice 
recognition task, based solely on the sexual label -
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lesbian or heterosexual - without having read the 
Betty K biography. Since this group showed no 
evidence of response-bias, so Snyder and Uranowitz 
claim, neither should the "reconstruction" groups. 
Bellezza and Bower counter this argument by saying 
that Snyder and Uranowitz' fabrication group was
probably just choosing its responses at random.
This is not convincing. It relies upon the implicit 
claim that the fabrication group received no
information upon which to base their responses. 
(Otherwise, it is hard to see how Bellezza and Bower 
could claim that the responses were pure guesswork. ) 
This is however untrue; the members of the fabrication 
group were told that Betty K was homo- or
heterosexual. This is a minimal amount of information 
indeed; but it is precisely the same amount of
information that Bellezza and Bower claim to have 
produced response-bias in their reconstruction group. 
Of course, they had also presented their subjects with 
the Betty K biography beforehand, but it is on the 
sexual-orientation label only - not on the 
biographical information - that they blamed the mooted 
response-bias in their subjects. One suspects that 
they are trying to have their cake and eat it.
This is not to come out wholeheartedly on the side 
of Snyder and Uranowitz, however. A look at the 
pattern of results that they achieved (discussed 
above) renders their explanation less than wholly 
convincing. After all, it is a strange kind of
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retrieval schema the results of which are mediated to 
such a great extent by error.
One must not forget however that the accuracy (by 
which Snyder and Uranowitz mean the number of items 
correct, rather than the number correct divided by the 
total) of recognition of heterosexual information was 
increased by labelling Betty K a heterosexual. One 
would be more convinced, though, if the accuracy of 
recognition of lesbian information had also increased; 
as mentioned above, "heterosexuality" is probably not 
even a stereotype. If it is not a stereotype, one can 
hardly argue that the increased accuracy of 
recognition of heterosexual items in the experiment 
was due to the "heterosexual stereotype" acting as a 
retrieval schema.
More work is required in the area if any concrete 
conclusions are to be drawn. That the Snyder and 
Uranowitz experiment should prove so important is 
perhaps unsurprising given the relative simplicity and 
directness of its design. Therefore it would appear 
that the way forward in this area is to attempt to 
resolve the confusion surrounding this experiment. It 
is also important for the present thesis to attempt to 
resolve this question. The eyewitnessing situation is 
a real-world instance which offers great scope for the 
action of stereotypes presented at retrieval. After 
seeing a crime, the eyewitness may be exposed to 
stereotypic information at a number of stages; e.g., 
during conversations about the incident with friends 
and relatives, during the police interview, etc. If
206
stereotypes presented at retrieval can be shown to 
have effects upon memory for target information, then 
the potential for distortion of the memory trace in 
the eyewitness situation is very great. Indeed it 
could be argued that, in this case, stereotypic 
information has more opportunity to bias memory at 
retrieval than at encoding. This is the area which is 
addressed in the following two chapters.
Summary and Conclusions
There are two questions concerned with the effects of 
stereotypes on memory; and these two questions can be 
approached in either of two ways: using the social or 
the cognitive paradigm. The literature on the effect 
of stereotypes presented at encoding is large and 
contradictory, partly because of the number of 
paradigms used: impression-formation vs. memory-set
instructions, recall vs. recognition, and so on. The 
earlier, simpler models of these effects, such as the 
schema-consistency model proposed by Cohen (1977/81) 
appear unlikely ever to give satisfactory accounts of 
the literature. Later models appear more successful; 
and of these, the one proposed by Stangor and Ruble 
(1989) is the best supported. This model predicts a 
consistency effect in most paradigms.
The literature of the effects of stereotypes 
presented at retrieval is especially relevant to the 
present area, because so many effects are conceivable 
here, both positive and negative. This literature 
centres around the controversy engendered by the
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classic paper by Snyder and Uranowitz (1978c), the 
results of which would not be predicted by most 
current models of the effects of stereotypes on memory 
(e.g., Hastie, 1980; Srull 1981; Bodenhausen 1988), 
but which would, interestingly, be predicted by that 
proposed by Wyer at al (1984). Snyder and Uranowitz' 
results appear to receive support from studies by Lutz 
(1983) and Shepherd (personal communication), although 
Clark and Woll and Bellezza and Bower (both 1981) 
failed to replicate the findings.
Were the Snyder and Uranowitz hypothesis to prove 
tenable, this would be a particularly important area 
for consideration in the present thesis. If not, the 
possible distorting effect of stereotypic information 
presented at retrieval is itself an area worthy of 
study. The following section considers the effects of 
social factors in the eyewitness memory situation, 
with emphasis on the way in which such factors may 
result in the production of distorted testimony. 
Experiments 4 and 5 then go on to study the effects of 
stereotypic information presented at the retrieval of 
target information.
Social Factors in the Police Interview
Every situation encountered by an eyewitness to a 
crime is a social situation. The crime itself, 
subsequent discussions with friends and relatives 
about the crime, the police interview, and possible 
eventual court appearances, are all situations of a 
social nature. Therefore it is to be expected that
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social factors which have been shown to affect memory 
or judgment will affect the accuracy of the 
eyewitness' account. Examples of such factors are the 
attitudes or opinions of the eyewitness with respect 
to the type of crime in question; the attitudes or 
opinions of the persons with whom s/he discusses the 
witnessed crime; and any social stereotypic factors 
which may accidentally be dropped into conversations 
regarding the crime. Perhaps the most likely stage of 
the eyewitnessing situation for social factors to have 
an influence is during the police interview. Given 
the potentially great importance of such factors, it 
appears strange that so little research has addressed 
the area: the great majority of research into the
police interview has been concerned with such issues 
as the development of strategies to increase the 
amount or accuracy of information recalled, (e.g., 
research on the cognitive interview by Geiselman, 
Fisher and their colleagues, reviewed in Chapter 10,) 
or specific means of dealing with special categories 
of witness (e.g., the child witness - Davies, Flin and 
Baxter, 1986; Flin, 1988; Flin and Tarrant, 1989; 
Friedemann and Morgan, 1985; Moston, 1988/89 - or the 
mentally handicapped - Tully and Cahill, 1986). In 
general, social factors have received only cursory 
attention, usually as a side-issue only tangentially 
related to the main thrust of a paper or experiment.
Mention is made of social factors in the police 
interview in relatively early papers by Firth (1975) 
and Goodsall (1974); however these papers are
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essentially documents written from experience by 
police officers without the time or resources to put 
their observations to the test under laboratory 
conditions. A paper by Palumbo (1975) is in a similar 
position, although this paper, also written by a 
professional policeman and aimed at an readership of 
policemen, is precocious in that it stresses the great 
importance of such social factors as the 
conversational nature of the interview, and 
establishing a positive relationship with the 
interviewee, a decade before Conversation Management 
(reviewed in Chapter 10) became an important area of 
research in the interviewing literature.
More recently - perhaps partly due to recent 
developments in Conversation Management techniques, 
which stress the importance of such social factors as 
rapport building in the police interview - social 
influences have received somewhat more attention.
Perhaps the most important figure in this area of 
the literature is Eric Shepherd, who (like Palumbo) 
has stressed the importance of viewing the police 
interview as a conversation between officer and 
witness, in the course of which the two attempt 
mutually to establish the facts of a particular 
criminal incident. E Shepherd (1985) holds that it is 
the responsibility of the interviewing policeman to 
build what he calls a "psychological bridge" - i.e., a 
rapport or mutual understanding - between himself and 
the witness, and has developed a police training 
scheme which aims to teach officers how to build this
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bridge during the course of an interview. Lack of 
social skills on the part of an interviewing officer 
can affect the accuracy and completeness of the 
account which s/he elicits from the witness. 
Particularly dangerous is the police officer's 
tendency to conceptualize the interview situation only 
in terms of his/her own specialist knowledge and 
ignore areas of knowledge which are inevitably also 
important in the interview situation, especially the 
area of discourse - a highly complex kind of event, 
which police officers are untrained in interpreting.
In a later paper, E Shepherd (1991) goes on to 
discuss how such poor interviewing procedure can lead 
to the negative outcome of interviewee resistance. 
Although it is not the purpose of the present section 
to discuss the phenomenon of interviewee resistance in 
any detail, an example might help to indicate the 
importance of social variables here. While some 
earlier papers, (e.g.. Firth, 1975,) recommend that an 
interviewing officer try to appear highly 
knowledgeable about the case in hand (even to the 
point of trying to appear far more knowledgeable than 
s/he actually is,) E Shepherd holds that such an 
approach may in fact prove counter-productive. 
However hard one tries to appear knowledgeable, he 
argues, one cannot fool the witness for very long. 
Any mistakes made by the interviewing officer in the 
content of his/her assertions regarding a case will 
inevitably lead to suspicion on the part of the 
interviewee, loss of confidence in and respect for the
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officer, and will tend to generate interviewee 
resistance. This is a good example of the influence 
of social factors in the eyewitness situation.
Roy (1991) briefly discusses the effects of the lack 
of training in interview techniques on police 
investigators. He holds that the standard training 
method (i.e., the recruit accompanies an experienced 
officer during that officer's interviews) may equip 
investigators to become "report-takers”, but does not 
aid them to become "information-gatherers" - i.e.,
investigators able to elicit more information from a 
witness than that witness would otherwise have 
provided. Roy holds that the application of 
Conversation Management techniques would overcome a 
large proportion of the fundamental problems which 
currently plague the police interview (these are 
discussed in Chapter 10). Most of these, (e.g., a 
staccato style of questioning, and interrupting the 
witness before s/he has finished speaking,) are once 
again socially-based, and spring from an ignorance of 
discourse, as argued by E Shepherd (1991).
Perhaps the most relevant study to the present area 
is that presented by Mortimer (1991), who looks at the 
influence of police officers' cognitive schemata of 
criminal offences on their perception of those 
offences. Mortimer argues that police officers make 
sense of an offence by applying to it the schemata 
that they have derived from past experience of such 
cases, as well as other sources. Such schemata can 
prove useful tools for investigating officers if used
211
212
in a flexible manner, but they must not be allowed to 
control an officer's behaviour during an interview
with an eyewitness. Mortimer reports three
experiments which aim to study the contents of such 
schemata for three types of crime, (shoplifting,
actual bodily harm, and rape,) and the relationship 
between the complexity of the "template" and the 
officer's background. She found very little
commonality in officers' templates of these types of 
crime. This could imply either that officers are 
open-minded with respect to these cases, or that they 
are prone to what Mortimer terms "click-whirr"
(relatively non-cognitively-driven) responding to 
cases, on the basis of very little information about a 
case. These "minimal templates (Mortimer, 1991, p 22) 
could act either beneficially or adversely in the 
investigation. They could have a positive effect 
where a skilled officer is trying to learn as much 
detail as possible about an idiosyncratic event; but 
could have a detrimental effect where a case is 
particularly complex and the officer has difficulty in 
cognitively coping with the wealth of detail 
associated with it. In this case, s/he might be 
"victim to problems of integrating information and 
missing out crucial detail and even 'missing the 
point'" (p 22). Additionally, the lack of specificity 
of these templates makes the handling of information 
problematic, because they provide no mental pointers 
to follow. An officer is much more likely to probe 
those areas that are already defined by the cognitive
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template than those which are not so defined; hence 
the resultant account of the crime in question is 
likely to be distorted in the direction of the 
contents of the officer's template.
As mentioned above, it seems strange that the 
influence of such social-cognitive factors in the 
eyewitness situation has received so little attention. 
It is the aim of the following section of the thesis 
to help redress this balance, by studying the 
influence of social stereotypes on memory when 
presented during the retrieval of target information.
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CHAPTER 7 - RECONSTRUCTION OF THINGS PAST: RETRIEVAL SCHEMATA AND THE AFTER-EFFECTS OF STEREOTYPING INFORMATION
"It's a poor sort of memory that only works 
backwards." Lewis Carroll: Through the Looking-Glass
Introduction
The literature review in Chapter 6 has demonstrated 
the importance of attempting to isolate the effects of 
stereotypic information on eyewitness memory. 
Distorting effects are conceivable whether this 
stereotypic information precedes or follows the 
witnessed crime. While the effects are perhaps likely 
to be of greater magnitude in the former case, the 
latter is even more relevant to the eyewitness 
situation. Stereotypic information could be
introduced at almost any time following the crime: 
e.g., when the witness is thinking over the details of 
the crime, discussing it with friends and relations, 
or during the police interview itself. There is also 
the intriguing possibility that stereotypic 
information presented at retrieval might act as a 
retrieval schema for stereotype-consistent information 
from the crime itself. These possibilities merit 
close consideration in the present thesis.
To this end, it was decided to run an experiment 
conceptually based on that of Snyder and Uranowitz 
(1978c), but testing subjects' memory with a task 
designed to eliminate response-bias. Such a procedure 
was already extant: that designed by McCloskey and
Zaragoza (1985).
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McCloskey and Zaraaoza (1985): This paper reported
an experimental procedure designed to eliminate the 
response-bias effects which the authors claimed to be 
at the root of the "misinformation effect" 
investigated by Elizabeth Loftus and her colleagues 
(e.g., Loftus and Palmer, 1974? Loftus 1977; Loftus 
1979; Loftus, Schooler and Wagenaar, 1985).
In a typical example of these studies, subjects were 
exposed to a series of slides of e.g., a traffic 
accident. They then read a piece of prose purporting 
to be an account of the slide sequence. For the 
experimental ("misled") subjects, some peripheral 
detail was altered in the prose account (e.g., it was 
claimed that a yield sign was present when in fact a 
stop sign was present). For control subjects, the 
prose account did not mention the sign. When tested 
with a forced-choice recognition task for the slide 
sequence, subjects in the "misled" condition were 
found to perform consistently more poorly on this 
detail than those in the "control" condition.
For many years, the main controversy that this 
finding engendered was whether the misleading 
information replaced the original in memory, or 
rendered it inaccessible. McCloskey and Zaragoza, 
however, claimed that misleading information in fact 
had no effect on memory for the original event; that 
Loftus' finding was the result of reponse-bias. In a 
study where the original information was a stop sign 
and the misled item was a yield sign, McCloskey and
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Zaragoza showed that subjects in the "misled” 
condition would be statistically more likely to choose 
the yield sign than the stop sign, regardless of the 
effect of misleading information on the memory trace.
McCloskey and Zaragoza eliminated response-bias 
using a modified testing procedure. This was a 
variation on the standard test whereby instead of 
offering in the recognition task a choice between the 
original information and misinformation, they offered 
a choice between the original item and a foil, i.e., a 
similar object which was not part of the original
information or the misinformation. Subjects were not 
asked to choose between (say) a stop sign (shown in 
the sequence) and a yield sign (misled information), 
but between a stop sign and a roundabout sign 
(information that was neither shown nor misled). (In 
fact, this particular condition was not used by
McCloskey and Zaragoza, but simply serves illustrative 
purposes here.) Under this procedure, where a subject 
could not remember the answer to an item, then s/he 
would have to guess. Misled subjects who did not
remember the correct answer would be correct 50% of 
the time, as would control subjects who did not
remember the correct answer. Thus response-bias would 
be eliminated. This remains the procedure of choice 
for eliminating response-bias in the post-event 
misinformation situation (see, e.g., Wright 1992).
Use of the Modified Procedure: The question of
response-bias in Loftus' work is analagous to that in
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Snyder and Uranowitz' study. In each case, post-event 
information leads subjects to produce distorted 
"memories" of the target material? and, in each case, 
subsequent researchers have claimed the effect to be 
caused by response-bias. Therefore it was decided to 
apply McCloskey and Zaragoza's modified procedure to a 
conceptual replication of the Snyder and Uranowitz 
study. If the original results were still to hold 
under modified procedure conditions, this would 
provide strong support for Snyder and Uranowitz' 
position: that stereotypic information can act as a 
retrieval schema. The reverse results, obviously, 
would provide support for Bellezza and Bower's 
response-bias position. Such results would imply a 
lack of real effect of stereotypic information 
presented at retrieval. The hypotheses generated by 
the rival theories are presented in more detail, 
below.
The important models of social memory proposed by 
Wyer, Bodenhausen and Srull (1984) and by Stangor and 
Ruble (1989) also predict a consistency effect where 
stereotypic information is presented after target 
material. If the results of the present experiment 
support the Snyder and Uranowitz hypothesis, they 
would also provide support for these two theories. 
Results which contradict the Snyder and Uranowitz 
hypothesis, however, would also count against these 
models.
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The Free-Recall Paradigm: Srull (1984) suggests that
there may be a systematic difference between the 
results produced in recall and recognition testing 
paradigms. Given that eyewitness memory is for the 
most part accessed under recall conditions (during, 
e.g., the police interview), it was important for the 
present experiment to include a free-recall condition 
for comparison with the recognition conditions 
reported. Such comparisons have rarely been made in 
the social memory literature (Srull, 1984).
Snyder and Uranowitz (1978a - Snyder 1991, personal 
communication), did, however, run a conceptual 
replication of the Betty K study in which a free- 
recall measure was used. Subjects were required to 
write an essay that included as many facts from the 
target biography as they could recall. Judges 
classified these according to their best estimate of 
the subjects' beliefs about Betty's sexual 
orientation. Two classifications were discriminable: 
subjects who believed that Betty was homosexual, and 
those who believed that she was heterosexual or had no 
belief about her sexuality (judges were unable to 
discriminate between these two conditions). In 
another study, Snyder and Uranowitz (1978b) considered 
interpretive activities in reconstruction. Subjects 
in this study were required to answer questions about 
factual events in Betty K's life, and to interpret 
what meaning the events had for understanding Betty K. 
Interpretations were found to reflect current beliefs 
about Betty's lifestyle. This occurred not only for
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events that fit with current beliefs (e.g., a subject 
who remembered that a supposedly lesbian Betty never 
had a steady boyfriend in high school might see this 
as an early manifestation of her lack of interest in 
men,) but also, conversely, for events that did not so 
fit (e.g., if this subject remembered that Betty did 
go out on dates in high school, s/he might interpret 
this as an attempt to "pass" as heterosexual - Snyder, 
1991, personal communication, and see also Snyder, 
1981). These demonstrations appear to show that the 
basic Betty K finding is generalisable across 
paradigms (cf. Srull, 1984). None of these studies 
has yet been published, and details about them are 
unavailable? hence the evidence that they provide is 
somewhat weak.
Lutz (1983) is the only published study to apply a 
free-recall paradigm to the Betty K materials. He 
found a powerful effect of the "heterosexual" label - 
which led to subjects producing a more "heterosexual" 
protocol - but no significant effect of delay of 
testing time (testing after one or three weeks). This 
pattern of results closely parallels that found in the 
recognition conditions also included in his 
experiment, implying again that the information 
produced during free-recall is comparable to that 
produced during recognition.
The recall paradigm is of relatively greater 
relevance to the eyewitness memory situation; 
recognition memory, while a factor in such instances 
as the identification parade, will usually take a back
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seat to recall memory, which the police interview is 
designed to probe. Hence, a second experiment is 
reported here which employs a free-recall rather than 
a forced-choice recognition task paradigm, in an 
attempt to test the cross-paradigm generalisability of 
the results achieved. These experiments are reported 
separately as Experiments a and b.
A Note on Methodology: Snyder and Uranowitz, in
their original experiment, tested subjects after a 
three-week delay from receipt of the biographical 
material. In the present instance, only the nature of 
the effects are of interest; not their magnitude. 
With this in mind, in the interest of methodological 
simplicity, testing was performed immediately after 
receipt of stereotypic information. This brief 
interval was necessitated by the use of the free- 
recall condition. Pilot work showed that subjects 
asked to complete a free-recall task one week after 
receipt of the Betty K biography managed to produce 
only two or three items each (pace Lutz 1983), Since 
such poor results would necessarily obscure the 
relatively small expected effects of stereotypes on 
memory, it was thought preferable to test memory 
immediately after receipt of the biographical 
information, producing meaningful data from all groups 
of subjects. Besides, there was no reason to suppose 
that a short delay would increase the effects of 
stereotypes on memory. If anything, it would lead to 
smaller effects, with the biographical information
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still relatively fresh in the subjects' minds. Hence 
this was, if anything, a conservative departure from 
the original experimental design.
A Note on Terminoloay: - throughout the following
sections, terms from signal detection theory are used.
Hence "a piece of information correctly recognised as 
lesbian-stereotype consistent" is termed a "lesbian 
hit"; "a piece of information incorrectly 'recognised' 
as lesbian-stereotype consistent" is termed a "lesbian 
false alarm", and so on. Of course, in the modified 
test procedure, correct alternatives were presented 
with a neutral distractor rather than one consistent 
with the opposite stereotype. Hence, under modified 
procedure conditions, there was really no such things 
as "heterosexual-" or "lesbian false alarms". 
Nevertheless, these expressions are used with 
reference to the modified procedure, in the interests 
of consistency and ease of comprehension.
It is realised that terminology from signal j
detection theory is strictly inappropriate to the !■1present study since no signal detection paradigm was iiused. It was decided however that in this case the |
advantages of brevity and comprehensibility outweighed jJthose of fastidious terminology. 1
Throughout, the term "neutral" information is used \
to refer to information with no direct implications |
for the sexuality of Betty K. I
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The two experiments are reported separately below, as 
Experiments a and b.
Experiment 4a
Hypotheses : The hypotheses of the rival theories are
presented below, with a brief explanation of the 
reasoning behind them.
RETRIEVAL SCHEMA THEORY
1. There will be more "lesbian hits" than 
"heterosexual hits" with a lesbian label under all 
test procedures. The retrieval schema theory holds 
that the effect by which the increase in hits under a 
lesbian label is mediated should be unaffected by the 
memory task used (see above).
2. There will be equal numbers of "lesbian hits" and 
"heterosexual hits" with a heterosexual label under 
all procedures. The hypothesis holds that a
heterosexual label, being not a stereotypic label, 
should have no effect on memory performance, 
regardless of memory task used.
3. There may be more "neutral hits" with a lesbian 
label. This prediction is not part and parcel of the 
retrieval schema theory, but is consistent with the 
hypothesis and, if fulfilled, would support it rather 
than the response-bias theory. It is possible that 
the schema properties of a lesbian label are not 
restricted to information linked to that label; the 
retrieval of neutral information too might be 
facilitated.
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4. At least as many "heterosexual false alarms" as 
"lesbian false alarms" under any condition. The 
response-bias theory would predict that there would be 
a greater number of lesbian- than heterosexual false 
alarms where a lesbian label is given because those 
are precisely the conditions under which response-bias 
is most likely to occur. The retrieval schema theory 
holds that under no condition should the number of 
"lesbian false alarms" be greater than the number of 
"heterosexual false alarms".
RESPONSE-BIAS THEORY
5. Fewer "lesbian hits" under the modified than the 
standard test procedure when a lesbian label is given. 
The response-bias theory holds that response-bias will 
act only under the standard test procedure conditions.
6. Fewer "lesbian false alarms" under modified than 
under standard test procedure. This is an extension 
of the previous prediction.
Methodology
Subjects : One hundred and twenty undergraduates were
used in the experiment; sixty-five were female and 
fifty-five were male. Subjects were aged between 
seventeen and twenty-five years. Sixty received the 
standard test procedure, and sixty the modified test 
procedure. All were volunteers who took part for a 
small fee.
Materials: It was decided to base the experimental
materials on those used by Bellezza and Bower, since 
they used a greater number of critical items than did
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Snyder and Uranowitz. Before running the experiment 
however it seemed necessary to pilot the materials and 
ascertain their relevance to the present subject- 
population. The Bellezza and Bower experiment was run 
not only ten years earlier, but also in a different 
country. Obviously it was possible that stereotypes 
relevant to their subjects might not be relevant to 
the present subjects. One hundred Psychology
undergraduates were asked to rate, on a nine-point 
scale, how far the alternatives for each critical item 
in the Bellezza and Bower study were consistent with a 
general lesbian or heterosexual stereotype that might 
be held by undergraduates at the University of St 
Andrews. No critical item was retained unless at 
least half of the subjects agreed that one alternative 
was significantly "lesbian stereotype consistent" and
one significantly "heterosexual stereotype 1consistent". Only fourteen of the seventeen items I
used by Bellezza and Bower study fulfilled this 
criterion; hence only these fourteen items were used 
(see Appendix 17 for details of the construction of 
the recognition tasks). Bellezza and Bower's
Biography A of Betty K was tailored to fit the 
retained items, such that the correct answer to seven 
of the critical items in the questionnaire was a 
lesbian alternative, and the correct answer to the 
other seven was a heterosexual alternative. Hence the 
materials used here were more balanced than those used 
by Snyder and Uranowitz. The resultant biography was 
1021 words long (this is reproduced in Appendix 18).
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Each forced-choice recognition task contained a 
total of twenty-six items. "Neutral" items were 
identical across procedures. In the standard
procedure task however the correct alternative to any 
critical item was paired with a distractor that 
implied the opposite sexual orientation (i.e., a 
correct heterosexual alternative would always be 
coupled with an incorrect lesbian distractor and vice 
versa); whereas, in the modified task, correct 
alternatives were coupled with incorrect, neutral 
distractors. All such neutral distractors had been 
previously rated by one hundred subjects as being 
neutral with respect to sexual orientation. In some 
cases, these were the alternatives used in the 
Bellezza and Bower study that the subjects had 
previously rated as "neutral"; in other cases they had 
been generated specifically for the purpose and then 
tested on the subjects.
Each item in each forced-choice recognition task 
also contained a "No information provided" 
alternative, as used by Snyder and Uranowitz. It 
would have been equally possible to have included a 
"Don't know" alternative; this was however considered 
less appropriate. It was felt that to say "No 
information provided" is to make a fairly positive 
statement with regard to the prose account received, 
and that this was therefore the alternative most 
likely to lead to response-bias, i.e., to the subject 
actually choosing one of the other two alternatives. 
It was important to allow as much room as possible for
226
the action of response-bias in the standard test 
condition, since the other two conditions were 
designed to reduce response-bias; the aim of the 
experiment being to isolate the locus of Snyder and 
Uranowitz' effects.
Before completing their respective memory tasks, all 
subjects received a stereotyping paragraph describing 
Betty K's "current" lifestyle. This paragraph was 
identical with that used by Snyder and Uranowitz and 
by Bellezza and Bower. It stated that Betty was 
currently living either a stereotypically homo- or a 
stereotypically heterosexual lifestyle. Subjects were 
then asked briefly to answer four questions about 
Betty K. These questions were identical with those 
used by Bellezza and Bower in their Experiment 2 to 
increase the salience of the stereotype label 
received.
Procedure : The instructions used in the experiment
were identical with those used by Snyder and Uranowitz 
(1978c) and then by Bellezza and Bower (1981). 
Subjects were allowed five minutes to read the target 
biography. They completed a short (five minute) 
unrelated filler task. They were then presented with 
a paragraph labelling Betty K as hetero- or 
homosexual, and with four brief questions to answer 
(see above). All subjects then completed their 
respective memory tasks.
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Analysis : Dependant measures were the number of
"lesbian" and "heterosexual" alternatives correctly 
chosen in each condition (i.e., standard or modified 
procedure, lesbian or heterosexual label), the number 
incorrectly chosen, and the number of correctly 
remembered neutral items.
Results
The raw data for Experiment 4a are presented in 
histogram form in Figures 7.1 - 7.4.
Analysis of variance was run which took into account 
the combined effects of recognition paradigm and 
stereotype label on the information generated in 
response to critical items. No main effect of 
experimental condition was discovered: F(3,116) =
1.5280 p - 0.2110. This meant that the total amount 
of information generated did not differ significantly 
across conditions. The amount of different types of 
information generated (e.g., "lesbian hit", jif"heterosexual false alarm") did differ significantly I
however: F (3,3 48) = 1010.8050 p = 0.0000, although ithis was unsurprising since it was evident from the I
jraw data that the subjects had generated far more hits |1than false alarms: compare, e.g.. Figures 7.1 and 7.3. |
A significant interaction was discovered between
Iexperimental condition and information generated: ■jF(9,348) = 3.7785 p = 0.0001, i.e., the type of j
iinformation generated did differ significantly across |iconditions (see Appendix 19).
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Smaller analyses of variance attempted to break this 
effect down. Under a heterosexual label, the results 
of subjects under the standard and modified test 
procedure conditions did not differ significantly for 
correct information (or "hits"); F(1,58) = 1.7617 p - 
0.1896 (see Appendix 20, Table 1). These data are 
shown in graph form in Figure 7.1. Subjects in each 
recognition paradigm, therefore, correctly recognised 
equal amounts of information. There was no
significant difference between the numbers of lesbian 
and heterosexual hits made in either condition. This 
is consistent with the second hypothesis of the 
retrieval schema theory.
Where subjects received a lesbian label, there was 
again no significant difference between the two 
recognition conditions: F(l,58) = 1.2406 p = 0.2699,
neither was there a significant interaction between 
recognition condition and information recognised: 
F(l,58) = 1.5388 p = 0.2798 (see Appendix 20, Table 
2). Therefore, number of hits made under the lesbian 
label was unaffected by the test procedure employed. 
This result counts against the response-bias theory, 
but is consistent with the retrieval schema theory, 
which holds that the numbers of lesbian hits made will 
not differ with the testing procedure employed. These 
data are shown in Figures 7.1 and 7.2.
As for false alarms: under the modified procedure, 
subjects were significantly more likely to make false 
alarms: F(l,58) = 28.9239, p = O.OOOO. This also
counts against the response-bias theory, which
npredeicted fewer false alarms to be made under the 
modified test procedure. There was also a trend 
towards more heterosexual than lesbian false alarms, 
although this was not significant: F(l,58) = 3.088 p = 
0.0841 (see Appendix 21, Table 1). The fact that the 
numbers of heterosexual and lesbian false alarms made 
was not significantly different provides further 
support for the retrieval schema theory, which 
predicted that at least as many heterosexual false 
alarms as lesbian false alarms would be made under any 
condition. These data are presented in Figures 7.3 
and 7.4.
The pattern of false alarms made under a lesbian 
label did however differ significantly across 
recognition conditions (see Figure 7.4). Under a 
lesbian stereotype label, subjects tested under the 
modified procedure made more false alarms than those 
tested under the standard procedure: F(l,58) = 13.2571 
p = 0.0006. This result, casts some doubt upon the 
response-bias theory, which would predict that a 
testing procedure designed to eliminate response-bias 
should reduce the numbers of false alarms made with a 
lesbian label. However, the result does not have any 
direct ramifications for any of the hypotheses set out 
above. There was no significant interaction between 
recognition condition and type of false alarm made 
(i.e., between heterosexual and lesbian false alarms, 
F(l,58) = 0.7484 p = 0.3906: see Appendix 21, Table
2). This counts against the response-bias theory.
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which predicted that fewer lesbian false alarms would 
be made under modified than standard test procedures.
The amount of neutral information generated did not 
differ significantly across conditions (i.e., original 
and modified procedures x lesbian and heterosexual 
label) : F(3,116) = 0.5567 p = 0.6447 (see Appendix
22). The data for neutral hits and neutral false 
alarms made is rpesented in Figures 7.5 and 7.6. This 
disproves the third hypothesis of the retrieval schema 
theory; this was however not a hypothesis of central 
importance to the theory.
Discussion
Neither the retrieval schema nor the response-bias 
theory appears to give a fully convincing account of 
the findings of the present experiment. Of the two, 
the retrieval schema theory is certainly the more 
convincing, however. Neither of the predictions of 
the response-bias theory was supported.
The retrieval schema theory gives a superior account 
of the results. Four predictions were generated for 
this hypothesis, of which one was confirmed and one 
partially confirmed. It was predicted, in the second 
hypothesis, that equal numbers of lesbian and 
heterosexual hits would be generated under each 
recognition condition when a heterosexual label was 
given. This was confirmed: although it was found to 
hold only for the modified, but not for the standard, 
test procedure.
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The fourth hpothesis held that there should be no 
difference in the numbers of heterosexual and lesbian 
false alarms made under any condition. Obviously, the 
finding that, overall, more heterosexual than lesbian 
false alarms were made would not have disconfirmed the 
hypothesis; therefore it was couched in the following 
terms: "At least as many heterosexual- as lesbian
false alarms under any condition". Over all, there 
was no difference between numbers of lesbian and 
heterosexual false alarms produced; however, when a 
lesbian stereotype label was given, more lesbian false 
alarms were produced. This was caused by subjects in 
the modified test procedure making more lesbian false 
alarms than those in the standard test procedure. 
Hence the fourth hypothesis received only partial 
support.
Over all then the retrieval schema theory may have 
had more success in explaining the results; this 
success was not however complete. Two hypothess 
received no support.
Particularly damaging for the hypothesis was the 
finding that receipt of a lesbian stereotype label did 
not increase the number of lesbian hits made. It is 
hard to conceive of a retrieval schema that would act 
in such a manner; this was one of the major problems 
encountered by Snyder and Uranowitz' own 
interpretation of their results, outlined above.
Furthermore, the retrieval schema theory cannot 
explain why more lesbian- than heterosexual hits 
should have been made under standard test/heterosexual
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label conditions. This finding counts against the 
hypothesis. Neither however can the response-bias 
theory account for this finding: Bellezza and Bower i
give no a priori reason to predict greater salience 
for lesbian information when a heterosexual label is 
received. Hence this finding does not appear to be 
explicable in terms of either hypothesis. 
Conceivably, lesbian-stereotype consistent material is 
more unexpected than heterosexual-stereotype 
consistent material in the context of a short 
biography, and for that reason more memorable, no 
matter what stereotype label might later be presented.
One other unexpected finding was that the subjects 
in the modified test procedure made more false alarms 
than subjects in the standard procedure, under both 
lesbian and heterosexual label conditions. This 
effect was especially pronounced for heterosexual 
false alarms. The retrieval schema theory would
predict at least as many false alarms to be made under 
the modified as under the standard test procedure; 
whereas the response-bias theory would predict a 
greater number of false alarms to be made under the 
standard test procedure. Hence this finding tends to 
count against the response-bias theory. Nevertheless, 
it is a difficult result to explain. Tentatively, one 
might suggest an explanation: that some hitherto
unsuspected artifact in the standard test procedure 
might act to reduce the number of errors made.
However, this is necessarily a post-hoc conjecture, 
and cannot be made with any degree of certainty.
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Summary: On the whole, the retrieval schema theory
appears to offer a better explanation of the results 
achieved here than the response-bias theory. It is 
possible that at least some of the weaknesses of the 
hypothesis are explicable in terms of the paradigm 
employed: perhaps it was insufficiently sensitive to
highlight all the effects taking place. This is quite 
plausible given that a forced-choice recognition task 
has of its nature a very rigid structure, and 
therefore might not allow subtle effects to be seen.
Although the predictions of the retrieval schema 
theory received only partial support in this 
experiment, it does appear a more convincing 
explanation of the results than the rival response- 
bias theory. If this experiment be taken as evidence 
that stereotypes can act as retrieval schemata, then 
it is evident that the retrieval schemata act only for 
material that is relevant to the stereotype. 
Subjects' recognition performance on neutral items did 
not vary with recognition paradigm or with label 
received.
Experiment 4b
This experiment tests subjects' free recall 
performance for the Betty K biography after receiving 
either the lesbian- or the heterosexual stereotype 
label. It is hoped that results from this paradigm 
might be used to resolve questions remaining after 
Experiment 4a, and also test in a more externally
238
valid manner the effects of stereotypes presented at 
the retrieval of target material. An eyewitness to a 
crime will far more likely be required to use a recall 
than a recognition strategy when interviewed by the 
police; hence it is important to study in the present 
thesis the implications of this memory paradigm.
Methodology
Subiects: Sixty subjects were used in the present
experiment. Thirty were male and thirty female, all 
aged 17 - 25 years. All were volunteers who took part 
for a small fee.
Materials: The target biography, stereotyping
paragraph, and four short questions used were 
identical with those used in Experiment 4a. All 
subjects were given a sheet of lined A4 paper on which 
to write down everything that they could recall from 
the Betty K biography. Subjects were under no 
compulsion to try to write a complete record of 
Betty's life. It was expected that this absence of 
compulsion would inspire subjects to record only those 
details of which they were fairly sure. Hence, any 
response-bias operative should be minimal, and any 
results achieved largely attributable to the action of 
a retrieval schema.
Procedure: The experimental procedure was almost
identical with that of Experiment 4a, except that, 
instead of completing forced-choice recognition tasks.
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subjects were asked to write down everything that they 
could recall from the target biography.
Scoring: Free-recall accounts were scored along the
same dimensions as the forced-choice recognition 
tasks. This was done by a pair of judges who were 
blind to stereotype condition.
Prior to the start of the experiment, free-recall 
accounts of the Betty K biography were obtained from 
twenty volunteer subjects (Honours Psychology 
undergraduates). The judges were trained by scoring
these accounts. Scoring was carried out separately,
and correlations between the scores of the judges 
calculated (r = 0.876, p < 0.01). After the training 
period, the judges were allowed to discuss their 
scoring methods and resolve any disagreements they may 
have had concerning how particular responses should be 
scored. The judges were at all times required to 
concur with the scoring of the recognition tasks: 
e.g. , an item scored as a "lesbian hit" on the 
recognition tasks was necessarily judged a "lesbian 
hit" in the recall task.
The same procedure as for the training period was 
followed for the scoring of the experiment proper. 
Judging was performed separately, but where there were 
disagreements these were settled by discussion. 
Results were analysed in the same way and along the 
same dimensions as those of the recognition task 
conditions,
"'3
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Results
Analysis of variance performed on the entire data set 
indicated that the information generated differed 
significantly between the two free-recall groups: 
F(l,58) = 5.2390 p = 0.0257. Significantly more
information was generated by subjects who received a 
lesbian label. The type of information generated also 
differed significantly: F(3,174) = 165.4276 p =
0.0000: subjects made far more hits than false alarms. 
There was a significant interaction between stereotype 
label received and information generated: F(3,174) =
6.8146 p = 0.0002. This meant that more lesbian hits 
were generated by subjects who received a lesbian 
label than by subjects who received a heterosexual 
label, although no more heterosexual hits were 
generated by subjects who received a heterosexual 
label than by subjects who received a lesbian label. 
There was no significant effect of stereotype label on 
the number of false alarms made: i.e., under a lesbian 
label, subjects were no more likely to "recall" a 
piece of incorrect information that was not in fact 
mentioned in the biography, although this misses 
significance by just seven ten-thousandths : F(1/58) = 
3.9835 p = 0.0507 (see Appendix 23, Table 2). The 
response bias theory holds that lesbian false alarms 
are more likely under a lesbian label than 
heterosexual false alarms. Hence, this effect was 
broken down by analysis of variance of the type of 
false alarms made under the lesbian label. It was 
found that more lesbian false alarms were made under a
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lesbian label than under a heterosexual label: F (1/58) 
= 5.3506 p = 0.0243 (see Appendix 23, Table 3). There 
was however no difference in the pattern of mistakes 
made under a heterosexual label: no more heterosexual 
false alarms were made than lesbian false alarms 
(totals were exactly equal).
A Neumann-Keuls test was run on these data and it 
was found that all significant results were caused by 
the comparison of "false alarms" with "hits" - and, as 
mentioned above, "hits" outnumbered "false alarms" in 
all conditions. Under a lesbian label, more lesbian 
hits were made than lesbian false alarms (Q = 3.397, p
< 0.05), or than heterosexual false alarms (Q = 3.7, p
< 0,01). Also under a lesbian label, there were
significantly more heterosexual hits than lesbian 
false alarms or heterosexual false alarms (Q = 2.967, 
p < 0.05 in both cases). Finally, under a
heterosexual label, there were significantly more 
heterosexual hits than lesbian false alarms or 
heterosexual false alarms (Q = 3.467, p < 0.05 in both 
cases).
There was no significant difference between the 
number of neutral hits made under the lesbian label 
and the number made under the heterosexual label: 
F(l,58) = 1.1416 p = 0.2897 (see Appendix 23, Table
4).
Discussion
It was hoped that any problems presented by the 
results from the recognition paradigms might be
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resolved by reference to the results obtained under 
the free-recall paradigm. Although these data do not 
unequivocally support either side of the argument, 
again they do appear more consistent with Snyder and 
Uranowitz' retrieval schema theory than with Bellezza 
and Bower's response-bias theory.
Label received had a powerful effect on information 
generated. A greater number of lesbian hits was 
generated when a lesbian label was received, but the 
converse did not hold when a heterosexual label was 
received. This pattern of results is exactly in line 
with the predictions of the retrieval schema theory; 
being analagous to that found in the original Snyder 
and Uranowitz study.
The pattern of false alarms muddles the picture 
somewhat, however. More lesbian false alarms were 
made when a lesbian label was received. However, 
there was no difference in the pattern of false alarms 
made when a heterosexual label was received: under
this condition, subjects were as likely to make 
lesbian false alarms as heterosexual false alarms. 
This finding favours the response-bias theory: 
subjects receiving a lesbian label appear to have been 
more likely to guess at pieces of information which 
were not actually in memory; these guesses being 
guided by the stereotype the subjects had in mind. 
Receipt of a heterosexual label, on the other hand, 
had no such effect, since, as argued above, to label a 
person a "heterosexual" is, more or less, to give no 
stereotyping information about that person.
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This result may however simply reflect the 
stereotype of a lesbian is more developed than that of 
a heterosexual. Additionally, when these results are 
considered in absolute terms, the response-bias theory 
appears somewhat weaker. Although it was
statistically significant, the absolute difference in 
the number of lesbian false alarms made by subjects 
across stereotype label conditions was a mere ten,
i.e., one-third of one false alarm per subject. The 
absolute difference between the numbers of lesbian 
hits made however was thirty-eight, i.e., almost one 
and one-third hits per subject. Given that an 
increase of nearly one and a third items of correct 
information was achieved under the lesbian label at a 
cost of one third of an item of incorrect information, 
one could be justified in claiming that a stereotype 
label does indeed act as a retrieval schema, and that 
if response-bias does occur, then that its effects 
appear comparatively small. This result is more in 
line with the retrieval schema theory than with the
response-bias theory. i.Again, it is obvious that while stereotypic :l
information may act as a retrieval schema, this schema 
facilitates memory for relevant material only. Under 
free-recall, as under recognition conditions, 
stereotype label had no effect on memory for neutral 
items. This is unsurprising: although the third
hypothesis presented above held that presentation of a 
lesbian stereotype might increase the number of
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neutral hits made, this prediction was by no means 
central to the theory.
General Discussion
These experiments were intended to discover the locus 
of the effects found in the classic experiment by 
Snyder and Uranowitz (1978c), in which it was found 
that presentation of steretypic information after 
biographical material biassed memory for that 
material. This conclusion has been interpreted in 
subsequent literature as indicating that stereotypes 
can act as retrieval schemata. Bellezza and Bower 
(1981) claimed that they induced response-bias. The 
importance of this area to the eyewitness memory 
situation prompted an experiment to be conducted with 
the aim of choosing between the rival theories. This 
was done by including a recognition condition designed 
to eliminate response-bias, and a free-recall 
condition, the aim of which was to elucidate the 
effects observed in the recognition conditions.
Neither hypothesis was unequivocally supported. The 
pattern of results achieved was not fully explicable 
in terms either of response-bias or retrieval 
schemata. However, on the basis of the evidence 
presented here, the retrieval schema theory certainly 
appears the more compelling of the two. This is 
especially true of results reported in Experiment 4b, 
in which a free-recall rather than a recognition-task 
procedure was employed. As mentioned in the
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Introduction, the free-recall paradigm is the more 
relevant to the eyewitness situation.
One line of evidence does count against the 
retrieval schema theory, however: in Experiment 4a,
receipt of a lesbian label did not appear to
facilitate recognition memory of lesbian-stereotype 
consistent material. Given the nature of the
hypothesis, this was easily the most important of its 
predictions. This result was however discovered in 
Experiment 4b: the more relevant task to the present
thesis. It could be argued the greater freedom
implicit in a free-recall task allows schemata greater 
scope to act. This has powerful implications for
police interviews: perhaps stereotypic information
could be used as a last-ditch attempt retrieval
mnemonic in particularly difficult situations. Such a 
technique would have to be kept as a last resort, 
however, given the potential distorting effects of 
stereotypic information on memory (see Chapter 6).
Nevertheless it cannot be argued that the results 
reoported here provide complete support for the 
retrieval schema theory. Consistency effects were 
discovered both by Snyder and Uranowitz (1978c) and 
Lutz (1983), using recognition paradigms, and
materials similar to those employed here. This is an 
issue of much theoretical importance which deserves 
investigation. Srull (1984) argues that the quality
of the memory trace for social information may alter 
with time, such that different memory-testing 
techniques may tend to give slightly different results
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when presented after different intervals. This is the 
next area for investigation.
A more minor aim of these experiments was to test 
the theories of social memory proposed by Wyer, 
Bodenhausen and Srull (1984) and by Stangor and Ruble 
(1989). As mentioned in Chapter 6, these are 
currently probably the two best-supported theories in 
the social memory literature. Unfortunately it was 
not possible in the present experiment to test rival 
predictions of the two theories, since both hold that 
a consistency effect is likely where stereotypic 
information is presented after to-be-remembered 
material (except in the first stages of impression- 
formation, at which point the Stangor and Ruble model 
holds an inconsistency effect to be likely). Insofar 
as a consistency effect appears more prominent here, 
the present experiment tends to support both models.
It was hoped, using the present paradigms, to isolate 
the effects of stereotypes presented at the retrieval 
of to-be-remembered material. However, the evidence 
does not appear strongly to support either hypothesis. 
The next logical step then in isolating these effects 
was, as mentioned above, to run a conceptual 
replication which more or less directly paralleled the 
methodology employed by the previous researchers in 
the area, but using in one condition a more balanced 
forced-choice recognition task than that used by 
Snyder and Uranowitz, and employing the McCloskey and 
Zaragoza "modified procedure" in an attempt to
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eliminate the impact of response-bias effects. Such 
an experiment is reported in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 8 - HOW THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THINGS LASTS: DELAY, AND THE EFFECTS OF STEREOTYPIC INFORMATION PRESENTED AT RETRIEVAL
"At any rate he was certain, if it should prove the fact that such a history was really extant, being that of a knight-errant, it could not be otherwise than lofty, illustrious, magnificent, and true. This thought afforded him some comfort, but he lost it again on considering that the author was a Moor...and that no truth could be expected from Moors, who are all imposters, liars, and visionaries."Miguel Cervantes: Don Quixote de la Mancha
Experiment 5 
Introduction
Experiments 4a and b were attempts experimentally to 
characterise the effects of stereotypic information 
presented at retrieval. The results lend some support 
to the hypothesis proposed by Snyder and Uranowitz 
(1978c) that such information can act as retrieval 
schemata for stereotype-consistent information. 
However, the results are inconclusive, and Bellezza 
and Bower's rival formulation - that such information 
induces response-bias in the subjects receiving it - 
remains a possibility. This issue has great relevance 
to the investigation of stereotypes and eyewitness 
memory, since, as outlined in Chapter 7, both 
formulations imply far-reaching effects. Hence it is 
important here to specify the role played by 
stereotypic information in this situation.
Experiment 4a employed a recognition procedure 
designed to eliminate reponse-bias effects. This 
procedure was applied to an experimental situation not 
fully parallel to that used in the original 
experiments by Snyder and Uranowitz, Clark and Woll,
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or Bellezza and Bower. It was argued that the non- 
employment of a delay between receipt and testing of 
target material was a fairly conservative departure 
from the original design. However, it is possible 
that it might lead to subtle changes in the memory 
trace (see, e.g., Srull, 1984). Additionally, testing 
subjects after a delay has more external validity than 
testing them immediately: rarely will a police
interview take place within five minutes of a crime 
being witnessed. Therefore, a more direct replication 
of the original studies - still employing the 
"modified procedure" along the lines of McCloskey and 
Zaragoza (1985) - is employed in the present
experiment. This is a relatively small experiment, 
the purpose of which is to investigate the effect of 
delay in order to examine whether this variable might 
have implications for the results achieved in the 
various Betty K experiments reported in the 
literature. This should help highlight the relative 
efficacy of the response-bias and the retrieval schema 
hypotheses in explaining the results obtained.
Methodology
Subjects: Eighty subjects, approximately half of
them male and half female, aged 18 - 21 years,
participated in this experiment. All were
undergraduates enrolled in the First Year Psychology 
course at the University of St Andrews. Allocation to 
the four experimental conditions (see below) was
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carried out on a random basis, with the constraint 
that there should be twenty subjects per condition.
Materials : These were identical with those used in
Experiments 4a and b (see Appendix 18a).
Procedure : Subjects were individually presented with
the Betty K biographies and stereotyping paragraphs. 
Five minutes was allowed for reading this material. 
Subjects were then presented with the four short- 
answer questions designed by Bellezza and Bower (1981) 
to increase the salience of stereotype label (see 
Appendix 18a).
Subjects in the two immediate testing conditions 
completed modified procedure recognition tasks 
immediately after receipt of the four short-answer 
questions. Subjects in the two delay conditions were 
tested three weeks after receipt of the experimental 
materials, (this being the delay employed by Snyder 
and Uranowitz, 1978c,) again with the modified 
procedure.
Results
Analysis of variance performed on the entire data set 
revealed significant differences between the four 
experimental groups: F(3,76) - 8.1220 p = 0.0001 (see 
Appendix 24, Table 1). A significant interaction was 
also revealed between experimental group and type of 
information generated in the recognition task: 
F(9,228) = 13.9513 p = 0.0000. Finally, a significant
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difference was found between the four dependent 
measures - F (3,228) = 201.6994 p = 0.0000 - although 
this was unsurprising, since a glance at, e.g.. 
Figure 8.1 compared with Figure 8.3, will show that 
many more hits than false alarms were generated.
Two smaller analyses of variance were then performed 
in an attempt to isolate the cause of these effects.
A comparison of the results achieved under the two 
stereotype labels revealed a significant difference: 
F(l,78) = 5,1058 p = 0.0266. There was also a
significant interaction between label received and 
information generated: F(3,234) = 2.8173 p = 0.0398.
A significant difference was also discovered between 
the types of information generated - F(3,234) =
138.3138 p = 0.0000 - but again this was a somewhat 
banal finding, since, as mentioned above, many more 
hits were generated than false alarms (see Appendix 
24, Table 2). Where subjects were presented with a 
heterosexual label, they were found to make
significantly more heterosexual hits than lesbian 
hits: F(l,39) = 49.8400 p = 0.0000 (see Figure 8.1,
and Appendix 24, Table 6). A similar effect was found 
where subjects were presented with a lesbian label for 
Betty K: surprisingly, a greater number of
heterosexual than lesbian hits was also found under 
this condition: F(l,39) = 30.8900 p = 0.0000 (see
Figure 8.2 and see Appendix 24, Table 7). This result 
runs counter to the predictions of both rival 
theories.
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No significant difference was found in the number of 
false alarms generated under the two label conditions, 
however; F(1,78) = 1.0181 p = 0.3161, although over
all a greater number of heterosexual than lesbian 
false alarms was made; F(l,78) = 1.6037 p = 0.2910.
(This data is presented in Figures 8.3 and 8.4, and 
see Appendix 24, Table 8). This finding lends more 
support to the retrieval-schema theory than to the 
response-bias theory, since the latter predicts that a 
greater number of false alarms will be made when a 
lesbian label is presented than when a heterosexual 
label is presented.
A comparison of the results achieved under the two 
delay conditions revealed a significant difference: 
F(l,78) = 9.8831 p = 0.0024; and also a significant 
interaction between delay condition and information 
generated: F(3,234) = 32.3037 p = 0.0000. Again, a
significant difference was discovered between the 
types of information generated: F (3,234) = 188.7778 p 
= 0.0000 (see Appendix 24, Table 3).
A Neumann-Keuls test indicated that there were 
significantly more heterosexual hits made under a 
heterosexual label than lesbian hits made under a 
lesbian label (Q = 1.458 p < 0.05). Again, this is a 
surprising result which would not be predicted by 
either theory.
Similarly, a series of Neumann-Keuls test was 
performed upon the results for the comparison of delay 
conditions.
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The results were however uninteresting: the only
significant differences found were between numbers of 
hits and false alarms generated.
Analyses of variance were also performed on the 
number of neutral hits and false alarms generated 
under the two label conditions and the two delay 
conditions.
There was a significant difference for neutral
information generated across the two label conditions: 
F(1,78) = 5.6945 p = 0.0194; however stereotype label 
appears to have had no independent effect upon neutral 
hits or false alarms: F(l,78) = 1.0458 p = 0.3096.
Investigating the effects of delay, there was a
significant main effect of delay: F(l,78) = 5.9605 p = 
0,0169, and also a significant interaction between
delay condition and neutral information generated: 
F(l,78) = 56.0119 p = 0.0000. Significantly more
neutral hits were generated in the immediate testing 
condition than in the delayed testing condition; while 
significantly more neutral false alarms were generated 
in the delayed than in the immediate testing 
condition, (see Appendix 24, Tables 4 and 5).
Discussion
The present experiment was run in an attempt to 
ascertain whether the differences between Experiments 
4a and b and the results of previous researchers,
Snyder and Uranowitz (1978c), Bellezza and Bower
(1981), and Clark and Woll (1981), were due to the
fact that these researchers included in their
258
experiments a delay between receipt of stereotypic 
information and the testing of recognition memory.
Although a main effect of delay was discovered in the 
present experiment, this was not found to have a 
significant effect upon recognition memory for any of 
the measures that were of particular interest in 
Experiment 4. This parallels the finding of Lutz 
(1983), who found evidence of stereotypic bias due to 
a label presented at retrieval one week after encoding 
of target material.
The results of Experiments 4a and b tended to 
support the retrieval schema theory rather than the 
response-bias theory. The present experiment
indicates that the differences between the results of 
Experiments 4a and b and those of other researchers 
who have conducted Betty K-type studies was not due to 
the inclusion in previous studies of a delay between 
receipt of target material and testing. Therefore, as 
far as this major aim of the experiment is concerned, 
the findings of Experiment 4 are supported: the
retrieval-schema theory continues to appear a superior 
explanation of the results than the response-bias 
theory.
Particularly damaging for the retrieval-schema 
theory in Experiments 4a and b was the finding that 
presentation of a lesbian stereotype label failed to 
improve subjects' recognition memory for lesbian 
stereotype-consistent material. This finding does
cast doubt over the validity of the theory. Other :|
!predictions of the theory did however receive support. i
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The rival formulation, proposed by Bellezza and Bower, 
was not supported in Experiments 4a and b. It was a 
surprising result of the present experiment that, 
under lesbian-label conditions, subjects generated 
significantly more heterosexual hits than lesbian 
hits. This finding runs directly counter to the
retrieval-schema theory. Additionally, where a
heterosexual label was given, more heterosexual than 
lesbian hits were generated, where neither theory 
would predict a difference. These results therefore 
count against both theories. Indeed, the former 
result seems to imply the existence of an
inconsistency effect of stereotypic information 
presented after target material. This is in direct 
opposition to the predictions of Snyder and Uranowitz 
and Bellezza and Bower, and also those of Wyer, 
Bodenhausen and Srull (1984), and Stangor and Ruble 
(1989). These latter two papers, it has been argued, 
present probably the most convincing models of the
effects of stereotypic information presented at
retrieval.
An amendment to the retrieval-schema theory might 
make its predictions consistent with the results 
achieved here, however; The discovery that more 
heterosexual hits are generated under a heterosexual 
label is consistent with the retrieval-schema theory 
if it is held that "heterosexuality” could act as a 
stereotype label. However, it has been argued that 
Snyder and Uranowitz' results appear to make this 
unlikely. Snyder and Uranowitz found no difference in
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the pattern of results given by subjects in a 
heterosexual-label condition and those given by 
subjects in a no-label condition, implying that to say 
that a target was "heterosexual” was tantamount to 
providing no stereotypic information about the target.
In attempting to explain these results it is 
important to note that, across conditions, more 
heterosexual than lesbian false alarms were made. It 
might be argued by a proponent of the retrieval-schema 
theory that this represents the schema action of the 
"lesbian stereotype” in reducing the number of 
"lesbian false alarms" made in this condition when 
this stereotype was presented. Alternatively, it 
could be argued that, when unable to remember a 
correct bit of information, subjects may have relied 
upon conventional societal norms to provide them with 
their answer and, hence, were more likely to choose an 
item consistent with a representation of Betty as a 
heterosexual than as a homosexual. Intuitively 
appealing though such an explanation may be, however, 
it is probably not tenable. The explanation is a 
virtual reversal of the argument presented by Bellezza 
and Bower (1981) in their critique of the Snyder and 
Uranowitz experiment? and the forced-choice 
recognition task that was employed in the present 
experiment was designed with the intention of 
eliminating response-bias.
Discounting the present experiments, the literature 
contains one successful replication (Lutz, 1983) and 
two unsuccessful replications (Bellezza and Bower,
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1981, and Clark and Woll, 1981) of the Snyder and 
Uranowitz study. The literature also boasts at least 
two theories of social memory which predict a 
consistency effect of stereotypes presented at 
retrieval; an effect of the type discovered by Snyder 
and Uranowitz. It would certainly be premature to 
dismiss, on the basis of the present study alone, the 
theory that stereotypic information might act as 
retrieval schemata. Wyer et al (1984) found a 
consistency effect in this paradigm; as did Lutz 
(1983) and Snyder and Uranowitz (1978 a, b, and c) . 
Bellezza and Bower (1981) also found some effect, 
although they attributed this to response-bias. 
Stangor and Ruble (1989) present a model of social 
memory which implies a consistency effect in this 
paradigm. Experiments 4a and b in the present thesis 
found evidence to support the theory that stereotypic 
information presented at retrieval will act as 
retrieval schemata for stereotype-consistent
information. Against this evidence. Experiment 5 
appears to indicate that an inconsistency effect may 
be more likely: although results are also reported
which appear to add weight to the retrieval-schema 
theory. The only studies which fail to find any 
effect when stereotypic information is presented after 
target information are those by Rothbart, Evans and 
Fulero (1979) and Clark and Woll (1981). The most 
conservative appraisal of the state of the literature 
might be to say that it does appear to show that 
stereotypic information guides or distorts retrieval
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of material from social memory when presented at 
retrieval of that material. From the limited number 
of studies extant, however, it is difficult to make 
powerful predictions about the action of stereotypic 
information presented at retrieval in different 
situations, although it appears more likely to find a 
consistency effect than an inconsistency effect in 
most studies.
Conceivably, however, the exact type of result 
achieved might be found to depend, to some extent at 
least, upon the particular stereotype and encoding set 
employed, and so on. Srull (1984) argues a parallel 
case for the effect of stereotypic information 
presented at encoding, in which he claims that 
different experimental conditions are likely to 
produce different effects. This is certainly an area 
which future work should consider. It is particularly 
important to the present thesis to test the effect of 
stereotypic information presented at the retrieval in 
a situation which parallels as closely as possible a 
real-life crime situation. This is the area which 
will be addressed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 9 - KISS AND TELL: THE EFFECT OF STEREOTYPIC INFORMATION ON MEMORY FOR A STAGED INCIDENT
"You must remember this:
A kiss is just a kiss"Max Steiner: As Time Goes By
Introduction
The results of Experiments 4 and 5 appear to indicate 
that it is unlikely that stereotypic information could 
be used in the police interview situation as a means 
of increasing the amount of correct information 
generated by an eyewitness. The present chapter 
continues to investigate the effects of stereotypes 
presented at the retrieval of target material. An 
experiment is reported in which stereotypic 
information is presented during the retrieval of 
information from an incident analagous to a crime in 
that it is dramatic and unexpected. Additionally, the 
effects of very long (six-month to one year) retention 
intervals are considered.
All of the experiments reported so far have been 
laboratory-based, i.e., both presentation and testing 
occurred in a well-regulated, artificial setting. 
Perhaps more importantly, target materials were 
somewhat artificial. While it is an important aspect 
of eyewitness research to generate and refine 
hypotheses in the laboratory, it is also necessary to 
test these hypotheses using situations as close as 
possible to genuine crime situations.
For obvious ethical reasons, effects isolated in the 
laboratory can rarely be directly tested in crime 
situations. However, it is possible to utilise a
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paradigm that falls roughly half-way between the 
artificiality of the laboratory study and the realism 
of the field study: this is the "staged incident".
The experiment reported here, then, attempts to 
broaden the range of research that has been conducted 
into the effects of stereotypic information on memory. 
It attempts to specify more directly what type of 
effect might be expected to hold when stereotypic 
information is presented during retrieval of 
information about a criminal episode: specifically,
during a police interview.
An Outline of Experiment 6
The "staged incident" ("Wirklichkeitsversuch",
"reality experiment", or "event test") has had a long
and distinguished history in the service of
investigators into eyewitness memory. As Clifford and
Bull (1978) remark:
"This experimental approach is a big advance over static inspection and recognition of photographs in the sense that the action is dynamic, it reproduces real life in content and subjects' unpreparedness for becoming witnesses, and, because it is experimental, very careful checks can be made on all aspects of perception, memory and identification processes especially the rating data given by witnesses as to their certainty of correctness." (Clifford and Bull, 1978, p 52.)
In this particular instance, the authors are
especially concerned with memory for faces. However,
the general thrust of their remark holds true for all
aspects of eyewitness memory.
The aim of this experiment is to test the effects of 
stereotypic information on eyewitness memory for an
265
incident with greater external validity than the
materials employed so far.
For the purposes of this experiment, the usual form 
of staged incident, (in which, e.g., a rack of
technical intruments is maliciously knocked over - 
Malpass and Devine, 1984a or a calculator is
surreptitiously slipped into a thief's pocket - Wells, 
Leippe and Ostrom, 1979,) was considered
inappropriate. It was necessary to design an incident
with a number of special characteristics. The staged 
incident is generally unexpected, long-lasting, and 
capable of being performed in front of a large number 
of witnesses. This particular incident, however, also 
had to be quite dramatic (so as to resemble as far as 
possible an actual crime situation) and susceptible to 
the influence of stereotypic information.
To these ends, it was decided to interrupt a (well- 
attended) first-year social psychology lecture with 
the appearance of a kissogram; following this incident 
with a verbal altercation between the kissogram and 
her disapproving "boyfriend". The incident contained 
a number of characteristics judged to be "typical" or 
"untypical" of kissogram incidents (see below). Also 
included was a number of characteristics judged to be 
"neutral" with respect to kissogram incidents. 
Interviews with witnesses ascertained the effect of 
stereotypic information on memory for these types of 
information.
Experiment 6 considers two other aspects of the 
eyewitness memory situation which, while potentially
■'I
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important, have received little attention in the 
literature. These are witnesses' memory for clothing, 
and the decay of the eyewitnesses' memory trace with 
time. À brief review of each of these areas is given i
below.
MEMORY FOR CLOTHING Clothing is potentially an
extremely important feature of the crime situation.
Not only is it a salient contextual cue to recall 
(Cutler et al, 1986) - and hence an important variable 
to control in the identification parade - it might 
also be used to provide leads in criminal 
investigations. Very few studies have investigated 
memory for clothing however. In a review of the 
literature, MacLeod and Frowley (1991) were able to 
find just three studies in which a target person's 
clothing had been altered for recognition testing; and 
none in which a recall measure had been used. The 
only exception to this generalisation is the work of 
Yuille and his colleagues, which is addressed below.
The studies in which recognition memory was tested 
were all performed by Thomson and his colleagues,
(Thomson and Robertson, 1980; Thomson, 1981; Thomson,
Robertson and Vogt, 1982, - reviewed in chapter 2,
above). Thomson found that keeping the variables (as 
he called it, the "context" - which included the 
clothing variable) constant had a massive effect on 
recognition accuracy. In Thomson (1981), for example, 
accuracy increased from 25% to 89%.
These studies indicate the potential importance to 
eyewitness memory of such contextual variables as
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clothing; although they failed to show that clothing 
per se has a great effect. Thomson et al (1982) found 
a decrement in recognition performance when all three 
context variables (i.e., clothing, activity performed, 
and physical setting) were altered (Experiments 1 and 
2), but that this was not attributable to an 
independent change in any one variable.
MacLeod and Frowley (1991, p 10) conclude that: 
"These studies indicate that covarying •context 
variables may have some enhancing effect on 
recognition accuracy. Whether any single context 
variable would have such an effect was not 
investigated but cannot be ruled out." Since clothing 
was deemed by Thomson to be a context cue, MacLeod and 
Frowley felt it appropriate to present an account of 
the important work on context cues performed by 
Cutler, Penrod and their associates (Cutler and 
Penrod, 1988; Cutler, Penrod and Martens, 1987a and b; 
Cutler, Penrod, O'Rourke and Martens, 1986), in an 
effort to determine the importance of context cues in 
eyewitness situations.
Essentially, these studies determined that context 
cues are effective only when manipulated in multiple 
fashion, i.e., when more than one cue is manipulated 
at a time. The implication, therefore, is that a 
change in the clothing variable alone may have a very 
limited effect on eyewitness performance.
The other central consideration is this: Just how 
good is memory for this particular context cue?
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Again, the psychological literature has difficulty
in answering this question. The only relevant studies
are those by John Yuille and his colleagues (Yuille
and Cutshall, 1986/1989; Tollestrup, Turtle and
Yuille, in press). These studies considered
witnesses' memories for real-life crimes, with the
clothing variable considered only incidentally.
Yuille and Cutshall found that:
"...colors were correctly provided 66% of the time in the police interview [ie. the original interviews administered by police after the crime in question had taken place] and 59% to the researchers, while style was correct 88% and 80% respectively. Thus, the color of clothing seems to be the most difficult feature to retain (or notice). For example, one witness graphically described the wounds on the body of the thief and she provided detailed descriptions of the body's position and its exact location in the street. Whereas this information was highly accurate, she erroneously described him as wearing a T-shirt and a red and black plaid jacket. He actually wore a dark blue sweater and a blue jean jacket."(Yuille and Cutshall, 1986, p 296.)
This paper provides the only systematic study so far 
of memory for clothing. Yuille and Cutshall's results 
provide two hypotheses for the present experiment: 
first, that memory for style of clothing should be 
superior to memory for colour; second, that memory for 
both style and colour should fade with time. It 
should be mentioned however that some doubt may be 
cast over Yuille and Cutshall's results, given that 
the only subjects used in their experiment were 
volunteers - who may therefore have had greater 
confidence in their ability to remember information 
from the witnessed crime than does the "average" 
eyewitness. While the points established by Yuille 
and Cutshall regarding clothing may be importantones
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for the police investigator to be aware of when 
deciding how much credence to give an eyewitness' 
account of the style and colour of a suspect's 
clothing, they are not of central importance to the 
present study.
More important is a third hypothesis, derived from 
the social memory literature: that memory for the
kissogram girl's clothing should be enhanced where 
stereotypic information is presented; memory for her 
"boyfriend"'s clothing however - being incidental 
information - should remain unaffected. This is the 
most important of the hypotheses concerning memory for 
clothing.
THE EFFECT OF TIME In a genuine eyewitnessing
situation, a witness may be interviewed many times 
over the course of several months (Roy, 1991). During 
this time, the memory trace may degrade, although some 
questions about this remain unanswered, e.g., what is 
the relative rate of decay of different aspects of the 
memory trace, for how long is the memory trace 
reliable, and so on. Conceivably, the situation may 
be even more complicated that this. Witnessing a 
crime may cause the spontaneous generation of what 
Brown and Kulik (1977) term "flashbulb memories". 
Although the accuracy of such memories has not been 
tested, subjectively they appear highly detailed and 
remarkably stable over time. This implies that
memory for crimes may decay at a much slower rate than 
memories for more mundane occurrences. Even if a
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flashbulb memory is not formed, it is possible that 
the repetition of the story of the crime (with 
friends, relatives and so on) over time may serve to 
keep the incident fresh in the mind. Alternatively, 
embellishment of details may take place during story­
telling, thus causing erroneous information to be kept 
"fresh" in the mind.
There is a certain controversy in the eyewitness
memory literature as to the likelihood of these
different effects. The most common opinion is the
intuitive one that the memory trace degrades with time
(see, e.g., Penrod, Loftus and Winkler, 1982);
however, Yuille and Cutshall (1986) take issue with
this claim (although one should bear in mind that
their subjects were volunteers from the set of
witnesses to the crime; and those with poorer memories
may possibly have "deselected" themselves):
"One of the more striking results was the lack of memory loss over time. Accuracy rates remained virtually unchanged five months after the incident. This results calls into question the general conclusion that eyewitness memory deteriorates rapidly with time...an Ebbinghaus decay curve simply doesn't apply in this type of case."(Yuille and Cutshall 1986, p 299.)
Only a few studies in the eyewitness literature 
explicitly consider this variable. Deffenbacher and 
Horney (1981) conclude that, although there are 
methodological problems with much of the earlier work, 
a reasonable estimate of average accuracy loss would 
be about 0.3% per day. Estimates vary somewhat about 
this figure (cf. Marshall, 1966; Lipton, 1977); 
however, Deffenbacher and Horney agree with Yuille and
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Cutshall that the forgetting curves are less steeply 
declining than one might predict from Ebbinghaus 
forgetting functions.
Hypotheses : To summarise, the hypotheses for the
present experiment are:
1. presentation of stereotypic information will aid 
memory for stereotype-consistent information, but not 
for other forms of information. A corrollary of this 
is that presentation of stereotypic information will 
aid memory for the kissogram's clothes but not the 
"boyfriend"'s. Additionally, memory for style of 
clothing should prove superior to memory for colour of 
clothing. Memory for both style and colour will 
deteriorate with time.
2. there will be less deterioration of memory with
time in the stereotype condition than the non­
stereotype condition for stereotype-consistent 
information
3. the total amount of information recalled will
decrease with time. The accuracy of memory will also 
decrease with time. Accuracy will be greater for
stereotype-consistent than -inconsistent information 
in the stereotype condition.
Methodology
Generation of Materials: Fifty first-year Psychology
students were asked to list events or characteristics 
which they considered highly typical or highly 
untypical of a "kissogram artiste" and kissogram
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incident. They were also asked to write down the noun 
which they considered most appropriate for the 
stereotyping of a "kissogram artiste". Thirty of 
fifty subjects suggested the word "bimbo". This 60% 
level of agreement between subjects is higher than the 
25% agreement suggested by Bower, Black and Turner 
(1979) as constituting a shared stereotype, or even 
the 50% value, which Mortimer (1991) suggests may be 
more meaningful. No other noun was suggested more 
than three times. The data thus generated was used to 
provide an outline for the staged incident. The four 
most stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent 
characteristics were both included as items of to-be- 
remembered material e.g., the incident was accompanied 
by music, since this was considered typical of a 
kissogram incident; but the kissogram artiste was 
wearing glasses, since this was considered untypical. 
Also included were four items of incidental material, 
which were neutral with respect to the kissogram 
stereotype.
Two actors (one male, semi-professional; one female, 
amateur) were employed to stage the incident. Several 
rehearsals took place in the appropriate lecture 
theatre before the incident proper took place (for a 
description, see Appendix 25).
Subjects : The incident was staged during a lecture
attended by approximately one-hundred and fifty first- 
year undergraduate Psychology students. Twenty-five 
subjects volunteered to take part in the first set of
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interviews, which occurred one to two days after the 
incident; sixteen of these took part in the second 
set, six months after the incident; and twelve in the 
third set, one year after the incident. Of the 
twenty-five subjects who took part in the first set of 
interviews, seventeen were female and eight male. All 
subjects were aged between seventeen and nineteen 
years at the beginning of the study.
Design: This was a between-subjects design: half of
the subjects were presented with stereotypic 
information (see below) during the retrieval of 
information about the staged incident; half were not.
Procedure : On the day following the staged incident,
an announcement was made to the social psychology 
class that the event of the previous day had been 
staged, and that it would be appreciated if people 
would attend the Social Psychology Laboratory the next 
day to be interviewed about their memory of the 
incident. Each subject was met in the foyer of the 
department and escorted to the laboratory. The 
interviews took place at fifteen minute intervals, and 
took about ten minutes each to complete.
During the interview, each subject was simply asked 
to recall as many details as possible about the 
incident. They were asked to report details in 
"roughly" chronological order, and not to worry about 
how important or trivial the reported details might 
appear. Occasionally, when a subject skipped over a
274
particular detail, or omitted it entirely, then the 
interviewer would ask a direct question concerning 
that detail, as in a standard police interview (Roy, 
1991). Otherwise the interviewer remained silent.
Once the subject had finished recounting the 
incident to his/her own satisfaction, s/he was asked 
to "think through" the incident once more, and report 
any new details that s/he remembered and had not 
reported during the first stage of the interview.
Approximately six months later, subjects returned 
for a second interview. They were met in the foyer by 
an accomplice who escorted them to the laboratory. On 
the way, the accomplice feigned ignorance of the 
experimental design, asking the subject, "I don't know 
anything about this experiment, is it the one where 
the girl came into the lecture hall and took her 
clothes off?" - substituting, in the stereotype 
condition, the word "bimbo" for "girl". In this way, 
it was hoped to reproduce the effect of a stereotype 
being dropped during the course of a police interview, 
but without the experimenter being aware of the group 
to which any given subject belonged. Once the subject 
had entered the laboratory, the interview structure 
was identical with that used previously.
The third interview, (again taking place after a 
six-month interval,) followed the same format as the 
second, except that this time the accomplice dropped 
no stereotype-related information.
All interviews were tape-recorded for later 
analysis.
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Analysis: Due to the substantial subject drop-out
rate in each condition, the data were analysed using 
unequal-n analysis of variance. Three categories of 
information were of particular interest. First were 
neutral, incidental items, e.g., the subject that the 
girl was supposedly studying. Second were four 
stereotype-consistent items, e.g., removing the garter 
and handing it to the "victim". Third were four 
stereotype-inconsistent items, e.g., wearing glasses.
Hence, during analysis, it was possible not only to 
compare total numbers of items generated under each 
condition, but also the type of items generated across 
conditions, e.g., were more stereotype-consistent 
items recalled in the stereotype condition than in the 
non-stereotype condition?, and also to compare the 
types of item recalled within conditions, e.g., were 
more stereotype-consistent than -inconsistent items 
recalled in the stereotype condition?
Results
The raw data for correct information generated are 
represented in Table 9.1.
Hence, total level of recall did drop, as predicted, 
across the one year study period: from 10.857 to 10.0 
in the stereotype condition, and from 11.4 to 9.7 in 
the non-stereotype condition. Contrary to
expectations, the decline does not appear to have been 
steady. Total recall levels at the second interview
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De lav Group 1 Group 2
1 M 10.857 11.400SD 3.388 2.989
2 M 9.429 8.500SD 7.032 4.389
3 M 10.000 9.700SD 1.732 1.252
TABLE 9.1 - MEAN AMOUNT OF CORRECT INFORMATIONRECALLED X INTERVIEW GROUP X DELAY INTERVAL
are in fact slightly lower than those at the third, 
although this difference is not significant: t(6) = - 
0.56. Analysis of variance showed that this overall 
decrease in recall level with time was indeed 
significant: F(2,30) = 3.4759 p = 0.0439 (see Appendix 
26, Table 1). However, delay did not have a
significant effect on memory for any of the three
types of information particularly tested: F(2,30) -
2.3791 p = 0.1099 for stereotype-consistent
information; F(2,30) = 0.8071 p = 0.4556 for
stereotype-inconsistent information; F(2,30) - 1.0012 
p = 0.3794 for incidental information (see Appendix 
26, Tables 2 - 4 ) .  No significant effect was found 
for either group alone: For Group 1, F(2,10) = 1.4 286, 
p = 0.2846; for Group 2, F(2,12) = 1.2000, p = 0.3349 
(see Appendix 26, Tables 5 and 6). Hence, the
cumulative effects of a number of small, non­
significant decrements in memory was sufficient to 
produce a significant overall decrease in the number 
of items recalled.
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The effect of presentation of stereotypic 
information on memory was also tested. It was not 
found to affect total level of recall: F(1,15) =
0,0825 p = 0.7778. Neither was it found to affect 
recall of stereotype-consistent information, F(1,15) = 
2.7574 p = 0.1176, stereotype-inconsistent
information, F(l,15) = 0.846 p = 0.3722, or incidental 
information, F(l,15) = 0.9148 p = 0.3540 (Appendix 26, 
Tables 1 - 4 ) .
Finally, interactions between delay and presentation 
of stereotypic information were considered for each 
type of information; none was significant. F (2,30) = 
0.4001 p = 0.6738 for total information recalled;
F(2,30) = 2.8793 p = 0.0718 for stereotype-consistent 
information; F(2,30) = 0.1566 p = 0.8558 for
stereotype-inconsistent information; F(2,30) = 0.3612 
p = 0.6998 for incidental information (Appendix 26, 
Tables 1 - 4).
Next, analysis of variance was employed to 
investigate within-group effects. For subjects
receiving stereotypic information, more stereotype- 
consistent information was recalled than stereotype- 
inconsistent information: F(1,18) = 64.8 p = 0.0000.
There was no significant interaction between delay and 
consistent/inconsistent information recalled: F (2,18) 
= 0.6000 p = 0.5594 (Appendix 27, Table 1). The same 
pattern of results held for non-stereotype subjects. 
More stereotype-consistent information was recalled 
than stereotype-inconsistent information: F(1,18) =
10.2857 p = 0.0034, and there was no interaction
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between stage of interview and information recalled: 
F(2,27) = 2.7857 p = 0.0795 (Appendix 27, Table 2).
Hence presentation of stereotypic information 
appears not to have affected the amount of correct 
information generated. The next question to be 
considered was the number of errors made. The raw 
data are presented in Table 9.2.
Analysis of variance was performed on these data. 
Delay did not affect the number of errors made in the 
recall of stereotypically -linked items (i.e., 
stereotype-consistent or -inconsistent items): F(2,30) 
= 0.9696 p = 0.3908; F(2,30) = 3.0612 p = 0.1006
respectively.
Delay Group 1 Group 2
1 M 1.714 2.300SD 1.704 0.949
2 M 1.429 2 . 600SD 0.976 4.761
3 M 0.857 1.100SD 1.215 0.9944
TABLE 9.2 - MEAN NUMBER OF ERRORS MADE X INTERVIEW GROUP X DELAY
Delay was however found to affect the number of 
errors made in recall of incidental items: F (2,30) = 
3.9819 p = 0.0293. There was no interaction between 
time and presentation/non-presentation of stereotypic 
information for any type of information: F(2,30) =
0.0302 p = 0.9703 for stereotype-consistent
information, F(2,30) = 1.6100 p = 0.2167 for
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stereotype-inconsistent information, F(2,30) = 0.6180 
p = 0.5457 for incidental information (see Appendix 
28, Tables 1 - 3 ) .
Accuracy: Next, the accuracy (i.e., pieces of
correct information 4- total pieces of information) of 
recall in the two stereotype conditions was 
calculated. Only total information and incidental 
information were considered. These data are presented 
in Table 9.3. Stereotype-consistent information was 
not considered because no errors were made by any 
subject here (hence the total scores presented above 
may be considered as accuracy scores). Stereotype- 
inconsistent information could not be considered 
because many scores were not amenable to statistical 
analysis. In some cases, a number of errors was made, 
although no items of correct information were 
produced.
Delay GroUD 1 Group 2
1 M 87.510 83.123SD 40.489 5.914
2 M 87.159 77.369SD 7.810 12.847
3 M 93.333 90.967SD 8.598 10.529
TABLE 9.3 - ACCURACY OF INFORMATION RECALLED xINTERVIEW GROUP X DELAY CONDITION
There was a significant main effect of time on 
accuracy of recall of total information: F(2,45) =
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4.2754 p = 0.0200. À Neumann-Keuls test applied to 
these data indicated that accuracy was greater after a 
delay of one year (91.951%) than after six months 
(81.400%, Q = 10.5568, p < 0.01) or during immediate 
testing (84.9297%, Q = 7.0212, p < 0.05). Although 
there was no main effect of delay on the number of 
errors made in any category of information, this 
effect does appear likely to be due to an overall 
decrease in errors made with delay time. The mean 
number of errors made fell from 0.121 to 0.000 for 
stereotype-consistent information; from 0.314 to 0.286 
for stereotype-inconsistent information; and from 
2.007 to 0.979 for incidental information. There was 
also a slight concomitant fall in the number of items 
correctly recalled in each category with delay. 
Presentation of a stereotype was not foundto affect 
overall accuracy (i.e., across all information types), 
although this main effect only missed significance by 
seventy-four thousandths: F(1,45) = 3.8040 p = 0.0574. 
The trend was towards greater accuracy in the 
stereotype than in the non-stereotype condition 
(89.340% in the stereotype condition against 83.820% 
in the non-stereotype condition). There was no 
significant interaction between the two: F(2,45) =
0.6106 p = 0.5475. There was no main effect of
stereotype presentation on accuracy of recall of 
incidental information: F(l,20) = 1.0679 p = 0.3138;
no main effect of time: F(2,20) = 0.7515, and no
significant interaction between the two variables:
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F(2,20) = 0.7515 p = 0.4845 (Appendix 28, Tables 1 and
2) .
Therefore, neither delay interval nor presentation 
of stereotypic information appears to have affected 
the number of correct or incorrect pieces of
information generated, or the accuracy of the recall 
accounts.
Clothing: The most important hypothesis concerning
clothing was that accuracy of memory for the 
kissogram's clothing would be greater with the
presentation of stereotypic information. This was not 
found to be the case. Accuracy of memory for the
kissogram girl's clothing was not affected by 
presentation of stereotypic information: F(1,15) =
0.4823 p = 0.4980. Neither was there any interaction 
between presentation of stereotypic information and 
delay on memory for clothing: F(2,50) = 0.7276 p =
0.4914. Accuracy of memory for the "boyfriend"'s 
clothing was however affected by presentation of 
stereotypic information: F(l,15) = 7.1460 p = 0.0174. 
There was no significant interaction between 
presentation of stereotypic information and delay on 
memory for clothing: F (2,30) - 1.7404 p = 0.1927
(Appendix 30, Tables 1 - 4 ) .
Other hypotheses were advanced concerning memory for 
clothing. These were less central to the present 
issue. For the kissogram's clothing, memory for style 
was more accurate than memory for colour: F(1,48) ==
9.3603 p = 0.0036. Memory for style/colour did not
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interact with delay: F(2,48) = 0.2267 p = 0.7980;
neither did delay have any independant effect on the 
level of memory for style/colour of clothing: F(2,48) 
= 0.2401 p = 0.7875.
The same pattern of results held true for the 
"boyfriend"'s clothing. Memory for style was more 
accurate than memory for colour: F(l,48) = 96.0831 p =
0.0000. There was no interaction between memory for 
style/colour and delay: F(2,48) = 1.0805 p = 0.3475; 
neither did delay have any independent effect: F(2,48) 
= 2.4849 p = 0.0940.
Discussion
Each of the experimental hypotheses is discussed 
below.
1) Under no condition was presentation of stereotypic 
information found to affect level of recall. This is 
surprising given the number of studies which have 
found presentation of stereotypic information to 
affect recall in one way or another (see the meta­
analysis table in Chapter 6). Given this fact, 
perhaps the most valid conclusion that can be reached 
is that the stereotypic information in the present 
study was either insufficiently powerful to elicit 
effects, or that it was not presented in a powerful 
enough manner: Dropping a single word into a
(supposedly) chance conversation may simply be an 
insufficiently forceful medium for the generation of 
systematic effects. The effects of stereotypic 
information presented at retrieval are generally less
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profound than when presented at encoding. This result 
is nevertheless a failure to support the theories of 
Wyer, Bodenhausen and Srull (1984) and Stangor and 
Ruble (1989): both of which would predict a
consistency effect with the methodology employed here.
It was the major purpose of the present experiment 
to discover the effects of a stereotype "dropped by 
chance" during retrieval of information about a 
witnessed crime. It appears unlikely that very large 
effects will occur under such conditions. However, it 
should be mentioned that the present experiment used 
(relatively) low-key stimuli and that the interviews 
were less of an ordeal for the subjects than the 
average police interview for a witness. Under more 
emotive circumstances, somewhat different effects may 
be found to obtain. Again, though, it appears 
unlikely that very dramatic effects would be produced.
Memory for clothing was also studied in this 
experiment. For both targets, style of clothing was 
found to be more memorable than colour. This accords 
with the previous findings in the literature (Yuille 
and Cutshall 1986/89; Tollestrup, Turtle and Yuille, 
in press) and points to the reliability of this 
effect. Presentation of stereotypic information was 
not found to aid memory for the kissogram's clothing. 
It was however found to aid memory for the 
"boyfriend"'s clothing. This is the opposite result 
to that predicted. Since the stereotype presented 
applied only to the kissogram artiste herself, it is 
hard to see how this result can be explained. The
284
best explanation may be no explanation: the result may 
be due to chance.
2) Under no circumstance was a significant interaction 
discovered between delay and stereotypic information 
on information recalled.
3) Although there was a significant effect of delay on 
total recall level, this effect was not significant in 
the information categories of specific interest here:
i.e., consistent and inconsistent information. The 
implication therefore appears to be that memory 
deteriorated slightly, but non-significantly, with 
time in each category. Hence there appears to be 
nothing special about stereotypically-linked 
information: memory for the two categories of 
stereotypically-linked information (i.e., stereotype- 
consistent and -inconsistent) appears to have 
deteriorated no more and no less with time than did 
memory for other categories of information. It is 
possible that the subtle effects of stereotypic 
information were obscured by the other noise present 
in the results.
The effect of delay on memorial accuracy was found 
to be completely opposite to that hypothesized. Total 
accuracy was found to increase with time; and this 
effect appears to have been due to a slight decrease 
in the number of errors made. It appears that as the 
number of errors made decreased, then the number of 
items correctly remembered did not decrease 
proportionately. Conceivably the false "memory" trace 
created by erroneous information is less powerful than
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that created by correct information, and hence fades 
more rapidly. Although the subject may indeed 
frequently have rehearsed the story of the kissogram 
incident with his/her friends throughout the study 
period, this rehearsal did not, as might have been 
expected, lead to greater confabulation; neither does 
it seem to have been sufficiently powerful to keep the 
events completely fresh in the mind. Conceivably, 
delay may cause hypermnesic effects: although the
total amount of information recalled appears to 
decrease with time (across such long delay periods as 
those used here,) overall accuracy appears to 
increase. To establish the exact nature of these 
effects, a separate experiment would be required; and 
one that is outside the scope of the present thesis. 
Accuracy was not affected by the presentation of 
stereotypic information; although a slight trend was 
discovered in this direction. Had this proven 
significant, it would have provided support for Snyder 
and Uranowitz' hypothesis that stereotypic information 
acts as retrieval schemata. It would not however have 
supported the contention of Wyer, Bodenhausen and 
Srull and of Stangor and Ruble that stereotypic 
information presented at retrieval is likely to lead 
to a consistency effect. However it can only be 
concluded that the present case offers little reason 
to suppose that stereotypic information acts as a 
retrieval schema.
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Summary and Conclusions
The present experiment was performed with the 
intention of investigating the biassing effects of 
stereotypic information presented during the retrieval 
of material with greater external validity than had 
previously been investigated. Also, the effects of 
delay periods comparable to those encountered by 
witnesses to actual crimes were investigated. The 
experiment was designed so as roughly to parallel the 
effects that might be expected were a piece of 
stereotypic information to be dropped during a police 
interview about a witnessed crime. Counter to 
predictions derived from previous research in the area 
(Snyder and Uranowitz, 1978 a, b, and c; Wyer, 
Bodenhausen and Srull, 1984; Stangor and Ruble, 1989) 
stereotypic information was not found to cause a 
consistency effect in recall. In some cases, 
stereotypic information presented at retrieval may 
prove to have the kind of positive effect on memory 
that it is characterised as having by, e.g., Snyder 
and Uranowitz (1978c). In other cases, when a 
slightly different methodology is employed, it may be 
found to have little or no effect on memory (e.g. , 
Bellezza and Bower, 1981; Rothbart, Evans and Fulero, 
1979). Quite possibly, the effects of stereotypic 
information presented at retrieval will eventually 
prove as complex and task-dependent as those of 
stereotypic information presented at encoding (Srull,
1984).
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The effects of delay on memory also ran counter to 
hypotheses. Although a trend was discovered towards 
deterioration of memory with time, no significant 
result was in fact discovered. This parallels the 
finding of Yuille and his colleagues (see above) and 
contradicts the assumption of many researchers that 
eyewitness memory is likely to follow an Ebbinghaus 
decay curve. There was no interaction of delay time 
with stereotype presentation. It should be mentioned 
however that the present experiment is subject to the 
same kinds of criticism as that of Yuille and Cutshall
(1986). Both experiments used volunteers drawn from 
the total set of witnesses to an event. Hence those 
witnesses with less confidence in their memory for the 
incident may, as mentioned above, have "deselected" 
themselves from the experiment. Hence, both Yuille 
and Cutshall's experiment and the present experiment 
may provide a more optimistic assessment of 
eyewitnesses' memory performance over time than is 
really justified. Therefore, to some extent, both 
studies may underestimate the effect of delay on 
eyewitnesses' memory performance.
The present experiment, then, taken with those of 
Experiments 4 and 5, implies that, although 
stereotypic information may have some effect on 
eyewitness memory when presented after a crime, these 
effects are extremely difficult to characterise in 
advance, and are likely to be so subtle that, in the 
complex, real-world situation, they may well be 
negligible. Although a certain amount of support has
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been gained for Snyder and Uranowitz' claim that
stereotypes act as retrieval schemata, this effect 
appears very elusive, and the use of stereotypic 
information during the police interview cannot be 
recommended for improving recall. Any distorting 
effect will likewise probably be quite subtle and will 
be likely to lead in the direction of a consistency 
rather than an inconsistency effect. However, the
fact that the opposite result was discovered in
Experiment 5, implies that the effects may be context- 
dependent. This is an area which would profit from a 
great deal more research, particularly with an eye to 
developing theories of social memory which predict 
what effect is likely to occur under which conditions. 
As far as eyewitness memory is concerned, however, the 
effect of stereotypic information presented at
encoding appears to be of more direct relevance, in 
which case distorting effects appear most likely to 
occur. The following section of the thesis considers 
a means by which the impact of such information may be 
reduced.
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CHAPTER 10 - INTERVIEWING EYEWITNESSES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
"A critical component of effective law enforcement is the ability of police investigators to obtain accurate and detailed information from eyewitnesses. One experienced judge has stated that incorrect eyewitness identifications have led to more miscarriages of justice than all other factors combined (Sobell, 1972). It is ironic that although the quality of a witness's [sic] or victim's report is of paramount importance in solving criminal cases, police investigators often have minimal guidance in developing effective interview techniques to facilitate memory retrieval." (Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon and Holland, 1986, pp 385 - 386.)
The previous sections of this thesis have 
considered ways in which eyewitnesses' judgment or 
memory for crimes may be affected by stereotypic 
information. Although some theories (Snyder and 
Uranowitz, 1978c; Snyder, 1981,) would predict 
improved memory for stereotype-consistent 
material with presentation of stereotypic
information at retrieval. Experiments 4 and 5 
appear to cast some doubt over the validity of
this prediction. Therefore it appears likely that 
the usual effect of stereotypes in the eyewitness 
situation will be to distort the eyewitness'
memory or judgment.
It is therefore important for this thesis to 
address the question of how such negative effects 
may be reduced or eliminated. The present section 
of the thesis reviews the literature on police 
interview techniques and reports a pair of
experiments which aims to develop an interview
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technique which can be used to minimise the 
distorting effects of stereotypic information on 
memory. These experiments also play an important 
role in the development of a model of stereotypic 
effects in the eyewitness situation, to be 
presented in Chapter 13.
The present chapter consists of a review of the 
interviewing literature; considering the so-called 
"standard police interview" (i.e., that performed 
by otherwise untrained officers), as contrasted 
with the "optimal police interview", theform of 
which can be derived from the literature, and 
techniques which have been developed over the 
years by psychologists concerned with the area. 
Particular attention will be focussed on the 
forensic use of hypnosis, contextual 
reinstatement, conversation management, and the 
cognitive interview (basic and enhanced). The 
rather controversial area of police training in 
interviewing, (E Shepherd, 1985/91; Roy, 1991; 
Yuille, 1985,) is not of direct relevance to the 
present thesis and is therefore not discussed.
The "Optimal Police Interview"
The optimal structure of the police interview can 
be derived from a study of the literature. 
Hilgard and Loftus (1979) provide a (somewhat 
dated) account of the literature which provides 
the theoretical basis for the structure of such an 
"optimal police interview".
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There is strong evidence that narrative accounts 
are associated with greater accuracy than 
responses to direct questions (Cady, 1924, cited 
in Hilgard and Loftus, 1979; Dent and Stephenson, 
1979; Lipton, 1977). This increase in accuracy 
may be due to the witness producing a smaller 
quantity of information in the narrative format. 
This in turn may be associated with the witness 
adopting a more conservative response criterion in 
this format (Deffenbacher and Horney, 1981). 
Comparisons of question-and-answer with narrative 
formats find an advantage of up to 200% in 
completeness for the former (Hilgard and Loftus, 
1979). Hence, for the sake of production of a 
greater quantity of information, it is important 
to follow the free-recall phase of an interview 
with a question-and-answer phase (Geiselman, 
Fisher and Raymond, 1987; Loftus, 1979; Roy, 
1991).
The specific wording of the questions used in 
this phase is also important, since, as Loftus has 
repeatedly demonstrated, slight differences in 
question form can produce large differences in 
recall protocols. The effect of misleading 
questions on the performance of witnesses and 
their memory trace for the crime remains one of 
the most heavily-researched areas in the 
interviewing literature (see, e.g., Geiselman, 
Fisher, Cohen, Hollander and Surtes, 1986; Loftus, 
Korf and Schooler, 1988; McCloskey and Zaragoza,
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1985; Wright, 1992). Despite this wealth of 
laboratory work, in actual practice, leading 
questions remain one of the most difficult 
interviewing faults to correct. As Cahill and 
Mingay (1986, p 212) remark: "It is highly likely 
that a number of leading questions will be asked 
of witnesses, no matter how assidiously the 
officer tries to avoid doing so". Perhaps all 
that can realistically be hoped for in practice is 
that the negative effects of leading questions be 
kept to a minimum.
In summary, an optimal police interview would 
open with a narrative-recall phase, during which 
the interviewing officer would expect the witness 
to produce highly accurate but incomplete 
information. At the completion of the narrative 
stage, the officer would ask direct questions of 
the witness, here expecting more complete but less 
accurate information to be generated. During this 
stage, the officer should carefully select his 
questions so as to minimise the chance of 
producing distortions in the witness' account of 
the incident.
The following section considers the police 
interview as it appears to take place in practice.
The Police Interview
Research into the interview process has been an 
active area for many years in areas such as 
employment and personnel management (see, e.g..
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Schuh, 1981), but has begun to receive close 
attention from forensic and criminological 
psychologists only in relatively recent years 
(Fisher, Geiselman and Raymond, 1987; Smith and 
Ellsworth, 1987). Previous research considered 
relatively small details of the police interview 
(such as the misinformation effect: e.g., Loftus 
and Zanni, 1975; Loftus, Miller and Burns, 1978); 
however, until recently, the basic structure of 
the police interview seems to have been considered 
(not unreasonably, perhaps,) the exclusive 
property of the police themselves.
Child Witnesses: Special approaches (interview
techniques, recommendations to the legal system, 
etc.) have been developed for use with special 
categories of witness. These include the child 
witness (Davies, Flin and Baxter, 1986; Dent and 
Stephenson, 1979; Flin, Davies and Stevenson, 
1981; Flin and Tarrant, 1989); child victims of 
sexual abuse (see Friedemann and Morgan, 1985, for 
a discussion of the use of the "anatomical doll"); 
and the mentally handicapped (Tully and Cahill, 
1984; Cahill and Mingay, 1986). Indeed, over the 
last several years, more work has addressed the 
issue of the child witness than that of any other 
special category of witness. A great deal of this 
research has addressed the question of whether or 
not children are particularly poor eyewitnesses 
and whether their testimony should be discounted 
on this ground. However, as Flin (1988) remarks.
294
since most eyewitnesses are not perfect anyway, 
the difference between a child and an adult 
eyewitness is more likely to be quantitative than 
qualitative. The most interesting work in the 
field has accordingly addressed the degree of 
difference between adult and child witnesses in, 
for example, interrogative suggestibility and 
courtroom performance. Flin, Davies and Stevenson 
(1987) present a study of the issues of 
competence, credibility, and stress in the child 
eyewitness situation which exposes the then- 
current limitations of research in the area: for 
example, little research had addressed the honesty 
of children, or their ability to use the 
important investigative tool. Photofit. More 
recent research has helped fill the gaps in the 
literature. Brooks and Siegal (1991), found that 
children varied in their ability to remember real- 
life events, but were best at remembering events 
with some personal significance. The
suggestibility of children - long a bone of 
contention in the field - was found not to be 
fixed but to vary with the environment. They 
conclude that children of all ages, if properly 
prepared and handled, can give accurate and 
informed evidence, (see Baxter, 1990, and Yuille, 
1988, for similar arguments; and Kaplan, 1990, for 
a cautionary note regarding false reports which 
may occasionally be given by children). A more 
important question may be the extent to which
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jurors trust children's testimony, regardless of 
how reliable it can be shown to be. Davies, Flin 
and Baxter (1986), and Flin, Davies and Stevenson
(1987), present the intuitively appealing 
conclusion that most people will tend to believe 
the testimony of an adult over that of a child. 
This effect appears to be mediated by perceptions 
of the confidence and consistency of the witness, 
Moston (1989) shows that the effect may be due to 
the way in which children present their evidence: 
using a great deal of "powerless" speech; a habit 
which reduces the credibility of adult witnesses. 
This tendency may be exacerbated in the 
intimidating environment of the courtroom. It is 
an important goal of future research to establish 
which aspects of the courtroom experience children 
find most stressful. It is possible that 
children's lack of knowledge of the criminal 
justice system (Flin, Stevenson and Davies, 1989; 
Flin and Tarrant, 1989) will prove a particularly 
important factor here.
Adult Witnesses : The present section considers
the "standard" police interview involving adult 
eyewitnesses of normal intelligence.
Fisher et al (1987) provide descriptions and 
critiques of real interviews conducted by 
experienced detective officers of the Robbery 
Division of the Metro-Dade, Florida, Police 
Departments over a period of four months. A
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typical interview was found to begin with a single 
open-ended question asking the interviewee to 
recall as much as possible about the event. From 
that point on, the interview consisted of a 
narrative account by the eyewitness, punctuated by 
a series of direct short-answer questions about 
specific details of the event. Fisher and Price- 
Roush, (in an unpublished study cited in Roy, 
1991), find a number of problems associated with 
this interview format. One of these is the 
inappropriate sequencing of questions. Questions 
dealing with topics that are "perceptually 
related" to each other are often split by
questions dealing with "perceptually unrelated" 
topics: e.g., two questions about a suspect's eyes 
may be split by an intervening question concerning 
his shoes. The presence of such an intervening 
question may reduce accuracy by approximately 15% 
(see also Bekerian and Bowers, 1983).
Even more important, perhaps, is the excessive 
use by interviewing officers of the question- 
answer format. Thirty-five per cent of all 
correct statements may be generated within the 
brief, initial free-recall period of an
eyewitness' account (Fisher et al, 1987).
However, the narrative portion of an eyewitness' 
statement is interrupted, on average, every 7.5 
seconds by the police interviewer. As E Shepherd 
(1991) remarks, police officers "reduce the 
investigation to a questionnaire-like scenario" (p
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4, his italics) - a most ineffective interviewing 
technique, particularly when the actual case does 
not fit the preconceived scenario (Mortimer, 1991: 
this issue is discussed more fully in Chapter 6). 
Fisher et al found that no witness in their study 
was allowed to complete the free-recall part of 
the description without interruption. This causes 
disruption of concentration, and the tailoring of 
responses to fit the expected interval between 
interruptions.
In the average interview, Fisher et ai found the 
ratio of closed- to open questions to be almost as 
low as 9:1 (see also Schmitz and Plate, 1978). 
The sequencing of questions was often found to be 
incompatible with the eyewitness' mental 
representation of the facts (e.g., an eyewitness 
is thwarted in the attempt to recount events in 
chronological order by a police officer who 
insists on asking questions that jump around in 
time).
Roy (1991) provides a brief list of further 
bugbears in the standard police interview. These 
are: negative phraseology; non-neutral wording;
inappropriate language (e.g., to the eyewitness' 
mental abilities or social group); staccato style 
of questioning; judgmental comments; lack of 
follow-up of potential leads; and under-emphasis 
of auditory cues. All of these faults could 
easily be rectified by the briefest of training;
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yet they continue to exert negative influence over 
the efficacy of police interviewing.
The "human element" of the police interview is 
emphasized by Koepp, Lubbers, Lucero, Mankiewicz 
and Mason (1981). Neglect of the human element is 
a major factor in reducing the efficacy of the 
police interview. The interview should take into 
account such things as how the emotions of the 
witness are likely to be running (e.g., s/he is 
likely to be feeling nervous, apprehensive, and 
generally ill-at-ease) and the peculiar point of 
view (both physical and psychological) from which 
the witness perceived the crime in question. 
Schmitz and Plate (1978) point out that the 
interviewing officer is naturally placed in a 
position of superiority over the witness. A 
situation which is socially uncomfortable for the 
witness may further affect his/her performance. 
S/he may become perplexed, and fail to understand 
exactly what is required. This can be exacerbated 
by an officer who sees interactions with the 
public in terms of dominance-submission (E 
Shepherd, 1985).
Smith and Ellsworth (1987) found that the way in 
which an investigating police officer presents 
himself to the witness affects that witness' 
response to any information that the officer might 
provide. When the interviewer presents himself as 
more rather than less knowledgeable about the case 
in hand, questions which contain misleading
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information produce higher error rates in
responding. This factor appears unlikely to be
controlled for in the usual police interview
situation. Indeed, the importance of appearing
knowledgeable is emphasised in some texts dealing
with police interviews:
"...if the encounter between superior and subordinate is about mental rather than physical resources, then the superior must be able to outwit his subordinate. To display mere physical superiority in such a situation is the first step towards loss of status." (Irving and Hilgendorf, 1980, paraphrasing Morris, 1971)
Both Firth (1975) and Goodsall (1974), in their 
discussions of the police interview, emphasise the 
need for the interviewing officer to keep talking 
and appear knowledgeable about the case in hand. 
As E Shepherd (1991) remarks, however, it may be 
virtually impossible to disguise lack of knowledge 
about a case from a witness or a suspect: and the 
attempt is most likely simply to produce 
"resistance" in the interviewee.
The attitudes of the witness can also affect the 
results of the interview. Boon and Davies (1987a) 
suggest that the accuracy of an eyewitness' memory 
could be enhanced where only free recall 
(specifically without prompting by the 
investigating officer) was employed. This is 
reminiscent of recommendations made by Hilgard and 
Loftus (1979), and Fisher et al (1987). The 
attitude of the eyewitness to the police officer 
himself will also tend to affect how much
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information s/he gives. Some eyewitnesses are 
very uncooperative (E Shepherd, 1991).
Some faults lie neither with the interviewing 
officer nor with the witness exclusively, Palumbo 
(1975) points out that a large number of police 
interviews are conducted in surroundings that are 
not beneficial to either interviewer or 
interviewee. Often, they are conducted in
distracting or stressful environments, when they 
could quite easily be held in quieter and more 
controlled surroundings: e.g., the witness' own
home or place of work (although see Leonard, 
1971). The less ill-at-ease the witness feels, 
the better his/her memory performance is likely to 
be. It is unnecessarily detrimental to the 
success of the interview for it to be conducted in 
surroundings that are likely in and of themselves 
to make a witness feel ill-at-ease.
It seems likely that the "standard police 
interview" would benefit from eliminating the 
faults highlighted in this section, and more 
closely approaching the "optimal interview" 
outlined above. This could be achieved through 
more effective training in interview techniques, 
or application of specific techniques to improve 
the quality of information elicited. The use of 
special interview techniques is discussed below.
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Techniques to Aid Retrieval
Even to the layman, the use of retrieval 
techniques must appear a promising avenue for 
exploration in the interview situation: in
everyday life, ordinary people can and do utilise 
strategies to aid retrieval of information from 
memory, whether they are aware of them or not. 
Williams and Hollan (1981) offer a model of long­
term memory retrieval as a problem-solving 
process, involving at least four separate mnemonic 
strategies. The application of this process 
appears to result in considerable, if sub-optimal, 
gain in accuracy. Another everyday example is 
that of context-dependent memory: it is far
easier, for example, to recall the members of a 
particular jazz band when listening to jazz music 
than when listening to One EM. Such effects have 
been experimentally demonstrated in a number of 
studies, e.g., Godden and Baddeley (1975), Smith 
(1979). Many other techniques have been
investigated in the literature, using a range of 
methodologies and target materials. Loftus and 
Marburger (1983) used "landmark events" to help 
subjects temporally to localise events in their 
personal histories ("Since the eruption of Mt St 
Helens, has anyone beaten you up?"). Anderson and 
Pichert (1978) demonstrated the utility of 
adopting different perspectives on memory for a 
prose passage which described a house. Different 
items of information about the house were recalled
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with a change in retrieval perspective - subjects 
were asked to adopt the perspective of a burglar 
or a prospective home buyer. Bekerian and Bowers 
(1983) considered the memory advantage to be 
gained from the non-random presentation of 
questions about an eyewitness situation. They 
exposed subjects to a target event and tested 
memory for the event, presenting questions in 
either a random order or in the same order in 
which the even occurred. When questions were 
presented in the same order as the original event, 
subjects were more accurate then when questions 
were randomly presented. Sobell, Toneatto,
Sobell, Schuller and Maxwell (1990) considered the 
use of memory aids on the reduction of errors in 
life event inventories, and found that the use of 
such aids reduced the number of dates reported 
incorrectly, gave more reliable reports (as 
measured across two interviews) , and led to the 
recall of more events. Sheikh, Hill and Yesavage 
(1986) found that pretraining, plus the use of 
imagery-based mnemonics, was beneficial for 
patients suffering age-associated memory 
impairment. (See also Patten, 1990, for a history 
of the use of mnemonics in encoding and at 
retrieval). This section considers the
application of specific retrieval techniques to 
the eyewitness situation.
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Hypnosis
Hypnosis has been conceptualized as anything from 
"believed-in imagining" to highly focussed 
attention (see e.g., Orne et al, 1984). It is 
perhaps best defined by its characteristics, which 
are unlike those of any other state. It is a 
state in which subjects characteristically forgo 
evaluation of their experiences; leaving this in 
the hands of the hypnotist. It is the fact that a 
hypnotised subject can be requested to relive past 
experiences that makes its potential for memory- 
enhancement so seductive.
The use of hypnosis in the eyewitness situation 
was first proposed in an article by Arons in 1967. 
Since then, much anecdotal evidence has been 
provided for its efficacy (see e.g.. Reiser 1974, 
1976). However, "These field studies are more a 
reflection of the benefits perceived by those 
administering the procedure than a more objective 
evaluation requiring documented corroboration" 
(Timm, 1982, cited in Orne et al, 1984). It must 
be said that the efficacy of hypnosis has been 
much questioned in recent years, (see, e.g.,
Cooper and London, 1973; Dywan and Bowers, 1983; 
Putnam, 1979; Yuille and McEwan, 1985). 
Laboratory support for the efficacy of hypnosis 
has been extremely slight. Many experts now hold 
hypnosis to be only rarely a useful technique for 
memory-enhancement; it has even been suggested 
that, in the cases where hypnosis has allowed the
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recall of previously unrecallable material, this 
was caused not by hypnosis per se, but by the 
specific types of question asked of the hypnotised 
witness; types which contain known memory aids 
(Yuille and Kim, 1987).
Orne et al (1984) provide a very good review of 
the hypnosis literature, and the following section 
is partially endebted to their work. As mentioned 
above, few laboratory investigations have found 
hypnosis to be an effective memory aid. A common 
means of using hypnosis as a mnemonic involves 
age-regression: whether to childhood or just a few 
days or months previously. The subject is asked 
to imagine that s/he is once again at the age at 
which the events in question occurred. S/he is 
asked to answer questions about the event. Very 
few studies have found this approach to be 
effective; and those that have appear to be 
methodologically flawed, e.g. Reiff and Sheerer 
(1959), True (1949), in which hypermnesic effects 
were found to be caused by experimenter bias. It 
is possible that hypnosis might be useful where 
stress was encountered at encoding, but the 
evidence for this is slim. Only one study 
(Rosenthal, 1944) has found this effect.
The most important type of study for the present 
case however is that in which the memory of 
hypnotised subjects for verifiable information is 
compared with that of non-hypnotised subjects. 
This experimental paradigm allows for rigorous
305
control of materials and procedure, and for 
meaningful comparisons to be made across 
paradigms.
The literature here is surprisingly confused. 
However if one follows the example of Orne et al 
and considers studies which have used meaningful 
material separately from those which have used 
non-meaningful material, the picture becomes 
clearer. Hypnosis appears to provide no memory 
enhancement for non-meaningful material, but it 
does aid memory for meaningful material - at least 
for "some individuals in some situations" (Orne et 
al, 1984, p 185).
Most relevant here of course are those 
experiments in which memory for mock crimes has 
been tested. Only one such study (Griffin, 1980) 
appears to have found evidence for hypnotic 
hypermnesia. All other studies, including better- 
designed studies such as that by Putnam (1979), 
have found none.
The most positive results appear where the 
format for remembering is somehow structured, 
rather than when the subject is simply asked 
freely to recall everything that s/he witnessed. 
Unfortunately, such a paradigm has few 
implications for the real world. Before one can 
structure the memory format for recall of an 
incident, one must have some knowledge of that 
incident. Yet it is precisely when least is known 
about the event in question that hypnosis is most
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useful to the investigator. Additionally, the 
small increases that have been seen in the amount 
of correct information produced by hypnotised 
subjects are not necessarily meaningful. It is 
possible that hypnosis simply acts to lower the 
subject's response criterion: i.e., it encourages 
him/her to report more information, independent of 
correctness. Of course, when an investigator is 
simply trying to generate leads in a criminal case 
this need not be a great problem: however, later 
in the investigation, accurate information may be 
at a premium. Unfortunately, experimenters in the 
area have tended to measure only the accuracy of 
memory (i.e. number of correct items of 
information divided by total number of items 
generated), rather than response criteria.
The only study to have taken note of response 
criterion shifts appears to be that by Dywan and 
Bowers (1983), who found that apparent hypnotic 
hypermnesia was in fact due to adjustment of 
subjects' response-criterion. In a similar
experiment. Stager and Lundy (1984) used a probed- 
recall paradigm, and appeared to elicit genuine 
hypnotic hypermnesia. However, again, probed 
recall is hardly a useful strategy for the police 
officer who is trying to find out as much new 
information as he can about a case in hand.
In conclusion, laboratory evidence for the 
efficacy of hypnosis as a retrieval mnemonic is at 
best mixed and at worst extremely poor. There is
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little empirical justification for the use of 
hypnosis in the crime investigation situation: at 
least at stages of the investigation at which 
correct information is necessary. As a last-ditch 
attempt to generate new leads in a stagnating 
case, the use of hypnosis may have more 
justification; even then however it should be 
borne in mind that the information generated 
should not be relied upon with great confidence.
In addition to the evidence of the laboratory 
studies, there are further theoretical and 
practical drawbacks to the use of hypnosis in the 
eyewitness memory situation.
On the practical side, the safe use of hypnosis 
requires the presence of a trained hypnotist: and 
training is costly and time-consuming. Also, 
hypnotic induction itself is time-consuming: 
Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon and Holland (1985) 
found that induction took a mean of 27.1 minutes. 
Since police time is limited and expensive, a less 
time-consuming strategy would obviously be 
preferred. Also, hypnosis cannot be used on all 
subjects. Weitzenhoffer (1958) estimates that 78 
- 97% of people can reach the first level of
hypnosis, but a deeper level than this is needed 
for regression. Indeed, up to 5% of people may be 
totally unhypnotisable.
There is also the problem of increased 
suggestibility under hypnosis. Putnam (1979) 
reports the only study to deal exclusively with
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this phenomenon. After viewing a videotape of a 
motor accident, subjects were questioned in either 
a waking or a hypnotised state. Hypnotised 
subjects made significantly more errors; and this 
was independant of the interval between encoding 
and retrieval. They were found to be more 
confident in their answers, and believed 
themselves to be more accurate. This suggests 
that hypnotised subjects may have had perfectly 
clear visualisations of material which they 
confabulate. Increased suggestibility may be due 
either to shifts in the response criterion or to 
attempts to please the hypnotist, (an effect 
discussed at some length by Orne et al, 1984).
Finally, the theory generally supposed to 
underpin the use of hypnosis is flawed. Most 
advocates of the use of hypnosis (e.g., Reiser, 
1974) claim human memory to resemble a video­
recorder in that it records any information that 
enters it, and that what is recorded always has 
the potential to be played back, albeit only when 
the subject is under hypnosis. This theory is not 
currently accepted. Today, memory is held to be 
more of a reconstructive process than 
investigators like Reiser would have it.
These problems with hypnosis led to its use 
being outlawed in many American states. Other 
strategies may appear more promising.
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Contextual Reinstatement
"... the effectiveness of a retrieval cue is related to the amount of feature overlap with the encoded event (Flexser and Tulving, 1978). This is a statement of encoding specificity (Tulving and Thomson, 1973). One way to maximise feature overlap is to reinstate the context that surrounded the incident." (Geiselman, 1988, pp 245 - 246)
Thus stated, contextual reinstatement appears a 
simple and elegant means of improving eyewitness 
memory. One of the earliest attempts to utilise 
the technique to this end was in an experiment by 
Malpass and Devine (1981b), who used a contextual 
reinstatement paradigm which they termed "guided 
memory". Subjects were interviewed five months 
after witnessing a staged vandalism in which 
laboratory equipment was smashed. They were then 
asked to identify the vandal from an 
identification parade. Half of the subjects 
received a guided memory inteview, in which both 
internal contexts (emotional, etc.) and external 
contexts (physical features of the room in which 
witnessing took place) were reinstated. The other 
subjects acted as controls. Those who received 
the context-reinstating interview were found to be 
significantly more accurate in identifications 
than were controls.
However, the application of contextual 
reinstatement to the present area is somewhat 
problematic. Indeed, the very concept of context 
is difficult to define. As Thomson and Davies
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(1988) point out, for some researchers, it refers 
to "the setting in which a target is found" ; 
whereas for others it is assigned a more active 
role: "it is the context which determines the
figure or target" (Thomson and Davies, 1988, p 2). 
The literature on the issue is remarkably 
heterogenous : the contexts which have been
manipulated range from discrete words to physical 
settings to the emotional state of the subject; 
targets range from words to faces to pictures of 
objects. The experimental tasks and dependent 
measures used also vary greatly. Indeed, Thomson 
and Davies remark that "[i]t is tempting to 
dismiss context as a useful concept" (p 4).
McSpadden, Schooler and Loftus (1988) remark 
that recent research has proven ambiguous with 
regard to the usefulness of contextual 
reinstatement, and report three experiments which 
"painted a rather messy picture of context 
reinstatement" p 226). Geiselman (1988) remarks 
that contextual reinstatement on its own may not 
be a useful tool for memory enhancement. In light 
of the very diverse findings reported in the area, 
this is a tempting conclusion to endorse. 
Fernandez and Glenberg (1985, cited in McSpadden 
et al, 1988) report a series of experiments which 
fail to demonstrate reliable benefits with the use 
of contextual reinstatement. Geiselman's own work 
with his colleagues on the Cognitive Interview 
(see the separate sub-section, below), of which
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contextual reinstatement forms a principle 
mnemonic, however, does indicate that the 
technique is useful, at least when used in tandem 
with other techniques (see especially Geiselman, 
Fisher, MacKinnon and Holland, 1985).
More recent studies have utilised a Retroactive 
Interference design, by which one set of material 
is learned in environment x, and a second set in 
environment y. Memory for the first set of 
material is then tested, in either environment x 
or environment y. Using this design, positive 
effects have frequently been demonstrated (e.g., 
Bilodeau and Schlosberg, 1951; Greenspoon and 
Ranyard, 1957; Zentall, 1970, all cited in Godden 
and Baddeley, 1975). However, this paradigm is 
not without its critics. Strand (1970) suggests 
that the effects discovered in these experiments 
were not caused by testing environment per se, but 
by the disruption caused when a subject moves from 
one environment to another. With this variable 
controlled, she claims, there may be no effect of 
contextual reinstatement. However, Smith et al 
(1978) take issue with this claim, presenting 
experimental data which cannot be accounted for by 
this disruption hypothesis.
Certainly, the experimental evidence for the 
efficacy of contextual reinstatement appears to be 
less than fully convincing. However, as Geiselman 
points out, the published experimental evidence 
tends on the whole to be more positive than
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negative (although see McSpadden at al for a 
rejoinder to this claim). Perhaps the most 
thorough set of investigations into the effect is 
that which has been presented by Cutler, Penrod, 
and their associates (Cutler and Penrod, 1988; 
Cutler, Penrod and Martens, 1987 a and b; Cutler, 
Penrod, O'Rourke and Martens, 1986; Krafka and 
Penrod, 1985; Shapiro and Penrod, 1986): these
studies are reviewed in some detail in Chapter 4. 
This set of experiments do appear to show that the 
effect of contextual reinstatement may in many 
instances be more positive than the brief survey 
of the literature above might lead one to believe, 
and that, especially when used in tandem with 
other retrieval techniques (as recommended by 
Geiselman, 1988), may prove a useful tool in 
police investigations.
Conversation Management
The idea underpinning conversation management (CM) 
is that even in the absence of specific cognitive 
techniques for improving the quality of memory 
retrieval, improved quality of interviewer- 
interviewee discourse can improve the quality of 
information generated, and reduce interviewee 
resistance. Of course, this idea is not markedly 
unique. As long ago as 1975, Firth recommended 
interviewing officers to use many techniques which 
are part of conversation-management.
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Under CM, police officers are trained to use
conversational techniques to create new 
situations, or alter existing ones, in such a way 
as to build a "psychological bridge" (E Shepherd, 
1991) with the interviewee. The first step in
achieving this is to train police to break away 
from their "traditional" perspective of seeing 
encounters with the public in purely professional 
- as opposed to interpersonal - terms. Those
undergoing training are encouraged to combine a 
controlling influence on the interview with a 
conversational attitude which is socially 
rewarding for the interviewee.
In each interview, the police officer should
invoke the GEMAC script. This outlines a series 
of stages through which a successful interview 
should pass:
1. Greeting - which sets the tone of the 
interview, and provides the interviewee with 
information as to the officer's attitude vis-à-vis 
the interview.
2. Explanation - which provides a "route map" 
for the interview. E Shepherd (1991) argues that 
when no route map is specified, police officers 
not only indulge in non-systematic, haphazard 
questioning, but also limit their ability to 
monitor changes in an interviewee's non-verbal 
communication as each new topic is broached.
3. Mutual Activity. When the officer reviews 
the accounts presented by the interviewee, the
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interviewee is able to check, alter, or supplement 
his/her account of the event. At this point the 
conversational skills of the interviewer come into 
their own: it is necessary for the him/her to try 
to develop the "interview spiral", or systematic 
opening and exhaustion of topics, and probing of 
both verbal and non-verbal responses.
4. Close - the officer signals the end of the 
interview.
GEMAC gives a practical framework for 
structuring an interview using both cognitive and 
social psychological processes that require what 
Roy (1991) refers to as "personal micro-skills" on 
the part of the interviewer, e.g., observations of 
and memory for the actions of the interviewee; 
listening and assertion; appropriate questioning, 
etc. Many of the factors involved in these 
"micro-skills" appear obvious: e.g., under
"listening and assertion" it is specified by E 
Shepherd (1991, pp 5 - 6) that the interviewer
should not speak while the witness is trying to 
speak. The use of these micro-skills allows the 
development of "macro-skills", which may be of 
more direct use to the police interviewer. These 
include the ability changes in verbal and non­
verbal responses, and to detect emotional, 
motivational, attitudinal, and dispositional 
changes in the witness.
Use of CM is intended to lead to a more flowing 
conversation, and the production of a more
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accurate and well-structured account of a crime. 
Indeed, many of the points of CM are applicable 
and likely to be of advantage whatever other 
interview technique is employed. George (1992) 
has tested the efficacy of CM used in conjunction 
with the cognitive interview, as compared with CM 
alone, the cognitive interview alone, and the 
"standard interview". He found a significant 
interaction between CM and the cognitive interview 
on the amount of information obtained per 
question, whereas the effects of either technique 
alone were non-significant. The same pattern of 
results was found for the amount of information 
generated relevant to the perpetrator of the 
crime.
Although this study implies that CM is maximally
effective only when used in conjunction with
another retrieval technique, it does appear to
have won the approval of the British police.
Despite the costliness of training recruits,
(George, 1992,) by 1991, twenty-six police forces
throughout the UK had adopted the technique (Roy,
1991, p 29). Even such minimal training as a
single day spent learning "communication skills"
appears to be effective to some degree (J Adams,
/1985).
The Cognitive Interview
The cognitive interview has had two incarnations: 
basic (Cl) and enhanced (ECI). Each consists
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essentially of four general memory techniques 
which accord with two principles of memory 
function: 1. that "the memory trace is composed of 
several features, and that the effectiveness of a 
retrieval cue is related to the amount of feature 
overlap with the encoded event", and 2. that 
"there may be several retrieval paths to the 
encoded event" (Geiselman, Fisher et al, 1985, p
402). The techniques are discussed briefly below. 
The first two accord with the first "principle of 
memory function" outlined above; the second two 
with the second.
Using the first technique, the interviewer asks 
the witness mentally to reinstate the context 
(both internal and external) which existed when 
the crime was witnessed. À similar "jogging" of 
memory should be achieved under these conditions 
as when a witness returns to the scene of the 
crime; without the problems associated with 
actually doing this (George and Clifford, 1991). 
Memon and Kohnken (1992) believe this to be the 
most effective component of the Cl.
The second technique involves instructing the 
witness to recall the witnessed event from a 
variety of physical perspectives: s/he attempts to 
adopt the physical position of, say, the victim, 
or another witness, and describes what that person 
would have been able to see. This technique is 
reportedly most useful when dealing with child 
witnesses, where the child is asked to put
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him/herself into the body of another person, and 
ask what that person saw (Saywitz, Geiselman and 
Bornstein, 1992).
The third technique is for the witness to report 
everything that s/he can remember, including 
partial information. This may be effective for 
two reasons : 1. a witness may report only what
s/he considers to be relevant, but may not know 
precisely what information is of investigative 
value, and, 2. recall of partial details may lead 
to subsequent recall of additional relevant 
information (Geiselman, 1988).
Finally, once the witness has provided an 
account of the crime, s/he is asked to recall the 
events a second time, but in a different order. 
The witness may begin at any point: at the
beginning, middle, end, or simply the most 
memorable part of the crime; although the usual 
procedure is to ask the witness to recall the 
event first in chronological and then in reverse 
order (Memon and Kohnken, 1992).
The Cl also contains supplementary techniques 
for the generation of specific items which were 
not recalled during the narrative phase of the 
interview, e.g., for the physical appearance of 
the suspect, asking "Did he remind you of anyone 
you know?" (Memon and Kohnken, 199 2, p 40).
Other studies have extended research into the 
cognitive interview to the forensically important 
area of memory for licence plates; including
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special itienmonics to deal with the particular 
problems associated with this (MacKinnon, O'Reilly 
and Geiselman, 1988; Mende, MacKinnon and 
Geiselman, 1986),
The first empirical study of the efficacy of the 
Cl was reported by Geiselman et al (1984). 
Undergraduate subjects were interviewed about a 
staged crime, using either the Cl or standard 
police interview. Under the Cl, significantly 
more correct information was generated for two of 
three classes of memory (for persons and events, 
but not for objects), with no significant increase 
in the amount of incorrect information generated. 
Geiselman et al (1985) compared both the Cl and 
hypnosis with the standard police interview on 
memory for a violent police training film used by 
the Los Angeles Police Department. Both the Cl 
and hypnosis were found to elicit approximately 
3 5% more correct information than the standard 
interview. The number of incorrect and
confabulated details did not differ significantly 
with condition. A subsequent study (Geiselman et 
ai, 1986) showed that the hypermnesic effect of 
the Cl did not appear to be limited to any 
particular class of witness, but to be 
generalizable across age, ethnic group, annual 
income, and education level. These findings have 
been replicated in Germany (Aschermann, Mantwill 
and Kohnken, 1991, cited in Memon and Bull, 1991).
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Perry and Chapman (1992) used the Cl to study 
memory for road accidents, finding that the Cl 
produced 15% more correct information than the 
standard police interview, without increasing the 
amount of incorrect information generated. Memon 
and Kohnken (1992) speculate that the 
comparatively small effect discovered here is due 
to the unusual experimental procedure employed; 
Half of the subjects were interviewed under 
standard interview conditions after they had 
already experienced Cl techniques one week 
earlier, in the first part of the experiment. 
These subjects may have applied Cl techniques even 
in the standard interview. Newlands (1993) used a 
video-recording of a mugging event to compare 
memory under Cl and standard police interview 
conditions for recall of specific types of 
information: for people, surroundings,
conversation, actions, and perpetrator
information. Significantly more correct
information was generated under the Cl; however 
the type of detail which benefitted was 
information about the surroundings: perhaps the
least useful in a genuine crime investigation. A 
significantly greater number of incorrect details 
was also generated in the Cl than in the standard 
interview; a finding at odds with those cited 
above.
The enhanced cognitive interview (ECI) was 
produced by Fisher, Geiselman, Raymond, Jurkevich
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and Warhaftig (1987b), and Geiselman and Fisher
(1988), in response to their review (Fisher et al, 
1987a) of practical problems encountered by police 
officers who conduct interviews on an everyday 
basis. The ECI includes three techniques
reminiscent of conversation management. These 
are: rapport building with the interviewee;
transference of control to the witness to give 
him/her time to concentrate and search his/her 
memory; and structuring of the interview so that 
it is compatible with the mental operations of the 
witness - avoiding a rigid, uniform style of 
questioning. The ECI is therefore a more
effortful and time-consuming procedure for the 
interviewer. Fisher, Geiselman and Amador (1989) 
recognise that it may be difficult for 
interviewers to employ these techniques in the 
absence of proper training. Nevertheless, the ECI 
appears to be even more effective than the 
original procedure (Fisher et al, 1987b; Geiselman 
and Fisher, 1988).
Fisher et al (1987b) compared the Cl with the 
ECI in a laboratory study of memory for video­
recordings of simulated crimes. The ECI was found 
to generate 45% more correct information than the 
Cl. Since the Cl had already been found to elicit 
35% more information than the standard police 
interview, this represented a dramatic effect. 
This was not found to be caused by the extra time 
involved in application of the ECI.
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George and Clifford (1991) tested the ECI 
against the standard police interview and ECI- 
plus-conversation management for recall of a 
staged incident. Subjects were questioned by 
experienced detectives, two weeks after the staged 
incident took place. The ECI alone generated 36% 
more correct details than the standard police 
interview; and the ECI with conversation 
management 42% more correct information again: 
with no increase in the number of errors made. 
This is a similar finding to that reported by 
George (1992), above.
À number of studies of the ECI have been 
conducted in Germany by Kohnken and his
colleagues. Kohnken, Thürer and Zoberbier (1992) 
exposed subjects to a video-recording of a blood 
donation. One week later, memory was compared 
under the standard (or "structured") interview and 
under the ECI. The ECI was found to give 52% 
more correct information than the "structured" 
interview, with no increase in the amount of 
incorrect information generated. Using similar 
stimulus materials, Kohnken, Schimossek,
Aschermann and Hofer (1991) found the ECI to 
increase correct recall by 35% over the 
"structured" interview, although a marginally
significant increase was also discovered in the
amount of incorrect information generated.
Mantwill, Aschermann and Kohnken (unpublished 
manuscript, cited in Memon and Kohnken, 1992),
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again used the same stimulus materials. Half of 
their subjects had prior experience as blood 
donors, and half did not. Interviews were 
performed by subjects from various professions 
(none psychologists), all of whom had donated
blood. Half of these used the ECI, and half used 
the "structured" interview. The ECI was found to 
generate 25% more correct information than the 
"structured" interview, without any increase in 
incorrect information. The performance of
experienced and inexperienced subjects was not 
found to differ significantly.
Only two field tests of the ECI appear to have 
been reported. Fisher, Geiselman and Amador
(1989) studied use of the ECI by trained and 
"control" police detectives from Miami, Florida, 
when questioning victims and witnesses of actual 
crimes. The ECI was found to improve interview
performance ( in terms of pieces of correct and 
incorrect information generated) both within 
subjects (before vs. after training in the
techniques) and between subjects (ECI interviewers 
vs. controls). Detectives elicited 48% more
correct information after training in the ECI than 
before training, and 63% more information than the 
untrained detectives, George and Clifford (1991) 
used for subjects thirty-two British police 
officers either trained or untrained in the ECI. 
The ECI was found to elicit 14% more correct
information than the no-training condition. A
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before/after measure was also taken. It was found 
that training in ECI gave a within-subjects 
increase of 55% in the amount of correct 
information generated.
A number of recent studies (Geiselman and 
Padilla, 1988; Saywitz, Geiselman and Bornstein; 
Saywitz, Geiselman and Bornstein; Kohnken, Thürer 
and Zoberbier; Memon, Cronin, Eaves, Bull and 
Küpper - all 1992) have considered the use of the 
ECI with child witnesses. Although this is an 
important area of research, this literature is not 
reviewed here, since it lies some way outside the 
present field of enquiry.
Hence empirical findings appear to lend great 
support to the cognitive interview (whether basic 
or enhanced); "[t ]he memory enhancing effect of 
the Cl proved to be extraordinarily consistent and 
robust as far as adult witnesses are concerned" 
(Memon and Kohnken, 1992, p 46.) Positive effects 
appear to hold for a large range of interviewers 
and interviewees from the USA, the UK, and 
Germany, and for a number of stimulus materials 
(unpublished research by Fisher and Quigley, cited 
in Memon and Bull, 1991, used the Cl in an 
epidemiological study of outbreaks of food-borne 
disease). Memon and Bull summarise the results of 
investigations into the Cl as showing that it is 
20 - 40% more effective than the standard police 
interview, and that this is independent of the 
specific interviewer (whether student or police
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detective). However one should not be without 
reservations. As Memon and Bull (1991, p 302) 
remark, it is unclear how each aspect of the 
technique works and whether any one mnemonic is 
more effective than others: of particular concern 
may be the effects of the "reinstate context" 
mnemonic. The exact effects of contextual 
reinstatement on eyewitness memory have yet to be 
fully specified. The finding reported by Newlands 
(1993) that use of the Cl increased the amount of 
correct information generated, but specifically 
for the least relevant aspects of the crime 
situation, should also be investigated. In 
general, however, research indicates that use of 
the Cl givens positive results, and it appears a 
most effective technique for the improvement of 
eyewitness memory.
Conclusions
Eyewitness memory is the single most important 
source of information in the criminal 
investigation. Criminal investigation bodies tap 
eyewitness memory through the use of the 
interview. Hence, interview techniques that 
increase the amount of correct information 
generated - with no concomitant increase in 
incorrect information - are extremely valuable. 
While hypnosis is such a controversial technique 
in this respect that its use has been banned in 
several states in the USA, both conversation
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management and the cognitive interview appear to 
be more useful. By far the greater amount of 
research has addressed the cognitive interview. 
The results of this research have been generally 
very positive, although a number of criticisms can 
be made. Perhaps particularly exciting is work by 
George and Clifford (1991), and George (1992), in 
which Cl and CM techniques have been combined, 
their positive effects appearing to be additive.
The aim of the present section of this thesis is 
to develop an interview technique by means of 
which the potential negative influence of 
stereotypic information on eyewitness memory might 
be reduced. While CM techniques might be helpful 
in reducing the likelihood of stereotypic 
information being presented at retrieval, the 
effects of such information are likely to be most 
pronounced when it is present at encoding. For 
example, someone may witness a bank robbery, 
already possessing a stereotype of the type of 
person who commits bank robberies. Neither CM nor 
the Cl appears well-equipped to counter the 
effects that are likely to occur under such 
conditions. No discrimination is made in these 
techniques between what is true, (i.e., what
actually happened in the witnessed bank robbery,) 
and what the witness believes to be true, (i.e., 
the stereotypic information in terms of which s/he 
encoded the event in the first place). Indeed, no 
such discrimination is meant to be made. It is.
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however, necessary in the present situation. 
Aditionally, the aims of CM and the Cl make them 
somewhat inappropriate to the present situation. 
The aim of both techniques is to increase the 
amount of correct information generated while not 
increasing the number of errors made. The 
interview technique needed in the present 
situation is in some ways opposed to this. It 
must aim rather to decrease the amount of 
incorrect information generated while not 
affecting the amount of correct information. The 
next two chapters outline such an interview 
technique, and go on to test it in the laboratory.
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CHAPTER 11 - CUT ON THE BIAS: USE OF THE SOURCE-MONITORING TECHNIQUE TO REDUCE STEREOTYPIC DISTORTION IN RECALL
"'I don't usually...wait a minute, though.I've just remembered. I did rob a bank yesterday. I completely forgot.'"David Nobbs: The Return of Reginald Perrin
Introduction
The present thesis has so far considered many aspects 
of the relationship between stereotypic information 
and eyewitness judgment and memory. Areas which have 
received particular attention are the effects of 
stereotypes on judgments (both of actions and their 
basis, in Experiment 1, and of features of a to-be- 
remembered target individual, with respect to both 
face and whole-body information,) and the effect of 
stereotypes on memory, particularly with respect to 
the question of whether or not stereotypic information 
might be employed as a form of last-ditch retrieval 
mnemonic in police interviews of eyewitnesses. It was 
argued in the Discussion section of Experiment 6 that 
stereotypic information appeared unlikely to have any 
pronounced positive effect upon eyewitness memory, of 
the sort that was proposed by Snyder and Uranowitz 
(1978c), and that, therefore, the most pertinent area 
of study for the real-world eyewitness situation was 
the reduction of the biassing effects this might have 
on memory. To this end, the present experiment
continues the study of interviews begun in Experiment 
6, now considering whether or not it might prove 
possible to construct an interview by means of which 
the effect of stereotypic information may be reduced,
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where this is deemed by the investigating authority to 
be appropriate or necessary.
The type of effect under consideration is that 
mentioned by Shepherd, Ellis, McMurran and Davies 
(1978), in the quotation cited in Chapter 5. Where an 
eyewitness' memory of an event is distorted in some 
way by stereotypic information, likely it will only be 
under very rare conditions that the stereotypic 
information and the to-be-remembered information be 
presented through one and the same medium, or from one 
and the same source. Far more likely is that 
stereotypic expectancies or biasses be brought to the 
situation by the eyewitness, or that such biasses be 
introduced after the event, either during rehearsal in 
the eyewitness' own mind or discussion with friends, 
relatives, etc.:
"When a person witnesses an event, mulls it over in his or her mind, and hears other people talk about it, he or she stores information about the event from all three sources. If later asked to recall the event as it was witnessed, such a person must discriminate memories of the event itself from memories of his or her ruminations and from memories of what other people said about the event." (Lindsay and Johnson, 1989b p 111)
Hence, the central issue here is how to access 
during the course of an interview only information 
about what was actually witnessed, and not stereotypic 
information which may have been presented through 
other sources and which may bias memory.
Directly relevant here is the work by Marcia Johnson 
and her colleagues on "source-monitoring". This 
series of papers represents an attempt to define 
people's ability to discriminate between information
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provided by different sources. Her later experiments 
- particularly those conducted in partnership with 
Stephen Lindsay, (e.g., Lindsay and Johnson 1989a, b 
and c, ) - explicity consider the issue of eyewitness 
memory, and particularly the "suggestibility effect" 
studied by Elizabeth Loftus and her colleagues. These 
studies then are of special relevance to the present 
area of enquiry; however a consideration of them will 
be preceeded by a brief look at Johnson's earlier 
studies and the development of the "reality- 
monitoring" model. The application of source- 
monitoring techniques to the interview situation is 
considered in Experiment 7.
Literature Review
Johnson cites an impressive line of descent for her 
studies, which originally evolved out of an interest 
in the discriminability of externally- and internally- 
derived experiences. This family tree includes, among 
others, Hume, Locke, and Freud (Lindsay and Johnson 
1989b); however the earliest relevant studies in the 
psychological literature are probably those by Perky 
(1910). Perky had subjects look at a screen while 
imagining and describing a coloured object. On the 
screen, he raised to slightly above threshold an image 
of the object in question. Most subjects were found 
to report the perceptual stimulus as if it were their 
imaginings, and were somewhat surprised to be told 
that they had seen the stimulus. This experiment 
demonstrated an essential similarity between the
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imagination and perception which was later to prove a 
fundamental point in Marcia Johnson's work.
Segal and Nathan (1964) attempted to replicate 
Perky's results and achieved only a 25% effect: a
change in performance levels which they attributed to 
increased sophistication in subject populations since 
Perky's day. However, when a nominally more
sophisticated apparatus was used for the projection of 
images, results were found to be similar to those 
discovered by Perky.
After these papers, the area received very little 
attention until Johnson took the baton. There follows 
a brief resume of her work in the area.
Johnson, Raye, Wang and Taylor (1979) looked at two 
populations: one of good and one of poor visual
imagers. These subjects were either exposed to 
pictures of common objects, or heard the word 
corresponding to those pictures and asked to imagine 
the picture. They were then asked how many times they 
had actually seen the picture. It was found that, for 
both groups, imaging increased the apparent number of 
exposures to the picture, and that this effect was 
particularly pronounced for good imagers.
Johnson, Raye, Foley and Foley (1981) ran a rather 
more complex study, this time using verbal materials 
only. This study considered the importance of 
cognitive operations to the memorability of an item. 
Two types of item were used: "presented items" and
"generated items". For presented items, subjects were 
shown a category plus an instance of that category
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(eg. Animal - Dog). For generated items, subjects 
were shown a category plus the initial letter of an 
instance of that category (eg. Animal - D). Two types 
of generated item were used, easy ones and difficult 
ones. An example of an easy item would be Animal - D, 
since "dog" is a relatively accessible instance of the 
category "animal"; an example of a difficult item 
would be Animal - P, since "pig" is a slightly less 
accessible instance of the category. Subjects were 
then shown various instances of categories and asked 
which had been presented and which they had generated 
themselves. This task was found to be easier for less 
available instances. It was claimed that the 
generation of a relatively automatic instance like 
"dog" was more like perception than true generation. 
Hence, the experiment shows that the presence of 
cognitive operations associated with a memory trace 
can be used as a guide to the origin of that trace. 
This has obvious implications for studies of 
eyewitness memory, and particularly Elizabeth Loftus' 
work on the misinformation effect (see below).
Foley and Johnson (1982) ran an experiment in which 
the subject and a confederate of the experimenters 
were presented with a list of words. Of these, the 
confederate in both conditions had to say a random 
50%, while subjects had to imagine the other words 
being said. In one condition, subjects imagined 
themselves saying the words, and in the other imagined 
the confederate saying them. When asked to identify 
the source of the words, subjects performed more
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poorly than they did when they imagined themselves 
saying the words. This supports the hypothesis of the 
existence of qualitative differences between perceived 
and non-perceived, imagined events by showing that an 
increase in feature overlap between the two reduces 
their discriminability.
Foley, Johnson and Raye (1983) reported two 
experiments, using child subjects. In one condition, 
children were asked either to say words or to listen 
to a confederate of the experimenter saying words 
("Say-Listen" condition); in the other they were asked 
either to say words or to imagine saying them ("Say- 
Think" condition). They were then given an
identification-of-origin test for the words. As 
predicted, the children made significantly more errors 
in the Say-Think than in the Say-Listen condition. A 
second experiment using child subjects showed that a 
Say-Listen condition was significantly more difficult 
than a Listen-Listen condition: this is what the
reality-monitoring model would predict, since a 
distinction between memories from two different 
classes (internal or external) should be easier than a 
distinction of memories from within one class 
(external).
Johnson, Kahan and Raye (1984) report a complex 
experiment in which reality-monitoring for dreams was 
investigated and compared with that for similar (i.e., 
dream-like) material generated consciously. Pairs of 
partners were used for subjects in this experiment. 
Every night before sleeping each partner was secretly
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assigned to one of three conditions; every morning 
s/he had to report to his or her partner one of the 
following: a dream experienced during the nightj a
dream which they had read the previous evening; or a 
dream which they had invented, using cue-words given 
them by the experimenter. At the end of this period, 
the experimenters put together segments of all of 
these dreams or dreamlike imaginings, and asked 
subjects to report which segments were their own, 
which were their partners', and which were new. The 
reality-monitoring model made the counter-intuitive 
prediction that it would be easy to discriminate one's 
own readings or inventions from one's partner's 
readings or inventions, but difficult to discriminate 
one's own dreams from one's partners dreams: this
prediction on the basis of the level of cognitive 
effort that has gone into the creation of the 
memories. This prediction was supported:
interestingly, since the experimental support of a 
counter-intuitive prediction counts for much in the 
validation of a hypothesis. This lends support to the 
idea of the discriminability of memories from 
different sources.
Johnson and Foley (1984) also studied children's 
memory. They report two experiments. In the first, 
children were either shown pictures of objects or were 
read the names of the objects and asked to imagine the 
corresponding picture. Afterwards, children were 
asked to judge how many times the pictures had 
actually been presented. This was found to vary with
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the number of times the picture had been imagined as 
well as with the number of actual presentations of the 
picture. In the second experiment, discrimination 
between saying, thinking, and hearing words was 
examined. In the "Say-Listen" condition, children 
were asked to say some words and listen to another 
person saying other words. They were then asked 
whether the words were a) said by them, b) said by the 
other person or c) new. The reality-monitoring model 
predicted poorer performance in the Say-Think than in 
the Say-Listen condition, since in the former 
condition there should be relatively little difference 
in the amount of information that is available about 
the cognitive operations involved in the creation of 
the memory. This was indeed found to be the case. 
Their Experiment 4 involved action rather than verbal 
stimuli. The actions involved were simple
communicative gestures, extension of a part of the 
body, looking or orienting towards an object in the 
room, or actions "performed from a standing position 
(e.g., stand up, do a jumping jack, and sit back 
down)” (Johnson and Foley, 1984, p 43). There were 
three memory conditions: Do-Watch, Watch-Watch, and
Do-Think (paralleling Say-Listen, Listen-Listen, and 
Say-Think conditions in the earlier experiments, 
respectively). As expected, subjects' performance was 
more accurate in the Do-Watch than in the Watch-Watch 
condition. There were no consistent results in the 
third condition, since in this condition performance 
was found to vary with age. Once again these
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experiments supported the reality-monitoring 
hypothesis.
Foley and Johnson (1985) continued to investigate 
children's tendency to make confusions in the Do-Think 
condition (see above). They found this to generalize 
from words to simple actions in a Watch-Do condition, 
in a Watch-Watch condition, or a Do-Think condition.
Johnson (1985) uncovered new evidence that "real" 
and "unreal" memories were qualitatively different 
from each other. Subjects attended to both perceived 
and imagined items. Subjects in one condition were 
then administered an identification-of-origin task; 
subjects in the other condition were administered an 
old/new discrimination task. Johnson found origin of 
information to interact with the test administered: 
origin judgments were made more quickly for imagined 
than for perceived items, whereas old/new judgments 
were made more quickly for perceived than imagined 
items.
Suengas and Johnson (1985) decided to try to extend 
these earlier findings into the arena of more complex, 
autobiographical "mini-events" (e.g. meeting a Korean 
student, having coffee and cookies). The next day, 
subjects were asked to rate their memories along 
several dimensions. Qualitative and intuitively 
correct differences were discovered between real and 
imagined memories, e.g., real memories were sharper, 
had more colour, more sounds, etc. For real memories, 
subjects could also better remember how they felt at 
the time, thought the memory was more revealing about
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themselves, and had fewer doubts about its accuracy. 
On other dimensions, real and imagined memories were 
not found to differ (e.g., amount of smell, taste, or 
temperature information). Suengas and Johnson also 
manipulated the number of times events were thought 
about (0, 8, or 16 times). Rehearsal affected some
but not all aspects of the memories. Generally, 
rehearsal had parallel effects on perceived and 
imagined memories. The effect of rehearsal is 
summarised by Johnson (1987), who claims that 
rehearsal is selective and concentrates on the whole 
on visual aspects of an experience. It makes these 
aspects of imagined events less accessible, but makes 
them more like real events in the amount of cognitive 
and affective information they contain. Over all, she 
claims, differences between the two kinds of memory 
will increase with time.
Johnson and Suengas (1989) investigated the 
spontaneous use of reality-monitoring in the social 
world. They asked witnesses of certain events to 
describe those events to a panel of independent 
judges. They varied the content of the descriptions 
given by having witnesses rehearse different aspects 
of the event prior to describing the events. When 
asked to judge the truth or falsity of these accounts, 
judges were found to rely on the presence or otherwise 
of perceptual details (cf. Johnson 1987). Obviously, 
this is consistent with the differences between the 
two types of memory outlined in the previous research.
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Kahan and Johnson (1990) predicted on the basis of 
the reality-monitoring model a difference in subjects' 
performance on discrimination task and an old/new 
differentiation task when similar items were perceived 
or imagined. Performance on the discrimination task 
was expected to be poor, while that on the old/new 
differentiation task was expected to be good. Results 
were wholly consistent with this prediction.
Johnson (1987) pointed out that reality-monitoring 
can plausibly be seen as just one aspect of a 
pervasive feature of memory functioning: i.e., the
ability or inability to ascribe sources to memories. 
This general ability she termed "source-monitoring". 
The discrimination between an internal and an external 
source - the focus of most of the work up until that 
time - was one type of source-monitoring; another was 
the discrimination between two or more external 
sources ("external source-monitoring"). Obviously, 
much of the previous work (e.g., some of the
conditions employed by Foley and Johnson 1985) had 
included conditions which necessitated external
source-monitoring; nevertheless, this was the first 
time that the questions had explicitly been raised. 
It is "source-monitoring" in this more general sense 
that is of particular relevance in the present
instance.
Lindsay and Johnson (1991), following on from this 
piece of work, demonstrated the existence of a 
manipulation that had opposite effects on old/new 
differentiation and source-monitoring ability.
.
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Subjects were presented with nouns for deep or shallow 
processing. Deep processing was found to improve 
performance on the old/new differentiation task, but 
to impair performance on the source-monitoring task, 
in which they were asked to discriminate between 
targets and distractors which had also been deeply 
processed in the experimental situation.
This ability has obvious ramifications for that 
much-investigated area of eyewitness memory research, 
the "suggestibility effect" (see, e.g., Loftus, 1977; 
Loftus and Greene, 1980; Schooler, Gerhard and Loftus, 
1986; McCloskey and Zaragoza, 1985, 1987; Wright,
1992), Much subsequent work on source-monitoring has 
been concerned with investigation of the 
suggestibility effect. Loftus' claim is that
misinformation received after exposure to stimulus 
material actually alters the memory-trace for that 
material. There had been much criticism of this 
"over-writing" hypothesis (see especially Lindsay and 
Johnson, 1989; McCloskey and Zaragoza, 1985; Wright 
1992). Lindsay (1987, cited in Lindsay and Johnson, 
1989a) purportedly showed that the eyewitness 
suggestibility effect could not be wholly ascribed to 
demand characteristics of the task in question, (as 
claimed by, e.g., McCloskey and Zaragoza, 1985,) but 
that genuine memory-source confusions do in fact 
occur. Schooler et al (1986) discuss the
suggestibility effect in terms of the Johnson and Raye 
reality-monitoring model, saying that failures in 
reality-monitoring may play an important role in
339
suggestibility. Lindsay and Johnson (1989b, cited in 
Lindsay and Johnson, 1989c) found that the likelihood 
of making source-monitoring errors increases with the 
degree of similarity between potential sources of 
information, in terms of their perceptual properties, 
modality of presentation, semantic content, or 
cognitive operations. Hence:
"[t ]he procedures used in studies of eyewitness suggestibility create ideal conditions for source-monitoring errors. Both the original information and the postevent information concern the same topic, and both are typically presented close together in time, in the same environment, by the same experimenter, and so forth. These similarities may make it difficult for subjects to later discriminate between memories derived from the postevent information and memories derived from the original depiction of the event." (Lindsay and Johnson, 1989c, p 3 50.)
Suggestibility effects occur, (at least some of the 
time,) when there is a failure in source-monitoring 
and subjects mistakenly identify a piece of 
information as having been presented in the stimulus 
materials when in fact it was presented in the post­
event information, or "summary" of the stimulus 
materials. It is possible therefore that the 
suggestibility effect could be at least greatly 
reduced by the application of source-monitoring 
techniques to the paradigm. Where memory distortions 
are caused by stereotypic information, there is an 
obvious parallel to the misinformation effect. 
Stereotypic information presented after to-be- 
remembered material is analagous in its effects to the 
"misinformation" paradigm in experiments by, e.g., 
Elizabeth Loftus, causing analagous memory distortions
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(see particularly Experiment 3 and Chapter 7). Even 
where stereotypic information is present at encoding, 
however, source-monitoring would still be expected to 
have positive effects: the stereotypic information and 
the to-be-remembered material could have their origins 
in different sources, and should therefore be 
discriminable. Given the similarities between the 
suggestibility effect and the effect of stereotypic 
information on social memory (see above), it may be 
efficacious to apply source-monitoring techniques to 
the type of paradigm presently under consideration.
Source'-monitorina in the eyewitness situation: An
initial experiment along these lines was run at the 
University of St Andrews School of Psychology in the 
academic year 1991/2 as part of an undergraduate 
degree. Sussman (1992) showed subjects a video­
recording of a meeting in a bar between two actors 
playing the parts of old schoolfriends, one of whom 
was dressed smartly and the other untidily. A voice­
over presented with the video-recording stated that 
the smartly-dressed man was a labourer, and the 
untidily-dressed man a lawyer: this being
information counter to previously-established 
stereotypes of these professions. Subjects .were
interviewed as to their memory for different types of 
information (particularly, stereotype-consistent and - 
inconsistent information) presented (either by the 
actors in their conversation, or in the voice-over 
that accompanied the video presentation). In one
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condition, subjects were given source-monitoring 
instructions; the other was a control condition. All 
interviews had three phases; an initial, free-recall 
phase, a "readback” phase during which all subjects 
were read what they had recalled, and source-monitors 
were additionally asked to attribute a source to each 
piece of information, and finally a prompt phase in 
which direct questions were asked of the subjects. It 
was hypothesized that source-monitors would recall 
more facts, make fewer errors, and perform more 
accurately over all; that they would be able 
accurately to locate the source of their memories; and 
that they would not be influenced by an inconsistent 
stereotype. The results of the experiment were 
however inconclusive. Sussman, in his discussion of 
the experiment, suggested that the efficacy of the 
source-monitoring task might be increased by including 
source-monitoring instructions in the free-recall 
phase. There were two reasons for this; 1) the 
procedure should lead to very accurate reports, given 
the accuracy and volume of information generated on 
average in the free-recall phase, and subjects' very 
precise ability to locate the source of information 
reported, and, 2) the fact that, in Sussman's 
experiment, source-monitors showed better recall in 
the prompt phase than did controls, implies either 
that source-monitoring instructions, to be useful in 
improving memory, need time to work, or that, given 
source-monitoring instructions, subjects continue to 
use these throughout the interview despite only being
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specifically told to source-monitor before the 
readback phase. Each of these points gives reason to 
believe that, the earlier in an interview source- 
monitoring instructions are given, the more effective 
the interview may prove to be.
Following this line of reasoning, it was decided to 
run a conceptual replication of Sussman (1992) which 
would study the relative efficacy of the source- 
monitoring task presented with a free-recall 
component, and a control condition. It was
hypothesized that when subjects were presented with 
the source-monitoring task at the same time as the 
free-recall component of the interview, then their 
recall would be more complete and more accurate than 
that of the other two groups, and less susceptible to 
the effect of stereotypic information. It was also 
hypothesized that subjects in the original, 
"standard", source-monitoring condition would produce 
more complete and accurate recall, making fewer 
errors, than subjects in the control condition, but 
less well than subjects in the source-monitoring-plus- 
free-recall condition. Subjects in both source- 
monitoring groups were, in addition, expected to be 
able to monitor the sources of information which they 
receive. Consistent with the previous experiment, 
subjects were expected to show superior memory in the 
free-recall phase than in either of the two other 
phases. Both the amount of information recalled and 
the accuracy of this information were expected to be 
greatest during this phase.
■ '
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Hence, the hypotheses of the present experiment can 
be summarized as follows:
1. In the initial phase, subjects in the source- 
monitoring-plus-free-recall condition should remember 
more information, make fewer errors, and be more 
accurate than subjects in either of the two other 
conditions.
2. In the readback phase, subjects in the source- 
monitoring condition should remember more information, 
make fewer errors, and be more accurate than subjects 
in the control condition.
3. Subjects in the source-monitoring conditions 
should make fewer errors for factual information than 
subjects in the control condition, and should make 
fewer errors regarding the true professions of the 
characters on the video-recording.
4. Subjects should be able correctly to identify the 
sources of their memories.
5. Overall, performance of subjects in the source- 
monitoring-plus-free-recall should be superior to that 
of subjects in the source-monitoring condition (i.e. 
more correct information generated, fewer errors made, 
and greater overall accuracy), and performance of 
subjects in the source-monitoring condition should be 
superior to that of subjects in the control condition.
Experiment 7 
Methodology
Pilot— Study : Twelve undergraduate students (six
male, six female) took part in a preparatory study to
....
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establish the stereotypes to be used in the 
experiment. Each subject was asked how they would 
recognise a member of each of six job categories, 
judging by their characteristics and behaviour, such 
as appearance and conversation. The six job
categories provided were: doctor, lawyer, labourer,
dustman, accountant, and factory worker. Lawyer and 
labourer were the job-categories with the most clear- 
cut stereotypes across the twelve subjects, and hence 
were the categories used in the video-recording.
Subjects: Forty-six students (thirty female, sixteen
male) both undergraduates and postgraduates, aged 18 - 
27, participated in this experiment for a small fee. 
One male performed so poorly relative to other 
subjects (recalling a total of only three items of 
information) that his results were discounted.
Design: The experiment was a between-subjects design
with three interview conditions and fifteen subjects 
per condition. Each interview had three phases: an 
initial, a readback, and a prompt phase - although the 
exact content of each phase varied subtly with 
condition (see below). The three interview conditions 
were: control, source-monitoring, and source-
monitoring-plus-free-recall. These are referred to as 
Conditions C, SM and SMFR respectively. The exact 
contents of‘ each interview type is discussed below.
, / I
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Materials: À video-recording was made in a local
bar, using as principals two amateur actors. They 
were seated at a corner table in a bar, with a staff 
exit door visible behind them. On the table was 
cutlery, drinks, napkins, and an ashtray. Also 
visible, slightly to one side of the principals, was a 
girl (in reality also an amateur actress), seated at 
the adjoining table. The character on the right was 
wearing a suit, had short hair, and gave the 
appearance of being more subdued and responsible, 
whereas the character on the left was wearing a 
sweatshirt and jeans, had long hair held back in a 
pony-tail, and gave the appearance of being more self- 
confident and jovial. Subjects learned that the first 
of these characters was called Paul, and the second 
John. The voice-over then stated that Paul was a 
labourer and John a lawyer. This information was 
inconsistent with the stereotypes of these professions 
established in the pilot study. Throughout, the 
voice-over presented information that was consistent 
or inconsistent with that presented by the actors. 
(The script is reproduced in Appendix 31). The 
complete video-recording was about five minutes long.
Procedure : Subjects took part in the study one at a
time. They were seated at a desk at a comfortable 
distance from a TV set with video-recorder. They were 
told that they would be watching a video-recording of 
a meeting between two men in a pub, and that they were
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to imagine that they were overhearing, rather than 
taking part in, their conversation.
At the end of the video-recording, all subjects were 
administered a three-minute filler task before being 
interviewed in the various conditions. All interviews 
were tape-recorded to facilitate later analysis.
There were three phases to each interview. The 
initial phase was a period of free-recall in which 
subjects were instructed simply to remember and report 
everything they could from the video-recording, 
regardless of its apparent importance. In this phase, 
subjects in Condition SMFR were asked to tell the 
interviewer from which of the possible sources (i.e., 
video or voice-over) they remembered each piece of 
information they gave. All reported details were 
transcribed in this phase and read aloud to the 
subject in the second (readback) phase. In this 
phase, subjects in Conditions C and SMFR were simply 
asked to inform the interviewer when and if any piece 
of information read back to them reminded them of 
another piece of information which they now remembered 
but had not reported. Subjects in Condition SM 
however were asked to tell the interviewer from which 
source (video or voice-over) they remembered each bit 
of information. The final phase was a prompt phase, 
during which subjects in all three conditions were 
prompted on key points from the video-recording that 
they had not mentioned. In the case of factual 
information prompt questions were of the form: "Can
you tell me their ages?". For information pertaining
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to the conversation, questions were more pointed, 
e.g., "Do you remember anything about a football 
match/scout camps?" Factual information could be 
presented either by the actors, by the voice-over, or 
both. Some bits of information were consistent across 
these modalities, and some were inconsistent.
At the end of the prompt phase, subjects were 
debriefed, paid, and allowed to leave.
Scoring Procedure : Three types of information were
provided in the video-recording. These were:
1. Visual information - e.g., descriptions of the 
setting, clothing of the actors, items on the table, 
in the background, etc.
2. Conversational information - e.g., points 
mentioned in the anecdotes told by the two principals.
3. Factual information - facts about the 
lifestyles and life-histories of the principals, e.g. 
their families, their ages, their jobs, etc.
Four sub-categories of factual information were 
used. These were: information appearing only in the 
video (video-only information), information appearing 
only in the voice-over (voice-over-only information), 
or information appearing in both video and voice-over. 
Items in this last category could be consistent 
between the two sources (consistent information) or 
inconsistent between the two sources (inconsistent 
informaton). For example, the voice-over said that 
the character Paul had two sons, whereas in the video
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he said that he had two daughters. This was a piece 
of inconsistent, factual information.
Twenty-one points of visual information were 
available, thirty-six points of conversational 
information, and nineteen points of factual 
information (of which two were video-only; eight were 
voice-over only; six consistent; three inconsistent). 
Due to the nature of a video-recording and the 
importance of visual and conversational information in 
a vide-recording, it was impossible to balance the 
number of bits of information available in each 
category.
Each interview was analysed for the type of 
information remembered in each phase, the type of 
errors made, and percentage accuracy. Only new bits 
of information were considered. Thus if for example a 
subject recalled a certain bit of information x during 
the initial phase, and then again during the readback 
phase, only recall during the initial phase was 
counted. It was decided to use this method of 
analysis, rather than scoring each bit of information 
each time it was recalled, since this approach has 
more ecological validity in the present field. Police 
interviewers are more interested in the new bits of 
information that a witness can provide during an 
interview than in how many times the witness is able 
to recall the same bit of information.
Source-monitoring interviews were also analysed for 
accuracy in locating the source of information. Only 
answers in the factual information category were
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considered here, since only this type of information 
came from different sources. Within the factual 
information category, the consistent video/voice-over 
information was not used, since errors of source- 
monitoring could not be made for this category of 
information. If a subject had only learned a bit of 
information in the voice-over and said this, s/he 
would not be incorrect in their source allocation as 
s/he had no knowledge of the information appearing in 
the video. Inconsistent information was of course 
presented as a different item via each modality. 
Hence it was important to check how good subjects were 
at attributing the correct source to these items of 
information.
Results
Correct Information:
The data for correct information recalled in each 
interview group in each phase are presented in Table
11.1, below, and in histogram form in Figures 11.1 and
11.2.
Analysis of variance was performed on the effects of 
interview group and phase of interview, on the amount 
and type of correct information remembered. No 
significant effect of interview group was discovered; 
F(2,42) = 2.1229 p = 0.1323. There was however a
significant interaction between interview group and 
phase of interview for information remembered; F(4/84) 
= 3.0098 p = 0.0226.
A Neumann-Keuls test on these data established that 
more correct information was remembered during the
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initial phase by subjects in Condition SM than by
those in Condition C or Condition SMFR (Q = 3.6 p <
0.01; Q == 1.2 p < 0 .01, respectively).
Cond. Initial Readback Prompt TotalC M 14.200 1.467 9.933 25.600SD 4.998 1.329 4.675 6.563
SM M 19.933 1.733 6.067 27.733SD 4.086 1.234 2.475 4.337
SMFR M 14.133 1.590 9.667 25.390SD 3.932 1.302 2.463 5.040
TABLE 11.1 - MEAN CORRECT INFORMATION REMEMBERED INEACH INTERVIEW PHASE FOR EACH INTERVIEW TYPE, WITH STANDARD DEVIATIONS
A Neumann-Keuls test also established that there was a 
significant difference in correct information recalled 
between the initial phase of Condition SMFR and that 
of Condition C.
A highly significant effect of phase was also found: 
F(2/84) = 152.5074 p = 0.0000). A Neumann-Keuls test 
showed this to be due to a significant difference in 
the amount of information recalled in the initial and 
readback phases (Q = 11.156 p < 0.01). Figures 11.1 
and 11.2 give a visual indication of the difference in 
recall level during these interview phases. There was 
no significant difference between the amounts of 
information recalled in the initial and prompt phases 
(Q = 6.199 p > 0.05) or the prompt and readback phases
(Q = 4.956 p > 0.05).
Another highly significant effect was the
interaction between phase and information type
recalled: F(10/420) = 21.3993 p = 0.0000 (see Appendix
32) .
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À Neumann-Keuls test on these data showed that more 
conversational information was recalled in the initial 
phase than in the readback phase (Q = 3.467 p < 0.01), 
or the prompt phase (Q = 2.333 p < 0.01), also that, 
in the initial phase, more conversational information 
was recalled than any other type of information. More 
visual information was recalled in the prompt phase 
than the readback phase (Q = 2.444 p < 0.01); also 
more visual information was recalled in this phase 
than any other type of information. More visual 
information was recalled in the initial phase than in 
the readback phase (Q = 2.2 p < 0.01). More voice- 
over-only information was recalled in the initial 
phase than in the readback phase (Q = 1.97 p < 0.01) 
or the prompt phase (Q = 1.578 p < 0.01). More
conversational information was recalled in the prompt 
phase than in the readback phase (Q = 1.133 p < 0.01 - 
see Figure 11.1 for a visual representation of these 
data).
Since there were no significant differences between 
each pair of means for the initial phase, analysis was 
carried out on the data generated in the final two 
phases only. Again, interview group was found to have 
no significant effect on information generated: 
F(2/42) = 0.3457 p = 0.7098. There was however a
significant effect of phase: F(l/42) = 140.2299 p =
0.0000: more information was generated in the prompt 
phase than in the readback phase (the different levels 
of recall in these two phases is shown in Figures 11.1
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and 11.2). There was no significant interaction 
between interview group and phase: F(2/42) = 0.1886 p 
= 0.8288, or between interview group and category of 
information generated: F (10/210) - 0.8893 p = 0.5441. 
There was however a significant main effect of 
information category: F(5/210) = 55.9806 p = 0.0000.
This is unsurprising, since the amount of information 
available to be remembered varied with information 
category. Finally, a highly significant interaction 
was discovered between interview phase and information 
category: F(5/210) = 31.0355 p = 0.0000 (see Appendix
33). A Neumann-Keuls test showed that there was a 
significant difference between the amount of visual 
information generated in the prompt phase and the 
amount of other types of information generated in the 
prompt phase. There was also a significant difference 
between the amount of conversational information 
generated in the prompt phase and the readback phase 
(Q = 1.289 p < 0.01), and a significant difference 
between the amount of conversational information 
generated in the prompt and readback phases (Q = 0.699 
p < 0.01 - see Figure 11.1).
Univariate analyses were then performed for each 
information type across phase and interview group (see 
Appendix 34). A significant effect of interview group 
was found for inconsistent information: F (2/42) =
5.4772 p = 0.0077. A Neumann-Keuls test was however 
unable to localise the source of this difference. 
Otherwise, the only significant effects found were for 
phase of interview. This was supported by the
'__•___ L:__Î___ _______ il__:  L. _•________________________________  • T  . * J.' I/', ..... ^ • V
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initial, major analysis of variance, in which a highly 
significant effect of phase was discovered. Interview 
phase was found to have a significant effect on every 
type of information.
Highly significant effects for information type were 
found both in the initial analysis of variance: 
F(5/210) = 87.0676 p = 0.0000, and in the readback and 
prompt phases analysis of variance: F (5/210) = 55.9806 
p = 0.0000. This was to be expected given the
different amounts of information available across 
categories. Significant interactions between
information type and phase were also found in the 
initial analysis of variance: F(10/420) = 21.3993 p = 
0.0000, and in the readback and prompt phases analysis 
of variance: F(5/210) = 31.0355 p = 0.0000. Once
again this was to be expected, given the differing 
performance levels in the three phases.
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Errors :
Cond. Initial Readback Prompt TotalC M 1.599 0.1333 3.133 4.867SD 0.9612 0.3519 2.987 3.378
SM M 1.999 0.067 1.133 3.199SD 1.512 0 . 282 1.033 3.243
SMFR M 0.933 0.133 1.600 2.667SD 1. 254 0.414 1.056 3.570
TABLE 11 .2 - MEAN ERRORS IN EACH INTERVIEW PHASE FOREACH INTERVIEW TYPE, WITH STANDARD DEVIATIONS
Error data are also presented in Table 11,2, and also 
in histogram form in Figure 11.3 (showing errors made 
for different information types) and Figure 11.4 
(showing different types of error made for factual 
information). An analysis of variance was performed 
on these data. It was found that interview group had 
no significant effect on the number of errors made:
F(2/42) = 1.2467 p = 0.2979. Neither did phase of
interview have a significant effect: F(2/84) == 0.9519 
p = 0.3901. The interaction between phase and j
interview group was similarly non-significant:. F(4/84) I
= 2.3213 p = 0.0634. The effect of information type j
was however highly significant: F(5/210) = 24.5594 p = |
0.0000, although this was unsurprising since the 1
amount of information available differed across i
information categories.
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Also significant was the interaction between between 
interview group and information type: F (10/210) =
3.4233 p = 0.0004 (see Appendix 35). A Neumann-Keuls 
test revealed more visual errors to be made in 
Condition C than in either of the other conditions (Q 
= 1.2 p < 0.01 for Condition SM; Q = 0.8 p < 0.01 for 
Condition SMFR) and also that more visual errors were 
made than any other kind of error in Condition C.
More conversational errors were found to occur in 
Condition SM than in either of the other conditions (Q 
= 0.533 p < 0.05 for Condition C, Q = 0.866 p < 0.01 
for Condition SMFR); also, more conversational errors 
than any other kind of error were made in Condition 
SM. These data are presented visually in Figure 11.3.
A significant interaction was found between 
information type and interview phase: F (10/420) =
2.1998 p = 0.017. A Neumann-Keuls test showed that 
more errors were made in the prompt phase for visual 
information than in either the initial or readback 
phases (Q = 0.6889, p < 0.01 Q = 0.3556 p < 0.01,
respectively). Fewer conversational errors were made 
in the readback phase than in the initial phase (Q = 
0.4889 p < 0.01) or the prompt phase (Q = 0.3556 p < 
0.05). Equally, fewer voice-over-only errors were 
made in the readback phase than in the initial phase 
(Q = 0.3111 p < 0.05) or the prompt phase (Q - 0.3556 
p < 0.01) - see Figure 11.3.
Finally, a significant interaction was found between 
interview group, information type, and phase of
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interview: F(20/420) = 1.8190 p - 0.0170 (see Appendix 
35). A Neumann-Keuls test on these data showed that 
more errors were made for visual information in the 
prompt phase of Condition C than in the prompt phase 
of Condition SM (Q = 0.8667 p < 0.01) or Condition 
SMFR (Q = 0.6 p < 0.05). There were also more errors 
made for this information type in Condition C than for 
any other information type in the prompt phase. More 
errors were made in the initial phase of Condition SM 
for conversational information than for any other type 
of information. More conversational errors were made 
in this phase of this condition than in the initial 
phase of Condition C (Q == 0.8667 p < 0.01) or of
Condition SMFR (Q = 0.8 p < 0.01). No other
significant differences were found.
Since an unexpected difference was found in the 
performance of subjects in the first phase for correct 
information, it was decided to perform an analysis of 
variance on errors made in the final two experimental 
phases only (see Appendix 36). A significant effect 
of interview group was found; F(2/42) = 4.6148 p = 
0.0154. Significantly more errors were made in 
Condition C than in either of the other experimental 
conditions (Q = 2.067 p < 0.01 for Condition SM; Q = 
1.333 p = 0.01 for Condition SMFR). No difference in 
the error rates in the experimental conditions was 
found. Once again, a significant effect was found for 
information type, although this was unsurprising since 
the number of bits of information available varied 
across categories: F(5/210) = 18.5061 p = 0.0000. One
361
other main effect was also significant, and that was 
the effect of interview phase: F(l/42) = 10.2327 p = 
0.0026; more errors were made in the readback phase 
than in the prompt phase.
Two interactions were also significant: these were 
the interaction between interview group and 
information type: F(10/210) = 2.2573 p = 0.0159), and 
that between information type and phase of interview: 
F (5/210) = 2.5681 p = 0.028. Neumann-Keuls tests
were performed to discover the loci of these two 
effects. For the interaction between interview group 
and information type, more visual errors were found to 
be made in Condition C than in Condition SM (Q = 1.2 p
< 0.01) or Condition SMFR (Q = 0.8 p < 0.01). Within 
Condition C, more visual errors are made than any 
other type of error. More conversational errors were 
made in Condition SM than in Condition SMFR (Q = 0.933 
p < 0.01), or Condition C (Q = 0.533 p < 0.05). As 
for the significant interaction between information 
type and phase of interview, it was found that 
significant differences lay between prompt and 
readback phases for visual information (Q = 0.689 p < 
0.01) and also, within the prompt phase, between 
visual information and all the other information- 
types. More voice-over-only errors were made during 
the prompt phase than the readback phase (Q = 0.3556 p
< 0.01); and also errors for conversational 
information (Q = 0.3556 p < 0.01).
Univariate analyses were performed for errors made 
for each information type, across interview groups and
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phases (see Appendix 37). In the case of voice-over 
only information and inconsistent information, only 
the effect of phase was found to be significant, which 
was unsurprising given the differential performance of 
subjects across phases (see above). For video-only 
and consistent information, no significant effects 
were discovered. However, for conversational
information, significant effects were found for 
interview group: F(2/42) = 4.1774 p = 0.02 21; for
phase: F (2/84) = 8,1807 p = 0.0006; and for the
interaction between interview group and phase: F(4/84) 
= 4.3223 p = 0.0031. A Neumann-Keuls test on the
effect of condition showed that significantly more 
errors for conversational information were made by 
subjects in Condition SM than by subjects in Condition 
C (Q = 0.5 33- p < 0.05) or by subjects in Condition 
SMFR (Q = 0.9 33- p < 0.05). More errors were made by 
subjects in Condition C than by subjects in Condition 
SMFR (Q = 0.4 p < 0.05). A Neumann-Keuls test on the 
interaction between interview group and phase showed 
that significantly more errors were made by subjects 
in the initial phase of Condition SM than by subjects 
in any other phase of any other condition. There were 
no other significant effects.
Accuracy:Accuracy was calculated as:
Total amount of correct information Total amount recalled
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The table below gives mean percentage accuracy
for each phase for the three interview groups:
Initial Readback Prompt TotalC 89.879 91.667* 76.020 85.856SM 90.881 96.296** 84.259 90.479SMFR 93.805 92.263*** 85.799 90.622
*N = 9 **N = 13 ***N = 10. In each readback phase,a number of subjects recalled no correct information and made no errors. Since accuracy scores for these subjects could not be computed, their scores were omitted from the analysis.
TABLE 11.3 - MEAN ACCURACY OF RECALL X INTERVIEW GROUP X INTERVIEW PHASE
An analysis of variance was performed on these data. 
Since there were different numbers of subjects in each 
readback phase, phase could not be considered as a 
within-subjects variable. Hence the data was analysed 
as if both interview group and phase were between- 
subjects factors. There was no significant effect of 
interview group: F(2/113) = 1.3949 p = 0.2521, and no 
significant interaction of interview group with phase: 
F(4/113) = 0.6444 p = 0.6320. There was however a
main effect of interview phase: F(2/113) = 6.7977 p =
0.0016 (Appendix 38). A Neumann-Keuls test showed the 
difference to lie between the prompt phase and the two 
other phases. Between the prompt phase and the 
readback phase, Q == 13.962 p < 0.01; between the
prompt phase and the initial phase, Q = 12.507 p <
0.01. Accuracy of recall in the prompt phase was 
hence significantly lower than in either of the other 
two phases.
In this case, it is more appropriate to discount 
those subjects who recalled no information and made no
-- 1 • 1 • ' -■ ■ ■■i- - _ J'' u : .■ V. r.-;.
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errors during the readback phase of the interviews; 
since their contribution during this phase would be of 
no interest to a police officer investigating a crime. 
However, it is possible to hold that these subjects, 
having made no errors during the phase, were in fact 
completely accurate. If their accuracy scores during 
this phase are counted as 100%, then a different table 
of mean values is produced. In Table 11.4 below, the 
mean accuracy values for the readback phase are rather 
higher than those given in Table 11.3.
CSMSM+FR
Initial89.87990.88193.805
Readback95.00096.79094.842
Prompt76.02084.25985.799
Total85.85690.47990.622
TABLE 11.4 - MEAN ACCURACY OF RECALL X INTERVIEW GROUP 
X INTERVIEW PHASE, INCLUDING PREVIOUSLY DISCOUNTED DATA
Monitoring the Source of Information: Source-
monitoring took place during either the readback phase 
(in Condition SM) or the initial phase (in Condition 
SMFR). During their respective source-monitoring 
phases, subjects in Conditions SM and SMFR were asked 
to attribute sources for the items of factual 
information that they remembered. The number of 
correct source allocations made was divided by the 
total amount of correct information given in that 
category by each subject, to give a percentage 
accuracy score. These are shown in Table 11.5;
No. of subjects giving info, in the category Condition SM VO Only 15Consistent 14Inconsistent 8Video Only 8
Condition SMFR VO Only 14Consistent 14Inconsistent 9Video Only 5
Total 30
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Mean accuracy %
91.1180.6787.5062.50
93 .45 100.00 96.30 100.00
88.94
TABLE 11.5 - MEAN ACCURACY SCORES FOR EACH TYRE OF FACTUAL INFORMATION X CONDITION, PLUS NUMBER OF SUBJECTS GIVING INFORMATION IN EACH CATEGORY
Hence, total mean accuracy across conditions and items 
of factual inforoation was 88.94%. A single-sample t- 
test showed this to be significantly above the chance 
score of 33.33%, t(29) = 7.39 p < 0.001.
The Effect of Stereotypes on Recall: Of forty-five
subjects, thirty-five correctly identified the 
profession of one of the characters in the video­
recording as a lawyer, and thirty correctly identified 
the profession of one of the characters as a labourer. 
Of the remainder, eight subjects misremembered another 
white-collar profession in place of "lawyer", and only 
two remembered no detail about that profession. In 
the case of the labourer, two subjects misremembered 
another blue-collar profession, and three 
substitutions of different occupations occurred 
(specifically, one subject remembered one character as 
being a disc-jockey, another "an advisor or something-
366
or-other", and one as being "on the dole"). Ten 
subjects remembered nothing about this character's 
profession.
Of those who identified one of the characters as a 
lawyer, 100% (i.e. thirty-five subjects) thought that 
he was the man in the suit. Similarly, of those who 
identified one of the characters as a labourer, 100% 
(i.e., thirty) thought that he was the casually- 
dressed man.
Discussion
There follows a brief discussion of each of the 
experimental hypotheses in turn:
1. The first hypothesis was confirmed insofar as more 
pieces of correct information were recalled by 
subjects in Condition SMFR than by those in Condition 
C. However it should be borne in mind that, during 
the initial phase, more pieces of correct information 
were recalled by subjects in Condition SM than by 
those in Condition SMFR: i.e., before any manipulation 
had taken place. As far as errors are concerned, no 
effect was found during the initial phase for any 
interview type. This was also the case for accuracy 
of recall during this phase. Hence it must be 
concluded that this hypothesis was not, overall, 
confirmed.
Interestingly, very similar results were reported by 
Sussman (1992), who found that subjects in the source- 
monitoring condition recalled significantly more 
pieces of correct information than subjects in the
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control condition during the initial phase, despite 
the fact that no manipulation had yet taken place; 
also that more errors were made by these subjects in 
this phase, and that mean percentage accuracy appeared 
to be lower (although a Neumann-Keuls test could not 
localise the difference discovered here through 
analysis of variance).
2. Subjects in Condition SM were not found to recall 
more correct information than those in Condition C 
during the readback phase, and, indeed, there was 
found to be a trend towards more correct information 
being recalled in Condition SMFR during this phase 
than in Condition SM. Neither were fewer errors made 
during this phase for subjects in Condition SM, nor 
was accuracy significantly greater in this phase for 
subjects in this condtion.
Similarly, Sussman (1992) found no significant 
difference between the two groups in the readback 
phase for correct information, for errors made, or for 
accuracy of recall.
3. The use of the source-monitoring technique did not 
aid memory for factual information; equal numbers of 
errors were made for factual information in the two 
source-monitoring groups as in the control group; the 
only effects found were for conversational and for 
visual information. Again, this roughly parallels the 
results of Sussman (1992), who found a significant 
effect only for conversational information.
Of the subjects who were able to remember either one 
or both of the professions of the characters in the
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video-recording, 100% made the stereotype-consistent 
error of saying that the man in the suit was the 
lawyer and/or that the casually-dressed man was the 
labourer. Hence, no effect of source-monitoring 
instructions was discovered here. Of these, subjects 
who misremembered the professions specified, only one 
substituted a white-collar job ("an advisor or
something-or-other") for the blue-collar job of
labourer.
4. Analysis of scores for accuracy of monitoring the 
source of information shows that subjects were able to 
perform the source-monitoring task with a significant 
degree of accuracy: 88.941% accuracy in monitoring the 
sources of information being a significantly higher 
score than would be expected by chance. Hence any 
failure by subjects in these conditions to fulfill 
other hypotheses predicted for them cannot be
explained by the cognitive complexity of the task: 
subjects can and do carry out the task when asked.
5. Although the trend was for subjects in the source- 
monitoring conditions to recall more pieces of correct 
information than those in the control condition (4.2 
pieces/subject for the source-monitoring task, 3.93 3 
pieces for the source-monitoring plus free recall 
task) this difference was not found to be significant. 
Between Conditions SM and SMFR, the trend was in the 
opposite direction from that predicted by the 
hypothesis, although the difference in scores was
minimal (in fact, 0.267 of one piece of information). 
As far as number of errors was concerned, the trend
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was in the predicted direction: Condition C subjects 
made a mean 0.8 more errors than Condition SM 
subjects, who in turn made a mean 0.2 more errors than 
Condition SMFR subjects. This trend was not however 
found to be significant. Subjects in Condition SM 
were a mean 7.551% more accurate than control subjects 
- a trend predicted by the experimental hypotheses - 
but also a mean 0.55% more accurate than subjects in 
Condition SMFR, this trend being in the opposite 
direction from that predicted. Neither of these 
differences was however significant.
Hence it must be concluded that the present 
experiment gives little support to the notion that a 
source-monitoring or a source-monitoring plus free- :|
recall interview could be used to improve an 
eyewitness' recall performance for information that 
has been distorted by stereotypic information. A 
small amount of evidence was collected in favour of 
the hypotheses suggested by such a theory; however 
only a few of the predicted effects attained levels of 
significance.
This result does help to round out the emerging 
theory of stereotypes and eyewitness memory. Three 
earlier experiments in the present thesis show the 
effects of stereotypes on memory when testing occurs 
immediately after presentation of to-be-remembered 
material (to wit. Experiments 2 and 3, and Experiment 
4 ) : and these were the only three to show such
effects. The two experiments in which a time-lag was 
involved between stimulus presentation and 'testing ■j'3|
'I
370
showed no effect of stereotypes on memory (to wit, 
Experiment 6, in which delays of six months and one 
year were used, and Experiment 5, in which a delay of 
three weeks was used).
It appears likely that where stereotypes have an 
effect on the memory trace (this in turn appears more 
likely to occur when stereotypic information is 
presented at encoding than when it is presented at 
retrieval - see Experiments 4 and 5, and also Chapter 
6), this effect will decay with time, being most 
robust at the point immediately following presentation 
of the material. Therefore, interviews will more 
likely be efficacious when conducted after a delay 
than when conducted immediately after witnessing an 
event, in terms of minimising potential biassing 
effects of stereotypic information. Given the amount 
of support the source-monitoring interview has gained 
in the literature, and the number of successful 
studies that have been carried out employing the 
technique (e.g., Johnson et al, 1979, 1981; Foley and 
a Johnson, 1982; and, especially, Lindsay and Johnson, 
1989a, and b; also Lindsay and Johnson, 1989c, cited 
in Lindsay and Johnson, 1989a) this promises to be the 
most fruitful next avenue to explore.
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CHAPTER 12 - CITING YOUR SOURCES: USE OF THE SOURCE- MONITORING TECHNIQUE IN A DELAYED-TEST CONDITION
Experiment 8 
Introduction
Experiment 7, above, considered the efficacy of 
source-monitoring and source-monitoring-plus-free- 
recall interviews as means of reducing the impact of 
stereotypic information on memory for a social event.
Although the hypotheses laid down with regard to these I
interviews were not on the whole fulfilled, the 
possibility was mooted that the interviews might more 
likely prove effective when there was a delay between 
presentation of to-be-remembered material and the 
interview. Results of previous experiments imply that 
such a delay may allow the degradation of biassing or 
distorting effect of stereotypes on social memory: it 
is under these conditions that a source-monitoring 
interview may access the original information only.
Should this effect hold, it will imply that any model 
that might be proposed of the effect of stereotypes on 
social memory must take account of the temporal 
dimension.
This experiment has a second aim. Experiment 7 
aimed to generate data to test the efficacy of the 
source-monitoring interview in reducing the impact of 
stereotypic information on memory for social 
information. However, the present experiment can also 
be looked upon as a test of a proposal put forward by 
Wright (1992) in explanation of the results obtained 
in studies of that ongoing area of controversy in
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eyewitness research, the misinformation paradigm. 
Wright argues cogently that;
"...when the different items have different sources that are not contradictory, they may harmoniously coexist, but if the source traces vanish the items will contradict and a blend may need to occur" [sic] (Wright, 1992, p 20)
In a classic Loftus experiment, therefore, in which, 
e.g., a "yield" sign is presented in the slide 
sequence and a "stop" sign used for misinformation in 
a latterly-presented prose account, Wright holds that 
while the memory of the two information sources (slide 
sequence and prose account) is still present in the 
subjects' minds then both pieces of information are 
also present and either can be accessed. After time, 
however, when the memory sources have faded, a blend 
occurs and neither piece of information (i.e., in this 
case, "yield" or "stop" sign) can be accessed 
independently. This claim is backed up by a number of 
experimental observations, e.g., Lindsay (1990) who 
used a two-day lag between stimulus presentation and 
testing and found that the original information could 
not now be accessed. A comparison of this result with 
that obtained by Christiaansen and Ochalek (1983) is 
informative. Both Lindsay, and Christiaansen and 
Ochalek, investigate the efficacy of warnings in 
reducing the misinformation effect (i.e., specifically 
telling subjects that they have been presented with 
misinformation). Christiaansen and Ochalek find that 
a warning presented immediately after presentation of 
misinformation is effective in reducing the 
misinformation effect? after two days however a
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warning appears to be less effective (Lindsay, 1990), 
In the context of police interviewing, Belli et al 
(1982) write; "The temporal dimension stresses the 
importance of interrogating witnesses soon after the 
event".
Wright himself tests his model in a series of 
experiments in which slide sequences are used for 
stimuli, and the model appears to hold up very well.
Although the present experiment does not conform to 
the classic misinformation paradigm, it is 
nevertheless conceptually close enough to allow 
inferences to be drawn from it to the misinformation 
situation, and vice versa (see Chapers 6 and 11, 
above). Subjects' stereotypes of the personal
appearance of lawyers and labourers can be considered 
the original information, and the information given on 
the voice-over as to their actual professions can be 
considered the misinformation. If Wright's hypothesis 
is correct, then after the delay a blend should occur 
between the "original information" and the 
"misinformation". Since the occurrence of a blend 
depends upon loss of information about the sources of 
the two types of information, then source-monitoring 
should, ex hypothesi, have no effect on memory for the 
information.
In summary therefore, if the Wright model holds, 
then in an experiment which conceptually replicates 
Experiment 7, except for the inclusion of a delay 
between the presentation of target material and 
testing, then no group of subjects should differ
374
significantly in its results from any other. However, 
if the Wright model does not hold, and the different 
sources are still discriminable by subjects after a 
delay, then subjects in the source-monitoring-plus- 
free-recall condition (Condition SMFR) are expected to 
perform significantly better (i.e., producing more 
pieces of correct information, making fewer errors, 
and having greater accuracy,) than subjects in the 
source-monitoring condition (Condition SM), who, in 
turn, are expected to perform significantly better 
than subjects in the control condition (Condition C).
Otherwise, the hypotheses of the present experiment 
are:
1. In the initial phase, subjects in Condition SMFR 
should recall more information, make fewer errors, and 
be more accurate, than subjects in either of the two 
other conditions.
2. In the readback phase, subjects in Condition SM 
should remember more information, make fewer errors, 
and be more accurate, than subjects in Condition C.
3. Subjects in Conditions SM and SMFR should make 
fewer errors for factual information than those in 
either of the other two conditions, and make fewer 
stereotype-consistent errors regarding the true 
professions of the characters featured on the video­
recording.
4. Overall, performance in Conditions SM and SMFR 
should be characterised by greater recall of correct 
information, greater accuracy, and fewer errors than 
performance in Condition C; recall performace in 1j
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Condition SMFR should be similarly superior to 
performance in Condition SM.
Methodology
Subjects : Thirty students (sixteen female, fourteen
male), both undergraduates and postgraduates, aged 18 
- 27 years, participated in the study for the chance 
of winning first or second prize in a raffle which was 
limited to the set of experimental subjects.
Materials: These were identical with those used in
the previous study.
Procedure : Subjects participated in this experiment
one at a time. The procedure was identical with that 
for the previous experiment, except that stimulus 
exposure and recall were separated by a period of 
three weeks. All interviews were tape-recorded for 
later analysis, and no subject was de-briefed until 
the end of the second experimental session.
Scoring Procedure: This was identical with that used
in Experiment 7.
Results
Correct Information:
The raw data for correct information generated by 
interview group and interview phase are given in Table
12.1. A breakdown of this data by information type is
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given in Figure 12 . 1 ? and a breakdown of the types of
factual information generated in the four interview
phases is given in Figure 12.2.
Cond. Initial Readback Prompt TotalM 10.600 0.600 3.900 15.100C SD 2.503 1.732 1.792 4.198
M 12.400 1.500 5.200 19.100SM SD 4.584 1.345 2.440 5.306
M 11.200 1.100 5.000 17.300SMFR SD 3.343 1.134 1. 826 4.606
TABLE 12.1 - MEAN CORRECT INFORMATION REMEMBERED INEACH INTERVIEW PHASE FOR EACH INTERVIEW TYPE, WITH STANDARD DEVIATIONS
The same process of analysis was applied to these data 
as to those in Experiment 7. First, analysis of 
variance was performed on the entire data set. There 
was no significant effect of interview group on the 
amount of information remembered: F (2/27) = 1.7709 p = 
0.1894? this was the same result as found in 
Experiment 7. This time however there was no 
significant interaction between interview group and 
interview phase for the amount of information 
remembered: F(4/54) = 0.2106 p = 0.9315, in
contradiction to the results of Experiment 7. Hence, 
no differential effect of the positioning of source- 
monitoring instructions (whether in the initial or 
readback phase) on subjects' performance in that phase 
was found.
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Since no significant differences were found between 
the control and the source-monitoring groups in the 
initial phase, there was no necessity in this 
experiment to perform separate analysis of the results 
obtained in the final two phases only, as in 
Experiment 7.
There was a significant interaction between 
interview group and type of information remembered: 
F(10/135) = 2.5154 p = 0.0083 (see Appendix 39).
However, a Neumann-Keuls test was unable to isolate 
the source of this interaction: no one interview type 
was found to produce significant gains or losses for 
any specific type of information over any other 
interview type (see Figures 12.1 and 12.2).
Again, a highly significant effect of phase was 
found: F(2/54) = 177.5376 p = 0.0000. A Neumann-Keuls 
test showed this to be due to a significant difference 
between the amount of correct information recalled in 
every phase compared with every other phase. More 
correct information was recalled in the initial phase 
than in the readback phase (Q = 10.367 p < 0.01) or 
the prompt phase (Q = 6.7 p < 0,01). More correct 
information was recalled in the prompt phase than in 
the readback phase (Q = 3.667 p < 0.01). Again, this 
is visually presented in Figures 12.1 and 12.2.
Again, a highly significant interaction was 
discovered between phase of interview and type of 
information recalled: F(10/270) = 16.2166 p - 0.0000.
A Neumann-Keuls test showed again that more 
conversational information was recalled in the initial
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phase than in the readback phase (Q = 2.6 p < 0.01) or 
the prompt phase (Q = 1.8 p < 0.01). More
conversational information was recalled in the initial 
phase than was any other type of information: except 
for visual information (Q = 0.366 p > 0.05). More 
visual information was recalled in the initial phase 
than in the readback phase (Q = 2.967 p < 0.01) or the 
prompt phase (Q = 1.434 p < 0.01). More visual
information was recalled in the initial phase than any 
other type of information (except conversational 
information). More consistent information was
recalled in the initial phase than in the readback 
phase (Q = 2.2 p < 0.01) or the prompt phase (Q =
1.434 p < 0.01). More voice-over-only information was 
recalled in the initial phase than in the readback 
phase (Q = 1.766 p < 0.01) or in the prompt phase (Q =
1.433 p < 0.01). More visual information and
conversational information was recalled in the prompt 
phase than in the readback phase (Q = 1.533 p < 0.01;
Q = 1.1 p < 0.01, respectively). The number of bits 
of visual information recalled in the prompt phase did 
not differ significantly from the number of bits of 
conversational information recalled in that phase; 
however, the number of bits of each type of 
information did differ significantly from the number 
of bits of any of the other four types of information 
recalled in that phase.
As in Experiment 7, a highly significant effect of 
information type was discovered: F(5/135) = 59.6439 p 
= 0.0000. This is however unsurprising since the
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amount of information available differed across 
categories.
Univariate analyses were then performed for each 
information type by interview group and phase of 
interview (see Appendix 40). In most cases, only 
phase of interview was found to give a significant 
effect: unsurprisingly, given that little information 
was recalled in the readback phase (see Table 12.1). 
For voice-over-only information, however, significant 
effects were found for both phase and interview group. 
A Neumann-Keuls test showed that subjects in Condition 
SM recalled significantly more correct voice-over-only 
information than subjects in Condition C (Q = 1.6 p < 
0.01) or Condition SMFR (Q = 2.2 p < 0.01).
Errors :
The raw data by interview group and interview phase 
are given in Table 12.2, below. A breakdown of errors 
made by information type is given in Figure 12.3, and 
a breakdown of errors made for each factual 
information type is given in Figure 12.4.
Analysis of variance was performed on the whole data 
set. Interview group was found to have a significant 
effect on the number of errors made: F(2/27) -
9.2840 p = 0.0009 (Appendix 41). A Neumann-Keuls test 
showed that significantly more errors were made in 
Condition C than in the Condition SM (Q = 3.4 p < 
0.01) or Condition SMFR (Q = 4.7 p < 0.01).
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Additionally, more errors were found to have been made
in Condition SM than in Condition SMFR (Q = 1.3 P < !
0.01).
Cond. Initial Readback Prompt TotalM 2.2 0.4 3.1 5.7C SD 2.099 0.577 1.590 1.794
M 0.9 0.1 1.3 2.3SM SD 0.837 0.000 0.675 0.743 4
M 0.6 0.1 0.7 1.4 '■SMFR SD 0.447 0.000 1.140 0.527 i
TABLE 12 .2 - MEAN ERRORS IN EACH INTERVIEW PHASE FOREACH INTERVIEW TYPE, WITH STANDARD DEVIATIONS I
There was no significant interaction between interview 
group and phase of interview, however: F(4/54) =
2.2959 p = 0.0709. Hence, number of errors made in 
each phase was unaffected by the position of the 
source-monitoring task (whether in the initial phase, 
the readback phase, or not present at all).
A significant effect of interview phase was also 
discovered: F(2/54) = 14.5889 p = 0.0000, in
contradiction to Experiment 7. A Neumann-Keuls test 
showed that significantly more errors were made in the 
prompt phase than either the initial (Q ~ 1.5 p <
0.01) or readback phases (Q = 1.033 p < 0.01). There 
was a highly significant effect of information type: 
F(5/135) = 10.6058 p = 0.0000, but this was
unsurprising given the different amounts of 
information available in each information category. 
There was no significant interaction between interview 
group and information type: F(10/135) = 1.4051 p =
0.1844; but there was a significant interaction
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between interview phase and information type: 
F(10/270) = 3.3915 p = 0.0003 (see Figures 12.3 and 
12.4). À Neumann-Keuls test on these data was however 
unable to localise the source of this effect.
There was no significant three-way interaction 
between group, phase, and information type: F(20/270) 
= 1.5285 p = 0.0713.
Univariate analyses were then performed for errors 
made for each information type, across phase and 
interview condition (Appendix 42). Visual information 
was not considered, since no errors were made for this 
information type in any condition. For conversational 
and visual information, only the effect of phase was 
significant (these data are presented visually in 
Figure 12.3). For voice-over-only information however 
there was a significant effect of interview group: 
F(2/27) = 8.2552 p = 0.0016; of interview phase:
F(2/54) = 12.2324 p = 0.0000; and interaction between 
interview group and phase: F(4/54) = 5.1021 p = 0.0015 
(see Figure 12.4). A Neumann-Keuls test showed that 
more errors were made by subjects in Condition C than 
by subjects in Condition SM (Q = 0.9 p < 0.01), or 
Condition SMFR (Q = 1.3 p < 0.01). It also revealed 
that more errors were made for voice-over-only 
information by subjects in Condition SM than subjects 
in Condition SMFR (Q = 0.4 p < 0.05) - see Figure
12.4.
The same pattern of effects held for stereotype- 
consistent information: there was a significant effect 
of interview group: F(2/27) = 7,7294 p = 0.0022; of
1phase: F(2/54) = 6.0330 p = 0.0043; and a significant 
interaction between the two: F(4/54) = 2.7692 p =
0.0363. A Neumann-Keuls test showed that more errors 
were made for consistent information in Condition C 
than in Condition SM (Q = 0.9 p < 0.01) or Condition 
SMFR (Q = 0.8 p < 0.01). For the interaction, it 
revealed that more consistent errors were made in the 
prompt phase by subjects in Condition C than in either 
of the other phases or interview conditions (see 
Figure 12.4). There was no other significant effect. 
Hence, it appears that the effect of interview group 
on number of errors made is attributable at least in 
part to a reduction in the number of errors made for 
voice-over-only information across groups, and a 
reduction in number of errors made for consistent 
information with each source-monitoring interview. 
These significant effects are probably not the entire 
story however: a contributing factor to the
significant effect discovered for interview group in 
the major analysis of variance (above) was also 
probably the general direction of the results for the 
other information types: errors decreasing from
Condition C to Condition SMFR.
Accuracy:
Mean percentage accuracy for each phase for the three 
interview groups is given below. In Table 12.3, data 
for those subjects who produced no correct information 
but made no errors are discounted.
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Initial Readback Prompt TotalC 85.456 46.667* 57.331 60.151SM 93.083 100.000** 77.484 90.189SMFR 95.065 97.143*** 90.773 94.327
*N = 5, **N = 7, ***N = 7.
TABLE 12.3 - MEAN ACCURACY OF RECALL X INTERVIEW GROUP X INTERVIEW PHASE
Analysis of variance was performed on these data, 
with, once again, phase considered as a between- 
subjects variable (see Appendix 43). A significant 
effect of interview group on recall accuracy was 
discovered: F(2/70) = 24.6202 p = 0.0000. A Neumann- 
Keuls test showed that source-monitoring interviews 
elicited more accurate recall than the control 
interview, (Q = 27.566 p < 0,01 for Condition SMFR, Q 
= 22.6508 p < 0.01 for Condition SM,) but that the two 
source-monitoring interviews did not differ 
significantly from each other in terms of accuracy of 
information elicited (Q = 4.9150 p > 0.05). This
contrasts with the results of Experiment 7, in which 
no significant effect of interview group was found.
A significant effect of interview phase was also 
discovered: F(2/70) = 5.6067 p = 0.0055. A Neumann- 
Keuls test showed that there was greater accuracy of 
recall in the initial than the prompt phase: Q =
16.006 p < 0.01. There was no other significant
difference. This result is somewhat similar to that 
found in the previous experiment, in which accuracy of 
recall was found to be significantly lower in the 
prompt phase than in either of the other two phases.
1
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Finally, a significant interaction was discovered 
between interview group and interview phase: F(4/70) = 
4.9995 p = 0.0013. À Neumann-Keuls test showed
accuracy to be lower in the readback phase of 
Condition C than in the readback phase of either 
Condition SM: Q = 53.333 p < 0.01, or Condition SMFR: 
Q = 50.476 p < 0.01. The same pattern held for the 
prompt phases of these interviews: accuracy was lower 
in the prompt phase of Condition C than in the prompt 
phase of Condition SM: Q = 20.153 p < 0.05, or the
Condition SMFR: Q = 33.442 p < 0.01. This result
differs from that found in Experiment 7, in which no 
significant interaction of interview group with phase 
for accuracy of information elicited was discovered.
If those subjects who reported no correct 
information and made no errors during the readback 
phase are counted as having been 100% accurate, then 
the raw data for accuracy is as shown in Table 12.4:
Initial Readback Prompt TotalC 85.456 73.333 57.331 60.151SM 93.083 100.000 77.484 90.189SMFR 95.065 98.001 90.773 94.327
TABLE 12.4 - MEAN ACCURACY OF RECALL X INTERVIEW GROUP 
X INTERVIEW PHASE, INCLUDING DATA FOR SUBJECTS PREVIOUSLY DISCOUNTED
Total mean accuracy across interview groups and items 
of factual information was 92.83 3%. A single-sample 
t-test showed this to be significantly above the 
chance score of 33.333 %: t(19) = 11.200 p < 0.01.
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Monitoring the Source of Information: These data
were calculated in the same way as in Experiment 7.
No. of subjects givinginfo, in the category Mean accuracy %Condition SMVO Only 10 86.667Consistent 10 96.000Inconsistent 4 60.000Video Only 1 100.000
Condition SMFRVO Only 8 100.000Consistent 10 100.000Inconsistent 1 100.000Video Only 4 100.000
Total accuracy 20 92.8 33-
TABLE 12.5 - MEAN ACCURACY SCORES FOR EACH TYPE OFFACTUAL INFORMATION X  INTERVIEW GROUP, PLUS NUMBER OF SUBJECTS GIVING INFORMATION IN EACH CATEGORY
The Effect of Stereotypes on Recall: Of thirty
subjects, seventeen correctly remembered that the 
profession of one of the characters in the 
videorecording was that of lawyer, and twelve 
correctly identified the profession of one of the 
characters as labourer. Of the remainder, eight 
misremembered another white-collar job (e.g., 
"accountant"), or explicitly said that the person had 
a white-collar job, in place of "lawyer", and five 
remembered no details about that profession. In the 
case of the labourer, eight misremembered another 
blue-collar job (e.g., "plumber"), or explicitly 
stated that the person had a blue-collar job. One 
subject stated that this character was involved "in
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the arts". Nine subjects remembered no details about 
that profession.
Of those who identified one of the men as a lawyer, 
seven (of a possible seventeen) mistakenly identified 
him and the man in the suit. The remaining ten 
correctly identified him as the casually-dressed man. 
This is revealing when it is borne in mind that, in 
Experiment 7, 100% of those subject who correctly 
remembered that the profession of one of the men on 
the videorecording was a lawyer thought that the man 
in the suit was the lawyer. Similarly, of those who 
identified one of the men as a labourer, only five 
misidentified him as the casually-dressed man, the 
remainder correctly identifying him as the man in the 
suit. Again, in Experiment 7, 100% of those subjects 
who remembered that one of the characters was a 
labourer mistakenly thought that he was the casually- 
dressed man.
This effect is particularly interesting when broken 
down by interview group. This data is shown in Table 
12.6, overleaf.
In each case, the proportion of correct 
identifications of the professions of the characters 
in the videotape increased from the Condition C to 
Condition SM, and from Condition SM to Condition SMFR. 
There was however no corresponding increase in the 
number of subjects correctly recalling the professions 
of the two characters.
t i_._ * 1" î’ » C ^  Ü j. ’■ . .1 . '“j. 1 j.v>'. , _ j 5,3 1'-%.'^
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ConditionCSMSMFR
Total
ConditionCSMSMFR
Total
No. of Ss correctly remembering lawyer
575
17
No. of Ss correctly remembering labourer
264
12
Percentage identifying casually-dressed man as lawyer
40.000 71.42980.000
64.706
Percentage identifying smartly-dressed man as labourer
50.00066.667 ^100.000
75.000
TABLE 12.6 - NUMBER OF SUBJECTS REMEMBERING ANDPERCENTAGE CORRECTLY IDENTIFYING LAWYER/LABOURER ACROSS INTERVIEW CONDITIONS
Chi-square could not be performed on these data, 
since the expected values in three of the six cells 
fell below 5. Hence Fisher's Exact Probability Test 
was carried out. Since this test can only be 
performed on a 2x2 contingency table, it was necessary 
to combine scores obtained in Conditions SM and SMFR 
and compare the effect of source-monitoring 
instructions per se with that of control conditions. 
As far as identifying the lawyer was concerned, a 
result of p - 0.1384 was achieved. For identification 
of the labourer, p = 0.056. These results indicate 
that subjects who received source-monitoring 
instructions were not significantly better than 
control subjects at identifying the professions of the 
characters in the video-recording, even though the
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trends shown in Table 12.6 lie strongly in that 
direction.
Discussion
With regard to the hypotheses set out in the 
Introduction, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1. The first hypothesis held that, in the initial 
phase, subjects in Condition SMFR should recall more 
information, make fewer errors, and be more accurate, 
than those in either of the other conditions.
This hypothesis does not appear to hold: any gains 
made by subjects in Condition SMFR over those in 
Conditions C and SM cannot therefore be attributed to 
improved performance solely in the initial phase,
i.e., the phase during which source-monitoring 
instructions were presented.
2. The second hypothesis held that, in the readback 
phase, subjects in Condition SM should remember more 
information, make fewer errors, and be more accurate, 
than those in Condition C.
Again, this hypothesis did not hold as regards the 
number of errors made. Nevertheless, greater accuracy 
was shown, as predicted, in the prompt phase, by 
subjects in Condition SM than by subjects in Condition 
C (the prompt phase being the phase during which 
subjects in Condition SM received source-monitoring 
instructions). However, a significant difference was 
also discovered in the prompt phase between subjects 
in Condition SMFR and subjects in Condition C, with no 
significant difference between Conditions SM and SMFR.
393
Given that no significant difference in accuracy was 
discovered between subjects in Conditions C and SMFR 
for the initial phase, (see above,) it should be 
concluded that although source-monitoring instructions 
do appear to be efficacious in improving recall, this 
improvement cannot be ascribed to any single phase of 
the interview.
3. The third hypothesis held that subjects in 
Conditions SM and SMFR should make fewer errors for 
factual information than those in either of the other 
two conditions, and make fewer stereotype-consistent 
errors regarding the true professions of the 
characters in the video-recording.
Although no significant interaction was discovered 
between interview group and information type for 
number of errors made or accuracy of information 
reported, there was a significant interaction between 
interview group and information type for correct 
information reported. This applied only to visual and 
conversational, and not factual (as predicted) 
information. Neither do subjects in source-monitoring 
conditions appear superior to controls in identifying 
the correct professions of the men featured on the 
video-recording.
Source-monitoring interviews appear to have been 
particularly efficacious in reducing the impact of 
stereotypic expectancies regarding the professions of 
the two men in the video-recording. Accuracy of 
memory for this aspect of the to-be-remembered 
information increased with interview type, being
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lowest in the Condition C and highest in Condition 
SMFR, This was probably the most important hypothesis 
of the present experiment. It has been found that, 
when presented after a delay, source-monitoring 
instructions are efficacious in reducing the impact of 
stereotypic expectancies on recall. This effect holds 
in the case of the basic source-monitoring interview, 
in which source-monitoring instructions are given 
during the readback phase, and even more powerfully 
for the source-monitoring-plus-free-recall interview, 
in which source-monitoring instructions are included 
at the beginning of the interview, in the free-recall 
phase.
4. Hypothesis 4 held that, overall, performance in 
Conditions SM and SMFR should be characterised by 
greater recall of correct information, greater 
accuracy, and fewer errors than performace in 
Condition C; and that recall performance in Condition 
SMFR should be similarly superior to that in Condition 
SM.
There was no significant effect of interview group 
on the amount of correct information recalled. The 
number of errors of recall made however decreased from 
Condition C to SMFR. More errors were made by 
subjects in Condition C than subjects in Condition SM, 
and more errors were made by subjects in Condition SM 
than subjects in Condition SMFR. Therefore the 
present experiment provides some evidence that the 
source-monitoring technique (particularly when
combined with free-recall) is a powerful tool for 
reducing the number of errors made in recall of an 
event. Also, the source-monitoring technique was 
found to increase the accuracy of subjects' recall of 
the witnessed event. The inclusion of source- 
monitoring instructions during the free-recall phase 
of the interview did not increase accuracy of recall 
above the level achieved by the basic source- 
monitoring interview however; although there was a 
trend in this direction.
Overall, these results provide support for the use 
of the source-monitoring interview in situations in 
which there is reason to suspect that a witness' 
recollections may be coloured by stereotypic 
information or expectancies. The source-monitoring 
technique should not be expected to increase the 
amount of correct information recalled by a witness - 
it should not be used as a retrieval mnemonic - but 
can be expected to reduce the number of errors made 
and consequently increase the witness' over all 
accuracy. These effects may hold simply through the 
process of forcing the witness to think more deeply 
about the events in question, and hence reducing their 
likelihood of reporting incorrect information, or 
information of which they are less sure. The source- 
monitoring technique also appears to be a powerful 
technique for the reduction of the effects of 
stereotypic information - at least, when presented 
after a delay. This was the area in which the 
beneficial effects of the interview were expected to
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be most strongly apparent. Given not only the 
positive results of the present experiment, but also 
the long history of experimental success with source- 
monitoring tasks presented by Marcia Johnson and her 
colleagues, one need have little hesitation in 
recommending its use in situations in which social 
memory is likely to have been distorted by stereotypic 
information: and not just eyewitness memory
situations.
Four differences are apparent in the pattern of 
results achieved in the present and the previous 
experiment, 1) In Experiment 7, an interaction 
between interview condition and phase of interview was 
found for correct information, but no such effect was 
discovered in the present experiment. This may be 
explicable in terms of a model in which stereotypic 
and other forms of information are stored together in 
memory immediately after exposure to stereotypic 
information, but the effect of stereotypic information 
decays across time. Hence when there is no delay 
between receipt of information and interviewing, a 
special technique such as source-monitoring may be 
required for access to certain pieces of information; 
hence these pieces of information would only be 
recalled in the phases during which source-monitoring 
was carried out. Once a delay has occurred, however, 
this pattern would no longer hold. 2) There was a 
significant effect of interview group on number of 
errors made in the present experiment, but not in
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Experiment 7. In the present experiment, the main 
difference that was discovered between source- 
monitoring and control groups was in terms of the 
number of errors made. Since source-monitoring 
appeared efficacious when presented after a delay, but 
not when no delay occurred, this is the pattern of 
results that would be predicted. 3) Interview group 
had a significant effect on accuracy in the present 
but not in Experiment 7. This effect again was due to 
the reduction in number of errors made when source- 
monitoring instructions were given. 4) There was a 
significant interaction of interview group with phase 
of interview for accuracy in the present experiment 
but not in Experiment 7. This effect highlights the 
locus of the effect discussed under 3), above: the
effect on accuracy of source-monitoring instructions 
seems to have been due to an effect on the number of 
errors made; this effect in turn appears to have been 
more powerful during the phases in which source- 
monitoring instructions were actually given.
A second aim of the present experiment was to test 
Wright's (1992) model of the misinformation effect: 
another important area of eyewitness research. 
Wright's claim is that, in the misinformation 
paradigm, of which the present experiment is a 
variation, while memory of the two original sources is 
still present in the mind, then either piece of 
information can be accessed independently. However, 
with the passage of time, memory for sources will
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fade, and original information will blend with 
misinformation in the memory. Neither piece of 
information can now be accessed independently. Since 
memory for the source of information should have been 
lost, then source-monitoring should be ineffective.
The present experiment does not support this claim. 
Source-monitoring appears to have had very powerful 
effects on memory, reducing the number of errors made 
and increasing the accuracy of recall. Hence, the 
results presented here count against Wright's model. 
They give no cause to believe that, over time, a blend 
occurs between original and subsequently-presented 
misinformation.
A supporter of the Wright model could claim that 
this argument approaches circularity: that the use of 
a source-monitoring task presupposes that the sources 
of information are still discriminable in memory, and 
hence the success of the source-monitoring task in 
such an experiment proves little beyond the fact that 
the two information sources have not yet combined. 
However, such an argument is itself circular: the
holder of such a position would be asserting nothing 
beyond the self-evident statement that "when sources 
of memory have combined in the memory, then those 
sources will have combined". Any experiment that 
indicates Wright's position to be incorrect will in 
fact show nothing beyond the fact that the memory 
sources used in that experiment have not yet combined. 
Such an argument would indeed be circular, and 
generate no experimentally-testable hypotheses.
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Hence, the most optimistic assessment that can be made 
of the Wright model on the basis of the present 
experiment is that it is as yet unproven and certainly 
needs further work; the most pessimistic that it is, 
if not necessarily false, at least unhealthily close 
to circularity.
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CHAPTER 13 - DISCUSSION 
Introduction
The aim of the present thesis was to investigate 
the effects of stereotypic information on a number 
of aspects of the eyewitness situation, including 
judgment of and memory for a witnessed crime, and 
the efficacy of a source-monitoring interview in 
reducing the negative impact of stereotypic 
information. The present chapter reviews the 
major findings for each of the three areas and 
attempts to combine them to form a preliminary 
model of stereotypes and eyewitness memory. 
Implications for this theory are given in papers 
by Srull (1984) and Toglia, Shlechter and 
Chevalier (1992). These implications are also 
considered and incorporated into the model. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the type of 
work which should be conducted in future if the 
model is to be tested and refined further.
Judgment
Chapter 2 included a discussion of the 
conceptualisations proposed in the literature 
about the effect of stereotypic information on 
judgment. The most important papers in this 
respect are those by Bodenhausen (1988) and Macrae 
(in press). Both papers are strongly concerned 
with juridic judgments, which, as Hamilton (1979) 
points out, may be a special case. Few other
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real-world tasks include both "on-line" and 
"memory-based" components (Hastie and Park, 1986). 
Nevertheless, it was possible to draw from the 
literature some predictions for the eyewitness 
situation. Bodenhausen (1988) identifies three 
possible hypotheses to account for the effects of 
stereotypes on judgment, and concludes that the 
biassed interpretation hypothesis gives the best 
account of his findings. According to this 
hypothesis, when a stereotype is presented after 
receipt of target material, no judgmental bias 
should be found. Only one of the three hypotheses 
allows for such an effect; this being the
heuristic hypothesis. As Macrae (in press)
remarks, there are two possible versions of this. 
According to one version, activation of a social 
stereotype provides the perceiver with a range of 
possible information upon which (exclusively)
judgments may depend. According to the other 
hypothesis, pre-computed judgments may be stored 
in memory, and the presentation of stereotypic 
information will simply cause these judgments to 
be retrieved. Macrae also points out that 
Bodenhausen's means of discriminating between the 
biassed interpretation and selective processing 
hypotheses is based upon the shaky assumption of 
positive correlation between recall for and
judgment of target information (Hastie and Park, 
1986) . Hence it can be argued that, although 
Bodenhausen's theory of the primary importance of
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the biassed interpretation hypothesis may well be 
valid for the juridic judgment situation, it may 
not be generalisable to other, more common, real- 
world situations. It was therefore necessary in 
Experiments 1 - 3 to test the effects of
stereotypes presented both at encoding and 
retrieval of target material.
Bodenhausen and Wyer (1985) provide three 
hypotheses to account for the circumstances under 
which stereotypic information will affect 
judgments. The impact of stereotypic information 
is presumed to vary with the amount of other (non- 
stereotypic) information provided in a given case. 
The heuristic hypothesis holds that non- 
stereotypic information will be important in 
making judgments only when stereotypic information 
is unavailable. The work of Locksley and her 
colleagues (Locksley, Borgida, Brekke and Hepburn, 
1980; Locksley, Hepburn and Ortiz, 1982; Locksley, 
Ortiz and Hepburn, 1980), while controversial in 
other respects, (Grant and Holmes, 1981) appears 
to refute this hypothesis. At the opposite 
extreme, the default hypothesis holds that 
stereotypes are used only as a last resort in 
judgment tasks. While Locksley's work appears to 
confirm this hypothesis, closer consideration 
implies that it in fact appears to support the 
integration hypothesis, as proposed by Bodenhausen 
and Lichtenstein (1987). According to this 
hypothesis, subjects consider both stereotypic and
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non-stereotypic information in reaching a 
judgment. The relative weight attached to each 
may be to some extent situation-specific, 
according to the complexity of task demands. It 
was argued that this conclusion could be 
integrated with that proposed by Devine (1989a and 
b) , who argued that even a non-bigot might 
occasionally make a judgment based upon 
stereotypes when task demands are particularly 
high. Unfortunately, such a model, although 
highly intuitively appealing and reconcilable with 
the results reported in the literature, cannot be 
used to generate testable hypotheses? hence the 
results achieved in Experiments 1 - 3, although
quite compatible with the model, cannot really be 
considered direct evidence in its favour.
While Experiments 2 and 3 involved both memory 
and judgment components, the main thrust of this 
section of the thesis was to test a) the impact of 
stereotypic information in paradigms with direct 
implications for the eyewitness memory situation, 
and b) to what degree this impact might vary with 
time of presentation of stereotypic information. 
This manipulation would provide a test of the 
"heuristic hypothesis" proposed by Bodenhausen 
(1988), and also, indirectly, the relevance of 
work of juridic judgments to the present 
situation. Naturally, this work could not be held 
to have any powerful implications for the 
hypotheses proposed by Bodenhausen or Macrae?
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however a powerful effect of stereotypes on 
judgment for a complex situation like the 
eyewitness situation would also be predicted by 
the "model" proposed by Srull and Wyer (1989) for 
the less specialised area of impression-formation. 
A demonstration of such effects would therefore 
tend to support the Srull and Wyer position.
Experiment 1 demonstrated an effect of 
stereotypic information on judgment of an 
ambiguous action. When a protagonist was
perceived to be larger than his victim, an 
ambiguous shove administered by the protagonist 
was judged in more negative terms than when he was 
smaller than or of an equal size to his victim. 
This demonstrated that stereotypic does indeed 
appear to have a powerful effect in a situation 
which is more closely analogous to eyewitnessing 
situation than is the kind of juridic task 
employed in much earlier research. This effect 
was demonstrated even where the absolute 
difference in body-size of the two actors was 
quite small: an actual difference of about three
inches and twenty-five pounds. When such effects 
could be achieved using actors whose body-sizes 
differed so slightly, it was argued that stronger 
effects would occur where body-sizes differed more 
dramatically; as could well be the case in the 
real world.
While Experiments 2 and 3 contained elements of 
both memory and judgment tasks, neither one showed
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a differential effect with stereotype presentation 
time; indeed, in both cases, data from the two 
presentation-time conditions was combined for the 
purpose of analysis. Bodenhausen's (1988) study 
demonstrates that, in the juridic task, a 
stereotype presented after target material is 
unlikely to affect judgments based upon that 
material. The implication of these studies 
however is that, in a more realistic task, in 
which judgments tend to be more on-line than 
memory based, stereotypic information does affect 
judgments.
In experiments even as marginally realistic as 
Experiments 2 and 3 above, the heuristic 
hypothesis does appear to have explanatory power. 
Indeed, neither the biassed interpretation
hypothesis nor the selective processing hypothesis 
is equipped to deal with such results. This 
strengthens the case for claiming that the juridic 
task represents a special situation in the 
stereotypes and judgment literature, and that 
other real-world situations deserve attention in 
their own right.
Of course, it is impossible to discriminate on 
the basis of these three sets of results between 
the two versions of the heuristic hypothesis
proposed by Macrae (in press). It is impossible
to tell whether the presentation of a stereotype 
activated stereotypically-linked information upon
which subsequent judgments were based, or whether
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it activated pre-computed judgments. This is a 
question for future research to address; however 
the suggestion could be tentatively advanced that 
the answer is likely to be situation-specific. 
Each means of producing judgments has an 
associated advantage and disadvantage; each 
involves a trade-off between accuracy and ease of 
judgment. Where more cognitive resources are 
available, one might predict stereotypic 
information to be generated and judgments to be 
made on the basis of that; where fewer resources 
are available, ease will be at a premium and a 
pre-computed judgment is likely to be produced.
In summary of the conclusions gained concerning 
stereotypes and judgment then, it can be said that 
a) the integration hypothesis appears likely to 
give the best indication of when judgments will be 
made on the basis of stereotypic information. The 
relative use of stereotypic and "other" 
information is likely to be very situation- 
specific; where there are greater demands upon 
cognitive resources, then reliance upon 
stereotypic information appears likely to be 
greater b) the heuristic hypothesis is the only 
one of the three outlined by Bodenhausen (1988) 
which can account for all of the results reported 
here. Although Bodenhausen's own results run 
counter to this hypothesis, this is explicable by 
the fact that Bodenhausen employed juridic tasks 
which appear likely to be special cases as far as
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real-world tasks are concerned. The effect of 
stereotypes presented at retrieval also has great 
ramifications for the stereotypes-and-memory 
field, addressed in the next sub-section, below.
Finally it should be mentioned that this area is 
unlikely to develop much beyond its present state 
until more adequate theoretical foundations are 
built. Science progresses through the testing and 
refinement of hypotheses. The hypotheses in this 
area are however extremely limited: applying as
they do for the most part to the juridic 
situation. The only theoretical formulation of 
the effects of stereotypes on judgment outside 
this narrow area of focus is that by Srull and 
Wyer (1989); and this paper addresses only the 
slightly less narrow area of impression-formation. 
Some theoretical formulation of the effects of 
stereotypes on judgment in other situations, and 
using other methodologies - particularly the crime 
situation - is really necessary for the 
advancement of work in this area.
Memory and Interview Techniques
Memory: The present sub-section consists of a
summary of the results of the experiments reported 
in the present thesis which tested the effects of 
stereotypes on memory, and a discussion of the 
inferences which can be drawn from these. In a 
separate sub-section, below, a preliminary model
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of the effects of stereotypes in the eyewitness 
memory situation is presented.
The effect of stereotypic information on memory 
is expected to differ with both time of stereotype 
presentation and type of material (Bodenhausen and 
Lichtenstein, 1987; Srull, 1984; Snyder, 1984; 
Wyer, Bodenhausen and Srull, 1984). The present 
thesis considered the effects of stereotypes 
presented at encoding and at retrieval, and also 
different types of target material. Both
variables must be considered in attempting to give 
a coherent account of the results achieved.
Experiments 2 and 3, above, employed stimuli 
that are of use in person identification. 
Stereotypic information was presented both at 
encoding and at retrieval. In neither case was an 
effect of time of stereotype presentation 
discovered. Of four hypotheses generated in 
Experiment 2, however, only one was fulfilled; 
when subjects were told that a target committed 
the stereotypically aggressive crime of assault, a 
larger body-shape was regenerated than when they 
were told that the target committed a crime that 
was not stereotypically linked with
aggressiveness. Hence it may not be valid to draw 
too many conclusions from this study. Experiment 
3 looked at the regeneration of face stimuli. It 
was found that when subjects were told a target 
person received a 2i degree, subsequent 
regenerations of the target face were later judged
"more attractive" than when subjects were told 
that the target received a 2ii degree. When 
subjects were told that the target committed an 
assault, regenerated faces were judged more 
aggressive and dishonest looking than when 
subjects were told that the target committed a 
theft. A comparison of the results of Experiments 
2 and 3 implies that faces may be more susceptible 
to the action of social stereotypes than are 
bodies. This issue is discussed in more detail 
below.
Later experiments examining the effects of 
stereotypic information presented at retrieval 
failed to find any powerful effects, however. In 
Experiments 4 and 5, biographical target
information was used to test the rival claims of 
Snyder and Uranowitz (1978c) and Bellezza and 
Bower (1981) about the effects of stereotypic 
information presented at retrieval. These studies 
produced mixed evidence, but on the whole it 
appears unlikely that stereotypic information will 
usually act as retrieval schemata for target
material. When recognition testing took place
immediately after receipt of target material, no 
difference was discovered in the number of
stereotype-consistent "hits" generated across 
conditions. When testing took place after a 
delay, indeed (Experiment 5), more stereotype- 
inconsistent than stereotype-consistent
information was generated in the stereotype
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condition. There was no difference between 
conditions in amount of stereotype-inconsistent 
material generated, however. Hence this cannot be 
written off as a "simple" inconsistency effect 
like that discovered by Hastie and Kumar (1979), 
and held by the "Srull-Hastie model" (Hastie, 
1980; Srull, 1981) to be the most basic effect in 
the literature. Only in the recall paradigm of 
Experiment 4 was the hypothesized consistency 
effect actually discovered; reinforcing Srull's 
(1984) contention that recall and recognition 
paradigms may sometimes produce different results.
Recall is generally the more relevant paradigm 
in the present area. While recognition memory may 
be used by the eyewitness in, e.g., identity 
parades, or when looking through collections of 
mug-shots, recall memory will be of far greater 
use in the police interview. This was tested in 
Experiment 6, in which stereotypic information was 
presented at retrieval of a dramatic staged 
incident. The material used in this experiment 
perhaps had more direct relevance to the 
eyewitness situation than body/face or 
biographical information. No effect of
stereotypic information was found here.
Taking these experiments together, the effect of 
stereotypic information presented at retrieval 
does appear to vary with target material used. 
Although there is little reason to hold that they 
act as retrieval schemata - for any type of
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material - Experiments 2 and 3 appear to show that 
stereotypes presented at retrieval can have 
effects very similar to those of stereotypes 
presented at encoding. In Experiment 6 however, 
few significant effects were achieved when 
stereotypic information was presented at the 
retrieval of material from a dramatic staged
incident. It could be argued that the experiments
reported in the present thesis vary in the level 
of analysis which is employed. The relevance of 
this factor can be seen when the meta-analysis of 
the literature, presented in Chapter 6, above, is 
taken into consideration. Most of the studies 
reviewed consider social memory in the sense of 
person- or group- trait or behaviour information. 
While this is applicable to Experiments 4 - 6, it 
is less applicable to Experiments 2 and 3.
It is possible to apply Stangor and Ruble's 
(1989) model to this argument; Conceivably, where 
person- or group- trait or behaviour information 
is used for target materials in an experiment, 
then subjects' expectations will be more powerful 
than where materials such as face or body stimuli
are used. By this reasoning, a consistency effect
of stereotypic information is most likely in 
Experiments 4 - 6 in the present thesis, whereas 
in Experiments 2 and 3 different effects might be 
expected. Time of stereotype presentation in 
these experiments may therefore be of less
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importance than the characteristics of the 
materials considered.
In summary, then, the effects of stereotypic 
information presented at the retrieval of person- 
or group- trait or behaviour information may not 
be very powerful in the genuine eyewitness 
situation. This positive comment may be offset by 
a negative one however; In such a situation, it is 
unlikely that stereotypic information could be 
used as retrieval schemata in the way that Snyder 
and Uranowitz (1978c) suggest. The role of 
stereotypic information presented at retrieval of 
information which lies at a different level of 
analysis - in this case, face and body 
information, which may prove of especial relevance 
to the police - may be more important. While 
there appears once again to be no reason to 
predict a retrieval-schema effect (faces and 
bodies regenerated in the two conditions in these 
experiments did not differ in likeness to the 
target stimuli) neither is there any reason to 
predict lower effects when stereotypes are 
presented at retrieval than when they ' are 
presented at encoding. Hence, biasses in
regeneration may occur when stereotypic 
information is presented at retrieval; e.g., 
during discussions of the incident between the 
witness and his/her friends, or during the police 
interview itself.
414
To extend this line of reasoning, models such as 
the "Srull-Hastie model" and its later 
incarnations may indeed not be wholly applicable 
to real-world situations, since they appear to be 
based to a great extent on experiments which 
employ material quite unlike what is usually 
encountered outside the laboratory (cf. Ruble and 
Stangor, 1986). Hence the "Srull-Hastie model" - 
in both its original and later versions - may 
prove inapplicable to at least the majority of 
real-world situations. It is however conceivable 
that an inconsistency effect might be discovered 
in situations where expectancies are moderately 
low. Such a formulation would however encounter 
problems in predicting under what particular 
conditions expectancies might be high or low. 
There would also be the theoretical problem of 
specifying exactly what kind of social stereotype 
it might be that would generate low expectancies.
Support for the Stangor and Ruble model 
therefore appears quite convincing. The model is 
able to explain not only the divergence of results 
in the social memory literature as a whole, but 
also those specifically discovered in the present 
thesis. From this model one would draw the 
prediction that, in the "average" eyewitnessing 
situation, where the witness enters the situation 
with cognitive expectancies such that s/he encodes 
material in terms of person- or group- trait or 
behaviour stereotypes, then, on subsequent recall.
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a consistency effect is most likely. This will 
probably manifest itself in terms of superior 
recall for stereotype-consistent material; 
however, it is also possible that it will engender 
a degree of response-bias (see Experiment 4, 
above,) causing a larger number of stereotype- 
consistent errors ("false alarms") to be made. 
Depending on the point in the police investigation 
at which the interview takes place, this could be 
more or less important. Where the police are 
trying to generate leads in a difficult criminal 
investigation, the generation of a certain number 
of "false alarms" may not be of great consequence 
(Geiselman, Fisher et ai, 1985); however, where 
harder evidence is required the implications may 
be more negative.
Interview Strategies: It was argued in Chapter 10
that although a great deal of work in ‘ the 
psychological literature has addressed the issue 
of the enhancement of eyewitness memory through 
the use of different interview strategies - 
especially hypnosis and the cognitive interview - 
none of these strategies is wholly appropriate to 
the task of reducing the negative impact of 
stereotypic information on memory. Such an effect 
may be particularly likely where the witnessed 
event is encoded in terms of pre-existing social 
stereotypes ( see the previous sub-section), and 
the stimulus material is of the type that is most
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likely to be encountered during the eyewitnessing 
situation - i.e., person- or group- trait or
behaviour information. One might do well to 
predict distortions in eyewitness memory to form a 
consistency effect. A crime encoded in terms of a 
particular social stereotype appears likely to be 
remembered as having more closely matched the 
contents of that stereotype than in fact it did. 
The technique of source-monitoring developed by 
Marcia Johnson and her colleagues (e.g., Johnson, 
1977; Johnson, Raye and Durso, 1980; Johnson, 
Taylor and Raye, 1977; Johnson, Raye, Foley and 
Foley, 1981; Lindsay and Johnson, 1989,) seemed a 
promising means of discriminating between memories 
whose source lies in the witnessed incident itself 
and those whose source lies in the social 
stereotype in terms of which the incident was 
encoded.
Two experiments were reported in which the 
efficacy of the source-monitoring interview was 
examined. Both involved interviewing subjects 
about a previously-viewed video-recording which 
involved an encounter between two men in a bar, 
and discrimination of the actual professions of 
these two men.
In the first experiment, the source-monitoring 
interview, presented without a delay between 
encoding and retrieval, was not found to increase 
the amount or accuracy of information recalled, 
decrease the number of errors made, or reduce the
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impact of stereotypic information on memory 
relative to a control interview. With the 
addition of the externally valid measure of a 
delay between encoding and retrieval, however, the 
source-monitoring interview proved more effective.
This certainly seems a promising means for the 
reduction of stereotypic biasses in eyewitness 
memory. Future work would do well to continue the 
investigation of the source-monitoring technique, 
employing not only the methodological approach 
used in Chapters 11 and 12, but also a methodology 
which might offer less experimental control, but 
more clear genealisability to the real-world 
eyewitnessing situation, e.g., a video-recording 
of a crime in progress, or a staged incident.
The practical implications of this technique may 
prove limited, however. Since it does not claim 
to be a useful technique when the witness' memory 
has not been distorted by stereotypic information, 
use of the source-monitoring interview will be 
advantageous in only a limited number of real- 
world cases. This, coupled with the obvious
practical difficulties involved with knowing 
exactly when a witness' memory is likely to have 
been subject to stereotypic bias, mean that the 
adoption of the technique on a large scale appears 
unlikely, however successful it may prove in 
reducing the negative impact of stereotypic
information. The police service itself has
traditionally taken a rather negative attitude
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towards interview training; considering experience 
to be the best (and indeed only) teacher (see, 
e.g., Goodsall, 1974). This is remarkable given 
the importance attached by police officers to 
eyewitness evidence (Roy, 1991, p 5; Orne et al, 
1984, p 171; Geiselman et al, 1984), and the 
success with which interview training has met in 
employment and personnel fields (see, e.g., Schuh, 
1981). The outlook may be growing less bleak 
however. With the recent rise in interest among 
psychologists in police practice (see, e.e., 
Irving and Hilgendorf, 1980; Farrington, 1981;
Softley, Brown, Forde, Mair and Moxon, 1980), 
there has been a concomitant rise in certain types 
of police training. Spivey (unpublished)
discusses - and is quite positive about - the 
effectiveness of "social skills training" in the 
police forces of Britain. Adams (1985) discusses 
the rationale, method and procedure that lie 
behind "communication skills" training amongst new 
recruits to the police forces of the East 
Midlands. The success of such measures may 
encourage more widespread implementation of 
interview training throughout Britain.
"...[E]veryone now wants training" asserts E
Shepherd (1991, p 7). While this may be an
exaggeration, the future of police interview 
training certainly appears brighter now than 
previously. The main obstacle, as E Shepherd
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pointed out in an earlier paper, may be resistance 
within the profession itself (E Shepherd, 1985).
The source-monitoring technique has proven 
effective in combatting the misinformation effect 
(Lindsay and Johnson 1989; 1991 a, b, & c). It is 
perhaps to be hoped that it might at some time in 
the future be adopted by law-enforcement bodies 
with a stronger interest in interviewing 
techniques than they have at present, on the 
strength of this fact, and that its use may then 
spill over into cases in which witness' memories 
are believed to have been biassed by stereotypic 
information.
Towards a Model of the Effects of Stereotypes in 
the Eyewitness Situation
Throughout the thesis, and above, a preliminary 
conceptualisation of the effects of stereotypes 
upon social (and specifically eyewitness) memory 
has been developing. This sub-section attempts to 
bring together the arguments that have so far been 
presented and to summarise them in the form of a 
preliminary model of the effects of stereotypes in 
the eyewitness situation.
The question has many facets. Hard-and-fast 
conclusions regarding this complex area will 
almost certainly not be reached for some years, 
when every aspect of the question has received due 
consideration. The present thesis has considered 
effects of stereotypes presented both at encoding
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and at retrieval, with or without delay 
conditions, and for different types of target 
material. From this some preliminary remarks may 
be made regarding stereotypic effects in the 
eyewitnessing situation: particularly given the
results of Experiments 7 and 8. The aim here is 
not so much to try to construct a final model of 
the effects of stereotypic information on 
eyewitness memory, as to give an outline of which 
factors may be important, and when.
The Effect of Time of Stereotype Presentation: 
Stereotypic information can affect memory whether 
presented at encoding or at retrieval (Experiments 
2 - 5, above). However, as argued above, the
effects discovered may vary with the level of 
analysis employed. Stereotypes presented at 
retrieval appear likely to have an effect when 
information is analysed at the level of e.g., face 
or body information, and there is no delay before 
testing takes place. Experiments 2 and 3 showed 
that the effects of stereotypes presented at 
retrieval were not statistically different from 
effects of stereotypes presented at encoding when 
both of these conditions held. Experiment 4 used 
a different level of analysis, employing for 
target materials a biography of a young woman. 
Again, effects of stereotypic information 
presented at retrieval were discovered. While 
these effects appear to have been more pronounced
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when a free-recall paradigm rather than a 
recognition paradigm was employed (cf. Srull, 
1984), neither paradigm produced very powerful 
results. The range of experiments reported in the 
present thesis does not allow many inferences to 
be drawn regarding the effects of testing 
procedure, however. This is an area which future 
research might do well to address. In Experiment 
5, the same materials and level of analysis were 
employed, but when a delay condition was included, 
the results achieved contradicted those of 
Experiment 4. Experiment 6 also employed a delay 
condition. No effects of stereotypic information 
presented at retrieval were discovered in this 
experiment.
Hence, as argued above, in the real world, the 
effect of stereotypes presented after target 
information (whether during discussions with 
friends or during the police interview,) may not 
be very large. The majority of information 
contained in the crime situation is likely to 
be categorisable as person- or group- trait 
or behaviour information; also, some degree 
of delay is likely between witnessing a crime and 
discussing it with friends or a police officer. 
The exact length of time which will prove 
significant cannot be specified here since this 
was not an aim of any of the experiments reported; 
however one could suggest that the exact length of 
time which is important may differ with individual
'V
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cases, but is unlikely to exceed three weeks 
(Experiment 5).
The basic paradigm of Experiments 7 and 8 was to 
present stereotypic information at encoding. 
Every experiment in the present thesis in which 
stereotypes were presented at encoding showed an 
effect. Effects are perhaps likely to be similar 
to those of stereotypes presented at retrieval in 
that they will vary with the level of analysis 
employed, being less pronounced when information 
is analysed at the level of the facial or body 
characteristics of a target, and more pronounced 
when analysed at the level of person- or group- 
trait or behaviour information. Experiments 7 and 
8 demonstrate that effects are also likely to be 
more pronounced when testing is immediate than 
when it is delayed. The efficacy of the source- 
monitoring interview in reducing the impact of 
stereotypes only after a delay implies (as 
suggested in Chapter 11) that the two sources of 
information become discriminable only after a 
period of time has elapsed (pace Wright, 1992). 
The impact of stereotypic information therefore 
appears likely to decay with time.
The Effects of Different Testing Paradigms: The
testing paradigm used appears likely to affect the 
quality of information generated in an eyewitness 
memory experiment. The present thesis, being 
primarily concerned with outlining possible
-3
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effects in a little-explored area of research, did 
not explicitly consider the effects of different 
paradigms; hence the preliminary model given above 
makes little mention of this variable. However it 
is certain that any more comprehensive model which 
may later be developed must take this variable 
into account. The present sub-section gives a 
brief account of conclusions reached in the 
experimental situation by Toglia, Shlechter and 
Chevalier (1992) and in a literature review by 
Srull (1984), to outline the kinds of effects that 
appear most likely to occur.
Research into the effects of different 
modalities on eyewitness memory has been necessary 
for number of years. Yuille and Cutshall (1986) 
criticise much earlier research for attempting to 
generalise from ill-controlled and often 
unrealistic laboratory experiments to real-world 
situations in which memory may be better in all 
respects. Indeed, inter-paradigm differences may 
be more subtle even than this: memory for
different types of material may vary across 
paradigms in different ways (Yuille and Cutshall, 
1984) .
As Toglia et al point out, there are but a few 
studies of modality effects relevant to eyewitness 
research, and these have failed to show a 
consistent pattern of effects. Brown, Heyman, 
Preshill, Rubin and Wuletich (1977) found no 
memory differences between subjects who had
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witnessed a live event and those who had simply 
heard a description of the event. Wagenaar and 
Visser (1979), however, found superior recall for 
spoken-only than for television (sound-plus- 
vision) weather forecasts. Lassen (1988) found 
that indirectly experienced events appeared more 
difficult to remember than directly experienced 
events: a result which appears to contradict that 
of Wagenaar and Visser.
However the most systematic study of these 
effects is certainly that by Toglia et al 
themselves, and their conclusions stand repeating 
in full.
They report two studies, in which a staged event 
was experienced either directly, by the subjects 
themselves, or indirectly, through verbal 
reporting. Immediately following or two weeks 
after experiencing the incident, subjects' 
memories were tested for different types of 
information from the incident. Memory decayed 
less with time in both the free-recall and 
recognition paradigm (cf. Experiment 6, above) for 
those who had directly experienced the event than 
for those who had indirectly experienced the 
event. It was also found that action information 
was better retained than conversational or 
descriptive information, and also that retention 
for different types of information varied with 
exposure type. In both conditions, action details 
were remembered relatively well, but recall levels
425
were higher for the indirectly experienced event 
as conversation and physical description 
information were better retained. These results 
were found in the absence of any systematic 
between-condition difference in terms of the rated 
authenticity and stressfulness of the event, or 
confidence in the responses.
Of particular importance to the present thesis 
was the study of the effects of delay upon memory. 
Although this is a variable with great external 
validity, it has received little attention in the 
eyewitness literature. In the present situation
there was a second important reason to study the 
effects of delay: it was believed that the effects 
of stereotypic information on memory might change 
with time (Wright, 1992). This is, therefore, a 
particularly important variable for any future 
work in this area to consider. The findings of
Toglia et al are of particular importance here in 
that they demonstrate that the effects of delay
are likely to vary not only with stereotype
condition, but also with testing paradigm employed 
and type of information generated. Ideally, 
future research in the present area should take 
account of all of these variables in an attempt to 
develop a model which specifies effects under all 
possible conditions. Failing this, experiments 
should at least be designed with these effects in 
mind, and extrapolations from data thus generated 
should be limited to paradigms under which they
426
might reasonably be expected to hold. Toglia et 
al appear to find relatively little difference 
between recall and recognition testing paradigms. 
Hence, extrapolating from this result, it would 
appear that future research need not worry over­
much about which particular testing paradigm to 
use, but to use whichever is more convenient.
Srull (1984) however considers this question in 
more detail. He points out that the social 
cognition literature includes very few explicit 
comparisons of recall and recognition paradigms, 
but that nevertheless important theoretical 
differences exist between the paradigms, and these 
should be borne in mind when such experiments are 
designed.
The use of the free-recall testing procedure has 
one major drawback as far as research in the 
present area is concerned: it is one of the least 
sensitive measures of memory available. Srull 
holds therefore that it is a poor method for the 
investigation of small but theoretically important 
differences. This is most problematic when long 
delay intervals are used. On these grounds 
therefore, the free-recall measure appears 
inappropriate to the present situation: as argued 
above, only subtle effects of stereotypic 
information on eyewitness memory are to be 
expected; and the use of delay intervals is an 
important aspect of the work. Nevertheless, it 
should be borne in mind that the free-recall
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paradigm is the most appropriate to present 
circumstances (since the majority of information 
that eyewitnesses produce comes during the police 
interview, during which a free-recall measure is 
most likely to be used) and also that Experiments 
4, 6, 7, and 8 above did isolate stereotypic
effects on memory even when free-recall measures 
were used.
The recognition paradigm is, Srull points out, 
more sensitive than the free-recall paradigm to 
the retention of virtually any type of 
information. In most instances, the majority of 
drawbacks that can be associated with use of this 
paradigm can be eliminated by careful construction 
of the test itself (e.g. , making sure there is no 
a priori basis for discriminating between familiar 
and novel items; controlling the similarity of 
distractors and test items, etc.) However the 
main disadvantage of the recognition paradigm in 
the present situation is its lack of ecological 
validity; a drawback which cannot really be 
circumvented.
Bearing these factors in mind, it is difficult 
to suggest which paradigm should be used in future 
research. Each approach has advantages which 
compensate to some extent for the disadvantages of 
the other. Perhaps the best advice is that future 
research should, wherever practicable, use both 
paradigms, in an attempt to check whether effects 
obtained are generalisable from one to the other.
mg
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Where this is impossible, the likely differences 
between the paradigms should be borne in mind, and 
some discussion given of how likely the results 
are to obtainin the opposite paradigm, and, based 
on this, of the real-world applicability of these 
results.
Directions for Future Research
The present sub-section attempts briefly to recap 
the areas which should be addressed in future 
research, and the way in which this should be 
approached.
The most obvious limitation of the research 
presented here is in the area of stereotypic 
effects on social judgments. While the research 
presented demonstrated powerful effects of 
stereotypes on judgments (particularly in 
Experiment 1), only a limited range of 
experimental methods and target stimuli was 
employed. Future work should address the issue of 
the effects of stereotypic information upon 
judgment where the experimental materials used 
have more powerful real-world implications e.g., a 
video-recording of a crime in progress, or a 
staged incident.
It was found here that the effects of 
stereotypes presented at retrieval are unlikely to 
be very powerful except perhaps under very 
specific sets of circumstances. While these 
circumstances could stand further investigation
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and delineation, there would be greater utility in 
the further investigation of areas in which 
stereotypes are likely to have more powerful 
effects. Of particular importance would be the 
construction of a model of the effects of 
stereotypic information presented at encoding, and 
how these effects vary with condition. The 
compatibility of such a model with other models in 
the social cognition literature (and especially 
the "Srull-Hastie" model and the Stangor and Ruble 
model) should also be investigated.
The model presented by Stangor and Ruble (1989) 
appears to give the best account of the results 
achieved in the present thesis, and might, 
therefore, ultimately prove the best model to 
account for the effects of stereotypic information 
on eyewitness memory. This does however require 
future work to include rigourous testing of the 
role of subjects' expectancies on entering the 
eyewitness situation.
Delay interval is another important factor which 
should be considered in future work. The present 
thesis suggests that the impact of stereotypic 
information is likely to decrease with time. 
Future work should consider how long a delay is 
necessary for this to occur, and also whether such 
a model could be made compatible with research 
into the misinformation effect which holds that 
the sources of different items of information in
430
long-term memory will become less rather than more 
discriminable after a delay.
Finally, the source-monitoring interview
(Chapters 10 - 12) seems a particularly promising 
avenue for future research, appearing when 
presented after a delay to be an effective means 
of reducing the impact of stereotypic information. 
The technique also appears to have great 
credibility given the volume of successful
research conducted by Marcia Johnson and her
colleagues over the past fifteen years. However,
the experiments reported in the present thesis (as 
well as a preliminary experiment by Sussman, 1992) 
used a somewhat limited range of stimulus
materials. Future research should consider target 
events with greater external validity, as well as 
more forensically relevant stereotypes, such as 
those employed in Experiments 2 and 3 above. As 
mentioned above, the limited range of usefulness 
of the source-monitoring interview technique may 
mean that it is unlikely to be adopted in a 
widespread fashion no matter how successful it may 
prove.
Future research might also address the question 
of exactly when in the police interview 
stereotypic distortions of memory are most likely 
to arise. Previous research (e.g., Hilgard and 
Loftus, 1979) suggests that during the free-recall 
component of a police interview, a witness' 
recollections are likely to be highly accurate, if
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incomplete. This rule might also apply to 
stereotypic memory distortions: they may be less
likely to occur during the initial, free-recall 
phase of the interview, but more likely to occur 
in response to direct questions on the part of the 
interviewer. If one could isolate the points at 
which such distortions are most likely to occur, 
then source-monitoring instructions might 
successfully be incorporated only at those points 
in an interview. Such an approach might prove to 
be the most efficient application of this 
interview technique.
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APPENDIX 1 - RATINGS OF BEHAVIOUR OF ACTORS IN VIDEO CLIPS, EXPERIMENT 1
TABLE 1 - RATED SENSITIVITY X BODY-SIZE PAIRING X PROTAGONIST/VICTIM
SOURCE
SZABSZ AB SZ SS SZ SS AB
I I- I I I I I
I DFl/ DF2 I F I P  VALUE
IIIII
— I-
3/1/3/2828
282828
I 1.42481 154.23731 I 2.41811 I II I
I MEAN SQUARE I
I 2.2708 II 100.0000 II 4.4583 II 1.5938 ~ II 1.8438 I
0.25640.00000.0873
TABLE 2 - RATED MORALITY X BODY-SIZE PAIRING X PROTAGONIST/VICTIM
DFl/I SOURCE I
I SZ 1 3 /I AB 1 1 /I SZ AB I 3/I SZ SS I 28I SZ SS AB I 28
DF2 I F I P  VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
282828
I 0.51351 110.06741 I 0.08161 I II I
0.67630.00360.9695
0.708336.00000.29171.37953.5759
TABLE 3 - RATED HOSTILITY X BODY-SIZE PAIRING X PROTAGONIST/VICTIM
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II"I SZ I 3/ 28 -I—I 0.14831 0.9299 — I — I 0.2708 —III AB I 1/ 28 I 0.22381 0.6398 I 0.5625 II SZ AB I 3/ 28 I 2.13031 0.1188 I 5.3542 II SZ SS I 28 I I I 1.8259 II SZ SS AB I 28 I I I 2.5134 II- -- 1- -I------- 1- -I- -I
TABLE 4 - RATED COMPETITIVENESS X BODY-SIZE PAIRING X PROTAGONIST/VICTIM
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II-I SZ I 3/ 28 I 0.16521 0.1989 I 0.5573 II AB I 1/ 28 127.98841 0.0000 I 112.8906 II SZ AB I 3/ 28 I 0.38611 0.7638 I 1.5573 II SZ SS I 28 I I I 3.3728 II SZ SS AB I 28 I I I 4.0335 II-
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TABLE 5 “ RATED INDIVIDUALITY X BODY-SIZE PAIRING XPROTAGONIST/VICTIM
I
T _
SOURCE I DFl/
I sz I 3/I AB I 1/I SZ AB I 3/I SZ SS I 28I SZ SS AB I 28I-------------________
DF2 I I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
282828
1.387910.085212.30151II
0.26700.77260.0988
II 4-5573 II 0.3906 II 10.5573 II 3.2835 II 4.5871 I
TABLE 6 - RATED LIBERALITY X BODY-SIZE PAIRING X PROTAGONIST/VICTIM
I
T-
SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I_ T _ F I P VALUE I_ T _ MEAN SQUARE IXI SZ I 3/ 28 XI 0.63411 0.5993 XI 1.8542 —III AB I 1/ 28 I 0.47151 0.4980 I 2.2500 II SZ AB I 3/ 28 I 0.84691 0.4799 I 4.0417 II SZ SS I 28 I I I 2.9241 II SZ SS AB I 28 I I I 4.7723 II-— ———————————-I-_ _ _ _ _ _ ————.-I-——————I— -I- -I
TABLE 7 - RATED FAIRNESS X BODY-SIZE PAIRING X PROTAGONIST/VICTIM
II- SOURCE I-I- DFl/ DF2 I-I- F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I — II SZ I 3/ 28 I 0.77631 0.5171 I 1.7917 II AB I 1/ 28 I 5.70571 0.0239 I 20.2500 II SZ AB I 3/ 28 I 1.16231 0.3416 I 4.1250 II SZ SS I 28 I I I 2.3080 II SZ SS AB I 28 I I I 3.5491 II- -I- -------1- -I- -I
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TABLE 8 - RATED INTELLIGENCE X BODY-SIZE PAIRING xPROTAGONIST/VICTIM
I SOURCE
SZABSZ AB SZ SS SZ SS AB
I DFl/ DF2 I— T — F I P VALUE I— T — MEAN SQUARE IT— X"*I 3/ 28 JLI 0.52641 0.6677 J.I 0.8073 XII 1/ 28 I 0.83841 0.3677 I 2.6406 II 3/ 28 I 1.55281 0.2229 I 4.8906 II 28 I I I 1.5335 II 28 I I I 3.1496 I-I-——————— ———'-I- —————————-I- -I
TABLE 9 - RATED AGGRESSIVENESS x BODY-SIZE PAIRING X PROTAGONIST/VICTIM
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I
— T —  .
MEÀN SQUARE I— TI SZ I 3/ 28 I 0.16991 0.9158 I 0.3542 II AB I 1/ 28 I 0.00001 1.0000 I 0.0000 II SZ AB I 3/ 28 I 1.99381 0.1378 I 8.6250 II SZ SS I 28 I I I 2.0848 II SZ SS AB I 28 I I I-I- 4.3259 I-I
TABLE 10 - RATED LIKEABILITY X: BODY-SIZE PAIRING xPROTAGONIST/VICTIM
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I
— T —  .MEAN SQUARE II SZ I 3/ 0.08061 0 . 9700 I 0.1823 II AB I 1/ 28 I 9.56281 0.0045 I 34.5156 II SZ AB I 3/ 28 I 0.73161 0.5419 I 2.6406 II SZ SS I 28 I I I 2.2612 II SZ SS AB I 28 I I I 3.6094 I————— ------ 1— —————————-I- -I
TABLE 11 - RATED COMPETENCE X BODY-SIZE PAIRING XPROTAGONIST/VICTIM
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II-I sz I 3/ 28 I 2.71171 0.0639 I 3.8073 II AB I 1/ 28 I 1.32471 0.2595 I 2.6406 II SZ AB I 3/ 28 I 2.34901 0.0939 I 4.6823 II SZ SS I 28 I I I 1.4040 II SZ SS AB I 28 I I I 1.9933 II-
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TABLE 12 - RATED PRONENESS TO CRITICISM X BODY-SIZE PAIRING XPROTAGONIST/VICTIM
SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
—  — J — ---------1-I SZ I 3/ 28 I 2.37101 0.0917 I 3.9323 I ^I AB I 1/ 28 I 9.99551 0.0038 I 34.5156 II SZ AB I 3/ 28 I 0.02871 0.9933 I 0.0990 I 1I SZ SS I 28 I I I 1.6585 I 1I SZ SS AB I 28 I I I 3.4531 I Ï————I—————————----1- — —-- 1——————————
SZ - body-size combinations AB - protagonist/victim SS - subjects
APPENDIX 2 - INTENSITY RATINGS X BODY-SIZE OF ACTORS, EXPERIMENT X
TABLE 1 - RATED INTENSITY X PERCEIVED BODY-SIZE PAIRING
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II" ---1- -I--------1- -I- -II SZ I 2/ 37 I 1.26601 0.2939 I 3.7504 II IN I 3/ 111 I 6.64651 0.0004 I 16.0221 II SZ IN I 6/ 111 I 1.11871 0.3561 I 2.6969 II SZ SS I 37 I I I 2.9624 II SZ SS IN I 111 I I I 2.4106 II---- -------- ---- -I----—— I———————————I — -I
TABLE 2 - RATED INTENSITY X ACTUAL BODY-SIZE PAIRING
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I 1:I-I SZ I 3/ 36 I 1.52231 0.2253 I 4.6229 I !I IN I 3/ 108 I 7.40781 0.0001 I 18.1063 I 1I SZ IN I 9/ 108 I 0.36171 0.9507 I 0.8840 II SZ SS I 36 I I I 3.0368 I 'I SZ SS IN I 108 I I I 2.4442 I 1I- -I-------- 1- -I- -I
SZ - body-size combinations IN - rated behaviour intensity SS - subjects
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APPENDIX 3 - ATTRIBUTION DATA X PERCEIVED BODY-SIZE OF ACTORS, EXPERIMENT 1
TABLE 1 - MAIN ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE, PERCEIVED SIZE X ATTRIBUTIONS GIVEN
I SOURCE
SZATSZ AT SZ SS SZ SS AT
I DFl/ DF2 I
I 2/I 3/I 6/I 37/I 111/•I------
I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
37 I 0.09421 1.87361 1.03901 I I
 1-
111111
0.9103 I 0.1382 0.4040
0,39374.87462.70324.1785
•———IIIIII
--- 1
TABLE 2 - ATTRIBUTIONS TO EXTERNAL FORCES, PERCEIVED BODY-SIZE PAIRINGS
SOURCEII------------I SZ I SZ SS
DFl/II-----I 2/ I 37
DF2 I F I
 1--------------------1-
37 I 0.10281I I
P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I 1---------------- 1
0.9026 I 0.4162 II 4.0479 I------1
TABLE 3 - ATTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNAL FORCES, PERCEIVED BODY-SIZE PAIRINGS
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II--------------1------------ 1-------- 1---------- 1----------------1I SZ 1 2 /  37 I 1.4171 0.2553 I 3.3584 II SZ SS I 37 I I I 2.3701 II--------------1------------ 1-------- 1---------- 1----------------1
TABLE 4 - ATTRIBUTIONS TO SITUATIONAL FORCES, PERCEIVED BODY-SIZE PAIRINGS
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II--------------1------------- 1------- 1---------- 1---------------- 1I SZ 1 2 /  37 I 0.42661 0.6559 I 1.7359 II SZ SS I 37 I I I 4.0689 II--------------1------------- 1------- 1---------- 1---------------- 1
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TABLE 5 - ATTRIBUTIONS TO "OTHER” FORCES, PERCEIVED BODY-SIZE PAIRINGS
SOURCE
SZSZ SS
I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
1 2 /  37 I 0.52431 0.5963 I 1.6587 II 37 I I  I 3.1635 I
SZ - perceived body-size pairingsSS - subjectsAT - attributions given
APPENDIX 4 - ATTRIBUTION DATA X ACTUAL BODY-SIZE OF ACTORS, EXPEIRMENT 1
TABLE 1 - ATTRIBUTIONS TO EXTERNAL FORCES, ACTUAL BODY-SIZE PAIRINGS
IT_ SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I■I” F I P VALUE I_  T — MEAN SQUARE I~-TI SV I 1/ 18 I 0.08571 0.7730 I 0.2250 — XII SH I 1/ 18 I 0.14271 0.7101 I 0.6250 II SV SH I 1/ 18 I 0.46231 0.5052 I 2.0250 II SV SS I 18 I I I 2.6250 II SV SS SH I 18 I I I 4.3806 II---- ———————— ——————----- I-——————I— —  J — -I
TABLE 2 ■ PAIRINGS ATTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNAL FORCES, ACTUAL BODY-SIZE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II-I sv I 1/ 18 I 1.40151 0.2519 I 3.0250 II SH I 1/ 18 I 0.23121 0.6364 I 0.6250 II SV SH I 1/ 18 I 1.56321 0.2272 I 4.2250 II SV SS I 18 I I I 2.1583 II SV SS SH I 18 I I I 2.7028 II- -I- -I
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TABLE 3 - ATTRIBUTIONS TO SITUATIONAL FORCES, ACTUAL BODY-SIZE PAIRINGS
I SOURCE I
__ T — DFl/ DF2 I_T- F I__x _ P VALUE I — I — MEAN SQUARE II SV I 1/ 18 I 0.51451 0.4824 I 2.0250 “III SH I 1/ 18 I 0.47061 0.5014 I 2.0250 II SV SH I 1/ 18 I 0.00581 0.9401 I 0.0250 II SV SS I 18 I I I 3.9361 II SV SS SH I-1- 18 I-I- I— I- I-I- 4.3028 I-I
TABLE 4 - ATTRIBUTIONS TO "OTHER" FORCES, ACTUAL BODY-SIZEPAIRINGS
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I SV I 1/ 18 I 5.90241 0.0258 I 15.6250 II SH I 1/ 18 I 0.43531 0.5177 I 1.2250 II SV SH I 1/ 18 I 1.99901 0.1745 I 5.6250 II SV SS I 18 I I I 2.6472 II SV SS SH I 18 I I I 2.8139 II------------ -- 1 - -I- -I- -I
SV - size of victim (large or small)SH - size of protagonist (large or small) SS - subjects
APPENDIX 5 - SCRIPT FOR VIDEO CLIP, EXPERIMENT 1
Dilemma of choice: An electrical engineer must choose between
staying in his present job at a modest but adequate salary, or 
moving to a new job which offers better pay but no long-term security.
A: Reads out dilemma
B; He should definitely take it.
A: Why? His present job offers long-term security.
B: What long-term security? Electrical engineers are dependent upon how much people can afford to pay for electrical engineers. You're like a public servant. You're dependent on the economy as a whole.
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A: But if he'd got a steady job that gives him a decent income why should he risk it? This guy obviously has a place in life where he's comfortable. Our society teaches peoplethat they have to have a lot of money. People are taught money equals succss.
B: Who says he's motivated by that? For a start it says it's only an adequate salary. He's probably having to push himself to get that.
A: It doesn't mean that at all. It says it's adequate. It's clear he should stay where he is. Everyone these days is looking for a get-rich-quick scheme, but look how many have fallen flat on their faces. People shouldn't be looking for big money the whole time.
B: But he's not going to make big money. He's not likely to strike it rich or anything.
A: Money is the only thing this job can offer him that he doesn't have already. If I were him I'd stay where I was.
B: Well if I was an electrical engineer I'd take it. I think you're being condescending just because he's an electrical engineer. You think it's not for electrical engineers to take risks.
A: You're just assuming that's what I think.
B: Do you think anyone should take risks to get more money.
A: Yes.
B: Then you think that the sort of people who should be electrical engineers aren't the sort of people who should take risks.
A: Don't make assumptions about what I think. You're not thinking about all the ramifications of his decision. You don't know if he has a family, or a mortgage to pay off, or whether he's in debt, or what commitments he has. You just think he should take risks regardless and not consider long-term security or the people who could be affected. Do you think my father likes scrimping and saving all the time?
B: Your father?
A: Yes, my father. An electrical engineer.
B: Well I didn't know. Has he ever been offered a better job with no long-term security?
A: Yes he has. Are you're saying he didn't take it because he's an unambitious electrical engineer. You don't know anything about what might motivate someone to turn it down, you're just saying that they're afraid of taking risks.
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B: No, I'm just saying that with an uncertain economy you've got to take what you're offered. A better job with more pay is a better risk than a supposedly more secure job.
A: So, basically, my father is an idiot and can't weigh up the odds.
B: I'm not judging your father. I'm just - 
A: You are you're telling me -
Both start shouting; B administers "ambiguous shove" to A.
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APPENDIX 6 - ORIGINAL TARGET STIMULI - EXPERIMENT 2
TABLE 1 - ORIGINAL TARGET STIMULI, RATINGS OF INTELLIGENCE
SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I TG I TG SS I 5/ 30 I 0.13771I 30 I I 0.9822 I I 0.37782.7444
 1II
■— I
TABLE 2 - ORIGINAL TARGET STIMULI, RATINGS OF ATTRACTIVENESS
I SOURCE
I TG I TG SS
I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I 5/ 30 I 0.55471 0.7336 I 0.7611 II 30 I I I 1.3722 I
TABLE 3 - ORIGINAL TARGET STIMULI, RATINGS OF AGGRESSIVENESS
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I TG I 5/ 30 I 0.10131 0.9911 I 0.1778 II TG SS I 30 I I  I 1.7556 II--------------- 1------------ 1------- 1---------- 1----------------1
TABLE 4 - ORIGINAL TARGET STIMULI, RATINGS OF HONESTY
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II--------------- 1------------ 1------ -I---------- 1----------------1I TG I 5/ 30 I 0.10821 0.9897 I 0.2278 II TG SS I 30 I I I 2.1056 II---------------1------------ 1------- 1---------- 1----------------1
TG - original target faces SS - subjects
APPENDIX 7 - LIKENESS OF REGENERATIONS TO ORIGINAL TARGET STIMULI 1 - EXPERIMENT 2 1
TABLE 1 - EXPERIMENT a
SOURCEII---------I GP I BA I GP BA I GP BA SS I---------
DFl/ DF2 P VALUE MEAN SQUARE
1/1/1/20
202020
0.032314.394210.15161I
 1-
0.85920.05100.7012
0.06008.16670.28171.8585
475
TABLE 2 EXPERIMENT b
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II* -I- — — — — —•I- -I- -II GP I 1/ 20 I 0.01671 0.8983 I 0.0417 II BA I 1/ 20 I 0.04291 0.8381 I 0.1067 II GP BA I 1/ 20 I 0.96711 0.3371 I 2.4067 III- GP BA SS I-I- 20 II- I I-I- 2.4885 I-I
GP - reconstruction condition BA - stereotype presentation time SS “ subjects
APPENDIX 8 - MAIN ANALYSES OF VARIANCE - EXPERIMENT 2
TABLE 1 - EXPERIMENT a
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II- -I- -I— -----1- -I- -II GP I 1/ 20 I 4.68891 0.0426 I 3.3602 II BA I 1/ 20 I 1.54921 0.2276 I 1.1102 II GP BA I 1/ 20 I 2,30281 0.1448 I 1.6502 II TR I 1/ 20 I 0.10651 0.7476 I 0.1302 II GP TR I 1/ 20 118.21311 0.0004 I 22.2769 II BA TR I 1/ 20 I 2.49381 0.1300 I 3.0502 II GP BA TR I 1/ 20 I 1.41051 0.2489 I 1.7252 II GP BA SS I 20 I I I 0.7166 II GP BA SS TR I 20 I I I 1.2231 II-
TABLE 2 - EXPERIMENT b
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II-I GP I 1/ 20 I 2.70451 0.1157 I 3.3602 II BA I 1/ 20 I 0.06051 0.8082 I 0.0752 II GP BA I 1/ 20 I 0.47101 0.5004 I 0.5852 II TR I 1/ 20 112.22611 0.0023 I 11.7019 II GP TR I 1/ 20 I 3.85031 0.0638 I 3.6852 II BA TR I 1/ 20 I 0.20921 0.6523 I 0.2002 II GP BA TR I 1/ 20 I 0.75771 0.3944 I 0.7252 II GP BA SS I 20 I I I 1.2425 II GP BA SS TR I 20 I I I 0.9571 II-
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APPENDIX 9 - EFFECT OF TIME OF STEREOTYPE PRESENTATIONEXPERIMENT 2
TABLE 1 - EXPERIMENT a
I SOURCE
I BA I BA SS
I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I 1/ 46 I 0.05381 0.8175 I 0.0752 II 46 I I I 1.3967 I
TABLE 2 EXPERIMENT b
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I BA I 1/ 46 I 0.06361 0.8673 I 0.0987 II BA SS I 46 I I I 1,5460 I
APPENDIX 10 - SINGLE TRAIT JUDGMENTS ON REGENERATED FACES EXPERIMENT 2b
TABLE 1 - STEREOTYPE CONDITION X RATED ATTRACTIVENESS
I SOURCE
I GP I GP SS
I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I 1/ 22 I 6.11071 0.0216 I 7.0417 II 22 I I I 1.1523 I
TABLE 2 - STEREOTYPE CONDITION X RATED INTELLIGENCE
I SOURCE
I GP I GP SS I------------
I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE
I 1/ 22 I 0.00411 0.9497I 22 I I-I-------------1------- 1---------
I MEAN SQUARE I
I 0.0038 II 0.9194 II--------------- 1
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APPENDIX 11 - BIOGRAPHIES PRESENTED, EXPERIMENTS 2 AND 3
In this experiment we are interested in the way in which people form impressions of other people. Please read the following short biography very carefully. It outlines briefly the life of the man in the accompanying picture. Your task here is to try to form as accurate a picture in your mind as you can about this character. For instance, try to decide what are his likes and dislikes; might he be an optimistic person or a pessimist, etc. You will be given about 3 minutes to complete this task.
The man pictured here, for present purposes simply called X, was born in Leamington Spa in England in 1965. He lived there with his parents until 1967, when the family moved to Stratford. His brother was born in Stratford in 1972, at about the same time that their father lost his job. The family became very poor.Both parents took a number of odd jobs, but the family continued to get deeper into debt. Meanwhile, X was taken out of the public school which he had started, and sent to a comprehensive.Within three years, his father had found another job. The family paid off its debts, and life became easier. X started secondary school; which was where he discovered rock music, which has been a passion with him ever since.In 1981, X's parents bought a house in the Scottish Highlands.X went to live with his grandparents while he studied for 'O' levels. Afterwards, he went to live in the Highlands for 2 years. He found life there very dull, and holidayed in England whenever possible.X attended university in Edinburgh. In his first year there he met the girl whom he was later to marry. He had originally intended to to study Philosophy, but ended up with a 2i [or 2ii] degree in Psychology instead. After graduating, X managed to find himself a fairly well-paid office job in Edinburgh, at which he is still working.
OR
X attended university in Edinburgh. In his first year there he met the girl whom he was later to marry. He had originally intended to study Philosophy, but ended up with a degree in Psychology instead. After graduating, X managed to find himself a fairly well-paid office job in Edinburgh. Life was looking quite bright for X until the early part of the year, when he was arrested and charged with committing a theft [or assault].
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APPENDIX 12 - ORIGINAL TARGET STIMULI - EXPERIMENT 3a AND b
TABLE 1 - TRAIT RATINGS OF 4 ORIGINAL TARGET STIMULI
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
TGTRTG TR TG SS TG SS TRI--
-I—IIIII-I-
3/4/12/1664
16 I 0.302516464 2.32621 0.35301 II
0.8232 I 0.0657 0.9747 IIIII--
0.49002.46000.37331.62001.0575
 1IIIII —I
TG - original target bodiesTR - four character traits, + body-size ratings SS - independent raters
TABLE 2 - ACTUAL BODY-SIZE RECONSTRUCTED X CONDITION, EXPERIMENT a
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II--------------1----------- 1-------- 1---------- 1-----------------1I GP I 1/ 46 I 3.19341 0.0804 I 221.6139 II GP SS I 48 I I I 69.3968 II--------------1----------- 1-------- 1---------- 1-----------------1
TABLE 3 - ACTUAL BODY-SIZE RECONSTRUCTED X CONDITION, EXPERIMENT b
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II--------------1------------ 1------- 1-----------1-----------------1I GP I 1/ 46 I 0.01561 0.9011 I 1.6914 II GP SS I 48 I I I 108.2902 II--------------1------------ 1------- 1-----------1-----------------1
GP - reconstruction condition SS - reconstrcuted images
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APPENDIX 13 - LIKENESS OF REGENERATED BODIES TO ORIGINAL STIMULI - EXPERIMENT 3a AND b
TABLE 1 - LIKENESS TO ORIGINAL STIMULI, REGENERATED BODIES, EXPERIMENT a
I SOURCE
I GP BAGP BA GP BA SS
I DFl/ DF2 I F I
I 1/ 44 I 8.92131I 1/ 44 I 6.14871I 1/ 44 I 1.82941I 44 I I
P VALUE I
0.0046 I 0.0171 I 0.1831 I
MEAN SQUARE I
9.3633 I6.4533 I1.9200 I1.0495 I
— I
TABLE 2 - LIKENESS TO ORIGINAL STIMULI, REGENERATED BODIES, EXPERIMENT b
I SOURCE
I GP BAGP BA GP BA SS
II-IIII■I-
DFl/ DF2 I
1/ 44 I1/ 44 I1/ 44 I44 I
F I
0.39021 1.39231 0.58291 I
P VALUE I
0.5354 I 0.2444 I 0.4492 I I
MEAN SQUARE
0.60752.16750.90751.5567
 1
IIII
GP - reconstruction condition BA - stereotype presentation time SS - independent raters
APPENDIX 14 - INITIAL ANALYSES OF VARIANCE, ALL VARIABLES ~ EXPERIMENT 3a AND b
TABLE 1 - INITIAL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE, EXPERIMENT a. RATINGS OF AGGRESSIVENESS, HONESTY AND BODY-SIZE X STEREOTYPE CONDITION x STEREOTYPE PRESENTATION TIME
I
T-
SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I
.T-
F I P VALUE I
—  T-
MEAN SQUARE I 1
mmmTXI GP XI 1/ 44 XI 2.28131 0.1381 XI 2.5069 II BA I 1/ 44 I 0.00631 0.9370 I 0.0069 II GP BA I 1/ 44 I 0.24291 0.6246 I 0.2669 II TR I 2 / 88 I 2.70521 0.0724 I 2.4803 II GP TR I 2/ 88 I 0.92371 0.4008 I 0.8469 II BA TR I 2/ 88 I 1.01281 0.3674 I 0.9286 II GP BA TR I 2/ 88 I 1.63091 0.2016 I 1.4953 II GP BA SS I 44 I I I 1.0989 I ,I GP BA SS TR I 88 I I I 0.9169 I JI- -I- -I--------1- -I- —  I 1
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TABLE 2 - INITIAL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE, EXPERIMENT b. RATINGS OFINTELLIGENCE AND ATTRACTIVENESS X STEREOTYPE CONDITION XSTEREOTYPE PRESENTATION TIME
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I j;I*I GP —± —I 1/ 44 I 0.31991 0.5746 I 0.5104 —I I 1I BA I 1/ 44 I 0.31991 0.5746 I 0.5104 II GP BA I 1/ 44 I 0.09431 0.7603 I 0.1504 I XI TR I 1/ 44 119.98821 0.0001 I 8.2837 I 1I GP TR I 1/ 44 I 0.04931 0.3629 I 0.5500 I !I BA TR I 1/ 44 I 0.02511 0.8748 I 0.0104 I 1I GP BA SS I 44 I I I 1.5958 I fI GP BA SS TR I 44 I I I 0.4144 I "ïI- —I————————--- ---------- — I— -I 1
GP - stereotype conditionBA - stereotype presentation timeTR - character traits and body-size ratingsSS - independent raters
APPENDIX 15 - EFFECT OF TIME OF STEREOTYPE PRESENTATION ON JUDGMENTS OF REGENERATED BODIES - EXPERIMENT 3
TABLE 1 - EFFECT OF TIME OF STEREOTYPE PRESENTATION, EXPERIMENT a
I SOURCE
I BA I BA SS I----------
I DFl/ DF2 I F I
I 1/ 142 I 0.00001I 142 I I 1--------------1--------1_.
P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
1.0000 I 0.0000 II 1.0044 I 1---------------- 1
TABLE 2 - EFFECT OF TIME OF STEREOTYPE PRESENTATION, EXPERIMENT b
I SOURCE
I BA I BA SS
I DFl/ DF2 1  F I P  VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I 1/ 94 I 0.49171 0.4849 I 0.5104 II 94 I I I 1.0380 I
BA - time of stereotyype presentation SS- independent judges
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APPENDIX 16 - SINGLE TRAIT JUDGMENTS ON REGENERATED BODIES - EXPERIMENT 3a AND b
TABLE 1 - STEREOTYPE CONDITION X RATED AGGRESSIVENESS, EXPERIMENT a
I SOURCE
I GP I GP SS
I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I 1/ 46 I 2.35811 0.1315 I 3.6300 II 46 I I I 1.5393 I
TABLE 2 - STEREOTYPE CONDITION X RATED HONESTY, EXPERIMENT a
I SOURCE
I GP I GP SS
I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE
I 1/ 46 I 0.03541 0.8516I 46 I I
I MEAN SQUARE I
I 0.0208 II 0.5882 I
TABLE 3 - STEREOTYPE CONDITION X RATED BODY-SIZE, EXPERIMENT a
SOURCEII----------I GP I GP SS
DFl/I•I------I 1/ I 46
DF2 I F I 1------- 1-46 I 4.10531I I
P VALUE MEAN SQUARE I 1
4.0833 I0.9946 I0.0486
TABLE 4 - STEREOTYPE CONDITION X RATED INTELLIGENCE, EXPERIMENT b
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I
I GP I 1/ 46 I 0.21081I GP SS I 46 I II---------------- 1----------- 1-------I-
P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
0.6483 I 0.1633 II 0.7749 I 1--------------- 1
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TABLE 5 b STEREOTYPE CONDITION X RATED ATTRACTIVENESS, EXPERIMENT
I SOURCE
I GP I GP SS
I D F 1 / D F 2 I  F P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I 1/ 46 I 1.51961 0.2239 I 1.5052 II 46 I I I 0.9905 I
GP - stereotype condition SS - independent judges
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APPENDIX 17 - GENERATION OF ITEMS USED IN THE FORCED-CHOICE RECOGNITION TASKS
For each of the critical items used in their experiment, Bellezza and Bower generated four alternatives - a "less" and a "more" heterosexual and lesbian alternative. Along with their neutral items, all of the "less" heterosexual and lesbian alternatives were pilotted on 100 undergraduates, who were asked to indicate on a nine-point scale to what degree each statement was consistent with a "lesbian" or a "heterosexual" stereotype. Only if more than half of the subjects indicated that the alternative was consistent with a stereotype was that alternative retained. Listed below are all the alternatives pilotted on the subjects, along with the number of subjects who found that alternative consistent with which stereotype.
lesbian heterosexual1 Betty's fatherb) was kind to herc) was mean to her
2 As a child Betty liked movies thatb) were comediesc) were adventures
028 200
122
3 In her early teens Bettyb) went to some parties where there were 1 boys and girlsc) went to parties with her girlfriends 24
4 Physically, Betty wasb) not unattractive 0c) not particularly attractive 28
5 In high school Bettyb) went out with boys occasionally 0c) went out with a boy once 8
6 In high school Bettyb) had a crush on Mr Griffin 1c) felt very close to Ms Griffin 60
7 In college Bettyb) lived in a coed dorm 1c) lived in a girls' dorm 32
8 In college Bettyb) was able to get along with her roommate 8c) got along great with her roommate 12
200
7264
721
501
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9 In college Bettyb) became friends with some women students who lived in her dorm 4c) became close friends with some women students who lived in her dorm 4
13
8
10 In college Betty was able to reveal her most intimate secretsb) to some of her close female friends 3c) only to her female friends 4
11 Early in college Betty went out places in a groupb) with her female friends 0c) only with her female friends 58
12 After Betty started working at the animal clinicb) Dr and Mrs Sawyer became second parents to her 0c) Mrs Sawyer became a second parent to 16her
114
360
168
13 While working at the animal clinic Betty would tellb) Dr and Mrs Sawyer about her problems and anxieties 5c) Mrs Sawyer about her problems and 14anxieties
14 While working at the animal clinic Bettyb) came to like John very much 0c) asked John's advice on a number of 0things
15 While working at the animal clinic Bettyb) got along with Sue 12c) liked Sue 14
16 While a member of a theatre group Bettyb) admired Anne 3 7c) admired Anne tremendously 31
17 In college Bettyb) liked to dress up oftenc) liked to dress up occasionally
18 In college Bettyb) wore make up occasionallyc) rarely wore make up
1014
19 While a member of a theatre group Bettyb) thought that Robert was attractive 0c) thought that Robert was interesting 5
204
8632
290
280
9643
'1
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20 While a member of a theatre group Bettyb) hoped her relationship with Robertwould continue 0 86c) thought that her relationship withRobert wouldn't continue 0 56
21 In college Bettyb) dated guys often 0 88c) dated guys more often than in high 0 100 school
22 On her dates in college Bettyb) had some really good times 0 66c) had a good time occasionally 16 32
23 For awhile at college Bettyb) went steady with David 0 100c) went out often with David 0 92
24 While at college Bettyb) was seriously involved with David 0 100c) felt that David was a good friend 0 34
25 While at college Bettyb) reluctantly cut off her relationshipwith David 4 72c) decided to stop seeing David 8 23
26 In college Betty felt thatb) she could communicate with bothmen and women 4 13c) she could communicate better withwomen 37 4
27 The name of Betty's high school guidance counselor was:a) Ms Pennington 12 4b) Mr Griffin 0 5
28 At college Betty would often go with her close friends toa) art museums 0 8b) bars 0 3
29 During college Betty wasa) seemingly interested in medicine 0 0b) not interested in medicine 0 0
30 Her guidance counselor advised Betty toa) wait as long as possible beforedeciding on a major 9 0b) become a doctor 0 0
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31 Betty and her .family moved to the midwest when Betty wasa) 8 years old 0 3b) 12 years old 0 0
32 Betty's roommate at college wasa) Joan 0 4b) Jane 0 0
33 Betty's major in college wasa) biochemistry 10 0b) microbiology 8 0
34 Socially Bettya) would reveal personal informationonly to her close friends 3 0b) open and freely revealed personal 3 0information to many people
35 Betty went to elementary school ata) Redwood school 0 1b) Claremont school 0 1
36 Betty's best friend in high school wasa) Patty 4 8b) Peggy 3 8
37 The name of the university that Betty attended wasa) Mullin University 0 0b) Midwestern University 0 3
38 The name of Betty's high school wasa) Lincoln High School 4 0b) Midvale High School 9 0
39 Betty lived in the town ofa) Midvale 0 0b) Midfield 0 0
While all of the neutral items above were judged to be neutral by the subjects, very few critical items were judged to be consistent with the sexual stereotype in question. Therefore, for those items not judged to be consistent with the sexual stereotype, Bellezza and Bower's "more" heterosexual and lesbian alternatives were presented to the subjects. The results are detailed below.
t " lesbian heterosexual1 Betty's fathera) was kind to her and her mother 10 53d) was mean to her and her mother 60 4
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2 As a child Betty liked movies thata) were love stories 1 55d) had women as heroes 70 4
3 In her early teens Bettya) went to many parties where there were boys and girls 6 12d) went to parties only with her girl friends 36 7
4 Physically, Betty wasa) attractive 7 78d) rather unattractive 57 1
5 In high school Bettyd) avoided going out with boys 88 0
7 In college Bettyd) wanted to live in a girls' dorm 68 5
8 In college Bettya) considered having a male roommate 6 64b) became very attached to her roommate 51 16
9 In college Bettya) became friends with male students who lived nearby 8 71d) became intimately involved with some women who lived in her dorm 89 0
10 In college Betty was able to reveal her most intimate secretsa) to some of her close male and female friends 12 51d) only to female friends she was very close to 62 8
11 Early in college Betty went out places in a groupa) with her male and female friends 7 12[NB a new alternative had to be invented to replace thisthe new alternative read "only with her male friends"]
12 After Betty started working at the animal clinica) Dr Sawyer became a second parent to her 2 66d) only Mrs Sawyer became a second parent to her 73 8
!
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13 While working at the animal clinic Betty would tella) Dr Sawyer about her problems and anxieties 10 61d) only Mrs Sawyer about her problems and anxieties 51 3
14 While working at the animal clinic Bettyd) respected John's knowledge 5 7
15 While working at the animal clinic Bettya) liked John more than Sue 0 54d) liked Sue very much 51 17
16 While a member of a theatre group Bettya) thought that Anne was self-centred 7 8d) was physically attracted to Anne 90 0
17 In college Bettya) was a smart dresser 17 19d) never liked to dress up 19 6
18 In college Bettya) often wore make up 3 21d) didn't like to wear make up 3 3 17
19 While a member of a theatre group Bettyd) thought that Robert was uninteresting 13 12
20 While a member of a theatre group Bettyd) was relieved that her relationshipwith Robert ended. 6 7
21 In college Bettyd) never dated guys 76 1
22 On her datesin college Bettyd) never had a good time 53 1
23 For awhile at college Bettya) wanted to go out only with David 0 44d) went out occasionally with David 2 40
24 While at college Bettyd) couldn't communicate with David 23 12
25 While at college Bettyd) got tired of David 17 5
26 In college Betty felt thata) she could communicate only with men 5 53b) she could communicate only with women 67 0
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14 of the 17 critical iterms were thus found usable - ie. 14 of them had a pair of alternatives, one of which was judged consistent with a lesbian stereotype and one with a heterosexual stereotype. These were the items used in the forced-choice recognition tasks.The standard test procedure tested alternatives rated as 
lesbian against alternatives rated as heterosexual in every case. The modified test procedure tested the correct alternative in every case against an alternative that had been rated neutral.The resultant test forms are detailed below:
STANDARD TEST
1 Betty's fathera) was kind to her and her motherb) was mean to her and her mother
2 Betty and her family moved to the Midwest when Betty wasa) 8 years oldb) 12 years old
3 Betty lived in the town ofa) Midvaleb) Midfield
4 As a child, Bettya) liked movies that were love storiesb) liked movies that had women as heroes
5 Betty went to elementary school ata) Redwood schoolb) Claremont school
6 Betty's best friend in high school wasa) Pattyb ) Peggy
7 Physically, Betty wasa) not particularly attractiveb) not unattractive
8 In high school Bettya) went out with boys occasionallyb) avoided going out with boys
9 In high school Bettya) had a crush on Mr Griffinb) felt very close to Ms Griffin
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10 The name of Betty's high school wasa) Lincoln High Schoolb) Midvale High School
11 The name of Betty's high school guidance counselor wasa) Mr Griffinb) Ms Pennington
12 Her guidance counselor advised Betty toa) wait as long as possible before deciding on a majorb) become a doctor
13 The name of the university that Betty attended wasa) Midwestern Universityb) Mullin University
14 In college Bettya) wanted to live in a coed dormb) wanted to live in a girls' dorm
15 In college Bettya) considered having a male roommateb) became very attached to her roommate
16 Betty's roommate at college wasa) Janeb) Joan
17 In college Bettya) became friends with some male students who lived nearbyb) became intimately involved with some women who livednearby
18 While in college, Betty went out in a groupa) only with her male friendsb) only with her female friends
19 At college Betty would often go with her close friends toa) art museumsb) bars
20 After Betty started working at the animal clinica) only Dr Sawyer became a second parent to herb) only Mrs Sawyer became a second parent to her
21 While working at the animal clinic Bettya) liked Sue more than Johnb) liked John more than Sue
22 In college Bettya) never dated guysb) dated guys often
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23 On her dates in college Bettya) had some really good timesb) never had a good time
24 In her decision whether to marry or pursue a career Bettya) thought that she wanted to become an actressb) thought that she wanted to become a doctor
25 In college Betty felt thata) she could communicate only with menb) she could communicate only with women
26 Betty's major in college wasa) microbiologyb) biochemistry
MODIFIED TEST
1 Betty's fathera) was a kind manb) was mean to her and her mother
2 Betty and her family moved to the Midwest when Betty wasa) 8 years oldb) 12 years old
3 Betty lived in the town ofa) Midvaleb) Midfield
4 As a child, Bettya) liked movies that were love storiesb) liked movies that were adventures
5 Betty went to elementary school ata) Redwood schoolb) Claremont school
6 Betty's best friend in high school wasa) Pattyb) Peggy
7 Physically, Betty wasa) not particularly attractiveb) neither particularly attractive nor particularly unattractive
8 In high school Bettya) rarely went out with anyoneb) avoided going out with boys
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9 In high school Bettya) admired Mr Griffinb) felt very close to Ms Griffin
10 The name of Betty's high school wasa) Lincoln High Schoolb) Midvale High School
11 The name of Betty's high school guidance counselor wasa) Mr Griffinb) Ms Pennington
12 Her guidance counselor advised Betty toa) wait as long as possible before deciding on a majorb) become a doctor
13 The name of the university that Betty attended wasa) Midwestern Universityb) Mullin University
14 In college Bettya) lived in a girls' dormb) wanted to live in a girls' dorm
15 In college Bettya) was able to get along with her roommateb) became very attached to her roommate
16 Betty's roommate at college wasa) Janeb) Joan
17 In college Bettya) was friendly with some men and women who lived nearbyb) became intimately involved with some women who livednearby
18 While in college, Betty went out in a groupa) only with her male and female friendsb) only with her female friends
19 At college Betty would often go with her close friends toa) art museumsb) bars
20 After Betty started working at the animal clinica) only Dr Sawyer became a second parent to herb) Dr and Mrs Sawyer became second parents to her
21 While working at the animal clinic Bettya) disliked Johnb) liked John more than Sue
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22 In college Bettya) rarely dated guysb) dated guys often
23 On her dates in college Bettya) had a good time occasionallyb) never had a good time
24 In her decision whether to marry or pursue a career Bettya) thought that she wanted to become an actressb) thought that she wanted to become a doctor
25 In college Betty felt thata) she could communicate with both men and womenb) she could communicate only with women
26 Betty's major in college wasa) microbiologyb) biochemistry
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APPENDIX 18 - MATERIALS USED, EXPERIMENTS 4 & 5
Biographies presented to the subjects
In this experiment we are interested in the way individuals form impressions of other people. You will read the story of one individual's life. Names and places have been changed to conceal the person's identity. What we want you to do is read the story of the person's life and think about what the person is like.Try to form an impression of the person. For example, what are her likes and dislikes, personality characteristics, wants and needs, etc.? Later, we will ask you questions about your reactions to this person. Your task is simply to develop as complete an understanding as you can of this person.You will have 5 minutes to read this story.
CASE HISTORY
Betty K grew up in an urban environment on the West Coast of America. She had a stormy childhood since her parents were fighting most of the time. Her father, an engineer, was an abusive man who was mean to her and her mother. Finally, one day when Betty was 8 years old, her mother took her and her baby brother from their West Coast home and moved to the midwest to get away from their father.After that, Betty's life became more tranquil. She and he mother and brother lived happily in a suburban home in the city of Midvale. Her mother worked as a legal secretary and made enough money so that Betty's family was fairly well off financially. Betty liked going to movies as a child, and particularly liked love stories. At Redwood School, where she went for most of her elementary education, her favourite teacher was Miss Brock, who gave Betty much encouragement and had a great impact on Betty's high motivation to do well academically.Betty made lots of friends, and i^n her early teens began to y attend some parties. At this time she also became particularly close to one girl named Patty. The two spent a lot of time together throughout junior high and high school. Although most of their girl friends began dating when they were 16 or 17, Betty and Patty, who were physically not very attractive, went out on dates only ocasionally. When they did it was usually together on double dates.At Lincoln High School, Betty greatly admired her sophomore art teacher, Ms Griffin. She never told anyone about this, not even Patty. For some time Betty felt rejected becaus^ Ms Griffin showed no special interest in her. After about 2 months, however, she got over her disappointment.Betty, who was always near the top of the class academically, decided to go to college after graduation on the advice of her guidance counsellor, Ms Pennington. She had thought of becoming a doctor, but hadn't really decided. Her guidance counsellor advised Betty to wait as long as possible before deciding on a major and to take a wide variety of courses at college to see exactly where her interests lay.
-yr
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When she entered college at Mullin University, a school with about 15 000 students, she decided to live in a girls' dorm. She became very attached to her roommate, Joan. She also became friends with some male students who lived nearby, and they would all frequently hold long rap sessions late into the night.During these sessions, Betty would often find herself revealing some of her most intimate secrets, and others would do the same. She really enjoyed the intimacy she felt with these close friends. She often went out with her male friends and they did things as a group, for instance attending art museums and plays.During her first year in college, Betty got a part-time job working for Dr Sawyer, a vetinarian. Betty loved working with animals and caring for them. This was a maturing experinece for her because she had to take on important responsibilities in the running of the clinic and in dealing with the pets that were brought in, and their owners.Also, Betty got to know Dr and Mrs Sawyer very well. Dr Sawyer became like a second parent to her. She would sometimes take a break from her work and tell Dr Sawyer about her many problems and anxieties. Two other college students also worked for the Sawyers - John and Sue, Betty got on particularly well with John, and sought his advice on many things. He was like the older brother that she never had. She also liked Sue, and they became friends. They had a great many things in common.About this time, Betty joined an amateur theatre group and became acquainted with many of its members. However, the acquaintances never seemed to become more than that. One of the members, Anne, was a beautiful and talented actress. Betty admired her tremendously and occasionally tried to dress and make herself up to look like Anne. However, she was never able to become one of her close friends. Robert, another member of the group, had coffee with Betty a few times. Betty thought that Robert was attractive, but doubted that their relationship would continue. In fact, their relationship didn't seem to go anywhere.Betty started dating guys more often than she did in high school. She dated guys almost every weekend, although she never had a really good time on these dates. She went out often with one guy named David, a business major, for about six months. She became seriously involved with David, but he was much more serious about the relationship that she was, and wanted to get married. Somewhat reluctantly, she decided to break up with David. She had reached a point where she couldn't really see her relationship with any man as being more than friendship, while with her female friends she could be herself. She could communicate more easily with women. She did not have to make an effort to impress them, or win their approval, as she did with men.Betty had a hard time deciding on a major. Joan, her roommate, seemed quite engrossed in her major, psychology, but Betty was equally interested in so many things, she didn't know which one to pick. She finally decided on biochemistry, since if she wanted to go to medical school it would probably help her. Also, she did very well in her biochemistry classes.
'û
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By the time she reached her junior year of college, Betty had to decide what to do with her life. Late in her junior year, she decided to devote her full time to a medical career, assuming her grades were good enough to get into medical school. Being a woman of high ability and motivation, she is likely to be highly succesful in her chosen career.
Stereotyping paragraph presented to subjects
We would like you to know several other facts about Betty's life: During her senior year in college, Betty met a man/lesbian who introduced her to sexual/homsexual activity. Betty felt exhilgkted that she had finally found herself. She [married this man] and went on to a successful medical career living with her husband/lesbian lover. She found life in general very satisfying.
Questions to increase salience of stereotype label
Please answer the following questions briefly in the spaces provided:
When you were reading Betty's history, did you believe that she would eventually adopt a homosexual lifestyle?
How many specific instances can you remember form Betty K's history that indicated that she would eventually adopt a homosexual lifestyle?
What percentage of women with Betty's type of background do you think are able to adopt a lifestyle that they find satisfying?
List 3 events in Betty's life that you believe were the most important in forming her later values and attitudes.
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APPENDIX 19 - SUMMARY ANOVA TABLES FOR RECOGNITION CONDITIONS - EXPERIMENT 4
TABLE 1 - MAIN ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR RECOGNITION TASKS X STEREOTYPE LABEL X INFORMATION GENERATED IN RESPONSE TO CRITICAL ITEMS
I1“ SOURCE I DFl/I GP I 3/I IN I 3/I GP IN I 9/I GP SS I 116/I GP SS IN I 348/I-
DF2 I 1-116 I 348 I 348 I I I 1-
F I PValue I MEAN SQUARE I 1------------1--------------- 1
0.2110 I 0.8806 I0.0000 I 976.1917 I0.0001 I 3.6491 II 0.5763 II 0.9658 I 1-------------- 1
1.528011010.805013.77851II 1-
GP - test procedureIN - information generatedSS - subjects
APPENDIX 20 - EFFECT OF STEREOTYPE LABELS - EXPERIMENT 4
TABLE 1 - ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR HETEROSEXUAL LABEL, STANDARD vs MODIFIED TEST PROCEDURE X CORRECT INFORMATION X LESBIAN AND HETEROSEXUAL
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II--------------- 1--------------I----------- 1---------- 1----------------1I GP 1 1 /  58 I 1.76171 0.1896 I 2.1333 II IN 1 1 /  58 I 2.01421 0.1612 I 1.6333 II GP IN I 1/ 58 I 4.11061 0.0472 I 3.3333 II GP SS I 58/ I I  I 1.2109 II GP SS IN I 58/ I I  I 0.8109 II--------------- 1-------------- 1---------- 1---------- 1----------------1
TABLE 2 - ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR LESBIAN LABEL, STANDARD VS MODIFIED TEST PROCEDURE X CORRECT INFORMATION
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2I F I P  VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II---------------1--------------I----------- 1---------- 1----------------1I GP 1 1 /  58 I 1.24061 0.2699 I 2.1333 II IN 1 1 /  58 I 6.50341 0.0134 I 6.5333 II GP IN I 1/ 58 I 1.19451 0.2789 I 1.2000 II GP SS I 58/ I I  I 1.7195 II GP SS IN I 58/ I I  I 1.0046 II---------------1-------------- 1---------- 1---------- 1----------------1
GP - test procedureIN - information generatedSS - subjects
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APPENDIX 21 - ERRORS MADE IN RECOGNITION TASK CONDITIONS - EXPERIMENT 4
TABLE 1 - STANDARD vs MODIFIED TEST PROCEDURE, HETEROSEXUAL LABEL, FALSE ALARMS MADE
II- SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II GP I 1/ 58 I 28.92391 0.0000 I 12.6750 II IN I 1/ 58 I 3.08801 0.0841 I 1.8750 II GP IN I 1/ 58 I 2.31951 0.1332 I 1.4083 II-
TABLE 2 - STANDARD vs MODIFIED TEST PROCEDURE, LESBIAN LABEL, FALSE ALARMS MADE
TABLE 3 - STANDARD VS MODIFIED TEST PROCEDURE, HETEROSEXUAL LABEL, FALSE ALARMS MADE
IT ■ SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II GP I 1/ 58 I 13.25711 0.0006 I 8.5333 II IN I 1/ 58 I 0.18711 0.6669 I 0.1333 II GP IN I 1/ 58 I 0.74841 0.3906 I 0.5333 II-
IT« SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE IJLI GP I 1/ 58 I 28.92391 0.0000 I 12.6750 iI IN I 1/ 58 I 3.08801 0.0841 I 1.8750 II GP IN I 1/ 58 I 2.31951 0.1332 I 1.4083 II- -— I— -T----------1- -I-
GP - test procedureIN - information produced
APPENDIX 22 - NEUTRAL INFORMATION PRODUCED - EXPERIMENT 4
I SOURCE
I GP I GP IN I------------
I DFl/ DF2 I F I P  VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I 3/ 116 I 0.55671 0.6447 I 1.6556 II 116/ I I  I 2.9741 II--------------- 1-------- 1------------1--------------- 1
GP - test procedureIN - neutral information generated
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APPENDIX 23 - FREE RECALL RESULTS - EXPERIMENT 4
TABLE 1 - CORRECT INFORMATION GENERATED X STEREOTYPE CONDITION
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2
I GP 1 1 /  58I IN 1 3 /  174I GP IN I 3/ 174I--------------- 1--------------
I F I P  VALUE
I 5.23901 0.0257I 165.42761 0.0000I 6.81461 0.0002•I--------- 1---------
I MEAN SQUARE
I 7.0042 I 183.5153 I 7.5597 ■I-----------
——I
TABLE 2 - FALSE ALARMS X STEREOTYPE LABEL CONDITION
SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE l{
GP I 1/ 58 I 3.98351 0.0507 I 0.8333 I!IN I 1/ 58 I 4.26471 0.0434 I 0.8333 IGP IN I 1/ 58 I 4.26471 0.0434 I 0.8333 IGP SS I 58/ I I I 0.2692 IGP SS IN I 58/ I I I 0.1954 I-— I— ----- 1— ------- 1- -I- -I
TABLE 3 LESBIAN FALSE ALARMS X STEREOTYPE LABEL CONDITION
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P  VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II---------------1--------------I----------- 1-----------1--------------- 1I GP 1 1 /  58 I 5.35061 0.0243 I 1.6667 II GP IN I 58 I I I 0.3115 II--------------- 1-------------- 1---------- 1-----------1--------------- 1
TABLE 4- NEUTRAL HITS X STEREOTYPE LABEL CONDITION
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P  VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II--------------- 1---------------I---------- 1-----------1--------------- 1I GP 1 1 /  58 I 1.14161 0.2897 I 10.4167 II--------------- 1--------------- 1--------- 1-----------1--------------- 1
GP - stereotype labelIN - false alarms generated
500
APPENDIX 24 - SUMMARY ANOVA TABLES, EXPERIMENT 5
TABLE 1 - INITIAL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE, ALL VARIABLES
I SOURCE
I GP I IN I GP IN
I DFl/ DF2 I I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I 3/ 76 I 8.12201 0.0001I 3/ 228 1201.69941 0.0000I 9/ 228 I 13.95131 0.0000
I 4.7585 I 316.8583 I 21.9167
III-I
TABLE 2 “ COMPARISON OF HETEROSEXUAL VS. LESBIAN LABEL
I
I GP I IN I GP IN I------
SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P  VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I 1/ 78 I 5.10581 0.0266 I 3.6125 II 3/ 234 1138.31381 0.0000 I 316.8583 II 3/ 234 I 2.81781 0.0398 I 6.4542 I.— I-------------1-------- 1------------1-----------------1
TABLE 3 - COMPARISON OF IMMEDIATE VS. DELAYED TESTING
I SOURCE
I GP I IN I GP IN I------------
I DFl/ DF2 I F I P  VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I 1/ 78 I 9.88311 0.0024 I 6.6125 II 3/ 234 1188.77781 0.0000 I 316.8583 II 3/ 234 I 32.30371 0.0000 I 54.2208 I— I--------------1----------1------------- 1------------------ 1
TABLE 4 - NEUTRAL INFORMATION GENERATED vs. LABEL RECEIVED
I I " SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II GP I 1/ 78 I 5.69451 0.0194 I 10.0000 II IN I 1/ 78 I 8.70211 0.0042 I 140.6250 II GP IN I 1/ 78 I 1.04581 0.3096 I 16.9000 II-
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TABLE 5 - NEUTRAL INFORMATION GENERATED vs. DELAY CONDITION
I SOURCE
I GP I IN I GP IN
I DFl/ DF2I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I 1/ 78 I 5.96051 0.0169 I 10.5062 II 1/ 78 I 14.48501 0.0003 I 138.7562 II 1/ 78 I 56.01191 0.0000 I 536,5563 I
GP - testing conditions IN - information generated
TABLE 6 - CORRECT INFORMATION GENERATED - HETEROSEXUAL LABEL
I SOURCE
I IN I SS I SS IN I------------
I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I 1/ 39 I 49.83701I 39 I II 39 I I•I-------------1--------1-
0.0000 I 86.1125 II 2.4484 II 1.7279 I
 1----------------- 1
SS - subjects
TABLE 7 - CORRECT INFORMATION GENERATED - HOMOSEXUAL LABEL
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P  VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II-I IN I 1/ 39 I 30.88571 0.0000 I 52.8125 II SS I 39 I I I 3.2048 II SS IN I 39 I I I 1.7099 II-
TABLE 8 - INCORRECT RESPONSES x LABEL
SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
GP I 1/ 78 I 1.01811 0.3161 I 1.8063 IIN I 1/ 78 I 6.75691 0.0112 I 9.5063 IGP IN I 1/ 78 I 1.60371 0.2091 I 2.2562 IGP SS I 78 I I I 1.7742 IGP SS IN I 78 I I I I
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APPENDIX 25 - DESCRIPTION OF STAGED INCIDENT
Mid-way through a first year social psychology lecture, the double doors at the back of the lecture theatre (i.e., behind the undergraduates) were opened, and a girl entered the theatre. She was 21 years old. Her hair was in an old- fashioned bun. She was wearing glasses, grey coat, red shirt, black basque, black lace gloves, black mini-skirt, fishnet stockings with black and red garter, black shoes. She was also wearing very large and ornate gold-coloured earrings and a large quantity of make-up. She was carrying a portable stereo playing New York, New York; which alerted the undergraduates to her presence. This music was chosen not for its instant recognisability. Once she had the attention of the audience, the girl called out thelecturer's name. She then ostentatiously removed herglasses, placed them in the pocket of her coat and proceeded to dance down the seventeen steps from the back of thelecture theatre to the point at which the lecturer wasstanding. On the way, she removed coat and gloves anddropped them on the stairs, and unbuttoned her shirt. At the front of the lecture theatre, she removed her garter and handed it to the lecturer with the words "Happy retirement from Athene Gordon". As she was leaning forward to kiss the lecturer, the right hand front door of the lecture theatre (in front of the undergraduates) opened, and a young man entered, shouting "Mary Margaret1" He was wearing a brightly-coloured, red and blue ski jacket, blue and white T-shirt, blue trousers, and cowboy boots. The man marched across to where the girl was standing (this involved walking almost the entire width of the lecture theatre, thusexposing him for the longest possible period to the undergraduates). On the way, he shouted "I thought youweren't going to do this any more", to which the girl replied, "But it's for a good cause". The man said "What about your Finals? What about your Modern History Finals?" to which the girl did not reply. Removing his jacket, the man said "Look at yourself!" He covered the girl with the jacket and told her "I've been waiting half an hour foryou," He then took her with him out of the right-hand front door of the lecture theatre (the same door through which he had entered), the couple arguing all the way. As they passed the benches at the front of the lecture theatre, the girl's hip caught the trestle-table that had been placed there, knocking a large plastic tub and two pens to the floor.
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APPENDIX 26 - EFFECT OF TIME AND STEREOTYPIC INFORMATION ON MEMORYFOR STAGED INCIDENT - EXPERIMENT 6
TABLE 1 - MAJOR ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE, EFFECT OF TIME AND STEREOTYPIC INFORMATION
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I
«.T —
MEAN SQUARE I
—  T
I ST I 1/ 15 I 0.08251 0.7778
J-I 0.6454 II PH I 2/ 30 I 3.47591 0.0439 I 19.4994 II ST PH I 2/ 30 I 0.40011 0.6738 I 2.2445 II ST SS I 15 I I I 7.8184 II ST SS PH I 30 I I I —I— 5.6098 I-I
TABLE 2 - EFFECT OF TIME AND STEREOTYPIC INFORMATION, CONSISTENTINFORMATION RECALLED
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I
mmT mm
MEAN SQUARE I
—  T
I ST I 1/ 15 I 2.75741 0.1176 ^ J.I ‘ 0.7003 —  XII PH I 2/ 30 I 2.37911 0.1099 I 0.3731 II ST PH I 2/ 30 I 2.87931 0.0718 I 0.4515 II ST SS I 15 I I I 0.2540 II ST SS PH I 30 I I I 0.1568 II----------
TABLE 3 - EFFECT OF TIME AND STEREOTYPIC INFORMATION, INCONSISTENTINFORMATION RECALLED
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II----------I ST I 1/ 15 I 0.84601 0.3722 I 0.2868 II PH I 2/ 30 I 0.80711 0.4556 I 0.4866 II ST PH I 2/ 30 I 0.15661 0.8558 I 0.0944 II ST SS I 15 I I I 0.3390 II ST SS PH I 30 I I I 0.6029 II---------- ----1- ----- 1-------- 1- -I-
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TABLE 4 - EFFECT OF TIME AND STEREOTYPIC INFORMATION, INCIDENTALINFORMATION RECALLED
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II-I ST I 1/ 15 I 0.91481 0.3540 I 0.0473 II PH I 2/ 30 I 1.00121 0.3794 I 0.0613 II ST PH I 2/ 30 I 0.36121 0.6998 I 0.0221 I:I ST SS I 15 I I I 0.0517 11I ST SS PH I 30 I I I 0.0613 II-
TABLE 5 - EFFECT OF TIME, GROUP 1
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P  VALUE I MEAN SQUARE
I PH I SS I SS PH I------
I 2/ I 5 I 10 •I-----
10 I 1.42861 I II I•I------- 1*
0.2846 0.88890.88890.6222
TABLE 6 - EFFECT OF TIME, GROUP 2
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE
I PH I SS I SS PH I------
2/ 12 I 1.200016 1 1  12 I I 1------- 1-
0.3349 1.00000.76190.8333
ST - presentation or otherwise of stereotypic information PH - phase of experiment SS - subjects
APPENDIX 27 - WITHIN-CONDITION EFFECTS - EXPERIMENT 6
TABLE 1 - STEREOTYPE CONDITION
SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I P VALUE MEAN SQUARE1-I PH I 2/ 18 I 0.17651 0.8397 I 0.0238I CO I 1/ 18 164.80001 0.0000 I 7.7143I PH CO I 2/ 18 I 0.60001 0.5594 I 0.0714I PH SS I 18 I I I 0.1349I PH SS CO I 18 I I I 0.1190I-
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TABLE 2 NON-STEREOTYPE CONDITION
SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE1-I PH I 2/ 27 I 1.98841 0.1565 I 0.3167I CO I 1/ 27 110.28571 0.0034 I 2.4000I PH CO I 2/ 27 I 2.78571 0.0795 I 0.6500I PH SS I 27 I I I 0.1593I PH SS CO I 27 I I I 0.2333I-
PH - phase of experiment CO - two types of information SS - subjects
APPENDIX 28 - ERRORS MADE - EXPERIMENT 6
TABLE 1 - ERRORS MADE, CONSISTENT INFORMATION
SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I I P VALUE I MEAN SQUAREI-I ST I 1/ 15 I 0.14981 0.7041 I 0.0101I PH I 2/ 30 I 0.96961 0.3908 I 0.0810I ST PH I 2/ 30 I 0.03021 0.9703 I 0.0025I ST SS I 15 I I I 0.0673I ST SS PH I 30 I I I 0.0835I-
TABLE 2 - ERRORS MADE, INCONSISTENT INFORMATION
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUAREI-I ST I 1/ 15 I 3.06121 0.1006 I 1.0768I PH I 2/ 30 I 0.13361 0.8755 I 0.0213I ST PH I 2/ 30 I 1.61001 0.2167 I 0.2566I ST SS I 15 I I I 0.3517I ST SS PH I 30 I I I 0.1594I- — I- -T-------- 1- -I-
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TABLE 3 - ERRORS MADE, INCIDENTAL INFORMATION
SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE1-I ST I 1/ 15 I 2.47061 0.1368 I 5.4902I PH I 2/ 30 I 3.98191 0.0293 I 5.8490I ST PH I 2/ 30 I 0.61801 0.5457 I 0.9078I ST SS I 15 I I I 2.2222II- ST SS PH I 30 I I I 1.4689
ST - presentation or otherwise of stereotypic information PH - phase of experiment SS - subjects
APPENDIX 29 - ACCURACY OF RECALL - EXPERIMENT 6
TABLE 1 - TOTAL INFORMATION RECALLED
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE
I ST 1 1 /I PH 1 2 /I ST PH I 2/I ST PH SS I 45
45 I 3.80401 45 I 4.27541 45 I 0.61061 I I
0.05740.02000.5475
I 365.4185 I 423.0709 I 60.4230 I 98.9540
TABLE 2 INCIDENTAL INFORMATION RECALLED
SOURCEII-------------I ST I PH I ST PH I ST PH SS
I DFl/ DF2 I ■I-------I 1/I 2/I 2/I 20
 1 120 I 1.06791 20 I 0.75151 20 I 0.75151 I I
I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE  1--------------
0.31380.48450.4845
912.1622641.8919641.8919 854.1667
ST - presentation or otherwise of stereotypic information PH - phase of experiment SS - subjects
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APPENDIX 30 - MEMORY FOR CLOTHING - EXPERIMENT 6
TABLE 1 - RECALL OF KISSOGRAM'S CLOTHING X PHASE X STEREOTYPE PRESENTATION
I SOURCE
I ST PHST PH ST SS ST SS PH
I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE
1/2/2/1530
153030
0.482310.416410.72761II 1"
0.49230.66320.4914
0.51790.57731.00871.07401.3863
TABLE 2 - RECALL OF BOYFRIEND'S CLOTHING X PRESENTATION PHASE X STEREOTYPE
SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I I P VALUE I MEAN SQUAREi-I ST I 1/ 15 I 7.14601 0.0174 I 3.3280I PH I 2/ 30 I 2.53651 0.0960 I 2.2490I ST PH I 2/ 30 I 1.74041 0.1927 I 1.5431I ST SS I 15 I I I 0.4657II- ST SS PH I-— I- 30 I-I- I------- 1— I-I — 0.8867
TABLE 3 - STYLE vs COLOUR - KISSOGRAM'S CLOTHING
SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I I P VALUE I MEAN SQUAREI-I SY I 2/ 48 I 0.24011 0.7875 I 0.5588I SC I 1/ 48 I 9.36031 0.0036 I 2.8333I SY SC I 2/ 48 I 0.22671 0.7980 I 0.0686I SY SS I 48 I I I 2.3272I SY SS SC I 48 I I I 0.3027I-
îi
TABLE 4 - STYLE vs COLOUR - BOYFRIEND'S CLOTHING
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SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F P VALUE MEAN SQUAREI-I SY I 2/ 48 I 2.48491 0.0940 I 1.9216I SC I 1/ 48 196.08311 0.0000 I 45.3333I SY SC I 2/ 48 I 1.08051 0.3475 I 0.5098I SY SS I 48 I I I 0.7733I SY SS SC I 48 I I I 0.4718I-
ST - presentation or otherwise of stereotypic informationPH - phase of experimentSS - subjectsSY - style of clothingSC - colour of clothing
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APPENDIX 32 - INITIAL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - EXPERIMENT 7
TABLE 1 - ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE, INTERVIEW GROUP x INTERVIEW PHASE 
X INFORMATION TYPE RECALLED
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II-I IG I 2/ 42 I 2.12291 0.1323 I 3.4704 II PH I 2/ 84 1152.50741 0.0000 I 233.7370 II IG PH I 4/ 84 I 3.00981 0.0226 I 4.6130 II IN I 5/ 210 I 87.06761 0.0000 I 100.2459 II IG IN I 10/ 210 I 2.17011 0.0208 I 2.4985 II PH IN I 10/ 420 I 21.39931 0.0000 I 25.9652 II IG PH IN I 20/ 420 I 1.65111 0-0386 I 2.0033 II IG SS I 42 I I I 1.6347 II IG SS PH I 84 I I I 1.5326 II IG SS IN I 210 I I I 1.1514 II IG SS PH IN I 420 I I I 1.2134 II-
IG - interview group PH - interview phase IN - information type SS - subjects
APPENDIX 33 - FINAL TWO PHASES - EXPERIMENT 7
TABLE 1 - ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE, INTERVIEW GROUP x FINAL TWO PHASES X INFORMATION TYPE RECALLED
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II-I IG I 2/ 42 I 0.34571 0.7098 I 0.2796 II PH I 1/ 42 1140.22991 0.0000 I 100.5352 II IG PH I 2/ 42 I 0.18861 0.8288 I 0.1352 II IN I 5/ 210 I 55.98061 0.0000 I 37.3263 II IG IN I 10/ 210 I 0.88931 0.5441 I 0.5930 II PH IN I 5/ 210 I 31.03551 0.0000 I 22.0730 II IG PH IN I 10/ 210 I 1.10561 0.3592 I 0.7863 II IG SS I 42 I I I 0.8090 II IG SS PH I 42 I I I 0.7169 II IG SS IN I 210 I I I 0.6668 II IG SS PH IN I 210 I I I 0.7112 II"
APPENDIX 34 - UNIVARIATE ANALYSES OF VARIANCE - EXPERIMENT 7
TABLE 1 - VOICE-OVER ONLY INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE 
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2I F I P  VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II-I IG I 2/ 42 I 0.25641 0.7750 I 0.2741 II PH I 2/ 84 I 66.76511 0.0000 I 64.3630 II IG PH I 4/ 84 I 1.28701 0.2817 I 1.2407 II IG SS I 42 I I I 1.0688 II IG SS PH I 84 I I I 0.9640 II"
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TABLE 2 - CONVERSATIONAL INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 42 I 2.96361 0.0625 I 9.4741 II PH I 2/ 84 I 56.13941 0.0000 I 146.1407 II IG PH I 4/ 84 I 2.46991 0.0508 I 6.4296 II IG SS I 42 I I I 3.1968 II IG SS PH I 84 I I I 2.6032 I
TABLE 3 - VIDEO ONLY INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 42 I 2.54551 0.0905 I 0.2667 II PH I 2/ 84 I 4.90001 0.0097 I 0.6222 II IG PH I 4/ 84 I 1.48751 0.2133 I 0.1889 II IG SS I 42 I I I 0.1048 II IG SS PH I 84 I I I 0.1270 I
TABLE 4 - CONSISTENT INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 42 I 0.82601 0.4448 I 0.7185 II PH I 2/ 84 I 65.69671 0.0000 I 60.2741 II IG PH I 4/ 84 I 2.28491 0.0669 I 2.0963 II IG SS I 42 I I I 0.8698 II IG SS PH I-I- 84 I I I-I- 0.9175 I-I
TABLE 5 - INCONSISTENT INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I —I— DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I — I— MEAN SQUARE I~II IG I 2/ 42 I 5.47721 0.0077 I 1.6519 II PH I 2/ 84 I 8.89261 0.0003 I 2.5407 II IG PH I 4/ 84 I 1.97041 0.1065 I 0.5630 II IG SS I 42 I I I 0.3016 II IG SS PH I-I- 84 I I I — I— 0.2857 I-I
TABLE 6 - VISUAL INFORMATION K INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I_ T — DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I_j». MEAN SQUARE I—.T
I IG XI 2/ 42 I 1.01531 0.3710 I 2.6741 XII PH I 2/ 84 I 43.33751 0.0000 I 103.2074 II IG PH I 4/ 84 I 0.86161 0.4906 I 2.0519 II IG SS I 42 I I I 2.6339 II IG SS PH I 84 I I I 2.3815 I-I-—————— — ——---- % — I- -I
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APPENDIX 35 - MAIN ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - ERRORS - EXPERIMENT 7
TABLE 1 - ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE, ERRORS, INTERVIEW GROUP X INTERVIEW PHASE X INFORMATION TYPE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG —I"I 2/ 42 I 1.24661 0.2979 —1“I 0.3593 -III IN I 5/ 210 I 24.55941 0.0000 I 5.6170 II IG IN I 10/ 210 I 3.42331 0.0004 I 0.7830 II PH I 2/ 84 I 0.95191 0.3901 I 0.2111 II IG PH I 4/ 84 I 2.32131 0.0634 I 0.5148 II IN PH I 10/ 420 I 2.19981 0.0170 I 0.4793 II IG IN PH I 20/ 420 I 1.81901 0.0170 I 0.3963 II IG SS I 42 I I I 0.2882 II IG SS IN I 210 I I I 0.2287 II IG SS PH I 84 I I I 0.2218 II IG SS IN PH I-I- 420 I•I- I I-I- 0.2179 I-I
APPENDIX 36 - FINAL TWO PHASES - EXPERIMENT 7
TABLE 1 - ERRORS MADE X INTERVIEW GROUP' X INTERVIEW PHASE XINFORMATION TYPE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 42 I 4.61481 0.0154 I 1.3722 II IN I 5/ 210 I 18.50611 0.0000 I 3.9989 II IG IN I 10/ 210 I 2.25731 0.0159 I 0.4878 II PH I 1/ 42 I 10.23271 0.0026 I 2.2685 II IG PH I 2/ 42 I 1.51191 0.2322 I 0.3352 II IN PH I 5/ 210 I 2.56811 0.0280 I 0.4552 II IG IN PH I 10/ 210 I 0.98841 0.4546 I 0.1752 II IG SS I 42 I I I 0.2724 II IG SS IN I 210 I I I 0.2161 II IG SS PH I 84 I I I 0.2217 II IG SS IN PH I 420 I I I 0.1772 II-------------— I- ------- 1- -I- -I
APPENDIX 37 - ÜNIVARIÀTE ANALYSES OF VARIANCE - EXPERIMENT 7
TABLE 1 - VOICE-OVER ONLY INFORMATION X: INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
Jl XI IG I 2/ 42 I 0.41081 0.6658 I 0.1852 II PH I 2/ 84 I 4.58221 0.0129 I 1.6074 II IG PH I 4/ 84 I 0,93971 0.4452 I 0.3296 II IG SS I 42 I I I 0.4508 II IG SS PH I 84 I I I 0.3508 I
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TABLE 2 CONVERSATIONAL INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 42 I 4.17741 0.0221 I 1.0963 II PH I 2/ 84 I 8.18071 0.0006 I 2.8741 II IG PH I 4/ 84 I 4.32231 0.0031 I 1.5185 II IG SS I 42 I I I 0.2624 II IG SS PH I 84 I I I 0.3513 I
TABLE 3 - VIDEO ONLY INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 42 I 1.22501 0.3040 I 0.0519 II PH I 2/ 84 I 1.36591 0.2608 I 0.0296 II IG PH I 4/ 84 I 1.36591 0.2527 I 0.0296 II IG SS I 42 I I I 0.0423 II IG SS PH I 84 I I I 0.0217 I
TABLE 4 - CONSISTENT INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 42 I 1.65171 0.2039 I 0.1556 II PH I 2/ 84 I 2,98221 0.0561 I 0.2667 II IG PH I 4/ 84 I 1.73961 0.1489 I 0.1556 II IG SS I 42 I I I 0.0942 II IG SS PH I 84 I I I 0.0894 I
TABLE 5 - INCONSISTENT INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 42 I 0.56981 0.5700 I 0.0519 II PH I 2/ 84 I 8.13951 0.0006 I 0.7407 II IG PH I 4/ 84 I 0.56981 0.6853 I 0.0519 II IG SS I 42 I I I 0.0910 II IG SS PH I 84 I I I 0.0910 IX
TABLE 6 - VISUAL INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 42 I 4.14081 0.0228 I 1,8667 II PH I 2/ 84 I 13.72221 0.0000 I 5.4889 II IG PH I 4/ 84 I 1.72221 0.1527 I 0.6889 II IG SS I 42 I I I 0.4508 II IG SS PH I 84 I I I 0.4000 I
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APPENDIX 38 - ACCURACY DATA - EXPERIMENT 7
TABLE 1 - ACCURACY OF RECALL X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II-I IG I 2/ 113 I 1.39491 0.2521 I 404.9179 II PH I 2/ 113 I 6.79771 0.0016 11973.2446 II IG PH I 4/ 113 I 0.64441 0.6320 I 187.0540 II IG PH SS I 113 I I I 290.2825 II-
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APPENDIX 39 - INITIAL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - EXPERIMENT 8
TABLE 1 - ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE, INTERVIEW GROUP X INTERVIEW PHASE X INFORMATION TYPE RECALLED
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II-I IG I 2/ 27 I 1.77091 0.1894 I 2.2296 II PH I 2/ 54 1177.53761 0.0000 I 137.3907 II IG PH I 4/ 54 I 0.21061 0.9315 I 0.1630 II IN I 5/ 135 I 59.64391 0.0000 I 51.7085 II IG IN I 10/ 135 I 2.51541 0,0083 I 2.1807 II PH IN I 10/ 270 I 16.21661 0.0000 I 12.8819 II IG PH IN I 20/ 270 I 0.84861 0.6529 I 0.6741 II IG SS I 27 I I I 1.2591 II IG SS PH I 54 I I I 0.7739 II IG SS IN I 135 I I I 0.8670 II IG SS PH IN I 270 I I I 0.7944 II-
IG - interview group PH - interview phase IN - information type SS - subjects
APPENDIX 40 - UNIVARIATE ANALYSES OF VARIANCE - EXPERIMENT 8
TABLE 1 - VOICE-OVER ONLY INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II--- -I- -I--------1- -I- -II IG I 2/ 27 I 6.57631 0.0047 I 4.3111 II PH I 2/ 54 I 22.42361 0.0000 I 26.0778 II IG PH I 4/ 54 I 0.51111 0.7278 I 0.5944 II IG SS I 27 I I I 0.6556 II IG SS PH I-I- 54 I I I — I— 1.1630 I-I
TABLE 2 - CONVERSATIONAL INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I
_ T  — DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I_  T — MEAN SQUARE I— T
I IG JLI 2/ 27 I 2.07041 0.1457 XI 5.7333 II PH I 2/ 54 I 44.43941 0.0000 I 64.3000 II IG PH I 4/ 54 I 0.67961 0.6091 I 0.9833 II IG SS I 27 I I I 2.7691 II IG SS PH I 54 I I I 1.4469 I—I———————————' —————————— I — -I
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TABLE 3 - VIDEO ONLY INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 27 I 0.33641 0.7173 I 0.0444 II PH I 2/ 54 I 4,69011 0.0132 I 0.4111 II IG PH I 4/ 54 I 1.26761 0.2941 I 0.1111 II IG SS I 27 I I I 0.1321 II IG SS PH I 54 I I I 0.0877 IX X
TABLE 4 - CONSISTENT INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 27 I 1.04811 0.3644 I 0.7000 II PH I 2/ 54 1106.40281 0.0000 I 46.6333 II IG PH I 4/ 54 I 0.98871 0.4216 I 0.4333 II IG SS I 27 I I I 0.6679 II IG SS PH I 54 I I I 0.4383 I
TABLE 5 - INCONSISTENT INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 27 I 1.05561 0.3619 I 0.2111 II PH I 2/ 54 I 4,08511 0.0223 I 0.7111 II IG PH I 4/ 54 I 0.73401 0.5728 I 0.1278 II IG SS I 42 I I I 0.2000 II IG SS PH I 84 I I I 0.1741 I
TABLE 6 - VISUAL INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 27 I 1.89821 0.1693 I 2.2333 II PH I 2/ 54 I 47.20831 0.0000 I 66.0333 II IG PH I 4/ 54 I 0.90561 0.4673 I 1.2667 II IG SS I 27 I I I 1.1765 II IG SS PH I 54 I I I 1.3988 I
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APPENDIX 41 - ERRORS MADE EXPERIMENT 8
TABLE 1 - ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE, ERRORS, INTERVIEW GROUP X INTERVIEW PHASE x INFORMATION TYPE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 27 I 9.28401 0.0009 I 2.9056 II PH I 2/ 54 I 14.58891 0.0000 I 3.0889 II IG PH I 4/ 54 I 2.29591 0.0709 I 0.4861 II IN I 5/ 135 I 10.60581 0.0000 I 2.1722 II IG IN I 10/ 135 I 1.40511 0.1844 I 0.2878 II IN PH I 10/ 270 I 3.39151 0.0003 I 0.4844 II IG IN PH I 20/ 270 I 1.52851 0.0713 I 0.2183 II IG SS I 27 I I I 0.3130 II IG SS PH I 54 I I I 0.2117 II IG SS IN I 135 I I I 0.2048 II IG SS IN PH I 270 I I I 0.1428 II---------------I- -------- 1- — I- -I
APPENDIX 42 - UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS, ERRORS MADE - EXPERIMENT 8
TABLE 1 - VOICE-OVER ONLY INFORMATION x INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 27 I 8.25521 0.0016 I 1.4778 II PH I 2/ 54 I 12.23241 0.0000 I 2.1444 II IG PH I 4/ 54 I 5.10211 0.0015 I 0.8944 II IG SS I 27 I I I 0.1790 II IG SS PH I 54 I I I 0.1753 II------------- -------- 1- — I- -I
TABLE 2 - CONVERSATIONAL INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 27 I 1.43721 0.2552 I 1.1444 II PH I 2/ 54 I 3.79071 0.0288 I 1.8111 II IG PH I 4/ 54 I 0.30231 0.8751 I 0.1444 II IG SS I 27 I I I 0.7963 II IG SS PH I 54 I I I 0.4778 I
TABLE 3 - CONSISTENT INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
I SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
I IG I 2/ 27 I 7.72941 0.0022 I 0.8111 II PH I 2/ 54 I 6,03301 0.0043 I 0.6778 II IG PH I 4/ 54 I 2.76921 0.0363 I 0.3111 II IG SS I 27 I I I 0.1049 II IG SS PH I 54 I I I 0.1123 I
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TABLE 5 - INCONSISTENT INFORMATION X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I
1-1 IG I 2/ 27 I 1.00001 0.3811 I 0.0111I PH I 2/ 54 I 1.00001 0.3746 I 0.0111I IG PH I 4/ 54 I 1.00001 0.4157 I 0.0111I IG SS I 42 I I I 0.0111II- IG SS PH I 84 I I I 0.0111
I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE II I I I I I I
APPENDIX 43 - ACCURACY DATA - EXPERIMENT 8
TABLE 1 - ACCURACY OF RECALL X INTERVIEW GROUP X PHASE
SOURCE I DFl/ DF2 I F I P VALUE I MEAN SQUARE I
IG JLI 2/ 70 I 24.62021 0.0000 17129.2797 IPH I 2/ 70 I 5.60671 0.0055 11623.5378 IIG PH I 4/ 70 I 4.99951 0.0013 11447.7151 IIG PH SS I 70 I-I- I I 289.5705 _T----------------- I-I
